Pub Date : 2020-10-12DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1821070
A. Kruglova
ABSTRACT This article examines the effect of the presence of UN peacekeeping forces on the scale of domestic terrorist violence in civil war-torn countries. By employing matching and regression analysis, I explore two samples: one contains information about countries during the active phase of fighting (in-war); and the other relates to after the fighting has finished. I find that the presence of UN peacekeepers during the active phase of fighting has no significant effect on the number of terrorist attacks, but it decreases the number of terrorist attacks after the war is over.
{"title":"‘Does peacekeeping deter terrorism?’","authors":"A. Kruglova","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821070","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines the effect of the presence of UN peacekeeping forces on the scale of domestic terrorist violence in civil war-torn countries. By employing matching and regression analysis, I explore two samples: one contains information about countries during the active phase of fighting (in-war); and the other relates to after the fighting has finished. I find that the presence of UN peacekeepers during the active phase of fighting has no significant effect on the number of terrorist attacks, but it decreases the number of terrorist attacks after the war is over.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"14 1","pages":"50 - 71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821070","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45110327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-12DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1821071
H. Akins
ABSTRACT Scholars have increasingly disaggregated domestic terrorism from transnational terrorism and sought to understand the causal factors of the former by focusing on endogenous features of the state and the actions of the government that either provoke or create opportunities for the occurrence of domestic terrorist attacks, especially repressive actions of the government. These arguments are implicitly framed by a unitary view of the state within intra-state conflict. The conflict literature, however, has increasingly looked beyond this unitary view and examined the role and impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) as a tactical means of increasing the state’s ability to wage violence. Using negative binomial analysis of data on domestic terrorism and PGMs, this article demonstrates that PGM activity that serves as a force multiplier for official security forces increases the likelihood of an increase in domestic terrorism, an argument that is robust to various model specifications.
{"title":"Delegating repression?: Pro-government militias and domestic terrorism","authors":"H. Akins","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821071","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Scholars have increasingly disaggregated domestic terrorism from transnational terrorism and sought to understand the causal factors of the former by focusing on endogenous features of the state and the actions of the government that either provoke or create opportunities for the occurrence of domestic terrorist attacks, especially repressive actions of the government. These arguments are implicitly framed by a unitary view of the state within intra-state conflict. The conflict literature, however, has increasingly looked beyond this unitary view and examined the role and impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) as a tactical means of increasing the state’s ability to wage violence. Using negative binomial analysis of data on domestic terrorism and PGMs, this article demonstrates that PGM activity that serves as a force multiplier for official security forces increases the likelihood of an increase in domestic terrorism, an argument that is robust to various model specifications.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"14 1","pages":"72 - 91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821071","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41867081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-22DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1821067
C. Linebarger
ABSTRACT Do governments repress in order to defend themselves against the threat posed by the geographic proximity of victorious rebel forces? I theorize that the victory of rebel forces in armed conflict, and the subsequent creation of a revolutionary regime, provides a model for mobilization to would-be rebels and that this, in turn, leads government authorities to deploy domestic repression in order to defend themselves. This relationship is conditional upon the international assertiveness of revolutionary regimes, as well as their geographic proximity to the threatened state. Revolutionary regimes that provide assistance to foreign rebels are regarded as more threatening by status-quo states, as are those that are geographically proximate. I undertake a data analysis of state-year patterns of repression and find significant support for my theoretical expectations. My findings have implications for the study of counter-revolution, supporting the notion that state repression is, in part, a function of international threat.
