In response to widespread dissatisfaction with managed care, states have enacted numerous statutes, known as managed care patient protection laws, that address concerns of consumers and medical care providers. These laws include (in various combinations): (1) liability and external review provisions, (2) increasing choice of and access to providers, (3) protecting providers from undue influence, and (4) setting general coverage standards and specific coverage mandates. These laws are now well understood in terms of political responses to public and interest group concerns, but what is less well understood are justifications for managed care regulation in terms of well articulated market failures. Also lacking is an examination of how well legal enactments and enforcement activities respond to market failure theory. Accordingly, this article has two distinct parts: A detailed analysis of the market failures that managed care patient protection laws attempt to correct. And, a report of a 50-state survey of state managed care protection laws and their enforcement. We conclude that, while there are some deficiencies in managed care markets as they are constituted currently, overall the patient protection laws are not well designed to address many of the most important deficiencies since few of these laws address the fundamental source of these market flaws. At most, many of these laws attempt to treat only some of the symptoms of market defects. However, these laws are not being neglected by enforcement agencies. Enforcement activities are evident in most states, and the variation in enforcement relates to legitimate differences in legal, market and agency conditions.
{"title":"Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of Managed Care","authors":"F. Sloan, M. Hall","doi":"10.2307/1192283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192283","url":null,"abstract":"In response to widespread dissatisfaction with managed care, states have enacted numerous statutes, known as managed care patient protection laws, that address concerns of consumers and medical care providers. These laws include (in various combinations): (1) liability and external review provisions, (2) increasing choice of and access to providers, (3) protecting providers from undue influence, and (4) setting general coverage standards and specific coverage mandates. These laws are now well understood in terms of political responses to public and interest group concerns, but what is less well understood are justifications for managed care regulation in terms of well articulated market failures. Also lacking is an examination of how well legal enactments and enforcement activities respond to market failure theory. Accordingly, this article has two distinct parts: A detailed analysis of the market failures that managed care patient protection laws attempt to correct. And, a report of a 50-state survey of state managed care protection laws and their enforcement. We conclude that, while there are some deficiencies in managed care markets as they are constituted currently, overall the patient protection laws are not well designed to address many of the most important deficiencies since few of these laws address the fundamental source of these market flaws. At most, many of these laws attempt to treat only some of the symptoms of market defects. However, these laws are not being neglected by enforcement agencies. Enforcement activities are evident in most states, and the variation in enforcement relates to legitimate differences in legal, market and agency conditions.","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"41 1","pages":"169-206"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82325622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I INTRODUCTION The past decade has seen a proliferation of state laws aimed at modifying the function of managed care organizations ("MCOs"). (1) Reaction to the increasing prevalence and novel practices of MCOs has prompted passage of hundreds of state statutes governing everything from direct access to medical specialists, to minimum coverage standards for maternity stays. (2) The federal government has also taken action on such matters, and the competing "patients' bills of rights" under consideration in Congress would all expand federal oversight of managed care activities. (3) Though the true impetus for these legal initiatives is debatable, the proponents of "patient protection" measures often cite concern over the quality--or safety--of managed care as the driving force behind their legislative efforts. (4) Critics contend that MCOs sacrifice high-quality health care for cost savings and provide inferior medical coverage compared to fee-for-service ("FFS") plans. (5) Horror stories about alleged abuse or neglect of p atients by MCOs have gained wide circulation. (6) There are even web sites devoted to the promulgation of such anecdotal evidence. (7) Opponents of managed care have employed these singular tales of terror to advance their legislative agendas. (8) This article examines the empirical evidence, drawn from the medical literature, pertaining to the safety of managed care practices. It seeks to ground the ongoing debate on the medical merits of MCOs in the science of clinical research. The article is divided into three major sections. Part II is a systematic review of recent literature on the overall quality of MCOs relative to FFS plans, focusing on clinically important outcome and process measures. It extends previous such analyses to the present day. Part III surveys articles comparing the performance of generalists and specialists in the latter's fields of expertise. It aims to weigh claims about the alleged risks of "gatekeeping," a traditional feature of managed care that has come under increasing criticism. Part IV analyzes the medical evidence on early postpartum discharge ("drive-through deliveries"), perhaps the most publicized example of the supposed dangers of managed care. Though originating in FFS settings, this practice is associated with MCO s due to their widespread adoption of short maternal stays. Finally, the article renders an evidence-based opinion on the quality of America's major form of private health care coverage. II QUALITY-OF-CARE PERFORMANCE: MANAGED CARE VERSUS FEE-FOR-SERVICE Considerable data on the quality of care in MCOs versus FFS does exist even though it is conspicuously absent from public debates on the safety of managed care and the need for more patient protection laws in the post-FFS era. Robert Miller and Harold Luft have reviewed much of the early research on this subject, and in 1994 published the first of two literature analyses on the topic. (9) Examining studies from 1980 through 1993
