Pub Date : 2022-05-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29203
Andrzej Waleszczyński, Michał Obidziński, Julia Rejewska
: In the article, we present analyses and findings which add precision to the role of intentions and the relation between effects in attributing the intentionality of causing a side effect. Our research supplements and modifies numerous findings regarding the appearance of the so-called Knobe effect. The experiments and analyses show that the very originality of the story used by Knobe and the relationship between the evaluative to the occurrence of the side-effect effect. Because of this, we reject the thesis that the mode of attitude of the agent to the caused side effect or that the social expectation of this attitude determine the attribution of the intentionality of the caused effect. On the contrary, we defend the thesis that it is the relationship between the evaluative properties of the main effect and those of the side effect, as well as the impact of a side effect on the main effect, that significantly influence the attribution of intentionality in causing a side effect.
{"title":"The Problem of Intention and the Evaluative Properties of Effects in the Knobe Effect","authors":"Andrzej Waleszczyński, Michał Obidziński, Julia Rejewska","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29203","url":null,"abstract":": In the article, we present analyses and findings which add precision to the role of intentions and the relation between effects in attributing the intentionality of causing a side effect. Our research supplements and modifies numerous findings regarding the appearance of the so-called Knobe effect. The experiments and analyses show that the very originality of the story used by Knobe and the relationship between the evaluative to the occurrence of the side-effect effect. Because of this, we reject the thesis that the mode of attitude of the agent to the caused side effect or that the social expectation of this attitude determine the attribution of the intentionality of the caused effect. On the contrary, we defend the thesis that it is the relationship between the evaluative properties of the main effect and those of the side effect, as well as the impact of a side effect on the main effect, that significantly influence the attribution of intentionality in causing a side effect.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42686223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29202
Nora Grigore
Wolf proposes supererogation as a solution for curbing the exaggerated demands of morality. Adopting supererogation is supposed to prevent us from considering that all morally good deeds are obligatory. Supererogation, indeed, makes some morally good deeds merely optional, saving the agent from the requirement of behaving as much as possible like a Moral Saint. But I argue that Wolf cannot use supererogation in service of her overall project, for two reasons. First, because implied in the concept of supererogation is that going beyond duty adds to our humanity rather than detract from it (as Wolf argues). Secondly, after analyzing attempts to acclimatize supererogation in other theoretical frameworks, I conclude that supererogation can limit morality’s claims only if Wolf’s reasons of “individual perfection” can defeat moral reasons. I argue that a common scale of evaluation between moral and non-moral reasons is needed for their comparison, but Wolf explicitly rejects this way out.
{"title":"Susan Wolf on Supererogation and the Dark Side of Morality","authors":"Nora Grigore","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29202","url":null,"abstract":"Wolf proposes supererogation as a solution for curbing the exaggerated demands of morality. Adopting supererogation is supposed to prevent us from considering that all morally good deeds are obligatory. Supererogation, indeed, makes some morally good deeds merely optional, saving the agent from the requirement of behaving as much as possible like a Moral Saint. But I argue that Wolf cannot use supererogation in service of her overall project, for two reasons. First, because implied in the concept of supererogation is that going beyond duty adds to our humanity rather than detract from it (as Wolf argues). Secondly, after analyzing attempts to acclimatize supererogation in other theoretical frameworks, I conclude that supererogation can limit morality’s claims only if Wolf’s reasons of “individual perfection” can defeat moral reasons. I argue that a common scale of evaluation between moral and non-moral reasons is needed for their comparison, but Wolf explicitly rejects this way out.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48854865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29205
Erhan Demircioglu
In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.
