Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.002
Changhyung Lee, Y. Chung
In this paper, we explore key elements of President Moon Jae-in’s policy on the Korean Peninsula and provide a conceptual framework and diplomatic roadmap for denuclearization and peace. Next, we perform a keyword extraction analysis of China’s People’s Daily and People’s Daily Overseas Edition to identify the objectives, pathway, role identity, and position of the Chinese government in the nuclear negotiations since the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. Our research finds the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, protection of peace and stability, and establishment of a peace regime as constituting China’s main objectives. Dialogue and negotiation, political resolution, a double suspension and dual track approach, and international cooperation are suggested as pathways. China affirms its commitment to playing a constructive, active, unique, and responsible great power role on the Peninsula and suggests U.S.-DPRK dialogue and engagement as the primary vehicle to achieve peace, supplemented by inter-Korean reconciliation. Based on our findings, we address some key differences in perception and position between South Korea and China toward denuclearization and a peace regime. Finally, we offer prospects for bilateral crisis management and mechanisms for South Korea-China cooperation.
{"title":"Denuclearization-Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: How Should ROK and China Cooperate?","authors":"Changhyung Lee, Y. Chung","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.002","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we explore key elements of President Moon Jae-in’s policy on the Korean Peninsula and provide a conceptual framework and diplomatic roadmap for denuclearization and peace. Next, we perform a keyword extraction analysis of China’s People’s Daily and People’s Daily Overseas Edition to identify the objectives, pathway, role identity, and position of the Chinese government in the nuclear negotiations since the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. Our research finds the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, protection of peace and stability, and establishment of a peace regime as constituting China’s main objectives. Dialogue and negotiation, political resolution, a double suspension and dual track approach, and international cooperation are suggested as pathways. China affirms its commitment to playing a constructive, active, unique, and responsible great power role on the Peninsula and suggests U.S.-DPRK dialogue and engagement as the primary vehicle to achieve peace, supplemented by inter-Korean reconciliation. Based on our findings, we address some key differences in perception and position between South Korea and China toward denuclearization and a peace regime. Finally, we offer prospects for bilateral crisis management and mechanisms for South Korea-China cooperation.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"19-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.003
Kijoo Kim
This study analyzes American defense and security strategy towards China and assesses its policy impact on security on the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The rapid rise of the People’s Republic of China as a geopolitical power and its aggressive foreign policy has considerably heightened fears among U.S. policymakers that China poses a threat. The intensifying strategic rivalry and distrust between Washington and Beijing since the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump in 2017 is leading to worsened relations between the two countries. This trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, and it is also expected that the American grand strategy will view China as the new global adversary, drawing down the “War on Terror” in the process. China is indeed fast emerging as the target of sustained deterrence, and this shift in American strategic thinking will likely continue even after the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. Intensifying Sino-American geopolitical competition is resulting in a new Cold War posture, reflecting in turn a lack of strategic dialogue. As a result, the risk of Sino-American military conflict in geopolitical hotspots around the world (including the Korean Peninsula) is rapidly increasing, and countries in the region are worried about being entangled in a Great Power conflict between the two countries. In the meantime, the United States is soliciting countries in the region to join an “anti-Beijing” grouping of sorts, seeking to integrate pre-existing alliances (e.g., the ROK-U.S. Alliance) into this new grouping. Beijing, for its part, is attempting to weaken those traditional alliances with Washington, through measures such as economic coercion. Seoul is bearing the brunt of such sustained pressure from Beijing and is being pressured by both countries to “pick” one side over the other. Practically speaking, rather than pick sides, Seoul ought to chart a middle course, proceeding with “strategic confidence” that draws on a clear delineation of national interest and backing of the South Korean public. In particular, it would behoove Seoul to provide opportunities for deliberation on Korean Peninsula security issues, enhancing the prospects for meaningful strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Concurrently, Seoul would also benefit from vigilant monitoring of the changing balance of power between United States and China, utilizing insights drawn from keen monitoring to further enhance its defense capabilities. In so doing, it is expected that Seoul will enhance its strategic value and military deterrence capabilities. Concurrently, by way of proactive military-to-military diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, cooperative deterrence capabilities also would have to be significantly enhanced.
