Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.1163/1477285X-12341242
Luca Bertolino
Abstract The philosophical question “what is?” (τί ἐστι;) plays different roles in the work of Cohen and Rosenzweig. According to Cohen, it expresses the authentic meaning of the Socratic concept, which has its methodical-transcendental foundation in the Platonic Idea as answer, since it gives an account of the concept. So Cohen turns the question into an epistemological problem, because it ultimately refers to the necessary condition of knowledge. In contrast, Rosenzweig sees in the “what is?” question grounds to condemn the “old” philosophy founded on the identity of being and thought. In his view, the question is the original sin of the “philosophy of the All,” which has always reduced everything to something completely different by means of the altering word “is” in the “is”-question. Nevertheless, with regard to the “what is?” question, it is possible to detect a kind of agreement between the two philosophers: namely, Rosenzweig opposes a claim of ontological reduction that Cohen also rejects.
{"title":"Die Frage „Was ist?“ bei Hermann Cohen und Franz Rosenzweig","authors":"Luca Bertolino","doi":"10.1163/1477285X-12341242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/1477285X-12341242","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The philosophical question “what is?” (τί ἐστι;) plays different roles in the work of Cohen and Rosenzweig. According to Cohen, it expresses the authentic meaning of the Socratic concept, which has its methodical-transcendental foundation in the Platonic Idea as answer, since it gives an account of the concept. So Cohen turns the question into an epistemological problem, because it ultimately refers to the necessary condition of knowledge. In contrast, Rosenzweig sees in the “what is?” question grounds to condemn the “old” philosophy founded on the identity of being and thought. In his view, the question is the original sin of the “philosophy of the All,” which has always reduced everything to something completely different by means of the altering word “is” in the “is”-question. Nevertheless, with regard to the “what is?” question, it is possible to detect a kind of agreement between the two philosophers: namely, Rosenzweig opposes a claim of ontological reduction that Cohen also rejects.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"16 1","pages":"57-71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83197829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1163/147728512X629826
M. Kavka
Abstract The work of Martin Buber oscillates between talk in which transcendence is experienced and talk in which transcendence is merely postulated. In order to show and mend this incoherence in Buber’s thought, this essay attends to the rhetoric of verification (Bewahrung), primarily but not solely in I and Thou (1923), both in order to show how it is a symptom of this incoherence, and also to show a broad pragmatic strain in Buber’s thought. Given this pragmatic strain, the essay argues that a weak notion of Buberian verification, in which taking a dialogic stance with reference to others evinces the right to talk of the real possibility of transcendence (a You-world, or God as the “eternal You”), is all that is necessary to combat despair. Strong notions of encounter are unnecessary, and also sink Buber in a morass of theodicy, in which he interprets historical misfortune and destruction as evidence of history’s meaning.
{"title":"Verification (Bewährung) in Martin Buber","authors":"M. Kavka","doi":"10.1163/147728512X629826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/147728512X629826","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The work of Martin Buber oscillates between talk in which transcendence is experienced and talk in which transcendence is merely postulated. In order to show and mend this incoherence in Buber’s thought, this essay attends to the rhetoric of verification (Bewahrung), primarily but not solely in I and Thou (1923), both in order to show how it is a symptom of this incoherence, and also to show a broad pragmatic strain in Buber’s thought. Given this pragmatic strain, the essay argues that a weak notion of Buberian verification, in which taking a dialogic stance with reference to others evinces the right to talk of the real possibility of transcendence (a You-world, or God as the “eternal You”), is all that is necessary to combat despair. Strong notions of encounter are unnecessary, and also sink Buber in a morass of theodicy, in which he interprets historical misfortune and destruction as evidence of history’s meaning.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"72 1","pages":"71-98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78926193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1163/147728512X629835
M. Zank
Abstract Proceeding from Jewish philosophy’s origins in the convergence and divergence of Greek and Jewish thought and the resulting possibilities of construing Judaism and philosophy as heterogeneous or homogeneous, and ranging across the three major “ages” or linguistic matrices of Jewish philosophizing (Hellenistic, Judeo-Arabic, and Germanic), the essay describes Jewish philosophy as an unresolvable entanglement in a dialectic of heteronomy and autonomy.
