The paper has been written from a philosophical perspective and triggered by the recurrent discussions in psychology about the most suitable methods to study our multifaceted subjectivity. Its main point is that a phenomenological understanding of the human person provides a robust and also flexible philosophical framework for psychology. The first part discusses three classical distinctions –individual/general; explaining/understanding; induction/interpretation– which, in spite of possible deficiencies, are useful to illustrate the specificity of the human sciences relative to the natural sciences. If not understood as an either-or dichotomy these distinctions represent the search of the right balance to reflect the complexity and richness of psychological science. The second part presents the phenomenological notions of ‘vital reduction’ and ‘personalist reduction’, where reductions does not take on an eliminativistic meaning, but of directing the mind’s gaze to attend to what is originally the case. The ‘vital reduction’ reveals a subject of experience at the center of the lifeworld, and the ‘personalist reduction’ sees in rationality –i.e., the power to grasp the meaning of things and to recognize other subjects of experience– a deeper dimension of the subject, who we can thus call a person. Psychology and phenomenology converge in disclosing the person-centeredness of our lifeworld.
{"title":"The Person at the Core of Psychological Science","authors":"J. F. Franck","doi":"10.12775/setf.2021.016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2021.016","url":null,"abstract":"The paper has been written from a philosophical perspective and triggered by the recurrent discussions in psychology about the most suitable methods to study our multifaceted subjectivity. Its main point is that a phenomenological understanding of the human person provides a robust and also flexible philosophical framework for psychology. The first part discusses three classical distinctions –individual/general; explaining/understanding; induction/interpretation– which, in spite of possible deficiencies, are useful to illustrate the specificity of the human sciences relative to the natural sciences. If not understood as an either-or dichotomy these distinctions represent the search of the right balance to reflect the complexity and richness of psychological science. The second part presents the phenomenological notions of ‘vital reduction’ and ‘personalist reduction’, where reductions does not take on an eliminativistic meaning, but of directing the mind’s gaze to attend to what is originally the case. The ‘vital reduction’ reveals a subject of experience at the center of the lifeworld, and the ‘personalist reduction’ sees in rationality –i.e., the power to grasp the meaning of things and to recognize other subjects of experience– a deeper dimension of the subject, who we can thus call a person. Psychology and phenomenology converge in disclosing the person-centeredness of our lifeworld.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75245444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are we Human Beings Unable of God? Jose Cobo maintains that the worldview of contemporary man does not allow him to believe in the sense that the first Christians believed. And he argues that the main cause of that vision has been the development of empirical science. Here I argue that in reality the cause can best be described as an anthropological error, which carries with it a metaphysical deficit. On the other hand, we rectify certain intellectual resources with which we intend to get out of this situation.
{"title":"Incapaces de Dios","authors":"E. M. Claramunt","doi":"10.12775/SETF.2021.027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/SETF.2021.027","url":null,"abstract":"Are we Human Beings Unable of God?\u0000Jose Cobo maintains that the worldview of contemporary man does not allow him to believe in the sense that the first Christians believed. And he argues that the main cause of that vision has been the development of empirical science. Here I argue that in reality the cause can best be described as an anthropological error, which carries with it a metaphysical deficit. On the other hand, we rectify certain intellectual resources with which we intend to get out of this situation.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81083060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: The study of gratitude has become an increasingly important topic among psychologists to address the nature of human flourishing. Of more recent interest is how gratitude to God specifically functions within an account of human flourishing, with theologians seeking to provide a distinctively Christian account of the nature of gratitude. This article enters into the ongoing conversation by attending to Jonathan Edwards’s (1703-1758) theological anthropology and development of natural and supernatural gratitude. In particular, Edwards’s anthropology includes within it an account of how the self can, and should, enlarge to receive another in love. This “enlargement” is the creaturely mirror of God’s self-giving and is the supernatural response to the creature who has received God’s grace and been infused with divine love. As a supernatural response based on God’s action in the soul, this account of gratitude differs from its natural counterpart. On Edwards’s account, therefore, there is a need to develop studies that differentiate natural and supernatural gratitude. Furthermore, this article ends with a suggestion for a study that could pick up this task based on recent psychological studies that attend to how gratitude affects self-relation. On Edwards’s account of the enlargement of the self, as well as his notion of supernatural gratitude, there is meaningful research to be done on how these can help assess development in the formation of gratitude and human flourishing.
