Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29102
E. Corazza
In “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892) Frege raises a problem concerning identity statements of the form a=b and he criticizes the view he holds in the Begriffsschrift (1879, § 8). In building on a suggestion by Perry (2001/12, ch. 7) I will show how Frege’s Begriffsschrift account can be rescued and how Frege’s 1892 criticism of his Begriffsschrift’s position somewhat miss the point. Furthermore, the Begriffsschrift’s view can be developed to account in quite an elegant way to the so-called Frege’s Puzzle without committing to the sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction Frege introduces in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. To do so we have, though, to give up the idea that all the relevant information conveyed by the utterance of a simple sentence is encapsulated into a single content. I will show of this can be done in adopting a Perry-style pluri-propositionalist model of communication.
在“Über Sinn und Bedeutung”(1892)中，弗雷格提出了一个关于形式为a=b的同一性陈述的问题，并批评了他在《Begriffsschrift》(1879，§8)中所持的观点。在佩里(2001/12，第7章)的建议的基础上，我将展示弗雷格的Begriffsschrift的叙述如何可以被拯救，以及弗雷格1892年对他的Begriffsschrift立场的批评如何在某种程度上没有抓住重点。此外，Begriffsschrift的观点可以发展为以一种相当优雅的方式来解释所谓的弗雷格之谜，而无需致力于弗雷格在“Über Sinn und Bedeutung”中引入的意义/指称(Sinn/Bedeutung)区别。然而，要做到这一点，我们必须放弃这样一种观念，即一个简单句子所传达的所有相关信息都被封装在一个内容中。我将证明这可以通过采用佩里式的多元命题主义交流模式来实现。
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Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29101
David Peroutka
Partial compatibilism says that there are basically two kinds of freedom of the will: some free volitions cannot be determined, while others can. My methodological choice is to examine what assumptions will appear necessary if we want to take seriously—and make understandable—our ordinary moral life. Sometimes, typically when we feel guilty about a choice of ours, we are sure enough that we, at the considered moment, actually could have taken a different option. At other times, however, typically when we are aware of some unquestionable moral reasons for a certain choice, we may perceive our choice as voluntary and free in spite of the fact that it is, in the given situation, unthinkable for us to choose otherwise than we actually do (there are situations when responsible agents, because of their strong moral reasons/motives, cannot choose differently). The assumption that experiences of the first kind are not always mistaken excludes our world being deterministic. Yet free will and determinism go together in some of those possible worlds which contain only the second kind of free volitions. Partial compatibilism represents a ‘third way’ between standard compatibilism and incompatibilism, a way to solve that old dilemma. Partial Compatibilism: Free Will in the Light of Moral Experience 3 Organon F 29 (1) 2022: 2–25
部分相容主义认为，基本上有两种意志自由：一些自由意志是不能确定的，而另一些则可以。我的方法选择是，如果我们想认真对待——并让人们理解——我们的普通道德生活，那么我们需要检查哪些假设。有时，通常当我们对自己的选择感到内疚时，我们确信，在经过深思熟虑的时刻，我们实际上可以选择不同的选择。然而，在其他时候，通常当我们意识到某一选择的一些毋庸置疑的道德原因时，我们可能会认为我们的选择是自愿和自由的，尽管在特定的情况下，我们无法想象会做出与实际不同的选择（在某些情况下，负责任的代理人由于其强烈的道德原因/动机，无法做出不同的选择）。第一种体验并不总是错误的假设排除了我们的世界是确定性的。然而，在一些可能的世界里，自由意志和决定论是相辅相成的，这些世界只包含第二种自由意志。部分相容主义代表了标准相容主义和不相容主义之间的“第三条道路”，是解决旧困境的一种方式。部分相容主义：道德经验下的自由意志3 Organon F 29（1）2022：2–25
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Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29106
Szymon Makuła
This paper’s primary purpose is to show that there is a peculiar alternative to scientism whose central thesis is not about sources of knowledge or the existence of various objects, but it aims at setting out a strategy to help decide which of the two mutually exclusive beliefs is the better one to adopt. Scientophilia, to coin a term, recommends preferring, without any discussion, a position consistent with the consensus of credible and reliable experts in a given domain. In case there is no such agreement, mainly because peers disagree with each other, or experts are difficult to identify, it is recommended for a scientophile to suspend judgment. Scientophilia is not a position on science or human knowledge boundaries, but it deals with the practical side of belief change. Verdicts made by this approach are partially similar to those offered by mild scientism, as scientophilia puts scientific knowledge as one of the most reliable sources. However, it is also consistent with mild antiscientism, as in some particular cases (for example, Moorean truths), it assigns reliable expertise to non-scientific experts. Therefore it is a third way.
