Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-127-143
Mariya M. Fedorova
The article is an attempt to comprehend the radical changes in the historical self-consciousness of the modern era and their impact on modern political practices. The position of the author is that our attitude to the time of history crystallizes deep transformations of the political sphere. It is shown that the historicity regime at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries is characterized by an orientation towards today’s needs and interests (so-called presentism) and at the same time increased attention to the past (“memorial revolution”), which, in the absence of major socio-political projects of the future, plays the role of a consolidating social factor. These changes required, on the one hand, significant efforts by historians to revise the methodological foundations of their science and, on the other hand, philosophical reflection on key historiosophical concepts and meanings. The most significant discussions concern, first of all, the concept of the past in its relation to the present, “modernity”. Understanding the ontological and epistemological foundations of these concepts has become today a “bone of contention” in building modern political strategies and practices. The article demonstrates how the past from the concept of clear and self-evident, as it appeared within the framework of the historicist concepts of the Modern era, has become a philosophical and political problem in our days. There are two approaches to solving this problem. These are, firstly, those philosophers and historians who defend the modernist idea of the past as different in relation to the present, although they significantly modify it with the help of the idea of a “living past”. And secondly, those philosophers who defend the thesis about the “non-past” of the past and the continuation of its existence in the present. It is concluded that, with all the differences, both types of concepts proceed from the concept of “living past”, which implies a non-linear and “multi-layered” understanding of historical time.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-78-95
Olga V. Popova
The article considers the influence of I. Kant’s ideas on the development of philosophical and bioethical discourse on animal rights. The doctrine of I. Kant, with its inherent anthropocentric attitude, is usually regarded as opposed to the spirit of the biocentric position that has been characteristic of Anglo-Saxon utilitarianism since the time of I. Bentham. The Kantian approach is supposed to ignore the issue of animal rights. In the article, the author argues that the teachings of I. Kant had a significant impact on the formation of the discourse on animal rights not only in the sense that animal rights activists perceived the ideas of I. Kant as arguments of their ideological opponent, which should be questioned, but also in the sense that they were accepted and developed in the 20th century as part of the biocentric discourse and were used to protect animal rights.
{"title":"The animalistic turn in philosophy and bioethics and the Kantian line in the protection of animal rights","authors":"Olga V. Popova","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-78-95","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-78-95","url":null,"abstract":"The article considers the influence of I. Kant’s ideas on the development of philosophical and bioethical discourse on animal rights. The doctrine of I. Kant, with its inherent anthropocentric attitude, is usually regarded as opposed to the spirit of the biocentric position that has been characteristic of Anglo-Saxon utilitarianism since the time of I. Bentham. The Kantian approach is supposed to ignore the issue of animal rights. In the article, the author argues that the teachings of I. Kant had a significant impact on the formation of the discourse on animal rights not only in the sense that animal rights activists perceived the ideas of I. Kant as arguments of their ideological opponent, which should be questioned, but also in the sense that they were accepted and developed in the 20th century as part of the biocentric discourse and were used to protect animal rights.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135711794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-33-39
Anna A. Shiyan
The article focuses on the concept of sense in Husserl’s phenomenology. The author points to the presence of different interpretations of “sense” in phenomenology, and dwells in detail on the one that is consonant with the theme of this panel discussion. In this regard, the author refers to the introduction of the concept of sense as the core of the noema in the first book of “Ideas for Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy”. In accordance with the chosen interpretation strategy sense denotes an object considered in a phenomenological attitude, that is, an object from the point of view of its givenenness of consciousness. This means that the meaning and the subject meaningfully sense the same thing. From a phenomenological point of view, to perceive objectively means to perceive meaningfully. The article highlights the features of this concept of sense, which primarily include integrity and correlation with the content that already exists in consciousness. The author pays special attention to the fact that sense, as an objective integrity, can be understood not only material things, but also relationships, processes, states of affairs, etc. The task of phenomenology is to fix the sense, their justification and research. This research can be carried out within the framework of a theoretical cognitive approach, where the identification of the conditions for the possibility of sense as knowledge and the determination of their truth come to the fore.