{"title":"Preventive medicine: domestic repression and foreign revolutionary states","authors":"C. Linebarger","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821067","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Do governments repress in order to defend themselves against the threat posed by the geographic proximity of victorious rebel forces? I theorize that the victory of rebel forces in armed conflict, and the subsequent creation of a revolutionary regime, provides a model for mobilization to would-be rebels and that this, in turn, leads government authorities to deploy domestic repression in order to defend themselves. This relationship is conditional upon the international assertiveness of revolutionary regimes, as well as their geographic proximity to the threatened state. Revolutionary regimes that provide assistance to foreign rebels are regarded as more threatening by status-quo states, as are those that are geographically proximate. I undertake a data analysis of state-year patterns of repression and find significant support for my theoretical expectations. My findings have implications for the study of counter-revolution, supporting the notion that state repression is, in part, a function of international threat.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"14 1","pages":"3 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821067","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44499130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-16DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1821069
J. Schon, Y. Magid
ABSTRACT How do ethnic links between governments and pro-government militias (PGMs) affect the abusive behaviour of PGMs? PGMs may recruit irrespective of ethnic group (Non-Ethnic PGMs), from the ethnic group that controls the government (Dominant PGMs), from quiescent groups not in control of the government (Peripheral PGMs), and from ethnic groups actively rebelling against the government (Defector PGMs). PGMs recruited on ethnic lines tend to have informal relationships with the government, so they often help the government avoid accountability for civilian targeting. Examining ethnic relationships rather than whether the relationship is informal or semi-official, however, reveals important nuances. Defector PGMs are both able to target selectively and are deterred from being too abusive. Peripheral PGMs can target civilians more frequently, but they tend to lack the capacity to carry out large-scale massacres. Dominant PGMs can and do carry out large-scale massacres, but they target civilians less frequently because they only act when government accountability is not a concern. Regression analysis of a global group-year dataset of PGM abuses (1989–2007) supports these expectations. Our analysis demonstrates the value of considering PGM ethnic relationships with the government.
{"title":"How pro-government militia ethnic relationships influence violence against civilians","authors":"J. Schon, Y. Magid","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821069","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How do ethnic links between governments and pro-government militias (PGMs) affect the abusive behaviour of PGMs? PGMs may recruit irrespective of ethnic group (Non-Ethnic PGMs), from the ethnic group that controls the government (Dominant PGMs), from quiescent groups not in control of the government (Peripheral PGMs), and from ethnic groups actively rebelling against the government (Defector PGMs). PGMs recruited on ethnic lines tend to have informal relationships with the government, so they often help the government avoid accountability for civilian targeting. Examining ethnic relationships rather than whether the relationship is informal or semi-official, however, reveals important nuances. Defector PGMs are both able to target selectively and are deterred from being too abusive. Peripheral PGMs can target civilians more frequently, but they tend to lack the capacity to carry out large-scale massacres. Dominant PGMs can and do carry out large-scale massacres, but they target civilians less frequently because they only act when government accountability is not a concern. Regression analysis of a global group-year dataset of PGM abuses (1989–2007) supports these expectations. Our analysis demonstrates the value of considering PGM ethnic relationships with the government.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"14 1","pages":"25 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821069","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43755698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-16DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073
Victor Asal, Joseph M. Brown
ABSTRACT Protest and repression are reciprocally related. Governments respond with repression when faced with challenges to their rule. Dissidents choose their strategies, turning out to protest or staying home, based on the state’s behaviour. But what effect does repression have on protestors’ decisions? The existing literature is of two minds on this issue. One school of thought argues that repression suppresses protest. A second school of thought argues that repression increases protest by inducing public backlash against the regime. Efforts to adjudicate these claims are complicated by the endogeneity between protest and repression. We use US economic development assistance as an instrument for government repression. Governments seeking US development assistance eschew the repression of protestors. An instrumental variable analysis of the MAROB Middle East dataset shows that repression (instrumented on US development aid commitments) discourages protest by a dissident group. The likelihood of protest decreases by roughly 20% in a given year if the group is repressed. The need for an instrumental variable model is highlighted by the fact that uninstrumented regressions show the opposite effect, giving the spurious appearance of backlash. Unfortunately for protestors, the appearance is deceiving. Repression works.
