Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-26-32
Taras A. Shiyan
The text considers the impossibility of abstracting away from the sense of formal constructions in logical and mathematical researches. The validity of the application of the “formal methodology” is allowed only after some system of conventional notations and agreements has been accepted. The context determined by such agreements is called formal. A correlation of constructions and results obtained by formal methods within several formal contexts is impossible without a consideration of the various semantic aspects of the correlated formal constructions. The author calls such correlations intercontextual. The paper examines two examples of such intercontextual comparisons to demonstrate the necessity of taking into account different semantic components of the compared formal constructions. In the context of these conclusions, the author raises the question of the structure and origin of some senses of the “symbols” used in formal constructions and of the “sequences of symbols” constructed from them. The author identifies three main sources of the semantic load carried by formal constructions. Firstly, these are the various aspects of semiotic usage: first of all, the general cultural and general professional semiotic skills of the “interpreter”. Secondly, it is the sense given to formal constructions by verbal comments, descriptions of the construction process and the associated knowledge of the “interpreter”. Thirdly, these are the senses set by the formal constructions themselves: at the stage of defining a formal language and at the stage of constructing a formal deductive or semantic system. The author also considers the fallacy of the assumption of the existence of some universal “global intuition” associated with the very possibility of formal methodology.
{"title":"On the problem of describing semantic structures and semantic activity in formal mathematics and logic","authors":"Taras A. Shiyan","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-26-32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-26-32","url":null,"abstract":"The text considers the impossibility of abstracting away from the sense of formal constructions in logical and mathematical researches. The validity of the application of the “formal methodology” is allowed only after some system of conventional notations and agreements has been accepted. The context determined by such agreements is called formal. A correlation of constructions and results obtained by formal methods within several formal contexts is impossible without a consideration of the various semantic aspects of the correlated formal constructions. The author calls such correlations intercontextual. The paper examines two examples of such intercontextual comparisons to demonstrate the necessity of taking into account different semantic components of the compared formal constructions. In the context of these conclusions, the author raises the question of the structure and origin of some senses of the “symbols” used in formal constructions and of the “sequences of symbols” constructed from them. The author identifies three main sources of the semantic load carried by formal constructions. Firstly, these are the various aspects of semiotic usage: first of all, the general cultural and general professional semiotic skills of the “interpreter”. Secondly, it is the sense given to formal constructions by verbal comments, descriptions of the construction process and the associated knowledge of the “interpreter”. Thirdly, these are the senses set by the formal constructions themselves: at the stage of defining a formal language and at the stage of constructing a formal deductive or semantic system. The author also considers the fallacy of the assumption of the existence of some universal “global intuition” associated with the very possibility of formal methodology.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135711811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-87-102
Arseniy D. Savelov
This paper examines the phenomenalism of John Stuart Mill. The analysis of the theory includes consideration of the historical context of the creation of this doctrine. This doctrine was created in a debate with philosophers whom Mill associated with the intuitive school and in particular with W. Hamilton. It is argued that for Mill the establishment of phenomenalism was in many ways a political project. Then, the author traces the influence that Berkeley and Hartley had on Mill. The relativity of human knowledge and associationism are two main elements of Mill’s theory. Specific elements of Berkeley’s immaterialism are given, with which Mill agrees and elements that Mill considers unsuccessful. The following are the laws of association of ideas recognized by Mill. After that, the author analyzes Mill’s understanding of matter. Matter is understood as a permanent possibility of sensations. The main arguments in favor of this theory are analyzed. Some of these arguments are criticized. The similarities in Mill’s approach with Hume’s understanding of reality are pointed out. Changes are traced between the presentation of the theory in the 1865 edition and in the 1867 edition. The author also demonstrates the similarity between Mill’s theory and the XX century phenomenalism. The phenomenalists of the XX century, like Mill, sought to translate statements about material objects into dispositional statements. The difficulties of interpreting the essence of possible sensations are considered. Further, the main problems arising by the adoption of this theory are analyzed. These difficulties are associated with the acceptance of only dispositions as the fundamental basis of reality, and from Berkeley Mill also gets the problem of proving the existence of other consciousnesses. The author gives attempts to solve these difficulties from the perspective of Mill’s theory.