{"title":"The Quality of Managed Care: Evidence from the Medical Literature","authors":"Joseph Gottfried, F. Sloan","doi":"10.2307/1192281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192281","url":null,"abstract":"I INTRODUCTION The past decade has seen a proliferation of state laws aimed at modifying the function of managed care organizations (\"MCOs\"). (1) Reaction to the increasing prevalence and novel practices of MCOs has prompted passage of hundreds of state statutes governing everything from direct access to medical specialists, to minimum coverage standards for maternity stays. (2) The federal government has also taken action on such matters, and the competing \"patients' bills of rights\" under consideration in Congress would all expand federal oversight of managed care activities. (3) Though the true impetus for these legal initiatives is debatable, the proponents of \"patient protection\" measures often cite concern over the quality--or safety--of managed care as the driving force behind their legislative efforts. (4) Critics contend that MCOs sacrifice high-quality health care for cost savings and provide inferior medical coverage compared to fee-for-service (\"FFS\") plans. (5) Horror stories about alleged abuse or neglect of p atients by MCOs have gained wide circulation. (6) There are even web sites devoted to the promulgation of such anecdotal evidence. (7) Opponents of managed care have employed these singular tales of terror to advance their legislative agendas. (8) This article examines the empirical evidence, drawn from the medical literature, pertaining to the safety of managed care practices. It seeks to ground the ongoing debate on the medical merits of MCOs in the science of clinical research. The article is divided into three major sections. Part II is a systematic review of recent literature on the overall quality of MCOs relative to FFS plans, focusing on clinically important outcome and process measures. It extends previous such analyses to the present day. Part III surveys articles comparing the performance of generalists and specialists in the latter's fields of expertise. It aims to weigh claims about the alleged risks of \"gatekeeping,\" a traditional feature of managed care that has come under increasing criticism. Part IV analyzes the medical evidence on early postpartum discharge (\"drive-through deliveries\"), perhaps the most publicized example of the supposed dangers of managed care. Though originating in FFS settings, this practice is associated with MCO s due to their widespread adoption of short maternal stays. Finally, the article renders an evidence-based opinion on the quality of America's major form of private health care coverage. II QUALITY-OF-CARE PERFORMANCE: MANAGED CARE VERSUS FEE-FOR-SERVICE Considerable data on the quality of care in MCOs versus FFS does exist even though it is conspicuously absent from public debates on the safety of managed care and the need for more patient protection laws in the post-FFS era. Robert Miller and Harold Luft have reviewed much of the early research on this subject, and in 1994 published the first of two literature analyses on the topic. (9) Examining studies from 1980 through 1993","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"1 1","pages":"103-138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89166795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a recent commentary, health economist Jaime Robinson observed that "the fundamental flaw of managed care, in retrospect, was that it sought to navigate the tensions between limited resources and unlimited expectations without explaining exactly how it was so doing". One such failure is the absence, prior to the late 1990s, of any disclosure by HMOs that they use financial incentives to encourage physicians to contain costs, and of any explanation of how and why this is done. Other features of managed care are visible to all members, such as a limited network of providers, primary care gatekeeping, or prior authorization requirements. Physician incentives, however, are entirely behind the scenes. Disclosure of financial incentives to subscribers has occurred only in the past three years, in response to several legal pressures. These developments call for an assessment of the theory and practice of disclosing physician incentives. To what extent does HMOs' earlier silence about physician incentives account for the public's backlash against managed care and the failure to appreciate the need for making cost/benefit trade-offs in medicine? Now that disclosure is becoming more commonplace, will this help put managed care back on a better track? Or, is disclosure being done in an excessively legalistic environment that defeats its fundamental purposes? To gain better understanding of these issues, this article begins by summarizing the theoretical case for mandating disclosure of incentives, in terms of various types of information market failures. The article then analyzes the components of liability and regulatory law that require disclosure, observing how well each source of law responds to different aspects of the justification for disclosure. Following this, empirical literature is explored on the content, source, and timing of disclosures now being made, and on the impact of incentive disclosures. The article concludes by sketching a model approach to disclosure, one that provides information in layers, at different points and in varying levels of detail, as best suits people's desire and need for this information.
{"title":"The Theory and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives","authors":"M. Hall","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.329484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.329484","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent commentary, health economist Jaime Robinson observed that \"the fundamental flaw of managed care, in retrospect, was that it sought to navigate the tensions between limited resources and unlimited expectations without explaining exactly how it was so doing\". One such failure is the absence, prior to the late 1990s, of any disclosure by HMOs that they use financial incentives to encourage physicians to contain costs, and of any explanation of how and why this is done. Other features of managed care are visible to all members, such as a limited network of providers, primary care gatekeeping, or prior authorization requirements. Physician incentives, however, are entirely behind the scenes. Disclosure of financial incentives to subscribers has occurred only in the past three years, in response to several legal pressures. These developments call for an assessment of the theory and practice of disclosing physician incentives. To what extent does HMOs' earlier silence about physician incentives account for the public's backlash against managed care and the failure to appreciate the need for making cost/benefit trade-offs in medicine? Now that disclosure is becoming more commonplace, will this help put managed care back on a better track? Or, is disclosure being done in an excessively legalistic environment that defeats its fundamental purposes? To gain better understanding of these issues, this article begins by summarizing the theoretical case for mandating disclosure of incentives, in terms of various types of information market failures. The article then analyzes the components of liability and regulatory law that require disclosure, observing how well