{"title":"Gratitude to God: Jonathan Edwards and the Opening of the Self","authors":"K. Strobel","doi":"10.12775/setf.2021.021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2021.021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: The study of gratitude has become an increasingly important topic among psychologists to address the nature of human flourishing. Of more recent interest is how gratitude to God specifically functions within an account of human flourishing, with theologians seeking to provide a distinctively Christian account of the nature of gratitude. This article enters into the ongoing conversation by attending to Jonathan Edwards’s (1703-1758) theological anthropology and development of natural and supernatural gratitude. In particular, Edwards’s anthropology includes within it an account of how the self can, and should, enlarge to receive another in love. This “enlargement” is the creaturely mirror of God’s self-giving and is the supernatural response to the creature who has received God’s grace and been infused with divine love. As a supernatural response based on God’s action in the soul, this account of gratitude differs from its natural counterpart. On Edwards’s account, therefore, there is a need to develop studies that differentiate natural and supernatural gratitude. Furthermore, this article ends with a suggestion for a study that could pick up this task based on recent psychological studies that attend to how gratitude affects self-relation. On Edwards’s account of the enlargement of the self, as well as his notion of supernatural gratitude, there is meaningful research to be done on how these can help assess development in the formation of gratitude and human flourishing.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79564034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Empirical science, such as psychology and neuroscience, employ diverse methods to develop data driven models and explanations for complex phenomena. In research on the self, differences in these methods produce different depictions of persons. Research in developmental psychology highlights the role of intuitive beliefs, such as psychological essentialism and intuitive dualism, in individuals’ singular, cohesive, and stable sense of self. On the other hand, research in neuroscience highlights the de-centralized, distributed, multitudes of neural networks in competition making selves, with arguments around whether the interpretation of these data imply that the self is somehow fundamental and special to human functioning. In this paper, I explore these discrepant pictures of the self to advance understanding about personhood. Specifically, I suggest that these divergent pictures of self from psychology and neuroscience have the potential to inform philosophical and theological discussions around personhood by anchoring models of persons in empirical views of persons. Likewise, I explore the opportunity for philosophy and theology to inform and enhance scientific research on the self by critiquing scientific bias and construct development as well as highlighting potential limits in understanding selves with empirical models.
{"title":"A Tale of Two Perspectives: How Psychology and Neuroscience Contribute to Understanding Personhood","authors":"Erin I. Smith","doi":"10.12775/setf.2021.017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2021.017","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical science, such as psychology and neuroscience, employ diverse methods to develop data driven models and explanations for complex phenomena. In research on the self, differences in these methods produce different depictions of persons. Research in developmental psychology highlights the role of intuitive beliefs, such as psychological essentialism and intuitive dualism, in individuals’ singular, cohesive, and stable sense of self. On the other hand, research in neuroscience highlights the de-centralized, distributed, multitudes of neural networks in competition making selves, with arguments around whether the interpretation of these data imply that the self is somehow fundamental and special to human functioning. In this paper, I explore these discrepant pictures of the self to advance understanding about personhood. Specifically, I suggest that these divergent pictures of self from psychology and neuroscience have the potential to inform philosophical and theological discussions around personhood by anchoring models of persons in empirical views of persons. Likewise, I explore the opportunity for philosophy and theology to inform and enhance scientific research on the self by critiquing scientific bias and construct development as well as highlighting potential limits in understanding selves with empirical models.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81041691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent time the critique of the whole brain death as the criterion of human death, that was introduced in 1968, has been growing. The paper aims to show in systematically that there are good reasons based on empirical findings combined with Thomistic Christian anthropology to accept the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion as the criterion of human death. This will be shown through a systematic critique of other criteria of death: whole brain death, higher brain death, brain stem death, and controlled cardiac/circulatory death. The traditional cardiopulmonary criterion of death provides the opportunity to maintain the dead donor rule for organ transplantation. This also affirms the respect for human life required by the ethics of the sanctity of human life. The paper further provides a justification of dead donor rule. The paper proposes 35 minutes period after cardiac arrest to declare the patient dead, since at that time there is no possibility to autoresuscitate the heart.
{"title":"Traditional Cardiopulmonary Criterion of Death is the Only Valid Criterion of Human Death","authors":"P. Volek","doi":"10.12775/SETF.2021.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/SETF.2021.011","url":null,"abstract":"In recent time the critique of the whole brain death as the criterion of human death, that was introduced in 1968, has been growing. The paper aims to show in systematically that there are good reasons based on empirical findings combined with Thomistic Christian anthropology to accept the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion as the criterion of human death. This will be shown through a systematic critique of other criteria of death: whole brain death, higher brain death, brain stem death, and controlled cardiac/circulatory death. The traditional cardiopulmonary criterion of death provides the opportunity to maintain the dead donor rule for organ transplantation. This also affirms the respect for human life required by the ethics of the sanctity of human life. The paper further provides a justification of dead donor rule. The paper proposes 35 minutes period after cardiac arrest to declare the patient dead, since at that time there is no possibility to autoresuscitate the heart.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75469775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article I propose a theological reflection on the philosophical assumptions behind the idea that intelligent machine can be governed through ethical protocols, which may apply either to the people who develop the machines or to the machines themselves, or both. This idea is particularly relevant in the case of machines’ extreme wrongdoing, a wrongdoing that becomes an existential risk for humankind. I call this extreme wrong-doing, ‘evil.’ Thus, this article is a theological account on the philosophical assumptions behind the possibility of evil machines, machines that can create an existential risk for humankind, and the ethical remedies that limit that risk. After discussing these assumptions, I argue for the ineffectiveness of these ethical remedies to prevent the possibility of evil machines. The article is an application of Romano Guardini’s thought on technology to evil machines.