{"title":"John Stuart Mill’s classical phenomenalism","authors":"Arseniy D. Savelov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-87-102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-87-102","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the phenomenalism of John Stuart Mill. The analysis of the theory includes consideration of the historical context of the creation of this doctrine. This doctrine was created in a debate with philosophers whom Mill associated with the intuitive school and in particular with W. Hamilton. It is argued that for Mill the establishment of phenomenalism was in many ways a political project. Then, the author traces the influence that Berkeley and Hartley had on Mill. The relativity of human knowledge and associationism are two main elements of Mill’s theory. Specific elements of Berkeley’s immaterialism are given, with which Mill agrees and elements that Mill considers unsuccessful. The following are the laws of association of ideas recognized by Mill. After that, the author analyzes Mill’s understanding of matter. Matter is understood as a permanent possibility of sensations. The main arguments in favor of this theory are analyzed. Some of these arguments are criticized. The similarities in Mill’s approach with Hume’s understanding of reality are pointed out. Changes are traced between the presentation of the theory in the 1865 edition and in the 1867 edition. The author also demonstrates the similarity between Mill’s theory and the XX century phenomenalism. The phenomenalists of the XX century, like Mill, sought to translate statements about material objects into dispositional statements. The difficulties of interpreting the essence of possible sensations are considered. Further, the main problems arising by the adoption of this theory are analyzed. These difficulties are associated with the acceptance of only dispositions as the fundamental basis of reality, and from Berkeley Mill also gets the problem of proving the existence of other consciousnesses. The author gives attempts to solve these difficulties from the perspective of Mill’s theory.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67626297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.23977/phij.2023.020106
Han Lihua
: The Republic is the work of Plato's ideal country. The seventh volume discusses the issue of cave metaphor. Cave metaphor describes a story happened inside and outside the cave. In a cave, a group of bound prisoners took illusion as reality. One of the prisoners was unbound, he went out of the cave then saw the sun and the idea of supreme goodness, and then he returned to the cave to rescue the people, but was ostracized until he was killed. Thus Plato conceived an ideal country. In order to govern the ideal country, we should train the king of philosophy as the defender of the country, so that he can take on the task of rescuing the ignorant people in the cave and making them turn their souls. Plato conceived such a philosophical kingship, aiming at achieving the harmonious unity of philosophy and politics.
{"title":"Interpretation of the Cave Metaphor in Plato's the Republic in Ancient Greek Philosophy Course","authors":"Han Lihua","doi":"10.23977/phij.2023.020106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23977/phij.2023.020106","url":null,"abstract":": The Republic is the work of Plato's ideal country. The seventh volume discusses the issue of cave metaphor. Cave metaphor describes a story happened inside and outside the cave. In a cave, a group of bound prisoners took illusion as reality. One of the prisoners was unbound, he went out of the cave then saw the sun and the idea of supreme goodness, and then he returned to the cave to rescue the people, but was ostracized until he was killed. Thus Plato conceived an ideal country. In order to govern the ideal country, we should train the king of philosophy as the defender of the country, so that he can take on the task of rescuing the ignorant people in the cave and making them turn their souls. Plato conceived such a philosophical kingship, aiming at achieving the harmonious unity of philosophy and politics.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68788650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.23977/phij.2023.020108
S. Ting, Zeng Zheng
: The Birthmark is a short story written by Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804-1864) who is one of the most influential writers in American literature in the 19th century. It tells a story of a scientist called Aylmer who cannot accept the birthmark on his wife’s cheek, because he considers the birthmark as an imperfection of his beautiful wife. Therefore, he conducts scientific experiments to remove it, which unfortunately results in his wife’s death. Influenced by his puritan ancestors and the contemporary Transcendental Movement, Hawthorne expresses his ambivalent attitude towards puritanism through the portrayal of the destiny of the main characters in the novel. Through examining the flexible choice of transitivity system and the subtle distribution of the six processes in the discourse, this thesis, thus, holds that Hawthorne’s interpretation of puritanism lies in the characterization of the two main characters in the Birthmark. Hawthorne’s mixed feelings about Puritanism are mainly reflected in two aspects, namely, his acknowledgment of original sin and criticism of the rigidity and extremism of puritanism.