{"title":"Does repression work?: Measuring repression’s effect on protest using an instrumental variable model","authors":"Victor Asal, Joseph M. Brown","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Protest and repression are reciprocally related. Governments respond with repression when faced with challenges to their rule. Dissidents choose their strategies, turning out to protest or staying home, based on the state’s behaviour. But what effect does repression have on protestors’ decisions? The existing literature is of two minds on this issue. One school of thought argues that repression suppresses protest. A second school of thought argues that repression increases protest by inducing public backlash against the regime. Efforts to adjudicate these claims are complicated by the endogeneity between protest and repression. We use US economic development assistance as an instrument for government repression. Governments seeking US development assistance eschew the repression of protestors. An instrumental variable analysis of the MAROB Middle East dataset shows that repression (instrumented on US development aid commitments) discourages protest by a dissident group. The likelihood of protest decreases by roughly 20% in a given year if the group is repressed. The need for an instrumental variable model is highlighted by the fact that uninstrumented regressions show the opposite effect, giving the spurious appearance of backlash. Unfortunately for protestors, the appearance is deceiving. Repression works.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"15 1","pages":"2 - 16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49513615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-14DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1821074
P. J. Phillips, Benjamin McDermid
ABSTRACT The arrival of “FinTech” – non-bank companies offering financial services through new technology – has changed the regulatory landscape of the financial markets. This is especially the case in the funds transfer market. While terrorist finance might have once been more at risk of detection in some jurisdictions than others, FinTech threatens to bring about a levelling of risk across jurisdictions. To what extent, though, do we expect decision-makers engaged in transferring funds for terrorism to switch seamlessly in response to changes in risk? Because terrorist finance requires choice under risk and uncertainty, it may be characterized by systematic patterns of error deriving from human decision-making processes. These errors cause delays, or “stickiness” in adaptation to new conditions and may provide openings for counter-terrorist finance (CTF).
{"title":"FinTech, terrorism-related fund transfers and behavioural finance","authors":"P. J. Phillips, Benjamin McDermid","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821074","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The arrival of “FinTech” – non-bank companies offering financial services through new technology – has changed the regulatory landscape of the financial markets. This is especially the case in the funds transfer market. While terrorist finance might have once been more at risk of detection in some jurisdictions than others, FinTech threatens to bring about a levelling of risk across jurisdictions. To what extent, though, do we expect decision-makers engaged in transferring funds for terrorism to switch seamlessly in response to changes in risk? Because terrorist finance requires choice under risk and uncertainty, it may be characterized by systematic patterns of error deriving from human decision-making processes. These errors cause delays, or “stickiness” in adaptation to new conditions and may provide openings for counter-terrorist finance (CTF).","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"14 1","pages":"226 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821074","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48002776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1861809
G. Ligon, Lauren M. Zimmerman
{"title":"Letter from the editor","authors":"G. Ligon, Lauren M. Zimmerman","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1861809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1861809","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"13 1","pages":"191 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1861809","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44078049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1821068
Z. Ahmed, Qamar Abbas Jafri
ABSTRACT Since 2004, madrassas (Islamic seminaries) of Pakistan have been the primary focus of peace education interventions in Pakistan. The incidents of violence involving university students are a historic phenomenon in Pakistan, but the tendencies of violent clashes on university campuses and recruitment of university student in violent extremism are increasing. Despite an increasing number of violent clashes on university campuses and recruitment of university students by Islamists for jihad (holy war), there is negligible literature on university students’ radicalization in Pakistan. This study provides empirical data based on a comparative analysis of students’ perception from two public sector universities of Pakistan, namely the International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI) and the Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU). The findings suggest different dynamics of hate speech, availability of extremist material and extremist recruitment between the two universities. While the QAU campus is dominated by politically motivated ethnic groups, the IIUI students are exposed to religiously motivated contents, violence, and recruitment. As it is reported in this study, the differences between the two universities are also because most of the IIUI students have religious inclinations because of their madrassa backgrounds and also because of the dominance of groups like the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba Pakistan.