{"title":"Sense as an objective integrity: a phenomenological approach","authors":"Anna A. Shiyan","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-33-39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-33-39","url":null,"abstract":"The article focuses on the concept of sense in Husserl’s phenomenology. The author points to the presence of different interpretations of “sense” in phenomenology, and dwells in detail on the one that is consonant with the theme of this panel discussion. In this regard, the author refers to the introduction of the concept of sense as the core of the noema in the first book of “Ideas for Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy”. In accordance with the chosen interpretation strategy sense denotes an object considered in a phenomenological attitude, that is, an object from the point of view of its givenenness of consciousness. This means that the meaning and the subject meaningfully sense the same thing. From a phenomenological point of view, to perceive objectively means to perceive meaningfully. The article highlights the features of this concept of sense, which primarily include integrity and correlation with the content that already exists in consciousness. The author pays special attention to the fact that sense, as an objective integrity, can be understood not only material things, but also relationships, processes, states of affairs, etc. The task of phenomenology is to fix the sense, their justification and research. This research can be carried out within the framework of a theoretical cognitive approach, where the identification of the conditions for the possibility of sense as knowledge and the determination of their truth come to the fore.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135711801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.23977/phij.2023.020107
Han Lihua
: Strauss, the advocate of classical political philosophy, made the accusation of “nihilism” against “modern rationalism” initiated by Machiavelli and Hobbes' enlightenment rationality, and advocated returning to the virtue and wisdom of Socrates of Plato in classical Greece. Strauss' political philosophy tries to return to Plato's Socrates, guide the justice with the good of natural justice, educate the legislator to return to the state of universal political community, restore the natural state of human beings. The classical natural rights lie in that the value difference derive from the hierarchy of desire, and the hierarchy of this natural value difference is regarded as the proper good and justice, just as Plato's “justice lies in the division and performance of each”. According to Strauss, the good life is consistent with human nature, that is, natural law. This is justice.
{"title":"Strauss's Criticism of Modernity and His Admiration of Classical Natural Rights","authors":"Han Lihua","doi":"10.23977/phij.2023.020107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23977/phij.2023.020107","url":null,"abstract":": Strauss, the advocate of classical political philosophy, made the accusation of “nihilism” against “modern rationalism” initiated by Machiavelli and Hobbes' enlightenment rationality, and advocated returning to the virtue and wisdom of Socrates of Plato in classical Greece. Strauss' political philosophy tries to return to Plato's Socrates, guide the justice with the good of natural justice, educate the legislator to return to the state of universal political community, restore the natural state of human beings. The classical natural rights lie in that the value difference derive from the hierarchy of desire, and the hierarchy of this natural value difference is regarded as the proper good and justice, just as Plato's “justice lies in the division and performance of each”. According to Strauss, the good life is consistent with human nature, that is, natural law. This is justice.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68788696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-5-20
A. Prokofyev
The paper deals with the correlation between the justification of morality and the justification of utilitarian normative ethics in the two treatises of Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and Deontology. In the Introduction, the general requirement of morality (‘promote the good of others’) is considered justified because a) it is integrated into the structure of the principle of utility and only contingent to the concurring principles (the principle of asceticism and the principle of sympathy and antipathy), b) the two concurring principles cannot withstand rational criticism, c) the list of principles is closed. There are two additional strategies to justify morality in the treatise. Bentham claims that the advantages of having a reputation of a trustworthy person are a sufficient reason to hold burdensome obligations. At the same time, he insists that an agent cannot persuade other people that her moral judgments are right unless these jugments are grounded in her recognition of the equal non-instrumental value of every person. In the Deontology, Bentham expands on the second strategy – the identification of moral virtue (duty) with the correctly understood personal interest of an agent. First, he proposes such a conception of moral virtue (duty) where sacrifices and efforts made by a person of prudence, probity, and beneficence are interpreted as the result of a clash among her own interests. Then, he demonstrates that the system of sanctions (sympathetic, religious, physical, moral, political) peculiar to human societies makes advantages brought by breaches of prudence, probity, and beneficence illusory.