each source of law responds to different aspects of the justification for disclosure. Following this, empirical literature is explored on the content, source, and timing of disclosures now being made, and on the impact of incentive disclosures. The article concludes by sketching a model approach to disclosure, one that provides information in layers, at different points and in varying levels of detail, as best suits people's desire and need for this information.","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"66 1","pages":"207-240"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86016017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.... We may begin [any constitutional analysis] by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity. Justice Robert H. Jackson (1) Theoretically, Article I of the Constitution places the legislative power in Congress or, more accurately, jointly in Congress and in the Presidency, acting in accordance with the formalities of bicamerality and presentment. When this body--which we shall call the constitutional legislature--is capable of action, it will retain control of legislative authority.... Courts and agencies are capable of independent or autonomous action where the constitutional legislature is too fragmented to react. In such circumstances, lawmaking will tend to migrate to those bodies that are capable of decisive action. In these conditions we see the development of such familiar entities as the "runaway" bureaucracy and the activist courts. Professor John Ferejohn (2) I INTRODUCTION Explanations of judicial behavior that draw upon positive institutional theory have gained growing prominence within both the political science and the legal academies. (3) Within the latter, Professor John Ferejohn has been a leader in developing the neo-institutional approach to the study of the law and the courts. (4) His work has been particularly important in developing so-called "separation-of-powers" models of judicial behavior. (5) These "separation-of-powers models seek to explain judicial decisions by reference to exogenous constraints, such as the powers of Congress and the President to control federal courts, rather than by reference to endogenous constraints, such as the collegial nature of decision-making on certain appellate courts and the need to maintain a majority and avoid dissension. (6) Ferejohn's contribution to this symposium further develops this line of inquiry by outlining the possibility of a positive model of the judicialization of politics, and by suggesting institutional reforms that would reduce the level of the judicialization of politics in the United States. Although Professor Ferejohn's argument is still in its preliminary form, and some key features remain undeveloped, his argument nevertheless suggests important ways to think about both the relationship between law and politics in the United States and what should be done about the growing political role of the federal courts in U.S. democracy. This article begins by examining the central elements of Professor Ferejohn's argument. Part III specifically focuses on the relationship between the mod
{"title":"The Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-making (Or, Why Be So Positive about the Judicialization of Politics?)","authors":"Cornell W. Clayton","doi":"10.2307/1192403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192403","url":null,"abstract":"The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.... We may begin [any constitutional analysis] by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity. Justice Robert H. Jackson (1) Theoretically, Article I of the Constitution places the legislative power in Congress or, more accurately, jointly in Congress and in the Presidency, acting in accordance with the formalities of bicamerality and presentment. When this body--which we shall call the constitutional legislature--is capable of action, it will retain control of legislative authority.... Courts and agencies are capable of independent or autonomous action where the constitutional legislature is too fragmented to react. In such circumstances, lawmaking will tend to migrate to those bodies that are capable of decisive action. In these conditions we see the development of such familiar entities as the \"runaway\" bureaucracy and the activist courts. Professor John Ferejohn (2) I INTRODUCTION Explanations of judicial behavior that draw upon positive institutional theory have gained growing prominence within both the political science and the legal academies. (3) Within the latter, Professor John Ferejohn has been a leader in developing the neo-institutional approach to the study of the law and the courts. (4) His work has been particularly important in developing so-called \"separation-of-powers\" models of judicial behavior. (5) These \"separation-of-powers models seek to explain judicial decisions by reference to exogenous constraints, such as the powers of Congress and the President to control federal courts, rather than by reference to endogenous constraints, such as the collegial nature of decision-making on certain appellate courts and the need to maintain a majority and avoid dissension. (6) Ferejohn's contribution to this symposium further develops this line of inquiry by outlining the possibility of a positive model of the judicialization of politics, and by suggesting institutional reforms that would reduce the level of the judicialization of politics in the United States. Although Professor Ferejohn's argument is still in its preliminary form, and some key features remain undeveloped, his argument nevertheless suggests important ways to think about both the relationship between law and politics in the United States and what should be done about the growing political role of the federal courts in U.S. democracy. This article begins by examining the central elements of Professor Ferejohn's argument. Part III specifically focuses on the relationship between the mod","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"25 1","pages":"69-86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82588518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I INTRODUCTION Since World War II, there has been a profound shift in power away from legislatures and toward courts and other legal institutions around the world. This shift, which has been called "judicialization," (1) has become more or less global in its reach, as evidenced by the fact that it is as marked in Europe, and especially recently in Eastern Europe, as it is in the United States. The spectacles of Italian judges undermining Italy's postwar system of musical cabinets, or of newly energized French judges hounding prime ministers and presidents, are only the most visible aspects of these developments. One could also point to the role, and recent success, of judges in seeking to arrest and prosecute dictators and military leaders. Additionally, our own United States Supreme Court's intervention into electoral politics in Bush v. Gore (2) was yet another manifestation of this trend. One can distinguish at least three