{"title":"A Study of Puritanism in the Birthmark from the Perspective of Transitivity System","authors":"S. Ting, Zeng Zheng","doi":"10.23977/phij.2023.020108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23977/phij.2023.020108","url":null,"abstract":": The Birthmark is a short story written by Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804-1864) who is one of the most influential writers in American literature in the 19th century. It tells a story of a scientist called Aylmer who cannot accept the birthmark on his wife’s cheek, because he considers the birthmark as an imperfection of his beautiful wife. Therefore, he conducts scientific experiments to remove it, which unfortunately results in his wife’s death. Influenced by his puritan ancestors and the contemporary Transcendental Movement, Hawthorne expresses his ambivalent attitude towards puritanism through the portrayal of the destiny of the main characters in the novel. Through examining the flexible choice of transitivity system and the subtle distribution of the six processes in the discourse, this thesis, thus, holds that Hawthorne’s interpretation of puritanism lies in the characterization of the two main characters in the Birthmark. Hawthorne’s mixed feelings about Puritanism are mainly reflected in two aspects, namely, his acknowledgment of original sin and criticism of the rigidity and extremism of puritanism.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68788704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-62-77
Olga V. Artemyeva
The article deals with the problem of the cognitive status of moral judgements in moral philosophy and cognitive science. Having a cognitive status means that a judgement adequately expresses moral content in a form specific to morality. In moral philosophy, beginning with the Modern Times, the problem of cognitive status has been presented as a question about the nature of moral judgements and formulated as a dilemma of reason and sense. In the process of discussing this problem, two schools of thought emerged: intellectualism and sentimentalism, which set a paradigm for thinking about moral judgements that is also incorporated in contemporary ethics. In both, the assertion of the ‘rational’ or ‘emotional’ nature of moral judgements was used to justify such features as unconditionality, directness, universality, imperativeness, and non-utilitarianism. In contemporary cognitive science, the issue of the ‘rational’ or ‘emotional’ nature of moral judgements is related to the issue of the emotional-intuitive and rational-discursive factors in the formation of moral judgements. By analysing the theories of Jonathan Haidt, according to which sense-intuitive moral judgements have cognitive status, and Joshua Green, according to which only rational-discursive judgements have such status, it was shown that the dilemma of reason and feeling is not clarified in cognitive science, but only reproduced. The lesson that moral philosophy must learn from the discussion of moral judgements in cognitive science is to recognise that neither the validity of moral judgements nor their specific features depend on whether reason or feeling, reasoning or intuition is involved in their formation. These features are entirely determined by the specificity of morality as a cultural phenomenon and are not produced by natural mechanisms.