{"title":"Drivers of violent extremism in higher education institutions of Pakistan","authors":"Z. Ahmed, Qamar Abbas Jafri","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821068","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since 2004, madrassas (Islamic seminaries) of Pakistan have been the primary focus of peace education interventions in Pakistan. The incidents of violence involving university students are a historic phenomenon in Pakistan, but the tendencies of violent clashes on university campuses and recruitment of university student in violent extremism are increasing. Despite an increasing number of violent clashes on university campuses and recruitment of university students by Islamists for jihad (holy war), there is negligible literature on university students’ radicalization in Pakistan. This study provides empirical data based on a comparative analysis of students’ perception from two public sector universities of Pakistan, namely the International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI) and the Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU). The findings suggest different dynamics of hate speech, availability of extremist material and extremist recruitment between the two universities. While the QAU campus is dominated by politically motivated ethnic groups, the IIUI students are exposed to religiously motivated contents, violence, and recruitment. As it is reported in this study, the differences between the two universities are also because most of the IIUI students have religious inclinations because of their madrassa backgrounds and also because of the dominance of groups like the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba Pakistan.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"13 1","pages":"230 - 244"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821068","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43780528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2020.1821072
Md. Nurul Momen
ABSTRACT Bangladesh has been identified as one of the rising Islamic militancy regions in the world due to the security challenges posed by the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). JMB aims to change the existing political system and finding ways for the establishment of an Islamic state through an armed struggle. However, the purpose of this qualitative study is to examine the organizational design and activities of JMB, and also illustrates different strategies and measures in place that have been adopted by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) directed against the militant activities.
{"title":"Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh: analysis of organizational design and activities","authors":"Md. Nurul Momen","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821072","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Bangladesh has been identified as one of the rising Islamic militancy regions in the world due to the security challenges posed by the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). JMB aims to change the existing political system and finding ways for the establishment of an Islamic state through an armed struggle. However, the purpose of this qualitative study is to examine the organizational design and activities of JMB, and also illustrates different strategies and measures in place that have been adopted by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) directed against the militant activities.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"13 1","pages":"245 - 257"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821072","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48087890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2019.1650387
Gary Uzonyi
ABSTRACT First generation genocide scholars viewed bureaucratic quality as essential to government mass atrocity. However, second generation scholars view bureaucratic quality as an obstacle to government mass violence. I analyze the relationship between bureaucratic quality and killing severity econometrically to help resolve this debate. I find that stronger bureaucracies increase the severity of ongoing campaigns of genocide and politicide. These findings indicate that first generation scholars are correct in emphasizing the importance of bureaucratic quality in helping the government realize its genocide or politicide. The results also indicate that our understanding of the importance of bureaucratic quality is not driven by the German bureaucracy during the Holocaust. Instead, bureaucratic quality has a significant influence on the severity of genocide and politicide in many recent cases of government mass murder that have occurred in less developed states, as well.
{"title":"Bureaucratic quality and the severity of genocide and politicide","authors":"Gary Uzonyi","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2019.1650387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1650387","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT First generation genocide scholars viewed bureaucratic quality as essential to government mass atrocity. However, second generation scholars view bureaucratic quality as an obstacle to government mass violence. I analyze the relationship between bureaucratic quality and killing severity econometrically to help resolve this debate. I find that stronger bureaucracies increase the severity of ongoing campaigns of genocide and politicide. These findings indicate that first generation scholars are correct in emphasizing the importance of bureaucratic quality in helping the government realize its genocide or politicide. The results also indicate that our understanding of the importance of bureaucratic quality is not driven by the German bureaucracy during the Holocaust. Instead, bureaucratic quality has a significant influence on the severity of genocide and politicide in many recent cases of government mass murder that have occurred in less developed states, as well.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"13 1","pages":"125 - 142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2019.1650387","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45702389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}