Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-147-160
Lora Ryskeldiyeva
The article raises the question of the place and role of deontology in philosophical discourse. In the works of the classics of deontological thought, we find different answers to this question: Aristotle understands δέοντος in the broadest context and seeks to combine “should be” (correct, established, “horizontal”) and “ought to be” (corresponding to the model, the will of God, “vertical”); in the Kantian doctrine, duty-Pflicht as a vertical elevates a person above herself; J. Bentham criticizes the idea of duty as a fiction, “ought to” is criticized as an expression of violence and lays the foundations for consequentialism. The author of the article puts forward the thesis about the “inevitability of obligation”, that is, the non-eliminativity of expressions of obligation from philosophical discourse: they play an effective role, transforming worldview into world-attitude, theory into practice, description into proscription. The ought to be (“should be”) expresses the type of attitude that can be called “rejection” and can be seen to reveal the basis of what P.P. Gaidenko called “the tragedy of aestheticism” or the result of a contemplative and theoretical attitude to the world. It is characteristic of modernity, which does not abandon plans to transform (and nowadays technocratic “reassembly”) the world. The possibility of such a world attitude is a distinctive feature of European philosophy, founded by the insurmountable gap between what is and what is due. The duty of action (“ought to do”) is associated with the world-attitude as “acceptance” and a cardinal positive solution to the problem of the correlation between “ought to” and “can”.
{"title":"On deontology, duty and aestheticism","authors":"Lora Ryskeldiyeva","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-147-160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-147-160","url":null,"abstract":"The article raises the question of the place and role of deontology in philosophical discourse. In the works of the classics of deontological thought, we find different answers to this question: Aristotle understands δέοντος in the broadest context and seeks to combine “should be” (correct, established, “horizontal”) and “ought to be” (corresponding to the model, the will of God, “vertical”); in the Kantian doctrine, duty-Pflicht as a vertical elevates a person above herself; J. Bentham criticizes the idea of duty as a fiction, “ought to” is criticized as an expression of violence and lays the foundations for consequentialism. The author of the article puts forward the thesis about the “inevitability of obligation”, that is, the non-eliminativity of expressions of obligation from philosophical discourse: they play an effective role, transforming worldview into world-attitude, theory into practice, description into proscription. The ought to be (“should be”) expresses the type of attitude that can be called “rejection” and can be seen to reveal the basis of what P.P. Gaidenko called “the tragedy of aestheticism” or the result of a contemplative and theoretical attitude to the world. It is characteristic of modernity, which does not abandon plans to transform (and nowadays technocratic “reassembly”) the world. The possibility of such a world attitude is a distinctive feature of European philosophy, founded by the insurmountable gap between what is and what is due. The duty of action (“ought to do”) is associated with the world-attitude as “acceptance” and a cardinal positive solution to the problem of the correlation between “ought to” and “can”.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67624417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-47-63
M. Volf
Epic songs played an essential didactical role in ancient Greek society, stabilizing it by the maintenance of its moral patterns. To achieve the desired effect on the audience, the aedes used special techniques. The improving aspect of epic poetry is typical for ancient authors using this genre. On the case of Parmenides’ poem, it is shown that philosophical poems follow only partially the principles of the epic genre, corresponding to it in form and, probably, in purpose, but the content has significantly transformed. Even if Parmenides set himself didactical tasks, they were directly related not to the social, but the cognitive sphere. The sophists as teachers of wisdom of the new generation, who preserved and embodied the didactic claims of bards to preserve and transmit some moral paradigm. They also used ancient techniques: improvisation, mnemonics, stylistic modes. As for didactics, the sophists also taught by patterns, not transferring and preserving ancient moral ones, but producing them anew, transforming old forms. Illustrations for the construction are given in the surviving speeches of Gorgias based on plot parallels with three songs of Demodocus in the Odyssey – on heroes, love, and insidious deception. It is shown that in the process of the construction, the logos played a role of a tool for changing the world, both for the better and for the worse, and through this process the sophist edits subtly the old moral content, working out the inversion of plot lines. The habitual form justifies and legitimizes the novelty of the content, and the audience, fascinated by the word, gradually accepts this novelty. In sum, sophists shape the moral paradigm through epic techniques, correlating ethics with the cognitive sphere, however, unlike Parmenides, the main emphasis is placed not on divine thinking, and apprehension (doxa), but on the descriptive and discursive nature of the world’s cognition.