{"title":"Is There an Alternative to Moderate Scientism?","authors":"Szymon Makuła","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29106","url":null,"abstract":"This paper’s primary purpose is to show that there is a peculiar alternative to scientism whose central thesis is not about sources of knowledge or the existence of various objects, but it aims at setting out a strategy to help decide which of the two mutually exclusive beliefs is the better one to adopt. Scientophilia, to coin a term, recommends preferring, without any discussion, a position consistent with the consensus of credible and reliable experts in a given domain. In case there is no such agreement, mainly because peers disagree with each other, or experts are difficult to identify, it is recommended for a scientophile to suspend judgment. Scientophilia is not a position on science or human knowledge boundaries, but it deals with the practical side of belief change. Verdicts made by this approach are partially similar to those offered by mild scientism, as scientophilia puts scientific knowledge as one of the most reliable sources. However, it is also consistent with mild antiscientism, as in some particular cases (for example, Moorean truths), it assigns reliable expertise to non-scientific experts. Therefore it is a third way.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43557454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29104
D. Sepetyi
In the paper, I discuss Robert Kirk’s attempt to refute the zombie argument against materialism by demonstrating, “in a way that is intuitively appealing as well as cogent”, that the idea of phenomenal zombies involves incoherence. Kirk’s argues that if one admits that a world of zombies z is conceivable, one should also admit the conceivability of a certain transformation from such a world to a world z* that satisfies a description D, and it is arguable that D is incoherent. From which, Kirk suggests, it follows that the idea of zombies is incoherent. I argue that Kirk’s argument has several minor deficiencies and two major flaws. First, he takes for granted that cognitive mental states are physical (cognitive physicalism), although a zombist is free to—and would better—reject this view. Second, he confuses elements of different scenarios of transformation, none of which results in the incoherent description D.
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Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28405
J. Gascón
During the last decades several studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions do not depend on the reasons that we adduce afterwards, when we have to account for them. Our decisions seem to be often influenced by normatively or explanatorily irrelevant features of the environment of which we are not aware, and the reasons we offer for those decisions are a posteriori rationalisations. But exactly what reasons has the psychological research uncovered? In philosophy, a distinction has been commonly made between normative and motivating reasons: normative reasons make an action right, whereas motivating reasons explain our behaviour. Recently, Maria Alvarez has argued that, apart from normative (or justifying) reasons, we should further distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons. We have, then, three kinds of reasons, and it is not clear which of them have been revealed as the real reasons for our actions by the psychological research. The answer we give to this question will have important implications both for the validity of our classifications of reasons and for our understanding of human action.
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Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28402
Yavuz Recep Başoğlu
In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Process, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to posits they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomena, it has been repeatedly argued that they are in fact compatible. As one may expect, these arguments mostly end up contending either that Predictive Process is actually nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. In this paper, I will argue that such arguments are inadequate for the indicated purpose for several reasons: the variety of representational posits in Predictive Process, the diverse attitudes of practitioners of 4E approaches toward representations and the unconstrained use of the term “representation” in cognitive science. Hence, here I will try to demonstrate that any single argument, if it depends on representational 4E approaches or nonrepresentational Predictive Process, falls short of encompassing this heterogeneity in pertinent debates. Then, I will analyze similar arguments provided by Jacob Hohwy and Michael Kirchhoff to illustrate how destructive this seemingly ordinary criticism is. 778 Yavuz Recep Başoğlu Organon F 28 (4) 2021: 777–801
在认知理论中，4E认知方法被认为避免使用稳健的表示，而预测过程则被广泛使用。尽管它们在解释某些认知现象时使用的假设存在显著差异，但人们一再认为它们实际上是相容的。正如人们所料，这些论点最终大多争论预测过程实际上是非代表性的，或者4E方法是代表性的。在这篇论文中，我认为这样的论点不足以达到预期的目的，原因有几个：预测过程中表征假设的多样性，4E方法的实践者对表征的不同态度，以及认知科学中“表征”一词的不受约束的使用。因此，在这里，我将试图证明，任何一个论点，如果它依赖于代表性4E方法或非代表性预测过程，都不能在相关的辩论中包含这种异质性。然后，我将分析Jacob Hohwy和Michael Kirchhoff提供的类似论点，以说明这种看似普通的批评是多么具有破坏性。778 Yavuz Recep Başoğlu Organon F 28（4）2021:777–801
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Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28404
Vojtěch Zachník
This paper aims to assess current theoretical findings on the origin of coordination by salience and suggests a way to clarify the existing framework. The main concern is to reveal how different coordination mechanisms rely on specific epistemic aspects of reasoning. The paper highlights the fact that basic epistemic assumptions of theories diverge in a way that makes them essentially distinctive. Consequently, recommendations and predictions of the traditional views of coordination by salience are, in principle, based on the processes related to the agent’s presumptions regarding the cognitive abilities of a co-player. This finding implies that we should consider these theories as complementary, and not competitive, explanations of the same phenomenon.
