{"title":"Whistling In The Library Of Babel","authors":"J. Gericke","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3943","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>-</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47229668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of: Adams, Robert Merrihew, What It Is, and What It Is in Itself: A Systematic Ontology","authors":"Tien-Chun Lo","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3939","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>-</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43559982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Response to Critics","authors":"Samuel Lebens","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3945","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>-</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45396115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Religious Jews have Faith in the Principles of Judaism","authors":"N. Verbin","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3944","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>-</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45920593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of: Daeley, Justin J. Why God Must Do What is Best: A Philosophical Investigation of Theistic Optimism","authors":"C. Tucker","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3940","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>-</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48975960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Melioristic Case Studies by Ulf Zackariasson","authors":"SIMO FRESTADIUS","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3982","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>-</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42808976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I consider syncretic processes as generators of syncretic beliefs and discuss the question of whether the religious believer, especially the theist believer, would have reasons for trusting in the beliefs that arise from this process. I intend to answer the following specific question: Is the theist, specially the Christian theist, justified in forming and maintaining syncretic beliefs? However, the answer to the specific question is dependent on an answer to a broad question, namely, whether a believer in general is justified in forming and maintaining syncretic beliefs. For this reason, much of this article will focus on the broad question to later answer the specific question. I will argue that both in the case of syncretic beliefs in general and in the case of syncretic-theistic beliefs in particular, defeaters are unsustainable, and a religious believer has good reasons to maintain syncretic beliefs
{"title":"SYNCRETISM AND THEISTIC RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES: A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION ABOUT BLENDS OF BELIEF IN THE CONTEXT OF THEISM","authors":"Marciano Adilio SPICA","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3935","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I consider syncretic processes as generators of syncretic beliefs and discuss the question of whether the religious believer, especially the theist believer, would have reasons for trusting in the beliefs that arise from this process. I intend to answer the following specific question: Is the theist, specially the Christian theist, justified in forming and maintaining syncretic beliefs? However, the answer to the specific question is dependent on an answer to a broad question, namely, whether a believer in general is justified in forming and maintaining syncretic beliefs. For this reason, much of this article will focus on the broad question to later answer the specific question. I will argue that both in the case of syncretic beliefs in general and in the case of syncretic-theistic beliefs in particular, defeaters are unsustainable, and a religious believer has good reasons to maintain syncretic beliefs","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43166742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On the traditional Christian doctrine: 1. People have free will (in Heaven as on Earth). 2. Those with free will can go to Hell. 3. Heaven is eternal. Many Christians also hold: 4. God is all powerful, knowing and good and 5. Free will can justify eternal suffering, evil, or hell. The paper argues that those who accept a version of Christianity that endorses 1–5 face a dilemma: Either deny that free will can justify suffering, evil, or hell or accept that we can fail in heaven and so go to hell. It suggests that compassionate Christians may do best to i) give up on the idea that free will is valuable enough to justify significant suffering. This may require: ii) accepting that something has gone woefully wrong on Earth and iii) giving up the idea that people can suffer significantly in Hell, but allows Christians to maintain that iv) Heaven is eternal.
{"title":"FALLING FROM GRACE AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL","authors":"Nicole Hassoun","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3740","url":null,"abstract":"On the traditional Christian doctrine: 1. People have free will (in Heaven as on Earth). 2. Those with free will can go to Hell. 3. Heaven is eternal. Many Christians also hold: 4. God is all powerful, knowing and good and 5. Free will can justify eternal suffering, evil, or hell. The paper argues that those who accept a version of Christianity that endorses 1–5 face a dilemma: Either deny that free will can justify suffering, evil, or hell or accept that we can fail in heaven and so go to hell. It suggests that compassionate Christians may do best to i) give up on the idea that free will is valuable enough to justify significant suffering. This may require: ii) accepting that something has gone woefully wrong on Earth and iii) giving up the idea that people can suffer significantly in Hell, but allows Christians to maintain that iv) Heaven is eternal.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43742936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I want to demonstrate the possibility of a normative theory which, if true, would make it impossible to think of God as morally good and therefore would “disqualify” him as God. I call this theory negative altruism (NA) and regard it as the true basis of social morality, as well as the appropriate normative foundation of antitheism. The article is structured as follows: first, I clarify some basic notions I proceed from (such as antitheism, axiological atheism and normative pluralism), second, I describe the normative logic of NA, and then I show why it makes impossible to present any theoretically conceivable creator of this universe as morally good. Lastly, after some remarks on why I find NA preferable to alternative normative theories, I explain in which sense it leads to antitheism.
{"title":"Good is overrated: on negative altruism as normative foundation for antitheism.","authors":"A. Seregin","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3660","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I want to demonstrate the possibility of a normative theory which, if true, would make it impossible to think of God as morally good and therefore would “disqualify” him as God. I call this theory negative altruism (NA) and regard it as the true basis of social morality, as well as the appropriate normative foundation of antitheism. The article is structured as follows: first, I clarify some basic notions I proceed from (such as antitheism, axiological atheism and normative pluralism), second, I describe the normative logic of NA, and then I show why it makes impossible to present any theoretically conceivable creator of this universe as morally good. Lastly, after some remarks on why I find NA preferable to alternative normative theories, I explain in which sense it leads to antitheism.","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49615930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “God of the Gaps: A Neglected Reply to God’s Stone Problem”, Jc Beall and A. J. Cotnoir offer a gappy solution to the paradox of (unrestricted) omnipotence that is typified by the classic stone problem. Andrew Tedder and Guillermo Badia, however, have recently argued that this solution could not be extended to a more serious Curry-like version of the paradox. In this paper, we show that such a gappy solution does extend to it
{"title":"OMNIPOTENCE, GAPS, AND CURRY","authors":"J. J. Joaquin","doi":"10.24204/ejpr.2022.3796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3796","url":null,"abstract":"In “God of the Gaps: A Neglected Reply to God’s Stone Problem”, Jc Beall and A. J. Cotnoir offer a gappy solution to the paradox of (unrestricted) omnipotence that is typified by the classic stone problem. Andrew Tedder and Guillermo Badia, however, have recently argued that this solution could not be extended to a more serious Curry-like version of the paradox. In this paper, we show that such a gappy solution does extend to it","PeriodicalId":43251,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45594807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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