{"title":"Illegal heirs of Demodocus: a sophistic logos as a tool for the transformation of the universe","authors":"M. Volf","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-47-63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-47-63","url":null,"abstract":"Epic songs played an essential didactical role in ancient Greek society, stabilizing it by the maintenance of its moral patterns. To achieve the desired effect on the audience, the aedes used special techniques. The improving aspect of epic poetry is typical for ancient authors using this genre. On the case of Parmenides’ poem, it is shown that philosophical poems follow only partially the principles of the epic genre, corresponding to it in form and, probably, in purpose, but the content has significantly transformed. Even if Parmenides set himself didactical tasks, they were directly related not to the social, but the cognitive sphere. The sophists as teachers of wisdom of the new generation, who preserved and embodied the didactic claims of bards to preserve and transmit some moral paradigm. They also used ancient techniques: improvisation, mnemonics, stylistic modes. As for didactics, the sophists also taught by patterns, not transferring and preserving ancient moral ones, but producing them anew, transforming old forms. Illustrations for the construction are given in the surviving speeches of Gorgias based on plot parallels with three songs of Demodocus in the Odyssey – on heroes, love, and insidious deception. It is shown that in the process of the construction, the logos played a role of a tool for changing the world, both for the better and for the worse, and through this process the sophist edits subtly the old moral content, working out the inversion of plot lines. The habitual form justifies and legitimizes the novelty of the content, and the audience, fascinated by the word, gradually accepts this novelty. In sum, sophists shape the moral paradigm through epic techniques, correlating ethics with the cognitive sphere, however, unlike Parmenides, the main emphasis is placed not on divine thinking, and apprehension (doxa), but on the descriptive and discursive nature of the world’s cognition.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-154-173
T. Rezvykh, A. Tsygankov
Based on archival materials, personal correspondence and Swiss periodicals, a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the circumstances of Semyon L. Franck’s lecture visit in Switzerland in 1929 have been performed. The place and significance of the report “The Secret of Transcendence” (“Das Rätsel des Transzendenz”), which was given in Zurich at the invitation of the local Philosophical Society, in the philosopher’s creative heritage was established. It was concluded that the content of Semyon L. Frank’s lecture is reflected the epistemological problems that the philosopher set out systematically in his pre-emigrant work “The Object of Knowledge” (1915), and then presented it to the German-speaking professional community in an abridged form in two articles published under the general title “Cognition and Being” (“Erkenntnis und Sein”) in 1928 and 1929 in the German edition of the international yearbook on the philosophy of culture “Logos”. The appendix introduces the German-language synopsis of Semyon L. Frank “The Secret of Transcendence”, stored in Box 16 of the Philosopher’s Foundation in the Bakhmetev Archives of Columbia University (New York, USA) – Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York. S.L. Frank Papers. Box 16. S.L. Frank – Manuscript Fragments Notes; archival materials are provided with Russian translation and comments.
本文根据档案资料、个人信件和瑞士期刊，从历史和哲学角度对1929年谢米恩·l·弗兰克在瑞士的演讲进行了重建。“超越的秘密”报告(“Das Rätsel des Transzendenz”)是应当地哲学协会的邀请在苏黎世发表的，在哲学家的创作遗产中确立了其地位和意义。结论是，谢苗·l·弗兰克讲座的内容反映了这位哲学家在他移居前的著作《知识的对象》(1915)中系统阐述的认识论问题，然后在1928年和1929年以“认知与存在”(“Erkenntnis und Sein”)为总标题的两篇文章的节略形式将其提交给讲德语的专业团体，发表在德国版的文化哲学国际年鉴“Lo-gos”上。附录中介绍了谢苗·l·弗兰克《超越的秘密》的德语摘要，该书保存在美国纽约哥伦比亚大学巴赫梅特夫档案馆哲学家基金会第16箱——纽约哥伦比亚大学珍本书稿图书馆巴赫梅特夫俄罗斯和东欧历史文化档案馆。S.L.弗兰克论文。16箱。S.L.弗兰克-手稿片段笔记;档案资料附有俄文翻译和评论。
{"title":"Semyon L. Frank on the “secret of transcendence”: lecture version of the “Object of Knowledge”","authors":"T. Rezvykh, A. Tsygankov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-154-173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-154-173","url":null,"abstract":"Based on archival materials, personal correspondence and Swiss periodicals, a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the circumstances of Semyon L. Franck’s lecture visit in Switzerland in 1929 have been performed. The place and significance of the report “The Secret of Transcendence” (“Das Rätsel des Transzendenz”), which was given in Zurich at the invitation of the local Philosophical Society, in the philosopher’s creative heritage was established. It was concluded that the content of Semyon L. Frank’s lecture is reflected the epistemological problems that the philosopher set out systematically in his pre-emigrant work “The Object of Knowledge” (1915), and then presented it to the German-speaking professional community in an abridged form in two articles published under the general title “Cognition and Being” (“Erkenntnis und Sein”) in 1928 and 1929 in the German edition of the international yearbook on the philosophy of culture “Logos”. The appendix introduces the German-language synopsis of Semyon L. Frank “The Secret of Transcendence”, stored in Box 16 of the Philosopher’s Foundation in the Bakhmetev Archives of Columbia University (New York, USA) – Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York. S.L. Frank Papers. Box 16. S.L. Frank – Manuscript Fragments Notes; archival materials are provided with Russian translation and comments.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-131-146