{"title":"Changes in U.S. Security and Defense Strategy toward China: Assessment and Policy Implications","authors":"Kijoo Kim","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.003","url":null,"abstract":"This study analyzes American defense and security strategy towards China and assesses its policy impact on security on the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The rapid rise of the People’s Republic of China as a geopolitical power and its aggressive foreign policy has considerably heightened fears among U.S. policymakers that China poses a threat. The intensifying strategic rivalry and distrust between Washington and Beijing since the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump in 2017 is leading to worsened relations between the two countries. This trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, and it is also expected that the American grand strategy will view China as the new global adversary, drawing down the “War on Terror” in the process. China is indeed fast emerging as the target of sustained deterrence, and this shift in American strategic thinking will likely continue even after the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. Intensifying Sino-American geopolitical competition is resulting in a new Cold War posture, reflecting in turn a lack of strategic dialogue. As a result, the risk of Sino-American military conflict in geopolitical hotspots around the world (including the Korean Peninsula) is rapidly increasing, and countries in the region are worried about being entangled in a Great Power conflict between the two countries. In the meantime, the United States is soliciting countries in the region to join an “anti-Beijing” grouping of sorts, seeking to integrate pre-existing alliances (e.g., the ROK-U.S. Alliance) into this new grouping. Beijing, for its part, is attempting to weaken those traditional alliances with Washington, through measures such as economic coercion. Seoul is bearing the brunt of such sustained pressure from Beijing and is being pressured by both countries to “pick” one side over the other. Practically speaking, rather than pick sides, Seoul ought to chart a middle course, proceeding with “strategic confidence” that draws on a clear delineation of national interest and backing of the South Korean public. In particular, it would behoove Seoul to provide opportunities for deliberation on Korean Peninsula security issues, enhancing the prospects for meaningful strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Concurrently, Seoul would also benefit from vigilant monitoring of the changing balance of power between United States and China, utilizing insights drawn from keen monitoring to further enhance its defense capabilities. In so doing, it is expected that Seoul will enhance its strategic value and military deterrence capabilities. Concurrently, by way of proactive military-to-military diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, cooperative deterrence capabilities also would have to be significantly enhanced.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"539-560"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.004
Taesuh Cha
Two years ago, the relationship between Pyongyang and Washington remarkably changed from hair-triggering military tension to unprecedented rounds of summits. However, those diplomatic overtures suddenly fell away again over the course of 2019-2020. How can we understand this spectacular shift in the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula? What kinds of solutions can we (re-)try amid a long post-Hanoi impasse in nuclear talk? With the Trump presidency coming to an end, it is high time to look back on what really happened in this turbulent international drama, in an attempt to explain the serpentine trajectory of the Korean conundrum. In this context, I ask if mapping competing historical analogies can shed light on our understanding of the potential U.S.-DPRK rapprochement. Each mainstream political force in the Republic of Korea has mobilized contrasting historical reference points as heuristics to analyze the changing relations between America and North Korea, as well as to construct policy options to respond to them. There are competing discourses related to specific historical events, such as the Munich Agreement of 1938, the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, and Gorbachev’s “New Thinking.” In the near future, we will see if the North Korean supreme leader is a Gorbachev initiating fundamental reforms or a Hitler who exploits idealistic appeasement moves. Thus, the series of summit conferences between Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang in 2018-2019 will be remembered as a crucial watershed in the long history of the East Asian Cold War, similar to the Gorbachev-Reagan period during the Cold War in Europe.
