Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.33
J. Chun, Yan Ku
This study aims to analyze a reshaping of the geopolitical dynamics in the East Asian region during the 2009-2015 period, which was mainly derived from the rapid growth of Chinese power. What strategies did the three major powers in East Asia—the U.S., China, and South Korea—adopt to maintain and promote their own and their collective interests? What impact did these strategies bring to East Asian international relations? What implications do these strategies have for the future East Asian regional order? In response to these questions, this article mainly argues that during the 2009-2015 period, the U.S., China, and South Korea took three geostrategic choices—rebalancing, wedge strategy, and hedging, respectively. In particular, this study creates the concept of a historical alliance between China and South Korea against their former common adversary, Japan. As part of China’s wedge strategy, the formation of such historical alliance played a role in weakening the U.S.-ROK-Japan security triangle. These clashing strategies have produced unstable conditions in East Asia, including intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, continuity of China-Japan and Japan-ROK tensions, and an ambivalent South Korean stance. A most important measure to alleviate these volatile conditions is for the U.S. and China to not intensify their rivalry, and instead maximize mutual cooperation in dealing with various challenging global issues, such as pandemics, global economic/ financial instability, climate change, nuclear proliferation, and war on terror. This article also suggests that under the condition of the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, South Korea should
{"title":"Clashing Geostrategic Choices in East Asia, 2009-2015: Re-balancing, Wedge Strategy, and Hedging","authors":"J. Chun, Yan Ku","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.33","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to analyze a reshaping of the geopolitical dynamics in the East Asian region during the 2009-2015 period, which was mainly derived from the rapid growth of Chinese power. What strategies did the three major powers in East Asia—the U.S., China, and South Korea—adopt to maintain and promote their own and their collective interests? What impact did these strategies bring to East Asian international relations? What implications do these strategies have for the future East Asian regional order? In response to these questions, this article mainly argues that during the 2009-2015 period, the U.S., China, and South Korea took three geostrategic choices—rebalancing, wedge strategy, and hedging, respectively. In particular, this study creates the concept of a historical alliance between China and South Korea against their former common adversary, Japan. As part of China’s wedge strategy, the formation of such historical alliance played a role in weakening the U.S.-ROK-Japan security triangle. These clashing strategies have produced unstable conditions in East Asia, including intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, continuity of China-Japan and Japan-ROK tensions, and an ambivalent South Korean stance. A most important measure to alleviate these volatile conditions is for the U.S. and China to not intensify their rivalry, and instead maximize mutual cooperation in dealing with various challenging global issues, such as pandemics, global economic/ financial instability, climate change, nuclear proliferation, and war on terror. This article also suggests that under the condition of the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, South Korea should","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48496555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.59
Andrew S. Millard
In March, 2018, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) unexpectedly announced that it would re-start negotiations with the United States (US) with regards to nuclear weapons development, signaling an unexpected, but significant, U-turn in its foreign policy. Whilst many academics have put this down to the effect of increased sanctions on the DPRK, I argue that leadership changes in both the US and Republic of Korea (RoK) were the main factor, since these leadership changes brought about foreign policy changes in their respective states. Changes at the system and unit level do not appear to be significant to the DPRK’s foreign policy on their own, whereas shifts at the individual level have been more drastic than usual. This allowed the DPRK’s leadership to take advantage of the situation, at a point when the US and RoK had domestic disunity. As such, in this paper I analyze the main events at the three major levels; system, unit, and individual levels, using the IR theory of classical realism to support the thesis.
{"title":"North Korea’s 2018 Foreign Policy U-turn: Using Levels of Analysis to Understand Kim Jong-un’s Rationale","authors":"Andrew S. Millard","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.59","url":null,"abstract":"In March, 2018, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) unexpectedly announced that it would re-start negotiations with the United States (US) with regards to nuclear weapons development, signaling an unexpected, but significant, U-turn in its foreign policy. Whilst many academics have put this down to the effect of increased sanctions on the DPRK, I argue that leadership changes in both the US and Republic of Korea (RoK) were the main factor, since these leadership changes brought about foreign policy changes in their respective states. Changes at the system and unit level do not appear to be significant to the DPRK’s foreign policy on their own, whereas shifts at the individual level have been more drastic than usual. This allowed the DPRK’s leadership to take advantage of the situation, at a point when the US and RoK had domestic disunity. As such, in this paper I analyze the main events at the three major levels; system, unit, and individual levels, using the IR theory of classical realism to support the thesis.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46444831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-30DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.1
Jaewook Chung
This study explores how geographical proximity and power distribution between allies interact and affect alliance duration. Morrow (1991), based on the security-autonomy trade-off model, claims that asymmetric alliances are likely to last longer than symmetric ones. This paper, however, argues that the effect of the relative power distribution between allies on alliance duration can be conditional upon the distance between allies because geographical proximity between allies may serve to aggravate or dampen the autonomy concerns of allied states—for example, one ally may be concerned about the mounting influence of its alliance partner and this concern could be severe in case of unequal alliances because of presumably the overwhelming influence of the former on the latter, but this kind of concern may be alleviated if the two allies are geographically remote. By contrast, in case of symmetric alliances, the equal power status between allies may relieve such autonomy concerns but geographical remoteness between them may impede the effective and efficient operation of alliances. Hence, this study hypothesizes that geographically remote and unequal alliances are more likely to last longer than geographically close and unequal alliances and that geographically close and equal alliances are more likely to last longer than geographically remote and equal alliances. These hypotheses are put to test against the allied-dyad data covering the period of 1816-2002 and I find strong support for these hypotheses. However, the findings in the robustness check suggest that these findings be accepted with some reservation especially in the case of bilateral alliances.