{"title":"The cognitive status of moral judgements","authors":"Olga V. Artemyeva","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-62-77","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-62-77","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with the problem of the cognitive status of moral judgements in moral philosophy and cognitive science. Having a cognitive status means that a judgement adequately expresses moral content in a form specific to morality. In moral philosophy, beginning with the Modern Times, the problem of cognitive status has been presented as a question about the nature of moral judgements and formulated as a dilemma of reason and sense. In the process of discussing this problem, two schools of thought emerged: intellectualism and sentimentalism, which set a paradigm for thinking about moral judgements that is also incorporated in contemporary ethics. In both, the assertion of the ‘rational’ or ‘emotional’ nature of moral judgements was used to justify such features as unconditionality, directness, universality, imperativeness, and non-utilitarianism. In contemporary cognitive science, the issue of the ‘rational’ or ‘emotional’ nature of moral judgements is related to the issue of the emotional-intuitive and rational-discursive factors in the formation of moral judgements. By analysing the theories of Jonathan Haidt, according to which sense-intuitive moral judgements have cognitive status, and Joshua Green, according to which only rational-discursive judgements have such status, it was shown that the dilemma of reason and feeling is not clarified in cognitive science, but only reproduced. The lesson that moral philosophy must learn from the discussion of moral judgements in cognitive science is to recognise that neither the validity of moral judgements nor their specific features depend on whether reason or feeling, reasoning or intuition is involved in their formation. These features are entirely determined by the specificity of morality as a cultural phenomenon and are not produced by natural mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135711246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-103-116
A. Krotov
The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the political views of the philosophers of Montaigne circle. The ideas put forward by Charron and La Boétie were important not only for the period of religious wars of the 16th century, but also for various aspects of the genesis of modern philosophy. If autocracy is unacceptable in principle for La Boétie, then Charron is a supporter of a monarchical state structure, although he condemns tyrannical rule. La Boétie justifies his position with references to the need to protect political freedom. Autocracy, he believes, is inseparable from arbitrariness, illegal and gross violation of the interests of the country’s residents. People can refuse freedom only voluntarily, from force of habit of obeying tyrannical power, once established by deception or violence. He considers it possible to end religious strife by a revival of the Church and a moral renewal. La Boétie’s political ideal is a republic. Charron, by contrast, considers the king a true sovereign. But rulers often have both shortcomings and vices, sometimes giving rise to tyranny, expressed in disregard for the laws and traditions of the country. Charron, like La Boétie, sees the reason for the religious wars in the damage of morals. He also sees a compromise as the best solution; to withdraw compatriots from the state of civil confrontation is possible peacefully. For Charron, as for La Boétie, social inequality, class hierarchy seems to be an invariable condition of social existence. For both, violence is an unacceptable form of implementing social improvements. Both see religion as an important pillar of social life. In the coordinate system of the two thinkers of the Montaigne circle, religious considerations are not taken beyond the general contours of their political reflections. It is noteworthy that for the philosophical landscape of the late Renaissance, the problem of religious confrontation turns out to be closely associated with the question of the best form of social structure. Discussions about it continue in our time.
{"title":"The problem of autocracy in the late Renaissance (La Boétie and Charron)","authors":"A. Krotov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-103-116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-103-116","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the political views of the philosophers of Montaigne circle. The ideas put forward by Charron and La Boétie were important not only for the period of religious wars of the 16th century, but also for various aspects of the genesis of modern philosophy. If autocracy is unacceptable in principle for La Boétie, then Charron is a supporter of a monarchical state structure, although he condemns tyrannical rule. La Boétie justifies his position with references to the need to protect political freedom. Autocracy, he believes, is inseparable from arbitrariness, illegal and gross violation of the interests of the country’s residents. People can refuse freedom only voluntarily, from force of habit of obeying tyrannical power, once established by deception or violence. He considers it possible to end religious strife by a revival of the Church and a moral renewal. La Boétie’s political ideal is a republic. Charron, by contrast, considers the king a true sovereign. But rulers often have both shortcomings and vices, sometimes giving rise to tyranny, expressed in disregard for the laws and traditions of