{"title":"Whither North Korea? Competing Historical Analogies and the Lessons of the Soviet Case","authors":"Taesuh Cha","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.004","url":null,"abstract":"Two years ago, the relationship between Pyongyang and Washington remarkably changed from hair-triggering military tension to unprecedented rounds of summits. However, those diplomatic overtures suddenly fell away again over the course of 2019-2020. How can we understand this spectacular shift in the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula? What kinds of solutions can we (re-)try amid a long post-Hanoi impasse in nuclear talk? With the Trump presidency coming to an end, it is high time to look back on what really happened in this turbulent international drama, in an attempt to explain the serpentine trajectory of the Korean conundrum. In this context, I ask if mapping competing historical analogies can shed light on our understanding of the potential U.S.-DPRK rapprochement. Each mainstream political force in the Republic of Korea has mobilized contrasting historical reference points as heuristics to analyze the changing relations between America and North Korea, as well as to construct policy options to respond to them. There are competing discourses related to specific historical events, such as the Munich Agreement of 1938, the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, and Gorbachev’s “New Thinking.” In the near future, we will see if the North Korean supreme leader is a Gorbachev initiating fundamental reforms or a Hitler who exploits idealistic appeasement moves. Thus, the series of summit conferences between Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang in 2018-2019 will be remembered as a crucial watershed in the long history of the East Asian Cold War, similar to the Gorbachev-Reagan period during the Cold War in Europe.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"561-582"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.007
Haofan Fang
This paper examined the perceptions of Chinese scholars on Sino-DPRK relations and North Korea’s nuclear issue through meta-analysis of arguments of 102 articles published from January 2012 to June 2020. As a result of a comprehensive investigation, this paper found six main tendencies on Chinese academic discourse. First, although Sino-DPRK relations became strained at times, most articles viewed it as a friendly alliance and a special relationship. Some also argue that it should be transformed into normal diplomatic relations between sovereign states. Second, while acknowledging North Korea’s role as a strategic buffer, Chinese scholars tend to believe that Pyongyang’s nuclear program not only threatens China’s national security and interests but also allows the United States to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance and implement strategic deterrence against Beijing. Third, in many scholars’ predictions, the North’s nuclear weapons are likely to cause nuclear proliferation and an arms race in East Asia. Fourth, scholars claim that the North’s nuclear issue stem not only from the Cold War but also from the post-Cold War architecture on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, some of them support the North’s nuclear development, emphasizing a Korean unification led by Pyongyang, a strategic balance between the two Koreas, and lessons from the Indian and Iraqi cases. Fifth, most papers find the root cause of Pyongyang’s nuclear development as being from U.S. military threats, yet the authors think situational changes made the North’s nuclear policy more entrenched. Sixth, the authors stressed Sino-U.S. cooperation is necessary to resolve nuclear issue, criticizing the lack of Washington’s sincerity. They expect Beijing to play an active role in this problem based on its special relationship with Pyongyang despite some limitations.
{"title":"Sino-DPRK Relations and Chinese Perception toward North Korea’s Nuclear Issue: Meta-Analysis on Chinese Literature since 2012","authors":"Haofan Fang","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.007","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examined the perceptions of Chinese scholars on Sino-DPRK relations and North Korea’s nuclear issue through meta-analysis of arguments of 102 articles published from January 2012 to June 2020. As a result of a comprehensive investigation, this paper found six main tendencies on Chinese academic discourse. First, although Sino-DPRK relations became strained at times, most articles viewed it as a friendly alliance and a special relationship. Some also argue that it should be transformed into normal diplomatic relations between sovereign states. Second, while acknowledging North Korea’s role as a strategic buffer, Chinese scholars tend to believe that Pyongyang’s nuclear program not only threatens China’s national security and interests but also allows the United States to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance and implement strategic deterrence against Beijing. Third, in many scholars’ predictions, the North’s nuclear weapons are likely to cause nuclear proliferation and an arms race in East Asia. Fourth, scholars claim that the North’s nuclear issue stem not only from the Cold War but also from the post-Cold War architecture on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, some of them support the North’s nuclear development, emphasizing a Korean unification led by Pyongyang, a strategic balance between the two Koreas, and lessons from the Indian and Iraqi cases. Fifth, most papers find the root cause of Pyongyang’s nuclear development as being from U.S. military threats, yet the authors think situational changes made the North’s nuclear policy more entrenched. Sixth, the authors stressed Sino-U.S. cooperation is necessary to resolve nuclear issue, criticizing the lack of Washington’s sincerity. They expect Beijing to play an active role in this problem based on its special relationship with Pyongyang despite some limitations.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"43 1","pages":"625-653"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.007
Wei-guang Kong
As the United States and Australia both shifted from the “Asia-Pacific region” to the “Indo-Pacific region” in their official documents, this change means that the perception of national interests of the two countries in Asia has also changed. This change has an important impact on the future development of the U.S.-Australia alliance within the “Indo-Pacific region.” Given this situation, this paper attempts to analyze the reasons why the United States and Australia moved from the “Asia-Pacific” to the “Indo-Pacific” from the perspective of their national interests. It then compares the commonalities and differences between the two countries’ national interests in the context of the “Indo-Pacific region.” Finally, based on the previous discussion, this paper will analyze how this change will affect the future development of the U.S.-Australia alliance, especially their different ways in dealing with China.