{"title":"Capability Distribution between Allies, Geographical Proximity and Alliance Duration","authors":"Jaewook Chung","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2020.04.18.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores how geographical proximity and power distribution between allies interact and affect alliance duration. Morrow (1991), based on the security-autonomy trade-off model, claims that asymmetric alliances are likely to last longer than symmetric ones. This paper, however, argues that the effect of the relative power distribution between allies on alliance duration can be conditional upon the distance between allies because geographical proximity between allies may serve to aggravate or dampen the autonomy concerns of allied states—for example, one ally may be concerned about the mounting influence of its alliance partner and this concern could be severe in case of unequal alliances because of presumably the overwhelming influence of the former on the latter, but this kind of concern may be alleviated if the two allies are geographically remote. By contrast, in case of symmetric alliances, the equal power status between allies may relieve such autonomy concerns but geographical remoteness between them may impede the effective and efficient operation of alliances. Hence, this study hypothesizes that geographically remote and unequal alliances are more likely to last longer than geographically close and unequal alliances and that geographically close and equal alliances are more likely to last longer than geographically remote and equal alliances. These hypotheses are put to test against the allied-dyad data covering the period of 1816-2002 and I find strong support for these hypotheses. However, the findings in the robustness check suggest that these findings be accepted with some reservation especially in the case of bilateral alliances.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42937216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.267
Wonwoo Shin
The purpose of this study is to compare the aspects of China’s negotiation with Taiwan and South Korea’s negotiation with North Korea around the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement(ECFA) and Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) negotiation cases, and to derive implications from the aspects of China’s negotiation with Taiwan on the Inter-Korean relations, in a situation of a division. Con- clusions drawn from this study are as follows. First, both China’s negotiation with Taiwan and South Korea’s negotiation with North Korea are emphasizing practical interests. Second, in terms of military security, South Korea should adjust its critical point in the engagement strategy toward North Korea to the level of China’s critical point in the engagement strategy toward Taiwan. Third, South Korea should incorporate the organization responsible for Inter-Korean negotiations into the institutional system to hold the negotiation on a regular basis and also should seek for ways to grant the Inter-Korean agreement a legal status. Fourth, South Korea should minimize the changes in its North Korea policy arising from the change in the political camp and ruling party. Fifth, continuous efforts should be made to raise awareness among the South Korean people that the Inter-Korean economic cooperation project is not a means to provide a dispensational aid, but a part of investment to pursue mutual benefits. Lastly, the US influence on the Inter-Korean economic negotiations needs to be curtailed so that the negotiations are carried out in the framework of a bilateral negotiation.