{"title":"Conditional Uniqueness","authors":"Erhan Demircioglu","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29205","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49578562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29207
J. Peregrin
{"title":"Catarina Dutilh Novaes: The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical, Cognitive and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, xiii + 271 pages","authors":"J. Peregrin","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29207","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46470276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29201
O. Beran
In this paper, I discuss some moral dilemmas related to the COVID-19 crisis and their framing (mainly) in the public debate. The key assumption to engage with is this: that we need primarily to take into account the long-term economic consequences of the pro-posed safety measures of social distancing. I argue that the long-term economic concerns, though legitimate, cannot suspend the irreducibly moral nature of the demand placed on the decision-makers by those who are vulnerable, at risk, or in need of medical treatment. This is discussed in relation to two points: 1) The political endeavour and rhetoric of "flattening the curve" is not necessarily short-sighted, but expresses the acknowledgment of a legitimate expectation placed on elected representatives. 2) Not being able to prevent harm (to those who are in real need, or otherwise vulnerable) may lead to a genuine moral distress, even if it is not clear whether it was in one's, or any-body's, powers to prevent the situation, or even if the best possible outcome has been otherwise reached. The second point may be un-derstood as a part of the broader context of the established criticisms of utilitarianism.
{"title":"Flattening the Curve of Moral Imagination","authors":"O. Beran","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29201","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I discuss some moral dilemmas related to the COVID-19 crisis and their framing (mainly) in the public debate. The key assumption to engage with is this: that we need primarily to take into account the long-term economic consequences of the pro-posed safety measures of social distancing. I argue that the long-term economic concerns, though legitimate, cannot suspend the irreducibly moral nature of the demand placed on the decision-makers by those who are vulnerable, at risk, or in need of medical treatment. This is discussed in relation to two points: 1) The political endeavour and rhetoric of \"flattening the curve\" is not necessarily short-sighted, but expresses the acknowledgment of a legitimate expectation placed on elected representatives. 2) Not being able to prevent harm (to those who are in real need, or otherwise vulnerable) may lead to a genuine moral distress, even if it is not clear whether it was in one's, or any-body's, powers to prevent the situation, or even if the best possible outcome has been otherwise reached. The second point may be un-derstood as a part of the broader context of the established criticisms of utilitarianism.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"44 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41259355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29206
H. Noonan
Personites are shorter-lived, person-like things that extend across part of a person’s life. Their existence follows from the standard perdurance view of persons. Johnston argues that it has bizarre moral consequences. For example, it renders morally problematic spending time learning a difficult language in anticipation of going abroad. The crucial thought is that if persons have moral status so do personites. Johnston argues for this claim. Kaiserman responds, on behalf of stage theory, that this only works on a perdurantist account. This is a conservative response to the problem. It seeks to show that retaining the ontology of perdurantism one can resolve the difficulty by a semantic change. I show that the personite problem can be reworked as an argument against stage theorists. The stage theorist can respond by rejecting an assumption of the reasoning. But if it is acceptable for him to do so the perdurantist can reject this assumption too, which is enough by itself to block Johnston’s argument. Thus, for all it helps with the personite problem, stage theorists might as well be perdurantists.
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Pub Date : 2022-05-29DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29204
S. Park
: In this paper, I suggest a way of resolving the whole-part dilemma suggested in the Parmenides . Specifically, I argue that grabbing the second horn of the dilemma does not pose a significant challenge. To argue for this, I consider two theses about Forms, namely, the oneness and indivisibility theses. More specifically, I argue that the second horn does not violate the oneness thesis if we treat composition as identity and that the indivisibility thesis ought to be reinterpreted given Plato’s later dialogues. By doing so, I suggest a compositional understanding of Plato’s theory of Forms, which can resolve the whole-part dilemma.