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Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28401
S. Petkov
Current debates on the nature of explanatory understanding have converged on the idea that at least one of the core components of understanding is inferential. Philosophers have characterized the inferential dimension of understanding as consisting of several related cognitive abilities to grasp a given explanation and the nexus of complementing explanations to which it belongs. Whilst analyses of both the subjective epistemic abilities related to grasping and objective features of the inferential links within explanations have received much attention, both within theories of explanation and in the literature on understanding, the criteria for evaluating the specific structure and organization of explanatory clusters or nexuses has received much less attention. Nevertheless, two notable exceptions stand out—Khalifa’s characterization of an explanatory nexus, and theories of explanatory unification. I take Khalifa’s ideas, together with the basic criteria of successful explanatory unification, as my starting point. To both I make some corrections and additions, in order to arrive at a more robust notion of an explanatory nexus and ultimately show that its structural properties and the inter-explanatory relations it contains are relevant to the resulting understanding. The Degrees of Understanding and the Inferential Component of Understanding 747 Organon F 28 (4) 2021: 746–776 I propose to represent such nexuses as directed graph trees and show that some of their properties can be related to the degree of understanding that such nested explanatory structures can offer. I will further illustrate these ideas by a case study on an ecological theory of predation.
目前关于解释性理解本质的争论集中在这样一个观点上，即理解的核心组成部分中至少有一个是推理的。哲学家们将理解的推理维度描述为由掌握给定解释的几种相关认知能力及其所属的补充解释的关系组成。虽然在解释理论和理解文献中，对解释中与把握有关的主观认识能力和推理环节的客观特征的分析都受到了很大的关注，但评估解释簇或连接的具体结构和组织的标准却很少受到关注。然而，有两个明显的例外——哈利法对解释关系的描述，以及解释统一的理论。我以哈利法的思想，以及成功解释统一的基本标准为出发点。对此，我进行了一些更正和补充，以得出一个更有力的解释关系概念，并最终表明其结构性质及其所包含的解释间关系与由此产生的理解相关。理解度和理解的推断成分747 Organon F 28（4）2021:746–776我建议将这些nextuse表示为有向图树，并表明它们的一些性质可以与这种嵌套解释结构所能提供的理解度有关。我将通过一个关于捕食生态学理论的案例研究来进一步说明这些观点。
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Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28406
Andreas Elpidorou, Guy Dove
Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble. Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical theory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and complete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeterminate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain falsehoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threatens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical
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Pub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28403
Serdal Tümkaya
In passing remarks, some commentators have noted that for Nagel, physicalism is true. It has even been argued that Nagel seeks to find the best path to follow to achieve future physicalism. I advance these observations by adding that for Nagel, we should discuss the consciousness problem not in terms of physical and mental issues but in terms of our desire to include consciousness in an objective/scientific account, and we can achieve this only by revising our self-conception, i.e., folk psychology, to develop a more detached view of experience. Through the project of objective phenomenology, Nagel aims to achieve some sort of objective, detached, and scientific explanation of the subjective nature of experience. This project seeks to make the truth of physicalism intelligible and consciousness more amenable to scientific study, potentially raising an even broader concept than the one physicalism originally proposes.
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