the country. Charron, like La Boétie, sees the reason for the religious wars in the damage of morals. He also sees a compromise as the best solution; to withdraw compatriots from the state of civil confrontation is possible peacefully. For Charron, as for La Boétie, social inequality, class hierarchy seems to be an invariable condition of social existence. For both, violence is an unacceptable form of implementing social improvements. Both see religion as an important pillar of social life. In the coordinate system of the two thinkers of the Montaigne circle, religious considerations are not taken beyond the general contours of their political reflections. It is noteworthy that for the philosophical landscape of the late Renaissance, the problem of religious confrontation turns out to be closely associated with the question of the best form of social structure. Discussions about it continue in our time.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-21-38
S. Smirnov
The article provides an analysis of one problem related to the discussion of the ontological status of virtual reality. The author proposes to discuss the problem of the reality of virtual worlds in terms of transformed forms. In this regard, an analysis is given of how this concept was introduced by K. Marx and how it was discussed further in the scientific literature. It is proposed to perceive the transformed form not as a perverted or false reality, but as a separate form of life presented in its transformation. An example is the metamorphosis of the cost of labor into the monetary form of a commodity, as was shown in Capital. On this example, a proposal is made, according to which virtual reality is the same transformed form of reality, and not an illusion of consciousness, and not an imaginary world. The qualities of the transformed form of reality are introduced: 1) a separate, but not independent form of life; 2) playing a role in the process of transformation as an indirect form; 3) representation in the form of a copy of the original; 4) sign-symbolic mode of existence; 5) dependence on the original, generic form of reality, not independence. It is shown that virtual reality is, as it were, an unembodied form of reality, existence in its potency. Such a representation was presented in the history of philosophy in the form of the idea of potential being. But this idea did not subsequently become the basis for the development of an independent ontology of virtual reality. A distinction is made between the concept of virtual reality as a reality, not an illusion (the reality of digital objects) in the concept of D. Chalmers, and reality in the form of its transformed form. It is shown that virtual reality is not reduced only to the reality of imaginary worlds, to the reality of consciousness, the reality of special psychological states. The rationale is given that virtual reality is the continuation of a natural-artificial process of metamorphosis of human activity, only embodied in its transformed form. In this regard, the author proposes to interpret virtual reality as a form of life in its transformation and non-incarnation, which a person must use as a new resource for their development in order to overcome alienation from themselves.
{"title":"Virtual reality as a transformed form","authors":"S. Smirnov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-21-38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-21-38","url":null,"abstract":"The article provides an analysis of one problem related to the discussion of the ontological status of virtual reality. The author proposes to discuss the problem of the reality of virtual worlds in terms of transformed forms. In this regard, an analysis is given of how this concept was introduced by K. Marx and how it was discussed further in the scientific literature. It is proposed to perceive the transformed form not as a perverted or false reality, but as a separate form of life presented in its transformation. An example is the metamorphosis of the cost of labor into the monetary form of a commodity, as was shown in Capital. On this example, a proposal is made, according to which virtual reality is the same transformed form of reality, and not an illusion of consciousness, and not an imaginary world. The qualities of the transformed form of reality are introduced: 1) a separate, but not independent form of life; 2) playing a role in the process of transformation as an indirect form; 3) representation in the form of a copy of the original; 4) sign-symbolic mode of existence; 5) dependence on the original, generic form of reality, not independence. It is shown that virtual reality is, as it were, an unembodied form of reality, existence in its potency. Such a representation was presented in the history of philosophy in the form of the idea of potential being. But this idea did not subsequently become the basis for the development of an independent ontology of virtual reality. A distinction is made between the concept of virtual reality as a reality, not an illusion (the reality of digital objects) in the concept of D. Chalmers, and reality in the form of its transformed form. It is shown that virtual reality is not reduced only to the reality of imaginary worlds, to the reality of consciousness, the reality of special psychological states. The rationale is given that virtual reality is the continuation of a natural-artificial process of metamorphosis of human activity, only embodied in its transformed form. In this regard, the author proposes to interpret virtual reality as a form of life in its transformation and non-incarnation, which a person must use as a new resource for their development in order to overcome alienation from themselves.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67626008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-132-146