ways in which courts have taken on new and important roles relative to legislatures. First, courts have been increasingly able and willing to limit and regulate the exercise of parliamentary authority by imposing substantive limits on the power of legislative institutions. Second, courts have increasingly become places where substantive policy is made. Third, judges have been increasingly willing to regulate the conduct of political activity itself--whether practiced in or around legislatures, agencies, or the electorate--by constructing and enforcing standards of acceptable behavior for interest groups, political parties, and both elected and appointed officials. But judicialization is not simply limited to the increasingly important, pervasive, and direct roles that courts play in making policy. The fact that courts frequently intervene in policy-making processes also means that other political actors, as well as groups seeking political action, have reason to take the possibility of judicial reaction into account. Proposals need to be framed in a way to ensure that legislation will neither be struck down nor interpreted in Undersirable ways. In order to achieve such a result, part of the policy debate over new legislation must aim at anticipating the response of legal institutions. So, we see a global application of one aspect of the phenomenon that de Tocqueville noted about American politics years ago: the transformation of political questions into legal ones. (3) This means that legal/constitutional considerations and rhetoric assume new and sometimes decisive importance in ordinary legislative policy-making. One aspect of judicialization can be observed in the widespread adoption of institutions and practices of constitutional adjudication, even in places with legal institutions and traditions that had long been inhospitable to this process. True, the modes of constitutional adjudication adopted in Europe and elsewhere do not precisely follow the U.S. model. Ordinary European judges are not permitted to strike down le
{"title":"Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law","authors":"J. Ferejohn","doi":"10.2307/1192402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192402","url":null,"abstract":"I INTRODUCTION Since World War II, there has been a profound shift in power away from legislatures and toward courts and other legal institutions around the world. This shift, which has been called \"judicialization,\" (1) has become more or less global in its reach, as evidenced by the fact that it is as marked in Europe, and especially recently in Eastern Europe, as it is in the United States. The spectacles of Italian judges undermining Italy's postwar system of musical cabinets, or of newly energized French judges hounding prime ministers and presidents, are only the most visible aspects of these developments. One could also point to the role, and recent success, of judges in seeking to arrest and prosecute dictators and military leaders. Additionally, our own United States Supreme Court's intervention into electoral politics in Bush v. Gore (2) was yet another manifestation of this trend. One can distinguish at least three ways in which courts have taken on new and important roles relative to legislatures. First, courts have been increasingly able and willing to limit and regulate the exercise of parliamentary authority by imposing substantive limits on the power of legislative institutions. Second, courts have increasingly become places where substantive policy is made. Third, judges have been increasingly willing to regulate the conduct of political activity itself--whether practiced in or around legislatures, agencies, or the electorate--by constructing and enforcing standards of acceptable behavior for interest groups, political parties, and both elected and appointed officials. But judicialization is not simply limited to the increasingly important, pervasive, and direct roles that courts play in making policy. The fact that courts frequently intervene in policy-making processes also means that other political actors, as well as groups seeking political action, have reason to take the possibility of judicial reaction into account. Proposals need to be framed in a way to ensure that legislation will neither be struck down nor interpreted in Undersirable ways. In order to achieve such a result, part of the policy debate over new legislation must aim at anticipating the response of legal institutions. So, we see a global application of one aspect of the phenomenon that de Tocqueville noted about American politics years ago: the transformation of political questions into legal ones. (3) This means that legal/constitutional considerations and rhetoric assume new and sometimes decisive importance in ordinary legislative policy-making. One aspect of judicialization can be observed in the widespread adoption of institutions and practices of constitutional adjudication, even in places with legal institutions and traditions that had long been inhospitable to this process. True, the modes of constitutional adjudication adopted in Europe and elsewhere do not precisely follow the U.S. model. Ordinary European judges are not permitted to strike down le","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"13 1","pages":"41-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76323761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I INTRODUCTION Simon Schama begins his magisterial book on the FRENCH REVOLUTION, Citizens, by relating the reply of Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai to a question about the significance of those 1789 events: "It's too soon to tell." (1) One suspects that Zhou's emphasis on the importance of a long-term perspective is especially jolting to Americans, who inhabit a culture that generally waits until no later than Monday to engage in their analysis of weekend events. I am confident, for example, that many (perhaps most) readers remember watching television newscasts on the evening of December 12, 2000, which featured, toward the close of day, images of couriers for the various networks racing down the Supreme Court steps, followed within minutes by immediate analysis of the meaning of the Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore. (2) More recently, the truly awful events of September 11, 2001, which have cast a broad shadow over all of our lives, generated hours upon hours of experts not only opining that our lives will be fundamentally tr ansformed, which I am sure is the case, but also, and more problematically, specifying the transformations that will shape our future. It is good, therefore, to be reminded of the importance of adopting a longer perspective and to realize that it is difficult to know, with any confidence, what the importance and durable consequences of any given event actually may be. One need not be a full-fledged historicist to recognize that any full description or assessment of event X ultimately depends on knowing future events, which will inevitably throw a different light on the past; because of this change in lighting, we see