Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.73
Yongjae Lee
Current research about terrorism does not pay much attention to the relationship between terrorist incidents and interstate wars. This research project examines how interstate wars influenced terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2007 through an empirical study at the monadic level. This project attempts to explain that how interstate wars reduce domestic and transnational terrorist activities through three theoretical explanations, such as the diversionary theory of war, realism, and controlling freedom. In terms of the diversionary theory of war, because external threats like a war divert citizens’ discontent, terrorist incidents decrease in the war period. According to realism theory in the study of international relations, because trade that could increase other countries’ relative interests decreases in wartime, terrorists have less opportunities to obtain resources. Since a government limits public liberty in order to protect national security during war, terrorists confront higher risks and lose an incentive to conduct terrorist attacks. The empirical analysis demonstrates that interstate wars decreased the numbers of domestic and transnational terrorist incidents. However, less freedom during wartime had a critical impact on increasing domestic and international terrorist incidents.
{"title":"Interstate Wars and Terrorism: the Effect of External Enemies on Domestic and Transnational Terrorism","authors":"Yongjae Lee","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.73","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.73","url":null,"abstract":"Current research about terrorism does not pay much attention to the relationship between terrorist incidents and interstate wars. This research project examines how interstate wars influenced terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2007 through an empirical study at the monadic level. This project attempts to explain that how interstate wars reduce domestic and transnational terrorist activities through three theoretical explanations, such as the diversionary theory of war, realism, and controlling freedom. In terms of the diversionary theory of war, because external threats like a war divert citizens’ discontent, terrorist incidents decrease in the war period. According to realism theory in the study of international relations, because trade that could increase other countries’ relative interests decreases in wartime, terrorists have less opportunities to obtain resources. Since a government limits public liberty in order to protect national security during war, terrorists confront higher risks and lose an incentive to conduct terrorist attacks. The empirical analysis demonstrates that interstate wars decreased the numbers of domestic and transnational terrorist incidents. However, less freedom during wartime had a critical impact on increasing domestic and international terrorist incidents.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42974859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.49
Y. Chung
“Partnership diplomacy” in the study of Chinese foreign affairs has weak theoretical underpinnings and has been defined in a manner insufficiently systematic for middle-range theorizing. Whilst sufficient attention has been paid to determinants of partnership formation, its failure has hitherto received scant attention. To understand this failure, this paper identifies asymmetry of power, attention, and reciprocity as the three major determinants of China’s partnership diplomacy failure, generating distorted expectations and prediction uncertainty. Using the ROK–China partnership as a case study, we adopt a conceptual frame from the literature on asymmetric alliances to increase theoretical precision, conceptual clarity, and contextual similarity. We argue that South Korea’s naivety about the asymmetries in play and China’s overestimation of the ease with which it could leverage the framework to its advantage, ultimately led to collective action dilemmas and mutually exclusive expectations. In conclusion, we incorporate diverse theoretical perspectives more attuned to the actual realities in predicting the future of the bilateral partnership.
{"title":"Asymmetry of Power, Attention, and Reciprocity: Determinants of ROK-China Partnership Diplomacy Failure","authors":"Y. Chung","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.49","url":null,"abstract":"“Partnership diplomacy” in the study of Chinese foreign affairs has weak theoretical underpinnings and has been defined in a manner insufficiently systematic for middle-range theorizing. Whilst sufficient attention has been paid to determinants of partnership formation, its failure has hitherto received scant attention. To understand this failure, this paper identifies asymmetry of power, attention, and reciprocity as the three major determinants of China’s partnership diplomacy failure, generating distorted expectations and prediction uncertainty. Using the ROK–China partnership as a case study, we adopt a conceptual frame from the literature on asymmetric alliances to increase theoretical precision, conceptual clarity, and contextual similarity. We argue that South Korea’s naivety about the asymmetries in play and China’s overestimation of the ease with which it could leverage the framework to its advantage, ultimately led to collective action dilemmas and mutually exclusive expectations. In conclusion, we incorporate diverse theoretical perspectives more attuned to the actual realities in predicting the future of the bilateral partnership.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42111568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.29
Ki-Joon Hong
The primary objective of this article is to examine the possibility of path emergence by institutionalizing the security and human rights nexus in North Korea. The underlying assumption of this study is that institutionalization of the security and human rights nexus in a repressive state sets in motion self-organizing dynamics which often shift the institutional path of the country from path dependence to path emergence, culminating in drastic socio-political transformation. Path emergence unfolds through the sequential phases of an influx of information, activation of frame resonance, strategic coordination in a network, a boomerang effect and finally a threshold effect. This theoretical framework is applied to the case of North Korea. This article argues that self-organizing dynamics may occur in North Korea if the security and human rights nexus in Korea were to be institutionalized within a single institutional framework.