{"title":"The justification of morality and the justification of utilitarianism in Jeremy Bentham’s ethics","authors":"A. Prokofyev","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-5-20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-5-20","url":null,"abstract":"The paper deals with the correlation between the justification of morality and the justification of utilitarian normative ethics in the two treatises of Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and Deontology. In the Introduction, the general requirement of morality (‘promote the good of others’) is considered justified because a) it is integrated into the structure of the principle of utility and only contingent to the concurring principles (the principle of asceticism and the principle of sympathy and antipathy), b) the two concurring principles cannot withstand rational criticism, c) the list of principles is closed. There are two additional strategies to justify morality in the treatise. Bentham claims that the advantages of having a reputation of a trustworthy person are a sufficient reason to hold burdensome obligations. At the same time, he insists that an agent cannot persuade other people that her moral judgments are right unless these jugments are grounded in her recognition of the equal non-instrumental value of every person. In the Deontology, Bentham expands on the second strategy – the identification of moral virtue (duty) with the correctly understood personal interest of an agent. First, he proposes such a conception of moral virtue (duty) where sacrifices and efforts made by a person of prudence, probity, and beneficence are interpreted as the result of a clash among her own interests. Then, he demonstrates that the system of sanctions (sympathetic, religious, physical, moral, political) peculiar to human societies makes advantages brought by breaches of prudence, probity, and beneficence illusory.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67625721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-1-72-86
Natalia V. Ruvimova
The article is devoted to the work of the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard “The Point of View for My Work as an Author” which is the most complete statement on the topic of his use of pseudonyms. The purpose of the article is to reveal the meaning of “The Point of View” for the study of the thinker’s creativity, to identify and discuss work-related problems. The first part of the article is devoted to the history of the creation and publication of “The Point of View”. The interpretations of pseudonymity in “The Point of View” and “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” are compared, the difference between the goals and circumstances of the creation of works is considered. The reasons why Kierkegaard postponed the publication of “The Point of View” and never published it are analyzed. In the second part of the article the content of “The Point of View” is considered. Kierkegaard's interpretation of authorship and related problems are analyzed. Kierkegaard connects his interpretation with the modern crisis of Christianity and shows that in these conditions a direct message about Christianity is impossible. A religious author who carries out indirect communication appears as a new religious type. The formation of these views of the thinker and their significance in the context of his epoch are discussed. The author of the article shows that the last part of “The Point of View” is in contradiction with its first part. Next, the criticism of “The Point of View” is considered. The author concludes that the skeptical attitude towards the content of the work is fair, but it is more aimed at destroying ideas about the possible integrity of Kierkegaard’s work and is influenced by Derrida’s doctrine of deconstruction. The contradiction between the parts of “The Point of View” may be a consequence of Kierkegaard’s religious views and his communicative strategy. Arguments are made in favor of a positive attitude to the work and problems are formulated, work on which will help clarify the topic of pseudonymity. The author concludes that “The Point of View” is an important source through which we can trace the change in Kierkegaard’s attitude to his work.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-118-131
Nina N. Sosna
The article focuses on the symptomatic interpretation of some modern concepts that appeal to a cosmic order. Against the background of well-known “dark”, homeless systems proposed by such Western thinkers as Q. Meillassoux, K. Barad, D. Haraway, E. Thacker et al., trying to present pictures of a world “without us”, the author examines here anti-colonialist approaches that complement the conclusions of European and North American researchers in their own way. The author shows that the ideas of a direct connection between a moral act and a cosmic order or humanity spilled throughout the cosmos, although it turns out that they cannot be considered as the basis for universal coexistence, can nevertheless act as an engine of practical communication. With all fluctuations in the terminology that they use, in which the interchangeability of cosmopolitanism, cosmology and space is not uncommon, combined with attempts to maintain the specificity of the “local”, it seems that these different works obviously tend to construct a new special type of statement.