{"title":"The Development of the U.S.-Australia Alliance in the Context of the Indo-Pacific Strategy","authors":"Wei-guang Kong","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.007","url":null,"abstract":"As the United States and Australia both shifted from the “Asia-Pacific region” to the “Indo-Pacific region” in their official documents, this change means that the perception of national interests of the two countries in Asia has also changed. This change has an important impact on the future development of the U.S.-Australia alliance within the “Indo-Pacific region.” Given this situation, this paper attempts to analyze the reasons why the United States and Australia moved from the “Asia-Pacific” to the “Indo-Pacific” from the perspective of their national interests. It then compares the commonalities and differences between the two countries’ national interests in the context of the “Indo-Pacific region.” Finally, based on the previous discussion, this paper will analyze how this change will affect the future development of the U.S.-Australia alliance, especially their different ways in dealing with China.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"121-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.3.008
Wenfu Mou
Whilst the NPT regime constituted from several international treaties provides judicial and adjudicatory arrangements for nuclear dispute settlement such as ad hoc arbitration and litigation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Statute respectively, such arrangements, in contemporary practice, have remained silent towards nuclear proliferation problems, and the Security Council has dominated the proliferation issues in its own capacity. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that there is some obstacle in the dispute settlement clause itself: the arbitral clause in the CSA precludes the essential proliferation disputes as being able to be arbitrated, and the dispute settlement clause in the IAEA Statute covers no disputes possibly arising out of the CSA. Even if a better judicial procedure is to be developed, it is hard for them to function effectively because in the event of non-compliance with international adjudications, their enforcement needs support from external authority. On the other hand, the key to the settlement of nuclear proliferation disputes is the continued duty of performance, fulfillment of international obligations ever violated, to a large extent, implementation of international law, which also need legitimate coercive authority. These two elements may justify contemporary international practices in the settlement of proliferation disputes.
{"title":"Why Nuclear Non-proliferation Disputes Cannot Be Settled through Judicial or Adjudication Arrangements","authors":"Wenfu Mou","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.3.008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.3.008","url":null,"abstract":"Whilst the NPT regime constituted from several international treaties provides judicial and adjudicatory arrangements for nuclear dispute settlement such as ad hoc arbitration and litigation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Statute respectively, such arrangements, in contemporary practice, have remained silent towards nuclear proliferation problems, and the Security Council has dominated the proliferation issues in its own capacity. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that there is some obstacle in the dispute settlement clause itself: the arbitral clause in the CSA precludes the essential proliferation disputes as being able to be arbitrated, and the dispute settlement clause in the IAEA Statute covers no disputes possibly arising out of the CSA. Even if a better judicial procedure is to be developed, it is hard for them to function effectively because in the event of non-compliance with international adjudications, their enforcement needs support from external authority. On the other hand, the key to the settlement of nuclear proliferation disputes is the continued duty of performance, fulfillment of international obligations ever violated, to a large extent, implementation of international law, which also need legitimate coercive authority. These two elements may justify contemporary international practices in the settlement of proliferation disputes.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"475-494"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.006
Chang-Wee Lee
{"title":"The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Its Implications for South Korea’s Policy Choice: The Law and Politics of the NPT Regime","authors":"Chang-Wee Lee","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.1.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"101-119"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.3.003
J. Choi
This study attempts to examine how reinforced sanctions affected the North Korean economy focusing on the interdependence of industries. North Korea’s trade with China, accounting for more than 90 percent of its total trade, sharply dropped right after the UNSC intensified sanctions. Trade shock affects the domestic economy through a decrease in demand and supply, caused by the reduction of exports and imports, respectively. We estimate the ripple effect from trade shock after the recent sanctions using input-output analysis. According to the estimation results, export shock caused a decrease in value-added by 1.4-1.5 billion USD, which accounts for 8.5-9.0 percent of the North Korean GDP. In addition, import shock was concentrated on the capital goods of final goods, while it rarely affected intermediate imports. For the reinforced sanctions, the dependency of intermediate imports showed an increase in some industries such as agriculture, forestry and fishery and light industry. These results indicate that the economic impact from the recent sanctions could be different from that of the collapse of the former socialist bloc in the early 1990s. In terms of export shock, the sanctions’ negative effect is estimated to be higher. However, the negative effect from import shock is lower than that of the early 1990s, since it is far from reducing the intermediate inputs to the overall industry.