details of earlier events that had earlier seemed relatively unimportant, just as previously high-lit actors fade into insignificance to be replaced by what we mistakenly thought were bit players or even simply extras. And, as Chekhov taught us, an apparently unimportant gun over the mantle that we perceive only as part of the background scenery when the curtain rises may eventually turn out to generate catastrophic consequences by the conclusion of the play. Consider in this context, for example, what one might want to say, in a symposium commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Baker v. Carr, (3) the case in which the Supreme Court overruled a fifteen-year-old precedent (4) and held, contrary to the earlier case, that legislative districting did in fact present an issue capable of judicial resolution under the Fourteenth Amendment. (5) Had that symposium been scheduled for October 2000, I dare say that it would never have occurred to me or to any other participant to address the possibility that the ultimate consequence of Baker and of the "one person-one vote" doctrine adopted two years later in Reynolds v. Sims (6) and its progeny would be the empowerment of the Supreme Court to take charge of a national presidential election and, in effect, to bring the election to a halt by declaring the winner. No one toda
{"title":"Bush v. Gore and the French Revolution: A Tentative List of Some Early Lessons","authors":"Sanford Levinson","doi":"10.2307/1192401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192401","url":null,"abstract":"I INTRODUCTION Simon Schama begins his magisterial book on the FRENCH REVOLUTION, Citizens, by relating the reply of Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai to a question about the significance of those 1789 events: \"It's too soon to tell.\" (1) One suspects that Zhou's emphasis on the importance of a long-term perspective is especially jolting to Americans, who inhabit a culture that generally waits until no later than Monday to engage in their analysis of weekend events. I am confident, for example, that many (perhaps most) readers remember watching television newscasts on the evening of December 12, 2000, which featured, toward the close of day, images of couriers for the various networks racing down the Supreme Court steps, followed within minutes by immediate analysis of the meaning of the Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore. (2) More recently, the truly awful events of September 11, 2001, which have cast a broad shadow over all of our lives, generated hours upon hours of experts not only opining that our lives will be fundamentally tr ansformed, which I am sure is the case, but also, and more problematically, specifying the transformations that will shape our future. It is good, therefore, to be reminded of the importance of adopting a longer perspective and to realize that it is difficult to know, with any confidence, what the importance and durable consequences of any given event actually may be. One need not be a full-fledged historicist to recognize that any full description or assessment of event X ultimately depends on knowing future events, which will inevitably throw a different light on the past; because of this change in lighting, we see details of earlier events that had earlier seemed relatively unimportant, just as previously high-lit actors fade into insignificance to be replaced by what we mistakenly thought were bit players or even simply extras. And, as Chekhov taught us, an apparently unimportant gun over the mantle that we perceive only as part of the background scenery when the curtain rises may eventually turn out to generate catastrophic consequences by the conclusion of the play. Consider in this context, for example, what one might want to say, in a symposium commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Baker v. Carr, (3) the case in which the Supreme Court overruled a fifteen-year-old precedent (4) and held, contrary to the earlier case, that legislative districting did in fact present an issue capable of judicial resolution under the Fourteenth Amendment. (5) Had that symposium been scheduled for October 2000, I dare say that it would never have occurred to me or to any other participant to address the possibility that the ultimate consequence of Baker and of the \"one person-one vote\" doctrine adopted two years later in Reynolds v. Sims (6) and its progeny would be the empowerment of the Supreme Court to take charge of a national presidential election and, in effect, to bring the election to a halt by declaring the winner. No one toda","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"56 1","pages":"7-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88432288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The theory of deliberative democracy sketches a model of politics based on models of law and legal decision-making. It aspires to turn political decisions into a form of legal decision-making. It is easy to see how this ambition responds to the widespread belief that partial interests dictate public outcomes. Among other things, it implies that the kind of electoral calculations sketched out above would be entirely out of bounds, and that a sound public decision would be one based on science and ethics-science to predict the consequences of possible decisions, and ethics to evaluate the relative merits of those consequences. This legalistic vision of politics leaves much out of account, portrays an unrealistic and unattractive picture of politics, and is ultimately self-defeating, or so this paper will argue. Part II elaborates on deliberative democracy's attempt to displace politics with law. Part III exposes some of the difficulties with that attempt. Part IV returns to the impetus behind the attempt - deliberative democracy's belief that comprehensive views and partial interests should play no role in politics - and questions that belief. The role of partial interests in influencing particular political outcomes is and needs to remain endogenous to political practice itself. Politics should thus bear less resemblance to law than the deliberativists claim, and partial interests should rightly play a greater role in political decisions than the deliberativists would prefer.