本文着重于对一些现代概念的症状性解释，这些概念呼吁一种宇宙秩序。在众所周知的“黑暗”的背景下，西方思想家如Q. Meillassoux, K. Barad, D. Haraway, E. Thacker等人提出了无家可归的系统，试图呈现一个“没有我们”的世界的图片，作者在这里考察了反殖民主义的方法，这些方法以自己的方式补充了欧洲和北美研究人员的结论。作者指出，道德行为与宇宙秩序或人性之间存在直接联系的思想在宇宙中蔓延，虽然不能被视为普遍共存的基础，但却可以作为实际交流的引擎。从他们使用的术语的波动来看，其中世界主义、宇宙论和空间的互换性并不罕见，再加上试图保持“本地”的特殊性，这些不同的作品似乎明显倾向于构建一种新的特殊类型的陈述。
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-191-203
Vladimir V. Seliverstov
This paper considers different views on existent golden mountain problem, the subject of dispute within the framework of the discussion between Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell, which took place in the period from 1904 to 1920. Namely, we are talking about Russell’s argument that Meinong’s theory contains a contradiction regarding different types of existence. According to Russell, it turns out that Meinong thought that the existent golden mountain exists, but it does not exist. The entire discussion was divided into several stages. During the discussion, the conceptions of both authors changed, as well as their attitude to each other’s theories and the formulation of the problem. Russell at fiesta thought that it’s wrong to assert that there can be any correct propositions about non-existent objects like the current king of France, the golden mountain, or a round square. At that stage of the discussion the theory of Meinong did not have sufficient tools to clarify its position on this issue. This problem was solved only ten years later, but the problem of the “existing golden mountain” remained and was never sufficiently clarified by Meinong. Meinong agreed with Russell that, according to his theory, it follows “The existing golden mountain exists, but does not exist” is correct proposition, but at the same time pointed out that the concept of ‘existence’ is used in a different sense. Commentators and followers of Meinong (Ernst Mally, John Findlay, Dale Jacquette) believed that this refinement did not solve the problem, and therefore offered their own solutions in the framework of the theory of objects.The purpose of this study is to find out whether the methods proposed by them really solve the problem of the existent golden mountain, whether they violate any principles of the Meinong theory, and finally, whether it is possible to solve this problem.
本文以1904年至1920年梅农与罗素的争论为背景，对现存的金山问题进行了不同的思考。也就是说，我们正在谈论罗素的论点，即美农的理论包含了关于不同类型存在的矛盾。根据罗素的说法，原来美农认为存在的金山是存在的，但它并不存在。整个讨论分为几个阶段。在讨论过程中，两位作者的观念发生了变化，他们对彼此的理论和问题的表述态度也发生了变化。罗素在嘉年华上认为，对于不存在的物体，比如现在的法国国王、金山或圆形正方形，断言存在任何正确命题是错误的。在讨论的那个阶段，美农理论并没有足够的工具来阐明自己在这个问题上的立场。这个问题在十年后才得到解决，但“现存的金山”问题一直没有得到美农的充分澄清。梅农同意罗素的观点，认为根据罗素的理论，“现有的金山是存在的，但不存在”是正确的命题，但同时指出“存在”的概念是在不同的意义上使用的。美农的评论家和追随者(Ernst Mally, John Findlay, Dale Jacquette)认为这种细化并不能解决问题，因此在对象理论的框架内提出了自己的解决方案。他们提出的方法是否真正解决了现存金山的问题，是否违背了美农理论的原则，最后，是否有可能解决这个问题，是本研究的目的。
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-34-40
Vladimir V. Sidorin
The frequent opposition of “philosophy in Russia” and “Russian philosophy” is considered by the author as a counterproductive dilemma that prevents the natural interaction of the cultural and historical originality of national philosophizing and world philosophical culture. The most important point in this regard is the need of depoliticization and deideologization of discussions about the Russian philosophical heritage. One of the key problems in this regard is the circumstance that the contemporary history of Russian philosophy continues to use the self-description language of Russian philosophy of the first half of the 20th century. It causes, on the one hand, the uncritical use of philosophical ideas, categories, concepts of the past in the modern cultural and historical context, on the other hand, the fundamental rejection of work with this conceptual apparatus. The most characteristic examples in this regard are the concepts of “sobornost’” and so called “Russian idea”. The inclusion of the Russian philosophical heritage in the subject field of modern philosophy is hampered, in turn, by a number of circumstances caused both by the fragmentation of modern philosophical knowledge and the blurring of its disciplinary boundaries, and by the specifics of the formation of the Russian professional philosophical community. Historical reasons have necessarily led to a significant gap between the Russian philosophical heritage of the 19th–20th centuries and the conceptual and methodological space of modern philosophical thought. Awareness of this gap, in turn, caused a kind of corporate rift within the Russian philosophical community – its division into groups dealing with issues that claim to be relevant, and a community focused on the study of the Russian philosophical heritage. Overcoming this conceptual gap and corporate rift turns out to be necessary prerequisites for the genuine actualization of the Russian philosophical heritage in modern conditions.