Gala V. Maksudova-Eliseeva
The paper discusses norms of reasoning in the context of a current tendency in recent discussions towards a broader interpretation of the norm. The author of the article compares two ideas about the norm: norms as arising within the framework of emancipatory social movements (on the example of the movement for neurodiversity), and norms associated with the understanding of logic as a normative science. It is shown that these directions are based on different concepts of the norm. Social movements understand the norm as derivative from social relations, while the modern norm in contemporary logic is understood as rule following. The question is raised what concept of the norm is more appropriate when reasoning is assessed. The article shows that social movements run the risk of expanding the norm of reasoning too much, because they focus on aspects of the social functioning of neurodifferent individuals, and they touch upon the issues of reasoning only in connection with cases of successful reasoning, sometimes completely ignoring the presence of stable patterns of unsuccessful reasoning. At the same time, logic, which is traditionally considered as a science that sets the norms of correct reasoning, on the contrary, in the case of a classical understanding of normativity as an unambiguous requirement to obey its canons, narrows the idea of correct reasoning. In this regard, logic was heavily criticized by social activists at the end of the twentieth century. In extreme cases, the critics called for a complete rejection of logic as a normative theory. However, within the logical theory, there is also a gradual process of expanding the norm. This process is associated, firstly, with a revision of ideas about the normativity of logic, and secondly, with the fact that logicians began to propose models of reasoning that are clearly erroneous from a pragmatic point of view. The author proposes solutions to the following tasks: firstly, she considers the main ideas of neurodiversity as well as the dialogical approach to understanding the normativity of logic; secondly, she considers the process of expanding the norm of reasoning within the framework of neurodiversity and logic.
{"title":"Logic as a normative science: between biology and social critique (a case of neurodiversity)","authors":"Gala V. Maksudova-Eliseeva","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-131-146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-131-146","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses norms of reasoning in the context of a current tendency in recent discussions towards a broader interpretation of the norm. The author of the article compares two ideas about the norm: norms as arising within the framework of emancipatory social movements (on the example of the movement for neurodiversity), and norms associated with the understanding of logic as a normative science. It is shown that these directions are based on different concepts of the norm. Social movements understand the norm as derivative from social relations, while the modern norm in contemporary logic is understood as rule following. The question is raised what concept of the norm is more appropriate when reasoning is assessed. The article shows that social movements run the risk of expanding the norm of reasoning too much, because they focus on aspects of the social functioning of neurodifferent individuals, and they touch upon the issues of reasoning only in connection with cases of successful reasoning, sometimes completely ignoring the presence of stable patterns of unsuccessful reasoning. At the same time, logic, which is traditionally considered as a science that sets the norms of correct reasoning, on the contrary, in the case of a classical understanding of normativity as an unambiguous requirement to obey its canons, narrows the idea of correct reasoning. In this regard, logic was heavily criticized by social activists at the end of the twentieth century. In extreme cases, the critics called for a complete rejection of logic as a normative theory. However, within the logical theory, there is also a gradual process of expanding the norm. This process is associated, firstly, with a revision of ideas about the normativity of logic, and secondly, with the fact that logicians began to propose models of reasoning that are clearly erroneous from a pragmatic point of view. The author proposes solutions to the following tasks: firstly, she considers the main ideas of neurodiversity as well as the dialogical approach to understanding the normativity of logic; secondly, she considers the process of expanding the norm of reasoning within the framework of neurodiversity and logic.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67624346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-176-190
E. Dolgova, A. Malinov, Valeriya V. Sliskova