{"title":"The Security and Human Rights Nexus in North Korea: Is Self-Organizing Dynamics Feasible?","authors":"Ki-Joon Hong","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.29","url":null,"abstract":"The primary objective of this article is to examine the possibility of path emergence by institutionalizing the security and human rights nexus in North Korea. The underlying assumption of this study is that institutionalization of the security and human rights nexus in a repressive state sets in motion self-organizing dynamics which often shift the institutional path of the country from path dependence to path emergence, culminating in drastic socio-political transformation. Path emergence unfolds through the sequential phases of an influx of information, activation of frame resonance, strategic coordination in a network, a boomerang effect and finally a threshold effect. This theoretical framework is applied to the case of North Korea. This article argues that self-organizing dynamics may occur in North Korea if the security and human rights nexus in Korea were to be institutionalized within a single institutional framework.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47987865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.1
YoungHa Ki
This study analyzes the Nixon administration’s attempts to renegotiate the terms of the postwar international order, focusing on two events: the reform of Bretton Woods and the Year of Europe initiative. Through these two initiatives, Nixon and Kissinger sought to tweak economic and military arrangements between the United States and Western Europe, ultimately aiming to preserve the U.S.-led liberal order and the Atlantic alliance. However, a series of American foreign policies facilitated the disintegration of the postwar international monetary system and heightened transatlantic tensions. Henry Kissinger failed to address a value complexity problem in his new European initiative, sending confusing signals to Europeans. Moreover, George Shultz’s laissez-faire monetary policy undermined transatlantic efforts to reinstate Bretton Woods, exacerbating Europe’s skepticism about U.S. intentions. Convinced that Americans were building a new political-economic system in which they would predominate, Europeans accelerated efforts to strengthen their own economic and political integration. This research emphasizes domestic sources of strain in the Atlantic alliance and the liberal international order, with further implications for post-Trump U.S. foreign policy. It highlights the importance of ideological and leadership shifts, such as the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s and the contemporary resurgence of nationalism. Also, it cautions that strategies to preserve the status quo can be interpreted as revisionist moves due to conceptualization and coordination issues in foreign policy decision-making. whether break it. A proper handling of value complexity and clear signaling of benevolent would be essential to reduce miscommunication among the allies. Secondly, this shows that domestic shifts contributed to the change in the fundamental character of the order. The Bretton Woods system embodied the principle of embedded liberalism which balanced a liberal market economy and welfare states. This study highlights how ideological and shifts in the States facilitated the evolution of the into a An interesting comparison
{"title":"Tweaking or Breaking of the International Order: Kissinger, Shultz, and Transatlantic Relations, 1971-1973","authors":"YoungHa Ki","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"This study analyzes the Nixon administration’s attempts to renegotiate the terms of the postwar international order, focusing on two events: the reform of Bretton Woods and the Year of Europe initiative. Through these two initiatives, Nixon and Kissinger sought to tweak economic and military arrangements between the United States and Western Europe, ultimately aiming to preserve the U.S.-led liberal order and the Atlantic alliance. However, a series of American foreign policies facilitated the disintegration of the postwar international monetary system and heightened transatlantic tensions. Henry Kissinger failed to address a value complexity problem in his new European initiative, sending confusing signals to Europeans. Moreover, George Shultz’s laissez-faire monetary policy undermined transatlantic efforts to reinstate Bretton Woods, exacerbating Europe’s skepticism about U.S. intentions. Convinced that Americans were building a new political-economic system in which they would predominate, Europeans accelerated efforts to strengthen their own economic and political integration. This research emphasizes domestic sources of strain in the Atlantic alliance and the liberal international order, with further implications for post-Trump U.S. foreign policy. It highlights the importance of ideological and leadership shifts, such as the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s and the contemporary resurgence of nationalism. Also, it cautions that strategies to preserve the status quo can be interpreted as revisionist moves due to conceptualization and coordination issues in foreign policy decision-making. whether break it. A proper handling of value complexity and clear signaling of benevolent would be essential to reduce miscommunication among the allies. Secondly, this shows that domestic shifts contributed to the change in the fundamental character of the order. The Bretton Woods system embodied the principle of embedded liberalism which balanced a liberal market economy and welfare states. This study highlights how ideological and shifts in the States facilitated the evolution of the into a An interesting comparison","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48308771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.105
Dong Kyu Kim, Jaein J. Lee, Byungwon Woo
What explains the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) by China? While existing studies have debated Chinese motivations behind the creation of the AIIB being revisionist or status quo oriented, we sidestep the debate and instead try to identify conditions that have provided at least a permissive environment for China to propose and establish the AIIB. We contend that the institutional rigidity, the difficulty with which institutional changes can occur over time, of the BWIs played a permissive role in the eventual establishment of the AIIB. We show that China has repeatedly complained its inadequate quota shares since early 2000s, yet its demand for increased quota shares commensurate to its size of economy has met with stiff resistance from status-quo biased countries and with the rigid rules of quota reallocation. The institutional rigidity of the BWIs is further complicated by the salience of the U.S. domestic politics in organizational decision-making of the BWIs. We highlight how the US Congress has effectively exerted a veto power over important decisions at the BWIs and how that has inflated Chinese frustration at the BWIs.
