Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28312
S. Predelli
: This paper discusses the phenomenon of linguistic taboo. It contrasts that phenomenon with the truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional dimensions of meaning, paying particular attention to slurs and coarseness. It then highlights the peculiarities of taboo and its meta-semantic repercussions: taboo is a meaning-related feature that is nevertheless directly associated with the tokening process. In the conclusion, it gestures to the role of taboo within a theory of linguistic action and the standard framework for conversational exchanges. On these results, I am going to end by looking at some of the harms that epistemic injustice inflicts upon its victims.
{"title":"Unmentionables: Some Remarks on Taboo","authors":"S. Predelli","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28312","url":null,"abstract":": This paper discusses the phenomenon of linguistic taboo. It contrasts that phenomenon with the truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional dimensions of meaning, paying particular attention to slurs and coarseness. It then highlights the peculiarities of taboo and its meta-semantic repercussions: taboo is a meaning-related feature that is nevertheless directly associated with the tokening process. In the conclusion, it gestures to the role of taboo within a theory of linguistic action and the standard framework for conversational exchanges. On these results, I am going to end by looking at some of the harms that epistemic injustice inflicts upon its victims.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49507377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28309
B. Cepollaro
{"title":"The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs","authors":"B. Cepollaro","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28309","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47251670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28307
Chang Liu
Slurs are both derogatory and offensive, and they are said to exhibit “derogatory force” and “offensiveness.” Almost all theories of slurs, except the truth-conditional content theory and the invocational content theory, conflate these two features and use “derogatory force” and “offensiveness” interchangeably. This paper defends and explains the distinction between slurs’ derogatory force and offensiveness by fulfilling three goals. First, it distinguishes between slurs’ being derogatory and their being offensive with four arguments. For instance, “Monday,” a slur in the Bostonian argot, is used to secretly derogate African Americans without causing offense. Second, this paper points out that many theories of slurs run into problems because they conflate derogatory force with offensiveness. For example, the prohibition theory’s account of offensiveness in terms of prohibitions struggles to explain why “Monday” is derogatory when it is not a prohibited word in English. Third, this paper offers a new explanation of this distinction from the perspective of a speech act theory of slurs; derogatory force is different from offensiveness because they arise from two different kinds of speech acts that slurs are used to perform, i.e., the illocutionary act of derogation and the perlocutionary act of offending. This new explanation avoids the problems faced by other theories.
{"title":"The Derogatory Force and the Offensiveness of Slurs","authors":"Chang Liu","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28307","url":null,"abstract":"Slurs are both derogatory and offensive, and they are said to exhibit “derogatory force” and “offensiveness.” Almost all theories of slurs, except the truth-conditional content theory and the invocational content theory, conflate these two features and use “derogatory force” and “offensiveness” interchangeably. This paper defends and explains the distinction between slurs’ derogatory force and offensiveness by fulfilling three goals. First, it distinguishes between slurs’ being derogatory and their being offensive with four arguments. For instance, “Monday,” a slur in the Bostonian argot, is used to secretly derogate African Americans without causing offense. Second, this paper points out that many theories of slurs run into problems because they conflate derogatory force with offensiveness. For example, the prohibition theory’s account of offensiveness in terms of prohibitions struggles to explain why “Monday” is derogatory when it is not a prohibited word in English. Third, this paper offers a new explanation of this distinction from the perspective of a speech act theory of slurs; derogatory force is different from offensiveness because they arise from two different kinds of speech acts that slurs are used to perform, i.e., the illocutionary act of derogation and the perlocutionary act of offending. This new explanation avoids the problems faced by other theories.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46905908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28306
Andrés Soria-Ruiz
{"title":"Value and Scale: Some Observations and a Proposal","authors":"Andrés Soria-Ruiz","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28306","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42829084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28308
Alice Damirjian
{"title":"Rethinking Slurs: A Case Against Neutral Counterparts and the Introduction of Referential Flexibility","authors":"Alice Damirjian","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28308","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44037594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28303
Natalia Karczewska
: The debates over the problem of faultless disagreement have played a major role in shaping the landscape of today’s semantic theories. In my paper, I argue that even though the existent contex-tualism-friendly proposals explain a lot of disagreement data by specifying various ways in which speakers may use subjective predicates, neither provides a satisfactory account which would explain what all the subjective disagreements have in common. In particular, what is lacking is an explanation of the persistent autocentric cases (La-sersohn 2004), i.e., disagreements in which each speaker utters a subjective sentence while openly and knowingly occupying his or her own perspective. In my paper, I offer a solution which consists in supple-menting the standard contextualist semantics with an explanation of this most problematic class of cases, which is possible due to rede-scribing the phenomena in speech act nomenclature.
{"title":"Illocutionary Disagreement in Faultless Disagreement","authors":"Natalia Karczewska","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28303","url":null,"abstract":": The debates over the problem of faultless disagreement have played a major role in shaping the landscape of today’s semantic theories. In my paper, I argue that even though the existent contex-tualism-friendly proposals explain a lot of disagreement data by specifying various ways in which speakers may use subjective predicates, neither provides a satisfactory account which would explain what all the subjective disagreements have in common. In particular, what is lacking is an explanation of the persistent autocentric cases (La-sersohn 2004), i.e., disagreements in which each speaker utters a subjective sentence while openly and knowingly occupying his or her own perspective. In my paper, I offer a solution which consists in supple-menting the standard contextualist semantics with an explanation of this most problematic class of cases, which is possible due to rede-scribing the phenomena in speech act nomenclature.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41678442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28304
A. Davies
It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.
人们普遍认为，没有错误的不一致的可能性是由特殊类型的语言结构的特殊语义和/或语用来解释的。例如，如果A断言" o是F "而B断言这个句子的否定，那么只有当A和B使用正确的谓词作为它们的" F "时，它们才能毫无错误地不一致。在本文中，我提出了一个反对这一假设的论点。当感兴趣的表达是谓词时，我将重点关注这种特殊情况，并提供一系列示例，其中使用了相同的句子对，但在不同的上下文中。在某些情况下，我们会得到一种无可挑剔的意见分歧的印象，而在另一些情况下则不然。我在这些上下文中识别出一种模式，并得出结论，没有错误的分歧是可能的，不是通过一种特殊的谓词，而是通过一种特殊的上下文。
{"title":"Faultless Disagreement Contextualism","authors":"A. Davies","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28304","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44330383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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