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-47-53
Ruzana V. Pskhu
The article analyzes the aspect of the subject-predicative relationship, the actualization of which is superficially associated with the development of analytical philosophy in the West. This question has an important philosophical deepening (from grammar through logic to ontology) also in the history of Indian thought. In particular, the Sanskrit term sāmānādhikaraṇya, which is commonly translated as ‘correlative predication’, has become an important ontological principle in one of the vedānta schools (viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja). Previously, this term is found in the grammar of Panini and in the related philosophy of the Bhartirhari language In viśiṣṭādvaita, this term denotes (a) a logical and grammatical method of interpreting the sacred texts, according to which all texts of śruti, despite their inconsistency, should be considered by the interpreter as equally authoritative; (b) the principle justifying and explaining the viśiṣṭādvaitic model of ontology; (c) and the resulting only possible paradigm of liberation of the soul (bhakti, or devotional love of God, which is based on karma and jñāna, as a way of salvation). The analysis of the material of Indian philosophy is carried out in the context of the developments of Western European philosophy, in particular, Porphyry and a number of analytical philosophers (Frege, Russell, Wittshenstein). Using the example of sāmānādhikaraṇya, a different logical model of the structure of the world is presented, which makes the ontology proposed in viśiṣṭādvaita understandable and convincing.
{"title":"One more logical subject? Logical and grammatical foundations in viśiṣṭādvaita","authors":"Ruzana V. Pskhu","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-47-53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-2-47-53","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the aspect of the subject-predicative relationship, the actualization of which is superficially associated with the development of analytical philosophy in the West. This question has an important philosophical deepening (from grammar through logic to ontology) also in the history of Indian thought. In particular, the Sanskrit term sāmānādhikaraṇya, which is commonly translated as ‘correlative predication’, has become an important ontological principle in one of the vedānta schools (viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja). Previously, this term is found in the grammar of Panini and in the related philosophy of the Bhartirhari language In viśiṣṭādvaita, this term denotes (a) a logical and grammatical method of interpreting the sacred texts, according to which all texts of śruti, despite their inconsistency, should be considered by the interpreter as equally authoritative; (b) the principle justifying and explaining the viśiṣṭādvaitic model of ontology; (c) and the resulting only possible paradigm of liberation of the soul (bhakti, or devotional love of God, which is based on karma and jñāna, as a way of salvation). The analysis of the material of Indian philosophy is carried out in the context of the developments of Western European philosophy, in particular, Porphyry and a number of analytical philosophers (Frege, Russell, Wittshenstein). Using the example of sāmānādhikaraṇya, a different logical model of the structure of the world is presented, which makes the ontology proposed in viśiṣṭādvaita understandable and convincing.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135711637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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