{"title":"Institutional Rigidity of the Bretton Woods Institutions, Domestic Politics of the U.S. and the Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","authors":"Dong Kyu Kim, Jaein J. Lee, Byungwon Woo","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2021.04.19.1.105","url":null,"abstract":"What explains the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) by China? While existing studies have debated Chinese motivations behind the creation of the AIIB being revisionist or status quo oriented, we sidestep the debate and instead try to identify conditions that have provided at least a permissive environment for China to propose and establish the AIIB. We contend that the institutional rigidity, the difficulty with which institutional changes can occur over time, of the BWIs played a permissive role in the eventual establishment of the AIIB. We show that China has repeatedly complained its inadequate quota shares since early 2000s, yet its demand for increased quota shares commensurate to its size of economy has met with stiff resistance from status-quo biased countries and with the rigid rules of quota reallocation. The institutional rigidity of the BWIs is further complicated by the salience of the U.S. domestic politics in organizational decision-making of the BWIs. We highlight how the US Congress has effectively exerted a veto power over important decisions at the BWIs and how that has inflated Chinese frustration at the BWIs.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43032597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2020.12.18.3.197
Su-Jean Paek
This paper explains U.S. counterproliferation success against Libya. Throughout the history of nuclear counterproliferation, Libya was the only U.S. enemy which renounced its nuclear weapons program. This success was attributed to two factors – a credible guarantor and cooperation against a common threat – which reduced the level of distrust between the U.S. and Libya. The United Kingdom, a credible guarantor with willingness and capacity, alleviated distrust between the U.S. and Libya by providing its own security guarantee to Libya and by confirming Libya’s genuine intention for denuclearization to the U.S. The U.S.-Libyan cooperation against their common enemy – terrorist groups – also weakened distrust by allowing them to cooperate again on the nuclear issue. The findings of this paper have implications for explaining U.S. counterproliferation failures against North Korea and Iran.
{"title":"Discouraging the Bomb: U.S. Counterproliferation Success against Libya","authors":"Su-Jean Paek","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2020.12.18.3.197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.12.18.3.197","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explains U.S. counterproliferation success against Libya. Throughout the history of nuclear counterproliferation, Libya was the only U.S. enemy which renounced its nuclear weapons program. This success was attributed to two factors – a credible guarantor and cooperation against a common threat – which reduced the level of distrust between the U.S. and Libya. The United Kingdom, a credible guarantor with willingness and capacity, alleviated distrust between the U.S. and Libya by providing its own security guarantee to Libya and by confirming Libya’s genuine intention for denuclearization to the U.S. The U.S.-Libyan cooperation against their common enemy – terrorist groups – also weakened distrust by allowing them to cooperate again on the nuclear issue. The findings of this paper have implications for explaining U.S. counterproliferation failures against North Korea and Iran.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49643391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2020.12.18.3.169
Alec Chung
Regarding the future of global leadership, there are four possible scenarios in a broad sense – the world led by 1) the US, 2) China, 3) both the US and China (G-2), and 4) neither the US nor China (G-0). Analyzing survey data, I examined which of the four scenarios individuals in democracies think would be better for the world in the future. The empirical results show that individuals who have a positive perception of the US and those who perceived China’s power and influence negatively were more likely to prefer the global order led by the US than China. Further, individuals who think they live in a state where democratic values such as transparency, fairness, and freedom are respected were also more likely to support the US than China as the global leader. The results suggest that those in favor of democratic values such as transparency, fairness, and freedom do not want to see a world led by China, which is regarded an authoritarian state. Finally, individuals who have a positive attitude toward trade were more likely to prefer a global order led by the US compared to one led by the G-2. However, attitudes toward trade did not affect one’s preference for a US or China-led global order. Overall, positive attitudes toward the US, negative views of China, and support for democratic values increased the likelihood that individuals would support a US-led global order.