{"title":"Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics Into Law","authors":"C. Schroeder","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.358481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.358481","url":null,"abstract":"The theory of deliberative democracy sketches a model of politics based on models of law and legal decision-making. It aspires to turn political decisions into a form of legal decision-making. It is easy to see how this ambition responds to the widespread belief that partial interests dictate public outcomes. Among other things, it implies that the kind of electoral calculations sketched out above would be entirely out of bounds, and that a sound public decision would be one based on science and ethics-science to predict the consequences of possible decisions, and ethics to evaluate the relative merits of those consequences. This legalistic vision of politics leaves much out of account, portrays an unrealistic and unattractive picture of politics, and is ultimately self-defeating, or so this paper will argue. Part II elaborates on deliberative democracy's attempt to displace politics with law. Part III exposes some of the difficulties with that attempt. Part IV returns to the impetus behind the attempt - deliberative democracy's belief that comprehensive views and partial interests should play no role in politics - and questions that belief. The role of partial interests in influencing particular political outcomes is and needs to remain endogenous to political practice itself. Politics should thus bear less resemblance to law than the deliberativists claim, and partial interests should rightly play a greater role in political decisions than the deliberativists would prefer.","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"32 1","pages":"95-132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89432674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I INTRODUCTION Webster's Dictionary defines a person as competent if he or she has "requisite or adequate ability or qualities." (1) Synonyms for competent include sufficient and able, where the definition for able includes "having sufficient power, skill, or resources to accomplish an object" and "marked by intelligence, knowledge, skill, or competence." (2) Such definitions are worth noting because concerns about a special kind of competence motivate many public and private activities, as well as a widely read strain of contemporary philosophy. The competence in question is civic competence, by which I mean the citizenry's ability to accomplish well-defined tasks--particularly in their roles as voters, jurors, or legislators. (3) Civic competence is a central preoccupation of people who want citizens to base political choices on a broad and accurate understanding of their consequences. (4) Such desires, however, are dashed by evidence that citizens spend little time and effort engaging in politics. The finding that many Americans cannot answer common survey questions about a wide range of political phenomena, for example, dampens many observers' confidence in civic competence. (5) If citizens are simple and politics is complex, what is the optimal response for people who want greater civic competence? Actual responses vary. Many simply decry the situation, doing nothing more than bashing the masses for not being more interested in politics. A special few do something more constructive. They advocate mechanisms designed to change the amount and content of information available to target audiences. In short, they attempt to improve democracy by enhancing civic competence. Scholars, legislators, and foundations both public and private advocate various means to enhance competence, including civic education campaigns and the development of informative web-sites. These efforts focus on important topics such as the relationship between smoking and lung cancer, the relationship between sexual activity and AIDS, the plight of distant populations, and the quality of voter and juror decisions, all in an effort to help citizens better understand the consequences of their actions. When such activities enhance civic competence, they constitute valuable resources for the public at large. However, something is wrong with many of these attempts. The problem is that they are based on flawed assumptions about how citizens seek and process information. One manifestation of the problem is that many advocates of competence-generating proposals proceed as if merely providing new information is sufficient to improve competence. However, the transmission of socially relevant information is no "Field of Dreams." It is not true that "if you build it, they will come." (6) Nor is it true that if they come, the effect will be as advocates anticipate. Indeed, many efforts to improve civic competence provide information that target audiences ignore. Others produce information
{"title":"Deliberation Disconnected: What it Takes to Improve Civic Competence","authors":"A. Lupia","doi":"10.2307/1192406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192406","url":null,"abstract":"I INTRODUCTION Webster's Dictionary defines a person as competent if he or she has \"requisite or adequate ability or qualities.\" (1) Synonyms for competent include sufficient and able, where the definition for able includes \"having sufficient power, skill, or resources to accomplish an object\" and \"marked by intelligence, knowledge, skill, or competence.\" (2) Such definitions are worth noting because concerns about a special kind of competence motivate many public and private activities, as well as a widely read strain of contemporary philosophy. The competence in question is civic competence, by which I mean the citizenry's ability to accomplish well-defined tasks--particularly in their roles as voters, jurors, or legislators. (3) Civic competence is a central preoccupation of people who want citizens to base political choices on a broad and accurate understanding of their consequences. (4) Such desires, however, are dashed by evidence that citizens spend little time and effort engaging in politics. The finding that many Americans cannot answer common survey questions about a wide range of political phenomena, for example, dampens many observers' confidence in civic competence. (5) If citizens are simple and politics is complex, what is the optimal response for people who want greater civic competence? Actual responses vary. Many simply decry the situation, doing nothing more than bashing the masses for not being more interested in politics. A special few do something more constructive. They advocate mechanisms designed to change the amount and content of information available to target audiences. In short, they attempt to improve democracy by enhancing civic competence. Scholars, legislators, and foundations both public and private advocate various means to enhance competence, including civic education campaigns and the development of informative web-sites. These efforts focus on important topics such as the relationship between smoking and lung cancer, the relationship between sexual activity and AIDS, the plight of distant populations, and the quality of voter and juror decisions, all in an effort to help citizens better understand the consequences of their actions. When such activities enhance civic competence, they constitute valuable resources for the public at large. However, something is wrong with many of these attempts. The problem is that they are based on flawed assumptions about how citizens seek and process information. One manifestation of the problem is that many advocates of competence-generating proposals proceed as if merely providing new information is sufficient to improve competence. However, the transmission of socially relevant information is no \"Field of Dreams.\" It is not true that \"if you build it, they will come.