{"title":"The Heteronomy of Modern Jewish Philosophy","authors":"M. Zank","doi":"10.1163/147728512X629835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/147728512X629835","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Proceeding from Jewish philosophy’s origins in the convergence and divergence of Greek and Jewish thought and the resulting possibilities of construing Judaism and philosophy as heterogeneous or homogeneous, and ranging across the three major “ages” or linguistic matrices of Jewish philosophizing (Hellenistic, Judeo-Arabic, and Germanic), the essay describes Jewish philosophy as an unresolvable entanglement in a dialectic of heteronomy and autonomy.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 6 1","pages":"99-134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85053884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1163/147728512X629817
M. Bienenstock
Abstract At the beginning of his best seller Meaning in History, Karl Lowith launches a violent attack against Jewish prophetism, using the philosophy of history of Hermann Cohen as his first and foremost example. This article purports to show that Lowith misinterpreted the thought of Hermann Cohen. It also reclaims Cohen’s own position on history and on the philosophy of history by identifying the questions Cohen himself had asked in his time. At the end of the article, some paths of research are indicated that might prove themselves fruitful today, in a further study of Cohen’s thought.
{"title":"Hermann Cohen on the Concept of History: An Invention of Prophetism?","authors":"M. Bienenstock","doi":"10.1163/147728512X629817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/147728512X629817","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract At the beginning of his best seller Meaning in History, Karl Lowith launches a violent attack against Jewish prophetism, using the philosophy of history of Hermann Cohen as his first and foremost example. This article purports to show that Lowith misinterpreted the thought of Hermann Cohen. It also reclaims Cohen’s own position on history and on the philosophy of history by identifying the questions Cohen himself had asked in his time. At the end of the article, some paths of research are indicated that might prove themselves fruitful today, in a further study of Cohen’s thought.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"1 1","pages":"55-70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75361450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1163/1477285X-12341240
Zachary J. Braiterman
Abstract In this paper, I attempt to consider Jewish philosophy in opposition to the anti-ocularcentrism that defined the German Jewish philosophical tradition after Kant, namely the idea that Judaism—or at least its philosophical expression in Maimonidean philosophy—is aniconic and cognitively abstract. I do so by attempting to rethink the epistemic-veridical place of the imagination and visual experience in the Guide of the Perplexed. Once the imagination has been disciplined by reason, is there any cognitive status to an image or sound that the eye or the ear perceives, and to that mental faculty that combines and recombines such impressions? Is the sight or sound of revelation a hallucination or just a mere figure of speech? Does it bear any relation to a spiritual reality external to the human mind and finite physical existence? To address these questions I explore the visual images, both iconic and aniconic-abstract, that distinguish the Guide. There is no getting past the visual imagination, although I am not sure Maimonides would have recognized it as such. Even when he leaves behind figurative visual cues such as the false image-work of the undisciplined imagination or the appearance of angels and images of God found in lower grades of prophecy, he turns to another visual register, namely the “abstract art” of pure, dazzling light. In regard to these questions, Maimonides was more Greek than German, ascribing, cautiously, penultimate cognitive status to the visual imagination.
{"title":"Maimonides and the Visual Image after Kant and Cohen","authors":"Zachary J. Braiterman","doi":"10.1163/1477285X-12341240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/1477285X-12341240","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I attempt to consider Jewish philosophy in opposition to the anti-ocularcentrism that defined the German Jewish philosophical tradition after Kant, namely the idea that Judaism—or at least its philosophical expression in Maimonidean philosophy—is aniconic and cognitively abstract. I do so by attempting to rethink the epistemic-veridical place of the imagination and visual experience in the Guide of the Perplexed. Once the imagination has been disciplined by reason, is there any cognitive status to an image or sound that the eye or the ear perceives, and to that mental faculty that combines and recombines such impressions? Is the sight or sound of revelation a hallucination or just a mere figure of speech? Does it bear any relation to a spiritual reality external to the human mind and finite physical existence? To address these questions I explore the visual images, both iconic and aniconic-abstract, that distinguish the Guide. There is no getting past the visual imagination, although I am not sure Maimonides would have recognized it as such. Even when he leaves behind figurative visual cues such as the false image-work of the undisciplined imagination or the appearance of angels and images of God found in lower grades of prophecy, he turns to another visual register, namely the “abstract art” of pure, dazzling light. In regard to these questions, Maimonides was more Greek than German, ascribing, cautiously, penultimate cognitive status to the visual imagination.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"8 1","pages":"217-230"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85835049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1163/147728512X629790
Sergey Dolgopolski
Abstract This article traces a historical shift, and in particular its erasure from memory on the intellectual map of the West, in concepts of subjectivity across practices of rabbinic thinking in late antiquity, medieval interpretations of the Talmud, and modern talmudic scholarship. I first introduce a comparative perspective that relies on a mutual hermeneutics of philosophical and talmudic traditions. I consequently engage with Alain de Libera’s archaeological analysis of the birth of the thinking subject in medieval philosophy and theology. In this light, I analyze the role of the notion of the thinking subject in construing the Talmud from Maimonides to contemporary Talmud criticism. Finally, I explore the implications of de Libera’s program of a philosophical archaeology of the thinking subject for mapping the complex relationship of mutual presupposition and exclusion between philosophical, rhetorical, and talmudic traditions of thinking in antiquity, as manifested in the larger scope of these traditions.