{"title":"Who Supports the US-led Global Order? An Empirical Analysis Using Survey Data","authors":"Alec Chung","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2020.12.18.3.169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.12.18.3.169","url":null,"abstract":"Regarding the future of global leadership, there are four possible scenarios in a broad sense – the world led by 1) the US, 2) China, 3) both the US and China (G-2), and 4) neither the US nor China (G-0). Analyzing survey data, I examined which of the four scenarios individuals in democracies think would be better for the world in the future. The empirical results show that individuals who have a positive perception of the US and those who perceived China’s power and influence negatively were more likely to prefer the global order led by the US than China. Further, individuals who think they live in a state where democratic values such as transparency, fairness, and freedom are respected were also more likely to support the US than China as the global leader. The results suggest that those in favor of democratic values such as transparency, fairness, and freedom do not want to see a world led by China, which is regarded an authoritarian state. Finally, individuals who have a positive attitude toward trade were more likely to prefer a global order led by the US compared to one led by the G-2. However, attitudes toward trade did not affect one’s preference for a US or China-led global order. Overall, positive attitudes toward the US, negative views of China, and support for democratic values increased the likelihood that individuals would support a US-led global order.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49449032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2020.08.18.2.123
H. Sohn, Seokwoo Kim, Changbin Woo
The landscape of global foreign aid is changing with the growing number of new donors, especially in Asia. While Japan is no longer overwhelmingly dominant, complexity grows as China is becoming increasingly influential as an emerging donor, and Korea is rising to be a considerable donor by joining the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. In this context, there have been numerous controversies concerning East Asian donors, and even debates about the East Asian model of aid apart from the more traditional Western models. However, only a handful of studies have examined donor behavior empirically. This study aims to assess the motives in the foreign aid allocations of China, Japan, and Korea as a group and as individual donors by methodically and empirically examining aid patterns and the East Asian model of aid. This research shows that the most important drivers of aid allocations of East Asian donor are economic, as opposed to political-strategic or humanitarian, which is viewed as typical for China, Japan, and Korea. Furthermore, this characteristic of valuing economic factors can be seen more clearly in Asia and other regions compared to in Africa. However, on an individual country level, economic motives are the primary determinants of aid allocations only for China. Japan prioritizes humanitarian factors over economic ones, and Korea does not reveal a clear pattern either way. a uniform group distinct from the traditional Western model of aid, this study will show differences between each donor country by comparing the relative importance of their motives. Through such analyses, we aim for a comprehensive discussion of whether these East Asian donors on average are different from the traditional donors, and whether there are clear distinctions between individual donor countries.
{"title":"Assessing Motives in Northeast Asian Aid Allocations: China, Japan, and Korea as a Collective Group and as Individual Donors","authors":"H. Sohn, Seokwoo Kim, Changbin Woo","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2020.08.18.2.123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.08.18.2.123","url":null,"abstract":"The landscape of global foreign aid is changing with the growing number of new donors, especially in Asia. While Japan is no longer overwhelmingly dominant, complexity grows as China is becoming increasingly influential as an emerging donor, and Korea is rising to be a considerable donor by joining the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. In this context, there have been numerous controversies concerning East Asian donors, and even debates about the East Asian model of aid apart from the more traditional Western models. However, only a handful of studies have examined donor behavior empirically. This study aims to assess the motives in the foreign aid allocations of China, Japan, and Korea as a group and as individual donors by methodically and empirically examining aid patterns and the East Asian model of aid. This research shows that the most important drivers of aid allocations of East Asian donor are economic, as opposed to political-strategic or humanitarian, which is viewed as typical for China, Japan, and Korea. Furthermore, this characteristic of valuing economic factors can be seen more clearly in Asia and other regions compared to in Africa. However, on an individual country level, economic motives are the primary determinants of aid allocations only for China. Japan prioritizes humanitarian factors over economic ones, and Korea does not reveal a clear pattern either way. a uniform group distinct from the traditional Western model of aid, this study will show differences between each donor country by comparing the relative importance of their motives. Through such analyses, we aim for a comprehensive discussion of whether these East Asian donors on average are different from the traditional donors, and whether there are clear distinctions between individual donor countries.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44291594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2020.08.18.2.145
Fakhar Hussain