Igor A. Devaykin
The article provides a critical assessment of the project to overcome correlationism presented in Ray Brassier’s book “Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction”. Brassier is usually considered to be among the “speculative realists”, since the starting point of his philosophy in the 2000s was the struggle against correlationism. We argue that in terms of understanding correlationism, the philosopher was influenced by his colleague in speculative realism, Quentin Meillassoux. Meillassoux proposes to understand correlationism as philosophical approaches that focus on the relationship (correlation) between the poles: subject – object, signifier – signified, noema – noesis, etc. Meillassoux reproaches correlationists for not thematizing a reality independent of thinking, without which correlation itself would not exist. Meillassoux’s pathos is justified, since correlationism narrows the field of philosophical research, but Meillassoux himself cannot get rid of correlationism. Ray Brassier undertakes this task, drawing on the ideas of Wilfrid Sellars, Alain Badiou, and especially François Laruelle. Some natural-science theories also receive an anti-correlationist interpretation in Brassier’s book. Thus, the philosopher appeals to modern neurophysiology and eliminativism, as well as to cosmological physics. Based on the results of the study, it is concluded that Ray Brassier fails to overcome correlationism. The philosopher does not offer a convincing anti-correlationist interpretation of the ideas of Sellars, Badiou and Laruelle, and also does not justify the appeal to modern natural science. In addition, we come to the conclusion that the desire to oppose correlationism is productive, and for this, philosophy should shift its attention from correlation to the everyday pressure of reality itself, which the human subject cannot get rid of.
{"title":"The programme for overcoming correlationism in the book “Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction” by Ray Brassier","authors":"Igor A. Devaykin","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-132-146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-132-146","url":null,"abstract":"The article provides a critical assessment of the project to overcome correlationism presented in Ray Brassier’s book “Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction”. Brassier is usually considered to be among the “speculative realists”, since the starting point of his philosophy in the 2000s was the struggle against correlationism. We argue that in terms of understanding correlationism, the philosopher was influenced by his colleague in speculative realism, Quentin Meillassoux. Meillassoux proposes to understand correlationism as philosophical approaches that focus on the relationship (correlation) between the poles: subject – object, signifier – signified, noema – noesis, etc. Meillassoux reproaches correlationists for not thematizing a reality independent of thinking, without which correlation itself would not exist. Meillassoux’s pathos is justified, since correlationism narrows the field of philosophical research, but Meillassoux himself cannot get rid of correlationism. Ray Brassier undertakes this task, drawing on the ideas of Wilfrid Sellars, Alain Badiou, and especially François Laruelle. Some natural-science theories also receive an anti-correlationist interpretation in Brassier’s book. Thus, the philosopher appeals to modern neurophysiology and eliminativism, as well as to cosmological physics. Based on the results of the study, it is concluded that Ray Brassier fails to overcome correlationism. The philosopher does not offer a convincing anti-correlationist interpretation of the ideas of Sellars, Badiou and Laruelle, and also does not justify the appeal to modern natural science. In addition, we come to the conclusion that the desire to oppose correlationism is productive, and for this, philosophy should shift its attention from correlation to the everyday pressure of reality itself, which the human subject cannot get rid of.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135710277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-5-16
Abdusalam A. Guseynov
The main idea of the article is that the concepts of “Russian philosophy” and “philosophy in Russia” are one and the same. The very differentiation of the latter is associated with the peculiarities of the historical development of Russian philosophy, the formation of which coincided with the European turn in the development of the Russian state, carried out in the process of reforms of Peter the Great. This differentiation was justified at the initial stage and lost its meaning with the acquisition of Russian philosophy of its independence by the end of the 19th century, the emergence of the original nationally oriented philosophical teachings in it. It is shown that the specificity of philosophy as a kind of knowledge and at the same time as a form of social consciousness gives rise to the diversity of its specific manifestations, the unique identity of history and theory. It is concluded that the concept of Russian philosophy cannot be reduced to the history of Russian philosophy as a special research direction and academic subject within the subject field of professional philosophy. The question is raised about the specifics of national philosophy as a special kind of the latter.
