Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27405
D. Frederick
I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s proposed solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.
{"title":"Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction","authors":"D. Frederick","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27405","url":null,"abstract":"I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s proposed solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"494-503"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44387401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27410
J. Jarocki
{"title":"Galen Strawson: Things That Bother Me. Death, Freedom, the Self, Etc.","authors":"J. Jarocki","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27410","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"588-594"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41979912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-06DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27306
K. Polcyn
According to the two-dimensional argument against materialism, developed by David Chalmers, the conceivability of zombies entails primary possibility, and the primary possibility of zombies entails further secondary possibility. I argue that the move from the conceivability to primary possibility of zombies is unjustified. Zombies are primarily impossible despite being conceivable if the corresponding phenomenal and microphysical concepts have coinciding primary intensions (refer to the same properties in all possible worlds considered as actual) despite being distinct concepts. But there is no good reason to think that phenomenal and microphysical concepts cannot have coinciding primary intensions despite being distinct concepts. As I argue, this conclusion follows from reflection on special cognitive features of phenomenal concepts.
{"title":"Does the Conceivability of Zombies Entail Their Possibility?","authors":"K. Polcyn","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27306","url":null,"abstract":"According to the two-dimensional argument against materialism, developed by David Chalmers, the conceivability of zombies entails primary possibility, and the primary possibility of zombies entails further secondary possibility. I argue that the move from the conceivability to primary possibility of zombies is unjustified. Zombies are primarily impossible despite being conceivable if the corresponding phenomenal and microphysical concepts have coinciding primary intensions (refer to the same properties in all possible worlds considered as actual) despite being distinct concepts. But there is no good reason to think that phenomenal and microphysical concepts cannot have coinciding primary intensions despite being distinct concepts. As I argue, this conclusion follows from reflection on special cognitive features of phenomenal concepts.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"395-410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48284538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-06DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27304
T. Ciecierski
An approach to indexical beliefs is presented and defended in the paper. The account is inspired by David Kaplan’s representationalist analysis of de re belief reports. I argue that imposing additional constraints on the Kaplanian notion of representation results in an elegant theory of indexical beliefs. The theory is committed to representations of limited accessibility but is not committed to relativized proposition, special de se contents or propositions of limited accessibility.
{"title":"An Approach to Indexical Beliefs","authors":"T. Ciecierski","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27304","url":null,"abstract":"An approach to indexical beliefs is presented and defended in the paper. The account is inspired by David Kaplan’s representationalist analysis of de re belief reports. I argue that imposing additional constraints on the Kaplanian notion of representation results in an elegant theory of indexical beliefs. The theory is committed to representations of limited accessibility but is not committed to relativized proposition, special de se contents or propositions of limited accessibility.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"346-376"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48407681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-06DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27305
Sunny L. Yang
My aim in this paper is to illuminate the question of how vicarious feeling is possible, by advancing our understanding of vicarious emotions. I address this problem by classifying the reactive attitude into two categories: the vicarious, and the self-reactive. I argue that guilt is constitutively tied to personal responsibility and that the appropriateness of vicarious feeling of group harm derives from a reflection on the appropriateness of our own reactive attitude, that is, vicarious reactive attitude, e.g., indignation or outrage.
