Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-54-61
Andrei V. Paribok
The article describes the linguistic conditionalities and correlations of four civilization-specific types of rationality: (1) The Great West (BZ), the heir of the ancient civilization. (2) The Afro-Asian (AA) civilization, in its current state represented by the populous Arab-Islamic world and a more ancient version of the Jewish culture. (3) The South Asian (SA) civilization, which is originated in the central part of the northern India, which defined the cultures of Indochina (except Vietnam) and earlier Indonesia. (4) The Far Eastern (DV) civilization formed in China, which spread to its neighboring countries. The author explores the correlations with the types of a developed writing based on the tiers of the linguistic structure of each of the civilizations, as well as the results of the ultimate semantic-ontological transition. The only related theory belongs to Andrei Smirnov and is called the Logic-of-sense theory. Some of its results have found their application in the thoughts expressed in this paper.
{"title":"Super-concise theses on the linguistic aspects of the theory of civilization-specific rationality","authors":"Andrei V. Paribok","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-54-61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-54-61","url":null,"abstract":"The article describes the linguistic conditionalities and correlations of four civilization-specific types of rationality: (1) The Great West (BZ), the heir of the ancient civilization. (2) The Afro-Asian (AA) civilization, in its current state represented by the populous Arab-Islamic world and a more ancient version of the Jewish culture. (3) The South Asian (SA) civilization, which is originated in the central part of the northern India, which defined the cultures of Indochina (except Vietnam) and earlier Indonesia. (4) The Far Eastern (DV) civilization formed in China, which spread to its neighboring countries. The author explores the correlations with the types of a developed writing based on the tiers of the linguistic structure of each of the civilizations, as well as the results of the ultimate semantic-ontological transition. The only related theory belongs to Andrei Smirnov and is called the Logic-of-sense theory. Some of its results have found their application in the thoughts expressed in this paper.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135712037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-160-176
E. Loginov
Skepticism about moral responsibility is one of the most elaborated approaches to this important moral phenomenon in contemporary philosophical literature. In this paper, I use the skeptical approach in general, and specific skeptical arguments in particular, to clarify the connections between the conditions of an appropriate attribution of moral responsibility and the structural elements of this attitude. A distinction is made between moral dogmatism and a critical approach to morality, and a classification is given of the possible outcomes of the latter: skepticism proper, illusionism, and revolutionary approach. The difference between general moral skepticism and skepticism about moral responsibility is defined, and a classification of the types of skepticism about moral responsibility is proposed on the basis of which the elements of the structure of attribution of responsibility are questioned. Galen Strawson’s Basic argument, Gideon Rosen’s argument from epistemological regress, and his alethic conception of moral responsibility are analyzed. It is shown that Strawson’s argument unreasonably reduces moral responsibility to a so-called true moral responsibility. It is argued that the epistemic condition of responsibility to which the argument from regress is directed can be reduced to a normative condition, and thus regress can be avoided. The connection between responsibility and retribution, which Rosen postulates, is problematized. It is argued that the control condition binds the moral agent and the agent’s moral factor; the normative condition binds the agent’s moral factor and its moral value. It is argued that the connection between a moral factor and moral value cannot be the object of skepticism about moral responsibility.