{"title":"On the identity of Russian philosophy and philosophy in Russia","authors":"Abdusalam A. Guseynov","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-5-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-5-16","url":null,"abstract":"The main idea of the article is that the concepts of “Russian philosophy” and “philosophy in Russia” are one and the same. The very differentiation of the latter is associated with the peculiarities of the historical development of Russian philosophy, the formation of which coincided with the European turn in the development of the Russian state, carried out in the process of reforms of Peter the Great. This differentiation was justified at the initial stage and lost its meaning with the acquisition of Russian philosophy of its independence by the end of the 19th century, the emergence of the original nationally oriented philosophical teachings in it. It is shown that the specificity of philosophy as a kind of knowledge and at the same time as a form of social consciousness gives rise to the diversity of its specific manifestations, the unique identity of history and theory. It is concluded that the concept of Russian philosophy cannot be reduced to the history of Russian philosophy as a special research direction and academic subject within the subject field of professional philosophy. The question is raised about the specifics of national philosophy as a special kind of the latter.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135710278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-103-117
Taras N. Tarasenko
The article discusses the position of the Australian philosopher David Armstrong on the problem of the ontological status of the laws of nature. Through a clarification of Armstrong’s understanding of naturalism, physicalism, and factualism, the general essence of his metaphysical project is summarized. Then article presents his theory of the laws of nature, which is a kind of nomological realism: his version of the nomological argument is examined; his general grounds for rejecting the regularity theories, which is classical for the naturalistic approach, are clarified; and the role of abduction in Armstrong’s theory is demonstrated. The relation of nomic necessity, which is the key concept of his theory, is discussed in detail: its status as a second-order universal is explained; the terms of this relation, namely the types of states of affairs that constitute some special kind of universals, are distinguished; the essence of the nomic connection assumed by this relation is clarified through Armstrong’s theory of causality. Armstrong’s critique of regularity theories of laws of nature and the advantages of his nomological realism over them are discussed: cases where regularity is not law are considered; cases where there are laws that are not related to regularities, and cases where law and regularity seem to coincide, but there is reason to believe that they are different, these are the cases that appear to be most important. Finally, drawing on his own argumentation, the advantages of Armstrong’s theory over the best systems approach are justified: the problem of subjectivism and the threat of anti-realism inherent in coherentist approaches are examined; the highly counterintuitive dependence of the existence of some laws on the existence of others is pointed out; and the danger of actual contradictions within our ontology is demonstrated.
{"title":"David Armstrong’s nomological realism","authors":"Taras N. Tarasenko","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-103-117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-103-117","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses the position of the Australian philosopher David Armstrong on the problem of the ontological status of the laws of nature. Through a clarification of Armstrong’s understanding of naturalism, physicalism, and factualism, the general essence of his metaphysical project is summarized. Then article presents his theory of the laws of nature, which is a kind of nomological realism: his version of the nomological argument is examined; his general grounds for rejecting the regularity theories, which is classical for the naturalistic approach, are clarified; and the role of abduction in Armstrong’s theory is demonstrated. The relation of nomic necessity, which is the key concept of his theory, is discussed in detail: its status as a second-order universal is explained; the terms of this relation, namely the types of states of affairs that constitute some special kind of universals, are distinguished; the essence of the nomic connection assumed by this relation is clarified through Armstrong’s theory of causality. Armstrong’s critique of regularity theories of laws of nature and the advantages of his nomological realism over them are discussed: cases where regularity is not law are considered; cases where there are laws that are not related to regularities, and cases where law and regularity seem to coincide, but there is reason to believe that they are different, these are the cases that appear to be most important. Finally, drawing on his own argumentation, the advantages of Armstrong’s theory over the best systems approach are justified: the problem of subjectivism and the threat of anti-realism inherent in coherentist approaches are examined; the highly counterintuitive dependence of the existence of some laws on the existence of others is pointed out; and the danger of actual contradictions within our ontology is demonstrated.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135710280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：