{"title":"The Government of Evil Machines: an Application of Romano Guardini’s Thought on Technology","authors":"E. Beltramini","doi":"10.12775/SETF.2021.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/SETF.2021.010","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I propose a theological reflection on the philosophical assumptions behind the idea that intelligent machine can be governed through ethical protocols, which may apply either to the people who develop the machines or to the machines themselves, or both. This idea is particularly relevant in the case of machines’ extreme wrongdoing, a wrongdoing that becomes an existential risk for humankind. I call this extreme wrong-doing, ‘evil.’ Thus, this article is a theological account on the philosophical assumptions behind the possibility of evil machines, machines that can create an existential risk for humankind, and the ethical remedies that limit that risk. After discussing these assumptions, I argue for the ineffectiveness of these ethical remedies to prevent the possibility of evil machines. The article is an application of Romano Guardini’s thought on technology to evil machines.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84227012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Psychology and Religion. Remarks from a Methodological Perspective","authors":"J. Terelak","doi":"10.12775/SETF.2021.014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/SETF.2021.014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77091295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In defence of posthuman vulnerability","authors":"Belen Liedo Fernandez, J. Rueda","doi":"10.12775/SETF.2021.008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/SETF.2021.008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84356195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In responding to Joshua Farris’ The Soul of Theological Anthropology, I suggest several reasons for questioning the theological need for substance dualism in any form. Specifically, I argue that it is not at the level of analytic argumentation that the mind or soul is best understood, and that the sciences do indeed challenge substance dualism (despite philosophical arguments to the contrary). In making this argument, I examine the roles of intuition and theological pre-commitments in one’s determination of the correct understanding of the mind or soul. I suggest that dualism is not only theologically unnecessary, but also an intuition that we have reason to question.
{"title":"Wait, But Why? Challenging the Intuitive Force of Substance Dualism","authors":"S. Ritchie","doi":"10.12775/SETF.2021.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/SETF.2021.009","url":null,"abstract":"In responding to Joshua Farris’ The Soul of Theological Anthropology, I suggest several reasons for questioning the theological need for substance dualism in any form. Specifically, I argue that it is not at the level of analytic argumentation that the mind or soul is best understood, and that the sciences do indeed challenge substance dualism (despite philosophical arguments to the contrary). In making this argument, I examine the roles of intuition and theological pre-commitments in one’s determination of the correct understanding of the mind or soul. I suggest that dualism is not only theologically unnecessary, but also an intuition that we have reason to question.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90941970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The publication of Copernicus’ On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres (since now on referred to as Revolutions) marked the beginning of the Scientific Revolution. Christian doctrine played a key role for the emergence of the scientific turning point, that brought about the transition from a qualitative to a quantitative approach to natural phenomena. Although the Polish scientist was not a philosopher in the ordinary sense of the term, he shared with many other protagonists of modern science the idea of the universe as mathematical harmony created by God. In this sense, modern scientific thought completed the development that took place since the Scholastic Age. In the historical period between the XII and the XVII century, indeed, Christianity proved a fundamental factor for a considerable growth in natural knowledge.
{"title":"Theology and Science in Copernicus’ Universe","authors":"Alessandro Giostra","doi":"10.12775/SETF.2021.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/SETF.2021.004","url":null,"abstract":"The publication of Copernicus’ On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres (since now on referred to as Revolutions) marked the beginning of the Scientific Revolution. Christian doctrine played a key role for the emergence of the scientific turning point, that brought about the transition from a qualitative to a quantitative approach to natural phenomena. Although the Polish scientist was not a philosopher in the ordinary sense of the term, he shared with many other protagonists of modern science the idea of the universe as mathematical harmony created by God. In this sense, modern scientific thought completed the development that took place since the Scholastic Age. In the historical period between the XII and the XVII century, indeed, Christianity proved a fundamental factor for a considerable growth in natural knowledge.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86016031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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