{"title":"Skepticism and moral responsibility","authors":"E. Loginov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-160-176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-160-176","url":null,"abstract":"Skepticism about moral responsibility is one of the most elaborated approaches to this important moral phenomenon in contemporary philosophical literature. In this paper, I use the skeptical approach in general, and specific skeptical arguments in particular, to clarify the connections between the conditions of an appropriate attribution of moral responsibility and the structural elements of this attitude. A distinction is made between moral dogmatism and a critical approach to morality, and a classification is given of the possible outcomes of the latter: skepticism proper, illusionism, and revolutionary approach. The difference between general moral skepticism and skepticism about moral responsibility is defined, and a classification of the types of skepticism about moral responsibility is proposed on the basis of which the elements of the structure of attribution of responsibility are questioned. Galen Strawson’s Basic argument, Gideon Rosen’s argument from epistemological regress, and his alethic conception of moral responsibility are analyzed. It is shown that Strawson’s argument unreasonably reduces moral responsibility to a so-called true moral responsibility. It is argued that the epistemic condition of responsibility to which the argument from regress is directed can be reduced to a normative condition, and thus regress can be avoided. The connection between responsibility and retribution, which Rosen postulates, is problematized. It is argued that the control condition binds the moral agent and the agent’s moral factor; the normative condition binds the agent’s moral factor and its moral value. It is argued that the connection between a moral factor and moral value cannot be the object of skepticism about moral responsibility.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-69-84
Garris S. Rogonyan
Many philosophers agree that in our relations with philosophical tradition we face a hermeneutic problem. This problem is how to achieve an adequate understanding of the representatives of this tradition. It is believed that we need to establish a dialogue with figures from the past, rather than attribute our own thoughts and ideas to them. However, few dare to offer a reliable way to achieve this. At the same time, there are those who believe that the hermeneutic problem points to a fundamentally problematic relationship with our history. In this case, we are talking not only about a separate problem requiring its solution, but about a certain attitude as well. Within this attitude, we are focused not so much on an adequate interpretation of the philosophical tradition as on its overcoming. However, the nature of these problematic relations with tradition can be described differently. For example, one can consider their dependence on tradition as an obstacle to understanding oneself and one’s relations with the world. Conversely, one can consider it a condition for such understanding. It is the latter view that John McDowell adheres to. Without denying the obvious fact that there must be a certain distance between different historical contexts, he nevertheless shows that there is no unbridgeable gap in philosophy between its present and past. The article provides an overview of how McDowell, relying on Wilfrid Sellars’s idea of the logical space of reasons and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s idea of fusion of horizons, solves this problem. In addition, the article shows why McDowell himself can be considered a representative of modernism in philosophy.
{"title":"Modernism and philosophical tradition","authors":"Garris S. Rogonyan","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-69-84","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-69-84","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers agree that in our relations with philosophical tradition we face a hermeneutic problem. This problem is how to achieve an adequate understanding of the representatives of this tradition. It is believed that we need to establish a dialogue with figures from the past, rather than attribute our own thoughts and ideas to them. However, few dare to offer a reliable way to achieve this. At the same time, there are those who believe that the hermeneutic problem points to a fundamentally problematic relationship with our history. In this case, we are talking not only about a separate problem requiring its solution, but about a certain attitude as well. Within this attitude, we are focused not so much on an adequate interpretation of the philosophical tradition as on its overcoming. However, the nature of these problematic relations with tradition can be described differently. For example, one can consider their dependence on tradition as an obstacle to understanding oneself and one’s relations with the world. Conversely, one can consider it a condition for such understanding. It is the latter view that John McDowell adheres to. Without denying the obvious fact that there must be a certain distance between different historical contexts, he nevertheless shows that there is no unbridgeable gap in philosophy between its present and past. The article provides an overview of how McDowell, relying on Wilfrid Sellars’s idea of the logical space of reasons and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s idea of fusion of horizons, solves this problem. In addition, the article shows why McDowell himself can be considered a representative of modernism in philosophy.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135710273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-176-190
Rocco Porcheddu
The aim of the present paper is to show that a particular interpretation of the end in itself, which is widely accepted in research on Kant’s critical philosophy, is at least worth discussing. I refer to the interpretation of the end in itself as a so-called existing end, i.e., something for the sake of which we perform an action but which we do not realize – simply because it already exists. As I will argue, this interpretation does not take into account a crucial aspect of the end in itself, i.e., its property of being an end. Being an end, the end in itself must fit into the Kantian general definition of a practical end and must therefore be something to be realized.
{"title":"Taking ‘end’ seriously. Some remarks on the relation between Kant’s concept of an end and the end in itself","authors":"Rocco Porcheddu","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-176-190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-176-190","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the present paper is to show that a particular interpretation of the end in itself, which is widely accepted in research on Kant’s critical philosophy, is at least worth discussing. I refer to the interpretation of the end in itself as a so-called existing end, i.e., something for the sake of which we perform an action but which we do not realize – simply because it already exists. As I will argue, this interpretation does not take into account a crucial aspect of the end in itself, i.e., its property of being an end. Being an end, the end in itself must fit into the Kantian general definition of a practical end and must therefore be something to be realized.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135711438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-5-17
Andrey V. Smirnov
The article addresses the following question: what is sense (smysl) as such, not to be confused with the sense of something. The sense as such sets the absolute limit for human consciousness, since we can be conscious only of that which makes sense, and, vice versa, what makes sense is part of our consciousness. Sense is devoid of semiotic nature, for sense as such cannot be conceptualized as something opposed to meaning or related otherwise to it or to anything denoted. Sense is a tselostnost’ (integrity). Three basic axes for sense development are discussed, that is, opposition-and-integration, unity-and-multiplicity, continuity-and-discreteness. The development of tselostnost’ (integrity) as the “what-and-such” svyaznost’ (linkage and coherence) may vary depending on the initial intuition of tselostnost’, laying down the basis for variations in pure reason. The author delineates a contour of the four types of pure reason developed by the four big cultures (European, Arab-Muslim, Indian and Chinese). This typology finds a sound parallel in the civilizational typology of reason proposed by A.V. Paribok.