\" (6) Nor is it true that if they come, the effect will be as advocates anticipate. Indeed, many efforts to improve civic competence provide information that target audiences ignore. Others produce information","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"61 1","pages":"133-150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74003804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Professor Schroeder's paper sets out a compelling description of some intractable problems with deliberative theory. I have found nothing to criticize in his outstanding article. In this comment, I wish to expand upon Schroeder's critique. In particular, I wish to explore a tension that occasionally arises among the fundamental elements of the theory of deliberative democracy. I first invoke the privilege of symposium comment writers to free-ride on the work of the principal paper. Professor Schroeder has presented a lucid survey of deliberative theory. (1) While I do not intend to repeat an exercise so well accomplished, a few points bear emphasizing. Deliberative theory is concerned with the problem of dissensus and justification. Given a plurality of reasonable, opposing views and assuming that all citizens are free and equal, how can one group--even a majority--justify imposing its preferences on another? Put another way, how can we justify applying the coercive power of the state against reasonable dissenters? (2) The response of deliberativists is that the exercise of state power is justified through a process of public reasoning. (3) This deliberative process is modeled expressly on the example of judicial decision-making. (4) Those who make a claim regarding the application of state power must offer reasons to justify their claims, much as a judge offers an opinion to justi fy the holding in a case. (5) This process of deliberation has three hallmarks. First, deliberation must be status-insensitive. As Schroeder explained in his article, "individuals should have no advantages in the process of public deliberation by virtue of their wealth, social status, ability to mobilize electoral assets, or capacity to provide rewards to other participants in the process." (6) Second, decisions are to be based on reasoned argument. (7) Third, arguments advanced must be sincere. "An argument ... must be one that [a deliberating citizen] endorses and one that 'would figure prominently amongst [her] reasons for the proposal,' absent other considerations." (8) The operation of deliberative democracy focuses on the public justification for a position. Focusing on the ex post justification leads to significant problems because it ignores a distinct and prior stage--the actual formation of a position. (9) Perversely, this focus can lead deliberativists to discount the importance of reason and even to undermine the ability of reason to function at this prior stage. (10) Moreover, the requirement that public justification take the form of reasoned argument can conflict with the requirement of status insensitivity. The campaign finance reform debate illustrates this problem. Given the imperative of status-insensitivity, it is not surprising that deliberativists tend ardently to support campaign finance reform. (11) Large campaign contributions and expenditures have long been understood to yield significant inequalities among citizens in terms of ability to part
{"title":"Deliberative Democracy and Campaign Finance Reform","authors":"Neil J. Kinkopf","doi":"10.2307/1192407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192407","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Schroeder's paper sets out a compelling description of some intractable problems with deliberative theory. I have found nothing to criticize in his outstanding article. In this comment, I wish to expand upon Schroeder's critique. In particular, I wish to explore a tension that occasionally arises among the fundamental elements of the theory of deliberative democracy. I first invoke the privilege of symposium comment writers to free-ride on the work of the principal paper. Professor Schroeder has presented a lucid survey of deliberative theory. (1) While I do not intend to repeat an exercise so well accomplished, a few points bear emphasizing. Deliberative theory is concerned with the problem of dissensus and justification. Given a plurality of reasonable, opposing views and assuming that all citizens are free and equal, how can one group--even a majority--justify imposing its preferences on another? Put another way, how can we justify applying the coercive power of the state against reasonable dissenters? (2) The response of deliberativists is that the exercise of state power is justified through a process of public reasoning. (3) This deliberative process is modeled expressly on the example of judicial decision-making. (4) Those who make a claim regarding the application of state power must offer reasons to justify their claims, much as a judge offers an opinion to justi fy the holding in a case. (5) This process of deliberation has three hallmarks. First, deliberation must be status-insensitive. As Schroeder explained in his article, \"individuals should have no advantages in the process of public deliberation by virtue of their wealth, social status, ability to mobilize electoral assets, or capacity to provide rewards to other participants in the process.\" (6) Second, decisions are to be based on reasoned argument. (7) Third, arguments advanced must be sincere. \"An argument ... must be one that [a deliberating citizen] endorses and one that 'would figure prominently amongst [her] reasons for the proposal,' absent other considerations.\" (8) The operation of deliberative democracy focuses on the public justification for a position. Focusing on the ex post justification leads to significant problems because it ignores a distinct and prior stage--the actual formation of a position. (9) Perversely, this focus can lead deliberativists to discount the importance of reason and even to undermine the ability of reason to function at this prior stage. (10) Moreover, the requirement that public justification take the form of reasoned argument can conflict with the requirement of status insensitivity. The campaign finance reform debate illustrates this problem. Given the imperative of status-insensitivity, it is not surprising that deliberativists tend ardently to support campaign finance reform. (11) Large campaign contributions and expenditures have long been understood to yield significant inequalities among citizens in terms of ability to part","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"7 1","pages":"151-154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74254276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I INTRODUCTION Professor John Ferejohn's article is a preliminary, yet provocative, examination of some key issues raised by the exercise of legislative power by the judicial branch. (1) Ferejohn argues for a broader perspective on this problem, and includes a comparison of European and United States judicial activity; Ferejohn, however, ultimately restricts his analysis almost exclusively to the situation