{"title":"How Is Vicarious Feeling Possible? In Defense of Reactive Attitudes","authors":"Sunny L. Yang","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27305","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this paper is to illuminate the question of how vicarious feeling is possible, by advancing our understanding of vicarious emotions. I address this problem by classifying the reactive attitude into two categories: the vicarious, and the self-reactive. I argue that guilt is constitutively tied to personal responsibility and that the appropriateness of vicarious feeling of group harm derives from a reflection on the appropriateness of our own reactive attitude, that is, vicarious reactive attitude, e.g., indignation or outrage.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"377-394"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45436794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-06DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27307
Bjørn Jespersen
Kosterec (2019) points out that my current theory of modal modifiers cannot deal satisfactorily with limiting cases. This note solves the problem. The form of the solution is to leave the existing theory as is and instead add a clause handling the limiting case which Kosterec brings up and another clause handling the limiting case at the other end of the spectrum. My theory of modal modifiers, as set out in (2013), works well, as long as the argument property being modified is either (i) a purely contingent property or (ii) a contingent property with an essential core, provided the resulting modified property (MF) is not applied to an element of the essential core of F.1 To stick with the original example of mine that Kosterec takes over, we treat this predication as a datum:
{"title":"Limiting Cases of Modal Modification: Reply to Kosterec","authors":"Bjørn Jespersen","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27307","url":null,"abstract":"Kosterec (2019) points out that my current theory of modal modifiers cannot deal satisfactorily with limiting cases. This note solves the problem. The form of the solution is to leave the existing theory as is and instead add a clause handling the limiting case which Kosterec brings up and another clause handling the limiting case at the other end of the spectrum. My theory of modal modifiers, as set out in (2013), works well, as long as the argument property being modified is either (i) a purely contingent property or (ii) a contingent property with an essential core, provided the resulting modified property (MF) is not applied to an element of the essential core of F.1 To stick with the original example of mine that Kosterec takes over, we treat this predication as a datum:","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"411-415"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46837178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-06DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27303
Orli Dahan
I argue that in modern algebraic-formulated science the ‘physical constant’ can be understood, for practical purposes, as an ‘identifier’ of a universal law of nature. This identifying role is possible because the concept of ‘physical constant’ fulfills the same need for universality, stability, and fundamentality (as universal laws) for increasing the epistemic value of a scientific theory. This can be demonstrated in two different ways. The first involves a thought experiment envisioning science without physical constants, which appears to be a science of local and particular laws. The second is the observation that physical constants mostly emerge as components in an algebraic formulation of universal laws, but not in the algebraic formulation of particular laws. This observation about the link between physical constants and universal laws of nature, if correct, makes two contributions. First, it clarifies, at least partially, the ambiguity in the use (and the absence) of the concept ‘law’ in contemporary science. Second, it can help in distinguishing between a universal law and a particular law, while avoiding one of the abiding philosophical problems regarding laws of nature—the problem of the ceteris-paribus criterion for a generalization.
{"title":"Physical Constants as Identifiers of Modern Universal Laws of Nature","authors":"Orli Dahan","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27303","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that in modern algebraic-formulated science the ‘physical constant’ can be understood, for practical purposes, as an ‘identifier’ of a universal law of nature. This identifying role is possible because the concept of ‘physical constant’ fulfills the same need for universality, stability, and fundamentality (as universal laws) for increasing the epistemic value of a scientific theory. This can be demonstrated in two different ways. The first involves a thought experiment envisioning science without physical constants, which appears to be a science of local and particular laws. The second is the observation that physical constants mostly emerge as components in an algebraic formulation of universal laws, but not in the algebraic formulation of particular laws. This observation about the link between physical constants and universal laws of nature, if correct, makes two contributions. First, it clarifies, at least partially, the ambiguity in the use (and the absence) of the concept ‘law’ in contemporary science. Second, it can help in distinguishing between a universal law and a particular law, while avoiding one of the abiding philosophical problems regarding laws of nature—the problem of the ceteris-paribus criterion for a generalization.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"325-345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44358177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-06DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27308
J. Peregrin
{"title":"Neil Roughley and Kurt Bayerts (eds.): The Normative Animal? New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, x+380 page","authors":"J. Peregrin","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27308","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"415-420"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48247183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-06DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27301
S. Soames
The paper sketches and defends two instances of the strategy Let N’s be whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them—one in which N’s are natural numbers and one in which N’s are propositions. The former, which makes heavy use of Hume’s principle and plural quantification, grounds our initial knowledge of number in (a) our identification of objects as falling under various types, (b) our ability to count (i.e. to pair memorized numerals with individuated objects of one’s attention), (c) our (initially perceptual) recognition of plural properties (e.g. being three in number), and (d) our predication of those properties of pluralities that possess them (even though no individuals in the pluralities do). Given this foundation, one can use Fregean techniques to non-paradoxically generate more extensive arithmetical knowledge. The second instance of my metaphysics-in-the-service-of-epistemology identifies propositions (i.e. semantic contents of some sentences, objects of the attitudes, and bearers of truth, falsity, necessity, contingency, and apriority) with certain kinds of purely representational cognitive acts, operations, or states. In addition to providing natural solutions to traditionally unaddressed epistemic problems involving linguistic cognition and language use, I argue that this metaphysical conception of propositions expands the solution spaces of many of the most recalcitrant and What We Know about Numbers and Propositions... 283 Organon F 27 (3) 2020: 282–301 long-standing problems in natural-language semantics and the philosophy of language.