{"title":"Comparative Study on the Distinctive Strategies and Factors of China’s Negotiation with Taiwan and South Korea’s Negotiation with North Korea: Focusing on the ECFA and GIC","authors":"Wonwoo Shin","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.267","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to compare the aspects of China’s negotiation with Taiwan and South Korea’s negotiation with North Korea around the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement(ECFA) and Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) negotiation cases, and to derive implications from the aspects of China’s negotiation with Taiwan on the Inter-Korean relations, in a situation of a division. Con- clusions drawn from this study are as follows. First, both China’s negotiation with Taiwan and South Korea’s negotiation with North Korea are emphasizing practical interests. Second, in terms of military security, South Korea should adjust its critical point in the engagement strategy toward North Korea to the level of China’s critical point in the engagement strategy toward Taiwan. Third, South Korea should incorporate the organization responsible for Inter-Korean negotiations into the institutional system to hold the negotiation on a regular basis and also should seek for ways to grant the Inter-Korean agreement a legal status. Fourth, South Korea should minimize the changes in its North Korea policy arising from the change in the political camp and ruling party. Fifth, continuous efforts should be made to raise awareness among the South Korean people that the Inter-Korean economic cooperation project is not a means to provide a dispensational aid, but a part of investment to pursue mutual benefits. Lastly, the US influence on the Inter-Korean economic negotiations needs to be curtailed so that the negotiations are carried out in the framework of a bilateral negotiation.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44979818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.303
Kyuteg Lim
In the existing International Political Economy literature, the Volcker Shock has been widely regarded as historical significance in the development of international political economy. Three successive waves of IPE have evolved to highlight it respectively, as a subjugation of the US state to pressures of foreign states, to international financial power, and institutional configurations of US financial power. Without close attention to the particular role of the US Federal Reserve, however, these observations obscure the unprecedented process of a new mode of monetary governance. This paper argues that the Volcker Shock ushered in the rise of the US Federal Reserve as a world monetary authority in a way that the inner-making process of autonomous monetary policy became a new way of governing monetary and financial affairs. The Federal Reserve was able to pursue autonomous monetary policy far away from the economic management of the US government and at the same time to discipline banks in international financial markets. The Federal Reserve eventually established itself as a new kind of monetary authority between US government and international financial markets. This paper contributes to the study of international monetary power.
{"title":"The Rise of the US Federal Reserve as a World Monetary Authority: Revisiting the Volcker Shock","authors":"Kyuteg Lim","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.303","url":null,"abstract":"In the existing International Political Economy literature, the Volcker Shock has been widely regarded as historical significance in the development of international political economy. Three successive waves of IPE have evolved to highlight it respectively, as a subjugation of the US state to pressures of foreign states, to international financial power, and institutional configurations of US financial power. Without close attention to the particular role of the US Federal Reserve, however, these observations obscure the unprecedented process of a new mode of monetary governance. This paper argues that the Volcker Shock ushered in the rise of the US Federal Reserve as a world monetary authority in a way that the inner-making process of autonomous monetary policy became a new way of governing monetary and financial affairs. The Federal Reserve was able to pursue autonomous monetary policy far away from the economic management of the US government and at the same time to discipline banks in international financial markets. The Federal Reserve eventually established itself as a new kind of monetary authority between US government and international financial markets. This paper contributes to the study of international monetary power.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48668924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.385
S. O’Malley
Undersea communications cables are critical infrastructure for the national security of South Korea. As an isolated, peninsular state, South Korea de-pends on these cables as its lifeline to the international community. Nonethe-less, compared to its alliance partner the United States, South Korea desig- nates fewer of its own cable systems as critical and has no uniform approach for assessing threats and protecting this indispensable infrastructure. Using a design basis threat (DBT) framework, this paper assesses the threat envi- ronment of Northeast Asia for South Korea’s undersea communications cable infrastructure, and clarifies the role of the South Korean state in protecting this infrastructure. In order to achieve these two goals, this analysis provides a threat assessment based upon South Korea’s traditional geopolitical conditions and the submarine and cyber capabilities of regional state actors—North Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. Conclusions suggest that South Korea’s undersea cables are at risk from numerous geopolitical threats and the state should participate more actively in protecting these vital lines of communica- tion.
{"title":"Assessing Threats to South Korea’s Undersea Communications Cable Infrastructure","authors":"S. O’Malley","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.385","url":null,"abstract":"Undersea communications cables are critical infrastructure for the national security of South Korea. As an isolated, peninsular state, South Korea de-pends on these cables as its lifeline to the international community. Nonethe-less, compared to its alliance partner the United States, South Korea desig- nates fewer of its own cable systems as critical and has no uniform approach for assessing threats and protecting this indispensable infrastructure. Using a design basis threat (DBT) framework, this paper assesses the threat envi- ronment of Northeast Asia for South Korea’s undersea communications cable infrastructure, and clarifies the role of the South Korean state in protecting this infrastructure. In order to achieve these two goals, this analysis provides a threat assessment based upon South Korea’s traditional geopolitical conditions and the submarine and cyber capabilities of regional state actors—North Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. Conclusions suggest that South Korea’s undersea cables are at risk from numerous geopolitical threats and the state should participate more actively in protecting these vital lines of communica- tion.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44056449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.337
D. Gill
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a muti-billion dollar mega project in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) that would connect the city of Kashgar in China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang to the port city of Gwadar in Pakistan’s province in Balochistan. A significant milestone for the project was reached when the management of the Gwadar Port was given to Chinese Overseas Port Holdings in 2013. In 2015, President Xi Jinping arrived in Pakistan to cement the development of the CPEC by signing agreements that amounted to USD 46 billion of investments. The CPEC is seen to be of high economic relevance to Pakistan as the investments would be a crucial foundation to its national development. However, this paper intends to go beyond economics and look at CPEC through the lens of geopolitics. When completed, the CPEC would outline China’s long term geopolitical plans in the Indian Ocean which could alter the region’s security environment. However, both China and Pakistan are faced with a series of challenges that hinder the maximization of the project; nevertheless, the CPEC still has serious security implications for India that it must address. Issues that encompass India’s territorial integrity and the naval build-up of China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean significantly challenge its strategic and geopolitical interests in the region. India is thus opposed to the development of the CPEC in its backyard and must craft a strategy that would serve as a counter-weight in the region.