The purpose of the article is to introduce “General methodology of the Humanities” (1922), one of the latest monographs by the historian, sociologist and methodologist of science Nikolay Kareev (1850–1931). The book, which the scholar did not publish during his lifetime, was introduced into scientific circulation only partially and needs further updating in terms of its significance for the history of Russian sociology. It systematizes the methodological ideas of N.I. Kareev, establishes a connection between his works with such European trends as positivism and neo-Kantianism as well as with “Russian subjective sociological school”. The proposed fragment of the seventh chapter (“Normative and applied knowledge in the humanities”) focuses on the problem of the subjective method and assessment in science. It is concluded that the subjectivism of the Russian sociological school was of a special nature: it was associated not only with the ethical attitude towards the individual and society, but also with the recognition of the internal, mental, subjective side of social life itself. The combination of practical and psychological, imperative convictions and inner experiences resulted in a theoretical synthesis of which the embodiment was the “Russian sociological school”. The “Russian subjective school” remained a positivist project for which it was possible to study society scientifically, a project that studied phenomena and not essences, a project that built on facts and not on metaphysical fabrications. In the study of social phenomena, the School introduced the principle of personality, thereby rejecting Compte’s reductionism, which drew analogies between social and physical processes. It is hypothesized that the criticism of Marxism from the standpoint of the subjectivism of the Russian sociological school could serve as an additional argument for the prohibition of the book in the 1920s. The manuscript was found in the Research Department of Manuscripts of the Russian State Library in the personal collection of N.I. Kareev and is being restored based on drafts. The publication is accompanied by an introductory article revealing the main provisions in Kareev’s work.
{"title":"Subjective method and evaluation in science (based on the materials of Nikolay I. Kareev’s manuscript “General methodology of the Humanities”)","authors":"E. Dolgova, A. Malinov, Valeriya V. Sliskova","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-176-190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-176-190","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the article is to introduce “General methodology of the Humanities” (1922), one of the latest monographs by the historian, sociologist and methodologist of science Nikolay Kareev (1850–1931). The book, which the scholar did not publish during his lifetime, was introduced into scientific circulation only partially and needs further updating in terms of its significance for the history of Russian sociology. It systematizes the methodological ideas of N.I. Kareev, establishes a connection between his works with such European trends as positivism and neo-Kantianism as well as with “Russian subjective sociological school”. The proposed fragment of the seventh chapter (“Normative and applied knowledge in the humanities”) focuses on the problem of the subjective method and assessment in science. It is concluded that the subjectivism of the Russian sociological school was of a special nature: it was associated not only with the ethical attitude towards the individual and society, but also with the recognition of the internal, mental, subjective side of social life itself. The combination of practical and psychological, imperative convictions and inner experiences resulted in a theoretical synthesis of which the embodiment was the “Russian sociological school”. The “Russian subjective school” remained a positivist project for which it was possible to study society scientifically, a project that studied phenomena and not essences, a project that built on facts and not on metaphysical fabrications. In the study of social phenomena, the School introduced the principle of personality, thereby rejecting Compte’s reductionism, which drew analogies between social and physical processes. It is hypothesized that the criticism of Marxism from the standpoint of the subjectivism of the Russian sociological school could serve as an additional argument for the prohibition of the book in the 1920s. The manuscript was found in the Research Department of Manuscripts of the Russian State Library in the personal collection of N.I. Kareev and is being restored based on drafts. The publication is accompanied by an introductory article revealing the main provisions in Kareev’s work.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67624615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-161-175
N. I. Gerasimov
The article explores the problem of periodization of mystical anarchism. The author suggests that most of the disagreements between modern researchers of the creative heritage of the 20th century anarchist-mystics is related to the absence of any historical and philosophical reference point or scheme. The article suggests viewing the whole history of the development of this phenomenon as an evolution of communities of thinkers who were equally close to anarchist and mystical ideas. Three periods are distinguished: 1) 1905–1907; 2) 1917–1930; 3) 1924–1939. In each period, the author analyzes the ideological principles of a particular community of mystical anarchists, their ability to influence the cultural landscape of their era, and their conceptual relationship with their predecessors/successors. The terms “mystical anarchist” and “anarcho-mystic” are used synonymously in this text. Particular attention is paid to the emigrant period in the history of mystical anarchists (the study is based on the analysis of periodicals of the Russian diaspora in the United States).