这篇论文描绘并捍卫了策略的两个例子——假设N是解释我们对它们的认识所必须的——一个是N是自然数，另一个是命题。前者大量利用了休谟原理和复数量化，将我们对数字的最初认识建立在（a）我们对各种类型的物体的识别，（b）我们的计数能力（即将记忆的数字与个人关注的物体配对），（c）我们对复数性质的（最初感知的）识别（例如，数量为三），以及（d）我们对拥有它们的复数的那些性质的预测（即使复数中没有个体这样做）。有了这个基础，人们可以使用Fregean技术来非矛盾地生成更广泛的算术知识。我的形而上学为认识论服务的第二个例子将命题（即一些句子的语义内容、态度的对象以及真、假、必然、偶然性和先验性的载体）与某些纯粹代表性的认知行为、操作或状态相识别。除了为涉及语言认知和语言使用的传统上未解决的认知问题提供自然的解决方案外，我认为这种形而上学的命题概念扩展了许多最顽固的和我们所知道的关于数字和命题的解决空间。。。283 Organon F 27（3）2020:282–301自然语言语义和语言哲学中长期存在的问题。
{"title":"What We Know about Numbers and Propositions and How We Know It","authors":"S. Soames","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27301","url":null,"abstract":"The paper sketches and defends two instances of the strategy Let N’s be whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them—one in which N’s are natural numbers and one in which N’s are propositions. The former, which makes heavy use of Hume’s principle and plural quantification, grounds our initial knowledge of number in (a) our identification of objects as falling under various types, (b) our ability to count (i.e. to pair memorized numerals with individuated objects of one’s attention), (c) our (initially perceptual) recognition of plural properties (e.g. being three in number), and (d) our predication of those properties of pluralities that possess them (even though no individuals in the pluralities do). Given this foundation, one can use Fregean techniques to non-paradoxically generate more extensive arithmetical knowledge. The second instance of my metaphysics-in-the-service-of-epistemology identifies propositions (i.e. semantic contents of some sentences, objects of the attitudes, and bearers of truth, falsity, necessity, contingency, and apriority) with certain kinds of purely representational cognitive acts, operations, or states. In addition to providing natural solutions to traditionally unaddressed epistemic problems involving linguistic cognition and language use, I argue that this metaphysical conception of propositions expands the solution spaces of many of the most recalcitrant and What We Know about Numbers and Propositions... 283 Organon F 27 (3) 2020: 282–301 long-standing problems in natural-language semantics and the philosophy of language.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"282-301"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44865392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-06DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2020.27302
Nicole Fišerová
The main purpose of this paper is to compare two pluralistic approaches to knowledge, Goodman’s theory of worldmaking and Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism. It therefore examines firstly, the concept of world-versions, which according to Goodman create our worlds and at the same time are crucial for achieving a better understanding of reality; and secondly, the concept of alternative theories which are built upon pluralism and, according to Feyerabend, secure knowledge and make scientific progress possible. Feyerabend’s concept has been rejected by many, seemingly for its lack of limitations. In line with this argument, I propose that based on the comparison of these two pluralistic approaches, the alternative theories can be understood as a part of worldmaking, for Goodman’s theory has wider applicability since it encompasses not only science but also art. Furthermore, I suggest adopting Goodman’s principle of rightness, the criterion of functionality in his worldmaking, as a criterion within Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism when establishing the prevailing theory. It is to be expected that such a juxtaposition will uncover inconsistencies, in particular regarding boundless relativism and the vague terminology in both conceptions. Feyerabend’s Alternative Theories within Goodman’s Worldmaking 303 Organon F 27 (3) 2020: 302–324
{"title":"Feyerabend’s Alternative Theories within Goodman’s Worldmaking","authors":"Nicole Fišerová","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27302","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of this paper is to compare two pluralistic approaches to knowledge, Goodman’s theory of worldmaking and Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism. It therefore examines firstly, the concept of world-versions, which according to Goodman create our worlds and at the same time are crucial for achieving a better understanding of reality; and secondly, the concept of alternative theories which are built upon pluralism and, according to Feyerabend, secure knowledge and make scientific progress possible. Feyerabend’s concept has been rejected by many, seemingly for its lack of limitations. In line with this argument, I propose that based on the comparison of these two pluralistic approaches, the alternative theories can be understood as a part of worldmaking, for Goodman’s theory has wider applicability since it encompasses not only science but also art. Furthermore, I suggest adopting Goodman’s principle of rightness, the criterion of functionality in his worldmaking, as a criterion within Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism when establishing the prevailing theory. It is to be expected that such a juxtaposition will uncover inconsistencies, in particular regarding boundless relativism and the vague terminology in both conceptions. Feyerabend’s Alternative Theories within Goodman’s Worldmaking 303 Organon F 27 (3) 2020: 302–324","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"302-324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46997837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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