The increasing demands of energy supplies and limitations of the possession of natural resources of energy have been making every nature of military, economic and diplomatic stratagems of nation states. The demand and supply gap has produced an environment of strategic competition among the leading energy consuming states. China has serious concerns about the likelihood of interruptions in the smooth transportation of oil and gas shipment tankers towards China from Africa and the Gulf region through the Strait of Malacca in relation to attacks by the pirates or terrorists, as 80% of oil used in China goes through shipping lines of the Strait of Malacca. China desires for reduction of its dependency on the Strait of Malacca and has been making efforts for the development of alternative transit routes. Pakistan has been in the position of bridging the gap by making available the possible shortest transit route for the shipping of energy. China has been looking for alternate prospects to safeguard its energy supplies. In the military and strategic terms, Gawadar may help to monitor the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) originating from the Persian Gulf and bottle neck at Strait of Hormuz. Beijing can aspire to exercise considerable influence in the region, and monitor the Indo-US maritime collaboration in the Indian Ocean. This paper discusses the geostrategic imperatives of Gwadar for China in terms of Chinese quest for maritime, economic and energy security.
{"title":"Geostrategic Imperatives of Gwadar Port for China","authors":"Fakhar Hussain","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2020.08.18.2.145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.08.18.2.145","url":null,"abstract":"The increasing demands of energy supplies and limitations of the possession of natural resources of energy have been making every nature of military, economic and diplomatic stratagems of nation states. The demand and supply gap has produced an environment of strategic competition among the leading energy consuming states. China has serious concerns about the likelihood of interruptions in the smooth transportation of oil and gas shipment tankers towards China from Africa and the Gulf region through the Strait of Malacca in relation to attacks by the pirates or terrorists, as 80% of oil used in China goes through shipping lines of the Strait of Malacca. China desires for reduction of its dependency on the Strait of Malacca and has been making efforts for the development of alternative transit routes. Pakistan has been in the position of bridging the gap by making available the possible shortest transit route for the shipping of energy. China has been looking for alternate prospects to safeguard its energy supplies. In the military and strategic terms, Gawadar may help to monitor the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) originating from the Persian Gulf and bottle neck at Strait of Hormuz. Beijing can aspire to exercise considerable influence in the region, and monitor the Indo-US maritime collaboration in the Indian Ocean. This paper discusses the geostrategic imperatives of Gwadar for China in terms of Chinese quest for maritime, economic and energy security.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42875585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.87
K. Choi
This study investigates the bounded autonomy of middle power diplomacy by analyzing the continuity and changes in Taiwan’s foreign policies. The case of Taiwan, which has emerged as a middle power through democratization and economic development, illustrates how the internal state of politics and the economy and the external state of security threats simultaneously constrain the foreign policies of middle power states. Democratization and economic development function not only as constraints on the foreign policy makers who deal with external security threats but also as a means to advance foreign policy in international politics. Establishing diplomatic ties with other countries and becoming a member of international organizations show how a country’s foreign policy makers use material and normative policy tools to pursue their aims in international politics and how the interaction between internal and external conditions constrains the autonomy of foreign policy. The bounded autonomy of middle power states in dealing with great powers and security threats is primarily caused by the dual effects of democratization and economic development on the selection and use of foreign policy tools.
{"title":"Weapons Brushed By the Enemy: The Bounded Autonomy of Taiwan’s Middle Power Foreign Policy","authors":"K. Choi","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.87","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.87","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the bounded autonomy of middle power diplomacy by analyzing the continuity and changes in Taiwan’s foreign policies. The case of Taiwan, which has emerged as a middle power through democratization and economic development, illustrates how the internal state of politics and the economy and the external state of security threats simultaneously constrain the foreign policies of middle power states. Democratization and economic development function not only as constraints on the foreign policy makers who deal with external security threats but also as a means to advance foreign policy in international politics. Establishing diplomatic ties with other countries and becoming a member of international organizations show how a country’s foreign policy makers use material and normative policy tools to pursue their aims in international politics and how the interaction between internal and external conditions constrains the autonomy of foreign policy. The bounded autonomy of middle power states in dealing with great powers and security threats is primarily caused by the dual effects of democratization and economic development on the selection and use of foreign policy tools.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42714551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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