{"title":"History of mystical anarchism (problem of periodization)","authors":"N. I. Gerasimov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-161-175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-161-175","url":null,"abstract":"The article explores the problem of periodization of mystical anarchism. The author suggests that most of the disagreements between modern researchers of the creative heritage of the 20th century anarchist-mystics is related to the absence of any historical and philosophical reference point or scheme. The article suggests viewing the whole history of the development of this phenomenon as an evolution of communities of thinkers who were equally close to anarchist and mystical ideas. Three periods are distinguished: 1) 1905–1907; 2) 1917–1930; 3) 1924–1939. In each period, the author analyzes the ideological principles of a particular community of mystical anarchists, their ability to influence the cultural landscape of their era, and their conceptual relationship with their predecessors/successors. The terms “mystical anarchist” and “anarcho-mystic” are used synonymously in this text. Particular attention is paid to the emigrant period in the history of mystical anarchists (the study is based on the analysis of periodicals of the Russian diaspora in the United States).","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67624529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-37-50
V. Korotkikh
The object of investigation in this paper is the significance of the structure of the narrator in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” for understanding the content of the basic concepts of the work – time, history, “recollection”. This structure is determined by the correlation between the consciousness of the author and that of the reader, consciousness itself as an object of consideration and its own object. Each of the narrators goes through the same path from the point of view of logical content (“сircle” of “experience of consciousness”) but at the same time, objectivity itself is constantly becoming more complex. Time, history and “recollection” are the concepts of “experience of consciousness”, which act as universal object equivalents of experience, corresponding to the specified kinds of narrators. They reflect the movement of consciousness towards comprehending the spirit, this movement not only determines the main plot of “Phenomenology of Spirit”, but also retains its significance for the entire philosophy of Hegel. The need to recognize the dialogical nature of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” is determined by the fact that the meaning of the narrative as a whole is made up of roll calls that arise as a result of the reproduction of the same plots of experience from different points of view, and on this basis there is an ascent to the spirit and the “recollection” that embraces it. The analysis of the consideration of time, history and “recollection” as forms of objectivity of “experience of consciousness” shows that Hegel also developed a “Phenomenology of History” that is fundamentally different from the well-known course “Philosophy of History”: the movement of images of consciousness acts as a deep layer of the historical process in it, which is reproduced in “recollection” as the historical equivalent of “Logic”.
{"title":"The structure of the subject of “experience of consciousness” and the way of comprehending the spirit in Hegel’s philosophy: time, history, “recollection”","authors":"V. Korotkikh","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-37-50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-37-50","url":null,"abstract":"The object of investigation in this paper is the significance of the structure of the narrator in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” for understanding the content of the basic concepts of the work – time, history, “recollection”. This structure is determined by the correlation between the consciousness of the author and that of the reader, consciousness itself as an object of consideration and its own object. Each of the narrators goes through the same path from the point of view of logical content (“сircle” of “experience of consciousness”) but at the same time, objectivity itself is constantly becoming more complex. Time, history and “recollection” are the concepts of “experience of consciousness”, which act as universal object equivalents of experience, corresponding to the specified kinds of narrators. They reflect the movement of consciousness towards comprehending the spirit, this movement not only determines the main plot of “Phenomenology of Spirit”, but also retains its significance for the entire philosophy of Hegel. The need to recognize the dialogical nature of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” is determined by the fact that the meaning of the narrative as a whole is made up of roll calls that arise as a result of the reproduction of the same plots of experience from different points of view, and on this basis there is an ascent to the spirit and the “recollection” that embraces it. The analysis of the consideration of time, history and “recollection” as forms of objectivity of “experience of consciousness” shows that Hegel also developed a “Phenomenology of History” that is fundamentally different from the well-known course “Philosophy of History”: the movement of images of consciousness acts as a deep layer of the historical process in it, which is reproduced in “recollection” as the historical equivalent of “Logic”.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67624506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-80-93