{"title":"The Geopolitics of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC) and its Security Implications for India","authors":"D. Gill","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.337","url":null,"abstract":"The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a muti-billion dollar mega project in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) that would connect the city of Kashgar in China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang to the port city of Gwadar in Pakistan’s province in Balochistan. A significant milestone for the project was reached when the management of the Gwadar Port was given to Chinese Overseas Port Holdings in 2013. In 2015, President Xi Jinping arrived in Pakistan to cement the development of the CPEC by signing agreements that amounted to USD 46 billion of investments. The CPEC is seen to be of high economic relevance to Pakistan as the investments would be a crucial foundation to its national development. However, this paper intends to go beyond economics and look at CPEC through the lens of geopolitics. When completed, the CPEC would outline China’s long term geopolitical plans in the Indian Ocean which could alter the region’s security environment. However, both China and Pakistan are faced with a series of challenges that hinder the maximization of the project; nevertheless, the CPEC still has serious security implications for India that it must address. Issues that encompass India’s territorial integrity and the naval build-up of China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean significantly challenge its strategic and geopolitical interests in the region. India is thus opposed to the development of the CPEC in its backyard and must craft a strategy that would serve as a counter-weight in the region.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43878058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.355
Dohyun Choi
This study explores how Taiwanese domestic politics in the 1990s influenced China’s Taiwan policy in the early 2000s. To illustrate this, this paper applied Robert Putnam’s discussion of the linkage between domestic politics and international politics using the two-level game theory. Using a two-level analysis, this paper analyzes how Taiwanese social cleavages in the 1990s led to a change not only in its domestic politics but ultimately in China’s Taiwan policy. Taiwan’s social cleavages such as ethnicity and national identity have erupted throughout democratic transition in the 1990s.These social cleavages were also reflected in the political party system. As a result, political parties divided into two camps, and the unification or independence issues became the borderline between them. These points culminated in the 2000 “critical presidential election.” The 2000 Presidential election resulted in Taiwan’s strengthened bargaining power on the issue as well as its reduced win-set. The election also resulted in China’s bargaining power becoming relatively weak. In order to expand the possibility of consensus with Taiwan instead of using military threat, China expanded its win-set first and then interacted both with Taiwanese politicians from the Pan-blue camp and with Taiwanese businesspersons in China for the purposes of expanding Taiwan’s win-set. it applies Putnam’s discussion on the linkage between domestic and relations.
{"title":"How did Taiwan’s Critical Election Changed China’s Taiwan Policy in the Early 2000s: A Modified Two-Level Game Analysis","authors":"Dohyun Choi","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.355","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores how Taiwanese domestic politics in the 1990s influenced China’s Taiwan policy in the early 2000s. To illustrate this, this paper applied Robert Putnam’s discussion of the linkage between domestic politics and international politics using the two-level game theory. Using a two-level analysis, this paper analyzes how Taiwanese social cleavages in the 1990s led to a change not only in its domestic politics but ultimately in China’s Taiwan policy. Taiwan’s social cleavages such as ethnicity and national identity have erupted throughout democratic transition in the 1990s.These social cleavages were also reflected in the political party system. As a result, political parties divided into two camps, and the unification or independence issues became the borderline between them. These points culminated in the 2000 “critical presidential election.” The 2000 Presidential election resulted in Taiwan’s strengthened bargaining power on the issue as well as its reduced win-set. The election also resulted in China’s bargaining power becoming relatively weak. In order to expand the possibility of consensus with Taiwan instead of using military threat, China expanded its win-set first and then interacted both with Taiwanese politicians from the Pan-blue camp and with Taiwanese businesspersons in China for the purposes of expanding Taiwan’s win-set. it applies Putnam’s discussion on the linkage between domestic and relations.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42666360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2019.8.17.2.235
Hojung Joo and Taehee Whang
This article explores the effect of enforcement credibility on the number of negotiations during civil war peace processes. While the use of negotiations during civil wars has increased since the Cold War, there has been a lack of attention to the obstacles faced by conflict parties once negotiations begin. We argue that conflict resolution should be evaluated as a stepwise process, in which factors that increase prospects for agreement enforcement may impact the onset or frequency of negotiations differently. We rely on the international cooperation literature which addresses the relationship between bargaining and enforcement problems. As enforcement becomes more credible, parties engage in bargaining more rigorously in order to make sure the distributive terms are satisfactory. We argue that while the presence of third-party medi- ators and a negotiating partner with a strong internal support base might increase the likelihood of agreement enforcement, they may also make conflict parties more careful when drafting the agreement, since the cost of revising or breaking the agreement also rises with enforcement credibility. We test the effect of third parties and internal support on the number of negotiations using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. We find that the presence of mediators and the presence of a rebel group with a strong support base increase the frequency of negotiations. We also find that factors such as rebel territorial control and Cold War have distinct effects on negotiation onset and not on negotiation frequency, emphasizing the importance of evaluating con-The flict resolution as a multilevel process.