{"title":"Who Thinks in the Talmud","authors":"Sergey Dolgopolski","doi":"10.1163/147728512X629790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/147728512X629790","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article traces a historical shift, and in particular its erasure from memory on the intellectual map of the West, in concepts of subjectivity across practices of rabbinic thinking in late antiquity, medieval interpretations of the Talmud, and modern talmudic scholarship. I first introduce a comparative perspective that relies on a mutual hermeneutics of philosophical and talmudic traditions. I consequently engage with Alain de Libera’s archaeological analysis of the birth of the thinking subject in medieval philosophy and theology. In this light, I analyze the role of the notion of the thinking subject in construing the Talmud from Maimonides to contemporary Talmud criticism. Finally, I explore the implications of de Libera’s program of a philosophical archaeology of the thinking subject for mapping the complex relationship of mutual presupposition and exclusion between philosophical, rhetorical, and talmudic traditions of thinking in antiquity, as manifested in the larger scope of these traditions.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"82 1","pages":"1-34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83760057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1163/147728512X629808
K. Bland
Abstract In its treatment of imagination as understood by medieval Jewish philosophers, modern scholarship has tended to neglect the intersection of animal fables and political thought. This paper examines several Aesopian themes in Greek philosophy and medieval Jewish philosophic literature, especially the tales composed by Berakhiah ha-Naqdan, in order to highlight the attention lavished by these premoderns on the faculty of imagination. It is argued that, according to the philosophers, human perfection requires the cultivation of both intellect and imagination. It is also shown that Pierre Hadot’s notion of “spiritual exercises” as constituting philosophy is fruitfully applicable to the genre of fable.
{"title":"Liberating Imagination and Other Ends of Medieval Jewish Philosophy","authors":"K. Bland","doi":"10.1163/147728512X629808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/147728512X629808","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In its treatment of imagination as understood by medieval Jewish philosophers, modern scholarship has tended to neglect the intersection of animal fables and political thought. This paper examines several Aesopian themes in Greek philosophy and medieval Jewish philosophic literature, especially the tales composed by Berakhiah ha-Naqdan, in order to highlight the attention lavished by these premoderns on the faculty of imagination. It is argued that, according to the philosophers, human perfection requires the cultivation of both intellect and imagination. It is also shown that Pierre Hadot’s notion of “spiritual exercises” as constituting philosophy is fruitfully applicable to the genre of fable.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"80 1","pages":"35-53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80965412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-01-01DOI: 10.1163/147728511X591207
D. Lobel
Maimonides expresses the view that being is goodness; evil is a deprivation of being and goodness. This view is prominent in Neoplatonism but has strong roots in Aristotle as well. While Maimonides problematizes moral language of good and evil, he makes use of an ontological sense of Necessary Existence as the absolute good. Plotinus wrote that beings are the beautiful. Avicenna adds that the pure good is Necessary Existence, which is free of deficiency, as it has no possibility of lacking existence. This notion has a strong Aristotelian core. Despite his strictures on language about the divine, Maimonides allows himself to express this vision—an affective-aesthetic appreciation as well as a purely cognitive one. Being is the absolute good, the source of ontological beauty and value.