{"title":"Sense positing and plurality of reason","authors":"Andrey V. Smirnov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-5-17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-5-17","url":null,"abstract":"The article addresses the following question: what is sense (smysl) as such, not to be confused with the sense of something. The sense as such sets the absolute limit for human consciousness, since we can be conscious only of that which makes sense, and, vice versa, what makes sense is part of our consciousness. Sense is devoid of semiotic nature, for sense as such cannot be conceptualized as something opposed to meaning or related otherwise to it or to anything denoted. Sense is a tselostnost’ (integrity). Three basic axes for sense development are discussed, that is, opposition-and-integration, unity-and-multiplicity, continuity-and-discreteness. The development of tselostnost’ (integrity) as the “what-and-such” svyaznost’ (linkage and coherence) may vary depending on the initial intuition of tselostnost’, laying down the basis for variations in pure reason. The author delineates a contour of the four types of pure reason developed by the four big cultures (European, Arab-Muslim, Indian and Chinese). This typology finds a sound parallel in the civilizational typology of reason proposed by A.V. Paribok.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135712028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-146-159
A. Besedin
The article analyzes an epistemic condition for moral responsibility. The condition is taken in a dispositional form: the attribution of responsibility is appropriate only if the agent was in an epistemic position suitable for obtaining knowledge relevant to moral responsibility. The choice of a dispositional interpretation of the epistemic condition is justified with the help of four thought experiments showing that the actualist understanding of this condition is unacceptable. The main question of the article concerns this epistemic position. The article presents N. Levy’s criticism of the concept of responsibility that rests on the thesis that we never find ourselves in the epistemic position required for moral responsibility. Two lines of response to Levy’s criticism are briefly considered: the Reasonable Expectation Approach and the Attributionist Approach. With the help of the analysis of a thought experiment, the condition of basic knowledge of a morally significant situation is revealed. Further analysis of this condition exposes the condition of attention for moral responsibility. Attention refers to the ability to redirect one’s cognitive resources to different tasks. The moral significance of attention is demonstrated: inattention as an excusing factor is investigated, the connection between attention and such phenomena of moral life as care and respect is shown. The article shows that the requirement of attention implies certain control over attention. The condition of attention provides an answer to Levy’s criticism, according to which we have no control over the psychological states leading to actions. This is not the case since control of attention plays this role. In conclusion, the prospects for further research are discussed: the study of the concept of control over attention, the connection of moral responsibility and consciousness, and examination of the condition of attention in the context of virtue epistemology.