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Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29107
J. Peregrin
I must start this review non-traditionally, with an apology. As the author of the book remarks (p. 120. footnote 47), “Peregrin (2017) ... cites my (2015), but seems to indicate that I reject unrestricted inferentialism, despite the paper actually being an extensive defense of unrestricted inferentialism.” This, unfortunately, is true. The relevant note in my text was mutilated during my revision of the text based on the proofreading of a native speaker. Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. However, what Warren now writes in his book makes me think that we might perhaps call it quits. Warren, despite knowing about my work, including my Inferentialism book (which he refers to in his book), does not shy away from claiming that he is the only current defender of unrestricted inferentialism. Part I of the book has two chapters. In the first, Warren distinguishes his version of conventionalism from some other versions, reaching the twin characterizations:
{"title":"Jared Warren: Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism","authors":"J. Peregrin","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29107","url":null,"abstract":"I must start this review non-traditionally, with an apology. As the author of the book remarks (p. 120. footnote 47), “Peregrin (2017) ... cites my (2015), but seems to indicate that I reject unrestricted inferentialism, despite the paper actually being an extensive defense of unrestricted inferentialism.” This, unfortunately, is true. The relevant note in my text was mutilated during my revision of the text based on the proofreading of a native speaker. Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. However, what Warren now writes in his book makes me think that we might perhaps call it quits. Warren, despite knowing about my work, including my Inferentialism book (which he refers to in his book), does not shy away from claiming that he is the only current defender of unrestricted inferentialism. Part I of the book has two chapters. In the first, Warren distinguishes his version of conventionalism from some other versions, reaching the twin characterizations:","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41853081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29103
J. J. Joaquin, J. Franklin
In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other nonmental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental 48 Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin – James Franklin Organon F 29 (1) 2022: 47–77 content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result).
命题必须是公共的和可共享的，才能发挥其作为真理和逻辑关系关系的载体的重要作用。尽管普遍存在众所周知的柏拉图主义问题，但这一要求有利于柏拉图主义和其他非精神观点。命题是心理实体的观点也相应地失宠了，因为他们很难解释命题如何具有可共享的客观属性。受人工智能对感知算法的研究启发，我们重新提出了一种唯心主义的命题观，它展示了感知如何导致具有可共享属性的持久心理实体，使它们能够履行（一种核心类型）命题的传统角色。在感知中实现的聚类算法产生的输出是不同头脑中的（隐含的）原子命题。它们在大脑中的协调是通过交流的博弈论过程进行的。该叙述不依赖于任何无法解释的概念，如心理48 Jeremiah Joven B.Joaquin–James Franklin Organon F 29（1）2022：47-77内容、表征或对应关系（尽管这些概念适用于结果的哲学分析）。
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Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2022.29102
E. Corazza
In “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892) Frege raises a problem concerning identity statements of the form a=b and he criticizes the view he holds in the Begriffsschrift (1879, § 8). In building on a suggestion by Perry (2001/12, ch. 7) I will show how Frege’s Begriffsschrift account can be rescued and how Frege’s 1892 criticism of his Begriffsschrift’s position somewhat miss the point. Furthermore, the Begriffsschrift’s view can be developed to account in quite an elegant way to the so-called Frege’s Puzzle without committing to the sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction Frege introduces in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. To do so we have, though, to give up the idea that all the relevant information conveyed by the utterance of a simple sentence is encapsulated into a single content. I will show of this can be done in adopting a Perry-style pluri-propositionalist model of communication.
在“Über Sinn und Bedeutung”(1892)中，弗雷格提出了一个关于形式为a=b的同一性陈述的问题，并批评了他在《Begriffsschrift》(1879，§8)中所持的观点。在佩里(2001/12，第7章)的建议的基础上，我将展示弗雷格的Begriffsschrift的叙述如何可以被拯救，以及弗雷格1892年对他的Begriffsschrift立场的批评如何在某种程度上没有抓住重点。此外，Begriffsschrift的观点可以发展为以一种相当优雅的方式来解释所谓的弗雷格之谜，而无需致力于弗雷格在“Über Sinn und Bedeutung”中引入的意义/指称(Sinn/Bedeutung)区别。然而，要做到这一点，我们必须放弃这样一种观念，即一个简单句子所传达的所有相关信息都被封装在一个内容中。我将证明这可以通过采用佩里式的多元命题主义交流模式来实现。
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