{"title":"Enforcement Credibility and Frequency of Negotiations in Civil Wars","authors":"Hojung Joo and Taehee Whang","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2019.8.17.2.235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.8.17.2.235","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the effect of enforcement credibility on the number of negotiations during civil war peace processes. While the use of negotiations during civil wars has increased since the Cold War, there has been a lack of attention to the obstacles faced by conflict parties once negotiations begin. We argue that conflict resolution should be evaluated as a stepwise process, in which factors that increase prospects for agreement enforcement may impact the onset or frequency of negotiations differently. We rely on the international cooperation literature which addresses the relationship between bargaining and enforcement problems. As enforcement becomes more credible, parties engage in bargaining more rigorously in order to make sure the distributive terms are satisfactory. We argue that while the presence of third-party medi- ators and a negotiating partner with a strong internal support base might increase the likelihood of agreement enforcement, they may also make conflict parties more careful when drafting the agreement, since the cost of revising or breaking the agreement also rises with enforcement credibility. We test the effect of third parties and internal support on the number of negotiations using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. We find that the presence of mediators and the presence of a rebel group with a strong support base increase the frequency of negotiations. We also find that factors such as rebel territorial control and Cold War have distinct effects on negotiation onset and not on negotiation frequency, emphasizing the importance of evaluating con-The flict resolution as a multilevel process.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48787689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2019.8.17.2.189
Jaeyeon Joo
This article explores the power and influence of interest groups and public opinion in configuring the immigration policy direction in the United States and discusses how the pro-immigrant consensus between the two entities was disrupted by the Trump administration. As interest groups have been traditionally a pro-immigrant party due to the economic benefits immigration brings to certain sectors of business, notably the agricultural and high technology industries, it has remained at odds with the moderately anti-immigrant U.S. public for many years. Recently, however, these two previously divergent entities have been converging into a pro-immigrant (in aggregate) position as the public grew more favorable of immigration in recent years. In this light, we trace this convergence of public opinion and interest group lobbying and then examine how the Trump administration has disrupted this seemingly harmonious trend in order to push through a series of anti-immigration policies that in essence represent the minority view in the United States. We further show how the growing polarization between the antiand pro-immigrant public created an opening for Trump to exploit: capturing just enough support to win the election regardless of general public sentiment and interest group lobbying.
{"title":"The convergence of public opinion and interest group lobbying and the disruption of the Trump administration in United States immigration policy","authors":"Jaeyeon Joo","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2019.8.17.2.189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.8.17.2.189","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the power and influence of interest groups and public opinion in configuring the immigration policy direction in the United States and discusses how the pro-immigrant consensus between the two entities was disrupted by the Trump administration. As interest groups have been traditionally a pro-immigrant party due to the economic benefits immigration brings to certain sectors of business, notably the agricultural and high technology industries, it has remained at odds with the moderately anti-immigrant U.S. public for many years. Recently, however, these two previously divergent entities have been converging into a pro-immigrant (in aggregate) position as the public grew more favorable of immigration in recent years. In this light, we trace this convergence of public opinion and interest group lobbying and then examine how the Trump administration has disrupted this seemingly harmonious trend in order to push through a series of anti-immigration policies that in essence represent the minority view in the United States. We further show how the growing polarization between the antiand pro-immigrant public created an opening for Trump to exploit: capturing just enough support to win the election regardless of general public sentiment and interest group lobbying.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47190313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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