{"title":"Attention as a condition for moral responsibility","authors":"A. Besedin","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-146-159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-146-159","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes an epistemic condition for moral responsibility. The condition is taken in a dispositional form: the attribution of responsibility is appropriate only if the agent was in an epistemic position suitable for obtaining knowledge relevant to moral responsibility. The choice of a dispositional interpretation of the epistemic condition is justified with the help of four thought experiments showing that the actualist understanding of this condition is unacceptable. The main question of the article concerns this epistemic position. The article presents N. Levy’s criticism of the concept of responsibility that rests on the thesis that we never find ourselves in the epistemic position required for moral responsibility. Two lines of response to Levy’s criticism are briefly considered: the Reasonable Expectation Approach and the Attributionist Approach. With the help of the analysis of a thought experiment, the condition of basic knowledge of a morally significant situation is revealed. Further analysis of this condition exposes the condition of attention for moral responsibility. Attention refers to the ability to redirect one’s cognitive resources to different tasks. The moral significance of attention is demonstrated: inattention as an excusing factor is investigated, the connection between attention and such phenomena of moral life as care and respect is shown. The article shows that the requirement of attention implies certain control over attention. The condition of attention provides an answer to Levy’s criticism, according to which we have no control over the psychological states leading to actions. This is not the case since control of attention plays this role. In conclusion, the prospects for further research are discussed: the study of the concept of control over attention, the connection of moral responsibility and consciousness, and examination of the condition of attention in the context of virtue epistemology.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.23977/phij.2023.020103
{"title":"The Contemporary Value of the Class Struggle Thought in the Communist Manifesto","authors":"","doi":"10.23977/phij.2023.020103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23977/phij.2023.020103","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68788598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-163-177
Aleksei V. Antipov, Iurii A. Trusov
Modernity is marked by the advent of technologies capable of storing data almost indefinitely. On the other hand, the data collection takes place without the conscious permission of the users. The storage and collection of personal data is a potential problem, since the digital footprint of a person on the Internet has an impact on the social and political representation of the individual, its perception by other actors. Compromising the content of a digital footprint can expose information that is not intended for others. There is currently an increasing trend of misuse of stored data, both by criminals and by companies that use the data for sale or surveillance. The need to control how data is collected, stored and used leads to the emergence in the academic literature and the legal field of the “right to be forgotten”, which allows a person to actively moderate the process of collecting and storing data, to participate in determining the circle of those to whom they can be accessed, and delete personal data. The adoption of such a right not only allows the state to influence the collection and storage of data, regulating interactions through law-making activities, but also to realize the potential of an autonomous individual. The prospect of legislating the right to be forgotten has sparked debate in the academic and professional community about the destruction of the free marketplace of ideas and the imposition of political censorship on the Internet. The article deals with the philosophical, ethical and political foundations of the right to be forgotten. The article substantiates the conclusion that the right to be forgotten has a positive heuristic potential, but at the same time it has conceptual flaws, and is also not able to completely correct the current situation of data processing. However, the implementation of the right to be forgotten in the future can have a beneficial effect on the current situation in the field of collection and storage of personal data.
{"title":"Right to be forgotten: ethical and political aspects","authors":"Aleksei V. Antipov, Iurii A. Trusov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-163-177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-163-177","url":null,"abstract":"Modernity is marked by the advent of technologies capable of storing data almost indefinitely. On the other hand, the data collection takes place without the conscious permission of the users. The storage and collection of personal data is a potential problem, since the digital footprint of a person on the Internet has an impact on the social and political representation of the individual, its perception by other actors. Compromising the content of a digital footprint can expose information that is not intended for others. There is currently an increasing trend of misuse of stored data, both by criminals and by companies that use the data for sale or surveillance. The need to control how data is collected, stored and used leads to the emergence in the academic literature and the legal field of the “right to be forgotten”, which allows a person to actively moderate the process of collecting and storing data, to participate in determining the circle of those to whom they can be accessed, and delete personal data. The adoption of such a right not only allows the state to influence the collection and storage of data, regulating interactions through law-making activities, but also to realize the potential of an autonomous individual. The prospect of legislating the right to be forgotten has sparked debate in the academic and professional community about the destruction of the free marketplace of ideas and the imposition of political censorship on the Internet. The article deals with the philosophical, ethical and political foundations of the right to be forgotten. The article substantiates the conclusion that the right to be forgotten has a positive heuristic potential, but at the same time it has conceptual flaws, and is also not able to completely correct the current situation of data processing. However, the implementation of the right to be forgotten in the future can have a beneficial effect on the current situation in the field of collection and storage of personal data.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135710276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-128-145
Karen H. Momdzhyan
The author draws a distinction between the reflective (epistemic) tradition of philosophizing and the value philosophy, which perceives the world correlating it with the needs and interests of people as well as viewing it through the prism of the man’s value preferences. The author derives this distinction from the difference between denotative judgments about being and prescriptive judgments about the proper. These two types of judgments are claimed to be related but not reducible to each other and not derived from one another. The author defends the right of a refleсtive philosophy to speak in the language of verifiable judgments of truth, while opposing the position of cognitive imperialism, which absolutizes the truth and turns it into the substance of the human spirit. The author treats the anthropological and gnoseological interpretations of the reflective philosophy, which limit its subject to the analysis of the man in his praxiological, axiological and gnoseological relation to the world, as insufficient. The article defends the now unfashionable substantive understanding of philosophy, according to which its object is not the man, but the world surrounding and embracing us, and its subject is the possible unity of the world considered in the aspects of its integrative wholeness and taxonomic universality. An integrative approach that looks for substantive distinctions and connections between the subsystems of the world, is carried out by natural philosophy, social philosophy, and philosophy of consciousness. Philosophical ontology has a different objective. It begins with the axiomatic problem of the existence of the world, the relation between the real and the ideal, and proceeds to verifiable judgments about the referential relations between the various "realms of being”. The world is considered by the discipline of ontology in a conceptual projection “the separate – the singular – the particular – the universal”, which is different from a conceptual projection “the whole – the part”. The author argues for the importance of the ontological problematics, which is of great methodological importance for non-philosophical (first of all, social and humanitarian) sciences.
