This paper sets out a model of technical change and health care cost growth for a representative Medicare beneficiary facing a budget constraint. Derivation of an explicit expression for health care cost growth shows how technological change and preferences, including income effects, affect cost growth. The analysis highlights the role of the 76% percent subsidy from current taxpayers to Medicare beneficiaries for purchase of health insurance. This subsidy insulates beneficiaries from the income effects of cost growth by shifting the costs and income effects to taxpayers. Simulations show that over the next 10-20 years, income effects will have little effect on cost growth in Medicare.
The relation between the quantity of many healthcare services delivered and health outcomes is uncertain. In January 2004, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services introduced a tiered fee-for-service system for patients on hemodialysis, creating an incentive for providers to see patients more frequently. We analyzed the effect of this change on patient mortality, transplant wait-listing, and costs. While mortality rates for Medicare beneficiaries on hemodialysis declined after reimbursement reform, mortality declined more - or was no different - among patients whose providers were not affected by the economic incentive. Similarly, improved placement of patients on the kidney transplant waitlist was no different among patients whose providers were not affected by the economic incentive; payments for dialysis visits increased 13.7% in the year following reform. The payment system designed to increase provider visits to hemodialysis patients increased Medicare costs with no evidence of a benefit on survival or kidney transplant listing.
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