{"title":"The Impact of the Reinforced Sanctions on the North Korean Economy: Focused on the Ripple Effects from Trade Shock","authors":"J. Choi","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.3.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.3.003","url":null,"abstract":"This study attempts to examine how reinforced sanctions affected the North Korean economy focusing on the interdependence of industries. North Korea’s trade with China, accounting for more than 90 percent of its total trade, sharply dropped right after the UNSC intensified sanctions. Trade shock affects the domestic economy through a decrease in demand and supply, caused by the reduction of exports and imports, respectively. We estimate the ripple effect from trade shock after the recent sanctions using input-output analysis. According to the estimation results, export shock caused a decrease in value-added by 1.4-1.5 billion USD, which accounts for 8.5-9.0 percent of the North Korean GDP. In addition, import shock was concentrated on the capital goods of final goods, while it rarely affected intermediate imports. For the reinforced sanctions, the dependency of intermediate imports showed an increase in some industries such as agriculture, forestry and fishery and light industry. These results indicate that the economic impact from the recent sanctions could be different from that of the collapse of the former socialist bloc in the early 1990s. In terms of export shock, the sanctions’ negative effect is estimated to be higher. However, the negative effect from import shock is lower than that of the early 1990s, since it is far from reducing the intermediate inputs to the overall industry.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"371-391"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.005
M. Kim
Because the existing nuclear theories overlook leaders’ historically diverse preferences about how to use nuclear weapons, they cannot adequately explain why the United States used nuclear coercion at all against weak states or for non-vital national interests when the United States had superior conventional forces. I argue that while U.S. leaders’ learning of the overly destructive damage of military nuclear use raised the threshold of using nuclear weapons to attack, the lack of learning or biased learning of the repercussions of coercive nuclear use allowed many leaders to retain their belief in the coercive power of nuclear weapons. Drawing on theoretical concepts of nuclear learning and historical analysis, this paper explains how U.S. leaders’ spurious learning of the political reality of nuclear weapons led them to the counterproductive use of nuclear coercion. The historical analysis shows that President Richard Nixon was more willing to use nuclear coercion to end the Vietnam War than other leaders like President Lyndon Johnson. Nixon derived his nuclear strategy, represented by his “madman theory,” from his observation of atomic diplomacy during the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, though Nixon’s learning seemed to be fairly spurious as the role of nuclear coercive diplomacy in ending the War and Crisis is still highly debatable.
{"title":"The Spurious Nuclear Learning: Why Nixon Used Nuclear Coercion during the Vietnam War","authors":"M. Kim","doi":"10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22883/KJDA.2020.32.4.005","url":null,"abstract":"Because the existing nuclear theories overlook leaders’ historically diverse preferences about how to use nuclear weapons, they cannot adequately explain why the United States used nuclear coercion at all against weak states or for non-vital national interests when the United States had superior conventional forces. I argue that while U.S. leaders’ learning of the overly destructive damage of military nuclear use raised the threshold of using nuclear weapons to attack, the lack of learning or biased learning of the repercussions of coercive nuclear use allowed many leaders to retain their belief in the coercive power of nuclear weapons. Drawing on theoretical concepts of nuclear learning and historical analysis, this paper explains how U.S. leaders’ spurious learning of the political reality of nuclear weapons led them to the counterproductive use of nuclear coercion. The historical analysis shows that President Richard Nixon was more willing to use nuclear coercion to end the Vietnam War than other leaders like President Lyndon Johnson. Nixon derived his nuclear strategy, represented by his “madman theory,” from his observation of atomic diplomacy during the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, though Nixon’s learning seemed to be fairly spurious as the role of nuclear coercive diplomacy in ending the War and Crisis is still highly debatable.","PeriodicalId":43274,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of Defense Analysis","volume":"32 1","pages":"583-599"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68343396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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