A. Sanzhenakov
The article deals with the specifics of Elizabeth Anscombe’s approach to the history of philosophy. First, the author presents various approaches to the history of philosophy, and then gives a brief introduction of Anscombe as a philosopher and as a historian of philosophy. Her articles “Causality and Determinism” and “Practical Truth” are discussed as paradigmatic examples of Anscombe’s works on the history of philosophy. These examples show that Anscombe’s appeal to the philosophy of the past, and especially to the legacy of Aristotle, was not episodic. The reason for her turning to the history of philosophy were always caused by theoretical difficulties in the contemporary philosophical context. For instance, the article “Causality and Determinism” appeals to a wide range of sources (Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Hume, Mill) in order to show the history of the formation of the concept of causality as a necessary connection of events, but Anscombe looks for a solution to the problem in the works of her older contemporary B. Russell. Especially often, Anscombe turns to Aristotle’s practical philosophy, with the help of which she attacks contemporary concepts. In particular, she criticizes the concept of “moral obligation”, points at an incorrect understanding of the “practical syllogism”, reveals the shortcomings of the Anglo-American concept of desire. In the end, the author of the article offers a brief retelling of the analysis of the Aristotelian concept of “practical truth”, which Anscombe proposes to understand as “the truth that one produces in acting according to choice and decision”. In proposing such an interpretation, Anscombe relies less on a philological or contextual analysis, but rather is guided by her own intuitions.
{"title":"“Truth that one produces” or the history of philosophy by Elizabeth Anscombe","authors":"A. Sanzhenakov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-80-93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-80-93","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with the specifics of Elizabeth Anscombe’s approach to the history of philosophy. First, the author presents various approaches to the history of philosophy, and then gives a brief introduction of Anscombe as a philosopher and as a historian of philosophy. Her articles “Causality and Determinism” and “Practical Truth” are discussed as paradigmatic examples of Anscombe’s works on the history of philosophy. These examples show that Anscombe’s appeal to the philosophy of the past, and especially to the legacy of Aristotle, was not episodic. The reason for her turning to the history of philosophy were always caused by theoretical difficulties in the contemporary philosophical context. For instance, the article “Causality and Determinism” appeals to a wide range of sources (Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Hume, Mill) in order to show the history of the formation of the concept of causality as a necessary connection of events, but Anscombe looks for a solution to the problem in the works of her older contemporary B. Russell. Especially often, Anscombe turns to Aristotle’s practical philosophy, with the help of which she attacks contemporary concepts. In particular, she criticizes the concept of “moral obligation”, points at an incorrect understanding of the “practical syllogism”, reveals the shortcomings of the Anglo-American concept of desire. In the end, the author of the article offers a brief retelling of the analysis of the Aristotelian concept of “practical truth”, which Anscombe proposes to understand as “the truth that one produces in acting according to choice and decision”. In proposing such an interpretation, Anscombe relies less on a philological or contextual analysis, but rather is guided by her own intuitions.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-5-16
A. Kara-Murza
The article examines the question of the evolution of the philosophical and historical views of Russian intellectuals Pyotr Yakovlevich Chaadaev (1794–1856) and Vasily Vitalievich Shulgin (1878–1976). It is noted that both of them largely depart from the usual definition of the civilizational identity of Russia in the coordinates “West-East” and prefer to operate with the dichotomy “North-South”. Revealing the “Northern” identity of Russia, primarily, both Chaadaev (in the nineteenth century) and Shulgin (in the twentieth century) act in the genre of civilizational self-criticism, believing the northern (Nordic) conditionality of our culture is not a dignity, but, on the contrary, a kind of “karma”, a “Сross” that Russia has to carry through centuries of history. P.Ya. Chaadaev focuses his attention primarily on the philosophical and historical aspects of the domestic “Northerners”, defining the Russian North as a place of “solidification” of Western-origin “meanings”. In turn, V.V. Shulgin focuses his attention mainly on the forms of national identity and psychology, considering the domestic “Northerners” as a way of “cooling” (and eventually – extinguishing) the national energy.