{"title":"On the structure of reflective philosophical knowledge","authors":"Karen H. Momdzhyan","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-128-145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-128-145","url":null,"abstract":"The author draws a distinction between the reflective (epistemic) tradition of philosophizing and the value philosophy, which perceives the world correlating it with the needs and interests of people as well as viewing it through the prism of the man’s value preferences. The author derives this distinction from the difference between denotative judgments about being and prescriptive judgments about the proper. These two types of judgments are claimed to be related but not reducible to each other and not derived from one another. The author defends the right of a refleсtive philosophy to speak in the language of verifiable judgments of truth, while opposing the position of cognitive imperialism, which absolutizes the truth and turns it into the substance of the human spirit. The author treats the anthropological and gnoseological interpretations of the reflective philosophy, which limit its subject to the analysis of the man in his praxiological, axiological and gnoseological relation to the world, as insufficient. The article defends the now unfashionable substantive understanding of philosophy, according to which its object is not the man, but the world surrounding and embracing us, and its subject is the possible unity of the world considered in the aspects of its integrative wholeness and taxonomic universality. An integrative approach that looks for substantive distinctions and connections between the subsystems of the world, is carried out by natural philosophy, social philosophy, and philosophy of consciousness. Philosophical ontology has a different objective. It begins with the axiomatic problem of the existence of the world, the relation between the real and the ideal, and proceeds to verifiable judgments about the referential relations between the various \"realms of being”. The world is considered by the discipline of ontology in a conceptual projection “the separate – the singular – the particular – the universal”, which is different from a conceptual projection “the whole – the part”. The author argues for the importance of the ontological problematics, which is of great methodological importance for non-philosophical (first of all, social and humanitarian) sciences.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67626090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-147-162
Yuriy V. Barbaruk
Within the academic environment, we find the using of the term of biopolitics difficult because of its rather ambiguous definition. As a result, we can see either its naturalistic interpretations in which biopolitics is the application of life sciences (ethology, physiology, genetics, sociobiology, cybernetics, bioelementology, etc.) in modern politics, or definitions derived from Michel Foucault’s “biopower”, where biopolitics is a term that refers to techniques of managing all aspects of human life. In the one case, starting from biological knowledge, we come to a mosaic set of studies and techniques aimed directly or indirectly at the political process, the regulation of a political community. In the other case, we have got a historical and philosophical analysis of the development of techniques that allow for the control of entire populations in modern Western societies. This study proposed an approach to biopolitical issues in order to distinguish biopolitics, biopolitical research, and explorations in biopolitics. Such way of considering can improve the understanding of how different views interact with each other in this area, and how they relate to the existing practice of managing population.
{"title":"Biopolitical studies and research of biopolitics","authors":"Yuriy V. Barbaruk","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-147-162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-147-162","url":null,"abstract":"Within the academic environment, we find the using of the term of biopolitics difficult because of its rather ambiguous definition. As a result, we can see either its naturalistic interpretations in which biopolitics is the application of life sciences (ethology, physiology, genetics, sociobiology, cybernetics, bioelementology, etc.) in modern politics, or definitions derived from Michel Foucault’s “biopower”, where biopolitics is a term that refers to techniques of managing all aspects of human life. In the one case, starting from biological knowledge, we come to a mosaic set of studies and techniques aimed directly or indirectly at the political process, the regulation of a political community. In the other case, we have got a historical and philosophical analysis of the development of techniques that allow for the control of entire populations in modern Western societies. This study proposed an approach to biopolitical issues in order to distinguish biopolitics, biopolitical research, and explorations in biopolitics. Such way of considering can improve the understanding of how different views interact with each other in this area, and how they relate to the existing practice of managing population.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135710013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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