{"title":"Being and the Good: Maimonides on Ontological Beauty","authors":"D. Lobel","doi":"10.1163/147728511X591207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/147728511X591207","url":null,"abstract":"Maimonides expresses the view that being is goodness; evil is a deprivation of being and goodness. This view is prominent in Neoplatonism but has strong roots in Aristotle as well. While Maimonides problematizes moral language of good and evil, he makes use of an ontological sense of Necessary Existence as the absolute good. Plotinus wrote that beings are the beautiful. Avicenna adds that the pure good is Necessary Existence, which is free of deficiency, as it has no possibility of lacking existence. This notion has a strong Aristotelian core. Despite his strictures on language about the divine, Maimonides allows himself to express this vision—an affective-aesthetic appreciation as well as a purely cognitive one. Being is the absolute good, the source of ontological beauty and value.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"13 1","pages":"1-45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87951768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-01-01DOI: 10.1163/147728511X606183
Aubrey L. Glazer
Abstract Whether extrovertive, introvertive, or some further hybrid, the process of the soul touching the fullness of its divine origins is itself undergoing transformation in the twenty-first-century cultural matrices of Israel. A remarkable exemplar of devotional Hebrew cultures can be found within the hybrid networks of haredi worlds in Israel today. R. Yitzhaq Maier Morgenstern, author of Yam ha-okhmah, Netiv ayyim, and De’i okhmah le-nafshekha, is arguably the most innovative mystical voice in Israel. Why are his works resonating so strongly both inside and outside their haredi communities of origin? How is his innovative thinking affecting the devotional praxis of devekut both inside and outside the unfolding Hasidic networks? This exploration of mystical apperception through devekut builds upon studies of Garb, Huss, and Meir, while challenging the idea that Morgenstern’s expanding impact is solely a function of his mystical-magical charisma and hypernomian spiritual practice. This study argues that it is Morgenstern’s hybridized thinking through key theoretical issues in Kabbalah and Hasidism as they apply to the lived practice of a devotional life of devekut that will likely remain his strongest innovation and contribution to contemporary Jewish mysticism.
{"title":"Touching God: Vertigo, Exactitude, and Degrees of Devekut in the Contemporary Nondual Jewish Mysticism of R. Yitzhaq Maier Morgenstern","authors":"Aubrey L. Glazer","doi":"10.1163/147728511X606183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/147728511X606183","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Whether extrovertive, introvertive, or some further hybrid, the process of the soul touching the fullness of its divine origins is itself undergoing transformation in the twenty-first-century cultural matrices of Israel. A remarkable exemplar of devotional Hebrew cultures can be found within the hybrid networks of haredi worlds in Israel today. R. Yitzhaq Maier Morgenstern, author of Yam ha-okhmah, Netiv ayyim, and De’i okhmah le-nafshekha, is arguably the most innovative mystical voice in Israel. Why are his works resonating so strongly both inside and outside their haredi communities of origin? How is his innovative thinking affecting the devotional praxis of devekut both inside and outside the unfolding Hasidic networks? This exploration of mystical apperception through devekut builds upon studies of Garb, Huss, and Meir, while challenging the idea that Morgenstern’s expanding impact is solely a function of his mystical-magical charisma and hypernomian spiritual practice. This study argues that it is Morgenstern’s hybridized thinking through key theoretical issues in Kabbalah and Hasidism as they apply to the lived practice of a devotional life of devekut that will likely remain his strongest innovation and contribution to contemporary Jewish mysticism.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"127 1","pages":"147-192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74145182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-01-01DOI: 10.1163/147728511X591180
Ari Ackerman
This article examines two medieval sermons that examine philosophic and halakhic issues: the Passover sermon of Hasdai Crescas, which discusses the laws of Passover, and a sermon of Zerahia Halevi Saladin, a disciple of Crescas, which probes an aspect of the laws of vows (nedarim). In the analysis of Zerahia’s sermon, a comparison is made between his discussion and Thomas Aquinas’s examination of vows in his Summa Theologica. The comparison establishes the dependency of Zerahia on Aquinas regarding this issue. Likewise, Zerahia’s sermon is compared with Crescas’s, and the relationship between the legal theories of Crescas and Zerahia is investigated. The articles concludes with a brief examination of the significance of the analysis these sermons for understanding of the impact of scholastic sources on Spanish-Jewish philosophy and the relationship between law and philosophy in the writings of Hasdai Crescas and his students.
{"title":"Zerahia Halevi Saladin and Thomas Aquinas on Vows","authors":"Ari Ackerman","doi":"10.1163/147728511X591180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/147728511X591180","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines two medieval sermons that examine philosophic and halakhic issues: the Passover sermon of Hasdai Crescas, which discusses the laws of Passover, and a sermon of Zerahia Halevi Saladin, a disciple of Crescas, which probes an aspect of the laws of vows (nedarim). In the analysis of Zerahia’s sermon, a comparison is made between his discussion and Thomas Aquinas’s examination of vows in his Summa Theologica. The comparison establishes the dependency of Zerahia on Aquinas regarding this issue. Likewise, Zerahia’s sermon is compared with Crescas’s, and the relationship between the legal theories of Crescas and Zerahia is investigated. The articles concludes with a brief examination of the significance of the analysis these sermons for understanding of the impact of scholastic sources on Spanish-Jewish philosophy and the relationship between law and philosophy in the writings of Hasdai Crescas and his students.","PeriodicalId":42022,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF JEWISH THOUGHT & PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"47-71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75233216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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