in the United States. Let us begin with Ferejohn's definition of legislative power as the capacity to generate binding norms. (2) A grossly simplified outline of Ferejohn's argument might be: (1) If legislation can happen anywhere in government, and (2) If legislative power is the most dangerous to liberty and justice, then (3) The issue of how to control legislative power is the central problem of institutional design in democracies; however there is no single answer. In other words, the solution must be "institutionally unspecific." (3) The real question, given Ferejohn's real interest, is identifying the circumstances under which, and the extent to which, courts exercise legislative power. Read literally, Ferejohn's article depicts the courts' capacity to exercise legislative power as a kind of Brigadoon: (4) If conditions are right, the capacity appears. (5) If the conditions change, then the capacity of courts to legislate may disappear again, perhaps for a long period. (6) It struck me that the best way to represent Ferejohn's claims is to use a two-by-two matrix, the classic political science representation for a conditional theoretical claim. I was disappointed to see that, since Professor Ferejohn has been spending more time at law schools, he missed an obvious opportunity to use one of political science's hallmark tools. I hope, however, that I am not too late to save the day with this representation. Table 1, below, is the representation that comes to mind. TABLE 1 THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL LEGISLATION: TOO WEAK, OR TOO BROAD? It is Appropriate for the Court to Legislate? Does Court Have Power Yes to Legislate? Yes Court exercises power by generating binding norms in areas appropriate for such exercise: GOOD No Court is so weak that it cannot exercise legislative power even in areas where it would be appropriate: BAD It is Appropriate for the Court to Legislate? Does Court Have Power No to Legislate? Yes Court exercises too much power in areas inappropriate to such exercise: BAD No Court is unable to exercise power outside of appropriate areas: GOOD Table 1 represents the dilemma that the judiciary presents to institutional designers. (7) If, in fact, most legislative power is initially vested in the legislature, then the court may well be too weak. There are, after all (and as Ferejohn rightly points out), some settings in which the generation of binding norms by the judiciary is quite appropriate: "rules that need to be developed in light of repeated experience in use, and that should answer to concerns about equality, due process, a
John Ferejohn教授的文章对司法部门行使立法权所引发的一些关键问题进行了初步但具有挑衅性的考察。(1) Ferejohn主张从更广泛的角度看待这个问题，并对欧洲和美国的司法活动进行了比较;然而，Ferejohn最终将他的分析几乎完全局限于美国的情况。让我们从费约翰将立法权定义为产生具有约束力的规范的能力开始。(2) Ferejohn的论点可以大致简化为:(1)如果立法可以发生在政府的任何地方，(2)如果立法权是对自由和正义的最危险的，那么(3)如何控制立法权的问题是民主制度设计的中心问题;然而，没有单一的答案。换句话说，解决方案必须是“制度上不具体的”。(3)考虑到费约翰的真正利益，真正的问题是确定法院行使立法权的情况和程度。从字面上看，Ferejohn的文章将法院行使立法权的能力描述为一种旅队:(4)如果条件合适，这种能力就会出现。如果条件发生变化，那么法院的立法能力可能会再次消失，可能会持续很长一段时间。(6)我突然想到，表述费约翰主张的最佳方式是使用2乘2矩阵，这是对条件理论主张的经典政治学表示。我很失望地看到，由于费约翰教授花了更多的时间在法学院，他错过了一个明显的机会来使用政治学的标志性工具之一。不过，我希望我用这一陈述来挽救局面还不算太晚。下面的表1是我想到的表示。表1司法立法的困境:太弱，还是太宽泛?法院立法是否合适?法院有立法的权力吗?是的，法院通过在适当的领域制定具有约束力的规范来行使权力:好的，没有法院如此软弱，以至于即使在适当的领域也不能行使立法权:坏，法院立法合适吗?法院有立法权吗?是的，法院在不适合行使权力的领域行使了太多的权力:不好，不，法院无法在适当的领域之外行使权力:好，表1代表了司法机构给制度设计者带来的困境。(7)事实上，如果大多数立法权最初被赋予立法机关，那么法院很可能太弱了。毕竟(正如费约翰正确指出的那样)，在某些情况下，司法部门制定具有约束力的规范是非常合适的:“需要根据反复使用的经验来制定规则，并且应该回应对平等、正当程序和正义的关注。”(8)事实上，法院在这种情况下的立法能力可能对政府的正常运作至关重要。表1所示的困境是，法院要么有权力，要么没有权力。这其中有一个重要的规范因素。事实上，我认为，尽管这可能不太明显，但这种规范性的权衡巩固了许多关于法院角色的关键辩论。…
{"title":"Comment on Ferejohn's \"Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law\".(response to Article by John Ferejohn in This Issue, P. 41)","authors":"Michael C. Munger","doi":"10.2307/1192404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192404","url":null,"abstract":"I INTRODUCTION Professor John Ferejohn's article is a preliminary, yet provocative, examination of some key issues raised by the exercise of legislative power by the judicial branch. (1) Ferejohn argues for a broader perspective on this problem, and includes a comparison of European and United States judicial activity; Ferejohn, however, ultimately restricts his analysis almost exclusively to the situation in the United States. Let us begin with Ferejohn's definition of legislative power as the capacity to generate binding norms. (2) A grossly simplified outline of Ferejohn's argument might be: (1) If legislation can happen anywhere in government, and (2) If legislative power is the most dangerous to liberty and justice, then (3) The issue of how to control legislative power is the central problem of institutional design in democracies; however there is no single answer. In other words, the solution must be \"institutionally unspecific.\" (3) The real question, given Ferejohn's real interest, is identifying the circumstances under which, and the extent to which, courts exercise legislative power. Read literally, Ferejohn's article depicts the courts' capacity to exercise legislative power as a kind of Brigadoon: (4) If conditions are right, the capacity appears. (5) If the conditions change, then the capacity of courts to legislate may disappear again, perhaps for a long period. (6) It struck me that the best way to represent Ferejohn's claims is to use a two-by-two matrix, the classic political science representation for a conditional theoretical claim. I was disappointed to see that, since Professor Ferejohn has been spending more time at law schools, he missed an obvious opportunity to use one of political science's hallmark tools. I hope, however, that I am not too late to save the day with this representation. Table 1, below, is the representation that comes to mind. TABLE 1 THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL LEGISLATION: TOO WEAK, OR TOO BROAD? It is Appropriate for the Court to Legislate? Does Court Have Power Yes to Legislate? Yes Court exercises power by generating binding norms in areas appropriate for such exercise: GOOD No Court is so weak that it cannot exercise legislative power even in areas where it would be appropriate: BAD It is Appropriate for the Court to Legislate? Does Court Have Power No to Legislate? Yes Court exercises too much power in areas inappropriate to such exercise: BAD No Court is unable to exercise power outside of appropriate areas: GOOD Table 1 represents the dilemma that the judiciary presents to institutional designers. (7) If, in fact, most legislative power is initially vested in the legislature, then the court may well be too weak. There are, after all (and as Ferejohn rightly points out), some settings in which the generation of binding norms by the judiciary is quite appropriate: \"rules that need to be developed in light of repeated experience in use, and that should answer to concerns about equality, due process, a","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"21 1","pages":"87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82744093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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