{"title":"The “Northern” identity of Russia as a subject of civilizational self-criticism (from Pyotr Chaadaev to Vasily Shulgin)","authors":"A. Kara-Murza","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-5-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-5-16","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the question of the evolution of the philosophical and historical views of Russian intellectuals Pyotr Yakovlevich Chaadaev (1794–1856) and Vasily Vitalievich Shulgin (1878–1976). It is noted that both of them largely depart from the usual definition of the civilizational identity of Russia in the coordinates “West-East” and prefer to operate with the dichotomy “North-South”. Revealing the “Northern” identity of Russia, primarily, both Chaadaev (in the nineteenth century) and Shulgin (in the twentieth century) act in the genre of civilizational self-criticism, believing the northern (Nordic) conditionality of our culture is not a dignity, but, on the contrary, a kind of “karma”, a “Сross” that Russia has to carry through centuries of history. P.Ya. Chaadaev focuses his attention primarily on the philosophical and historical aspects of the domestic “Northerners”, defining the Russian North as a place of “solidification” of Western-origin “meanings”. In turn, V.V. Shulgin focuses his attention mainly on the forms of national identity and psychology, considering the domestic “Northerners” as a way of “cooling” (and eventually – extinguishing) the national energy.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-17-30
Maria A. Chernovskaya
A special footnote was added to the article “Educated Youth (Notes on its Life and Sentiments)”, included in the famous collection of essays Vekhi (1909), in which author A. Izgoev expressed his disagreement with a “common platform” of the collection, outlined by M. Gershenzon in the introduction. What was the reason for Izgoev’s rejection of the assertion that an individial’s inner life is the only foundation on which a society can be built? If Izgoev had criticized the ideas on intelligentsia proposed by some of Vekhi’s contributors back in 1903, why did he agree to become one of Vekhi’s contributors himself and, moreover, why did he defend Vekhi from accusations of conservatism after the publication of the volume? In our opinion, answers to these questions can be found in Izgoev’s theory of intelligentsia. The present paper is an attempt to reconstruct that theory. Izgoev believed that the conception of intelligentsia proposed by narodniks (in particular, N. Mikhaylovsky) and by neoidealists (N. Berdyaev and S. Bulgakov) was incorrect because it did not take into account the material interests of this social group. Intelligentsia earns an income by teaching and doing research, and with a lack of freedom of speech and thought in the state cannot execute its functions because the latter require a spiritual freedom. Representatives of intelligentsia can unite to fight for freedom. This is beneficial for the intelligentsia itself and contributes to the progress of the whole nation. Despite Izgoev’s disagreement with treating intelligentsia as a higher-class group that does not pursue its material interests, he, as other authors of Vekhi considered it to be the only group that was capable of transforming Russia into a democratic and law-governed state.
{"title":"A.S. Izgoev’s vision of intelligentsia","authors":"Maria A. Chernovskaya","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-17-30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-2-17-30","url":null,"abstract":"A special footnote was added to the article “Educated Youth (Notes on its Life and Sentiments)”, included in the famous collection of essays Vekhi (1909), in which author A. Izgoev expressed his disagreement with a “common platform” of the collection, outlined by M. Gershenzon in the introduction. What was the reason for Izgoev’s rejection of the assertion that an individial’s inner life is the only foundation on which a society can be built? If Izgoev had criticized the ideas on intelligentsia proposed by some of Vekhi’s contributors back in 1903, why did he agree to become one of Vekhi’s contributors himself and, moreover, why did he defend Vekhi from accusations of conservatism after the publication of the volume? In our opinion, answers to these questions can be found in Izgoev’s theory of intelligentsia. The present paper is an attempt to reconstruct that theory. Izgoev believed that the conception of intelligentsia proposed by narodniks (in particular, N. Mikhaylovsky) and by neoidealists (N. Berdyaev and S. Bulgakov) was incorrect because it did not take into account the material interests of this social group. Intelligentsia earns an income by teaching and doing research, and with a lack of freedom of speech and thought in the state cannot execute its functions because the latter require a spiritual freedom. Representatives of intelligentsia can unite to fight for freedom. This is beneficial for the intelligentsia itself and contributes to the progress of the whole nation. Despite Izgoev’s disagreement with treating intelligentsia as a higher-class group that does not pursue its material interests, he, as other authors of Vekhi considered it to be the only group that was capable of transforming Russia into a democratic and law-governed state.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：