Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1177/16118944221130478
M. Conway, Robert Gerwarth
In the first half of the twentieth century, Europe experienced a wave of civil wars, unparalleled since the French Revolution, from Finland in the North and Ireland and Spain in the West to Ukraine and Russia in the East and Greece in the South. This list can easily be expanded if we include, as some historians do, the violence that occurred in many areas of occupied Europe during and after the two world wars – most notably in Poland after 1918 and in the Balkans, but also in Italy and France during the final stages of Second World War – as a form of internal war frequently induced and catalyzed by occupying external forces.
{"title":"Europe's Age of Civil Wars? An Introduction","authors":"M. Conway, Robert Gerwarth","doi":"10.1177/16118944221130478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221130478","url":null,"abstract":"In the first half of the twentieth century, Europe experienced a wave of civil wars, unparalleled since the French Revolution, from Finland in the North and Ireland and Spain in the West to Ukraine and Russia in the East and Greece in the South. This list can easily be expanded if we include, as some historians do, the violence that occurred in many areas of occupied Europe during and after the two world wars – most notably in Poland after 1918 and in the Balkans, but also in Italy and France during the final stages of Second World War – as a form of internal war frequently induced and catalyzed by occupying external forces.","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49275187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-18DOI: 10.1177/16118944221130213
B. Kissane
For most Turks the emergence of the Republic of Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire involved a four-year period of national struggle/milli mücadele. In the version of events canonised by Ataturk's October 1927 Nutuk speech to the Turkish parliament the expression civil war is not used. Yet the range of adversaries he depicts, including the Ottoman Palace suggests that there were many types of wars being fought in Anatolia in those years. This article suggests that the term civil war can be applied to those years and discusses historical research that says so. Not only was the war with the Palace an inchoate civil war over the Ottoman Succession, there are strong European parallels with the Turkish experience of imperial collapse, ethnic conflict, partition and state formation between 1918 and 1923. To draw the connections we need to think of civil war in a ‘layered’ way and the latter part of the article justifies such an approach.
{"title":"Was There a Civil War in Anatolia between the Ottoman Collapse in World War I and the Establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923?","authors":"B. Kissane","doi":"10.1177/16118944221130213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221130213","url":null,"abstract":"For most Turks the emergence of the Republic of Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire involved a four-year period of national struggle/milli mücadele. In the version of events canonised by Ataturk's October 1927 Nutuk speech to the Turkish parliament the expression civil war is not used. Yet the range of adversaries he depicts, including the Ottoman Palace suggests that there were many types of wars being fought in Anatolia in those years. This article suggests that the term civil war can be applied to those years and discusses historical research that says so. Not only was the war with the Palace an inchoate civil war over the Ottoman Succession, there are strong European parallels with the Turkish experience of imperial collapse, ethnic conflict, partition and state formation between 1918 and 1923. To draw the connections we need to think of civil war in a ‘layered’ way and the latter part of the article justifies such an approach.","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46760526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1177/16118944221130222
S. Schattenberg
The aim of this article is to explain why and how two formerly hostile states such as the USSR and West Germany concluded a gas deal in 1970 that lasted not only the 20 years that had been initially contracted, but until 2022. Based on new documents from Russian archives, this paper will analyse how natural gas for the Politburo turned from a minor natural resource to a worthy political tool and a ‘soft power’. While the Soviet gas minister had already advocated the global sale of gas in 1966 and the Politburo used it in 1966 itself as a means to bind Austria to its sphere of influence, Moscow changed its mind towards West Germany only in 1969 due to political developments. In order to bring Willy Brandt to power, put China in its place and teach Italy a lesson, Moscow changed its policy towards West Germany from risk avoidance to danger containment. Both sides independently developed the idea that binding the other's market to their own would prevent the partner from imposing another embargo (the West) or stopping deliveries (the USSR). The entanglement of markets was supposed to serve as a guarantee for the reliability of the respective contractor – the result of which we see today.
{"title":"Pipeline Construction as “Soft Power” in Foreign Policy. Why the Soviet Union Started to Sell Gas to West Germany, 1966–1970","authors":"S. Schattenberg","doi":"10.1177/16118944221130222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221130222","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to explain why and how two formerly hostile states such as the USSR and West Germany concluded a gas deal in 1970 that lasted not only the 20 years that had been initially contracted, but until 2022. Based on new documents from Russian archives, this paper will analyse how natural gas for the Politburo turned from a minor natural resource to a worthy political tool and a ‘soft power’. While the Soviet gas minister had already advocated the global sale of gas in 1966 and the Politburo used it in 1966 itself as a means to bind Austria to its sphere of influence, Moscow changed its mind towards West Germany only in 1969 due to political developments. In order to bring Willy Brandt to power, put China in its place and teach Italy a lesson, Moscow changed its policy towards West Germany from risk avoidance to danger containment. Both sides independently developed the idea that binding the other's market to their own would prevent the partner from imposing another embargo (the West) or stopping deliveries (the USSR). The entanglement of markets was supposed to serve as a guarantee for the reliability of the respective contractor – the result of which we see today.","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45136410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.1177/16118944221110714
J. Goetz
Taking an analysis of relevant statements and campaigns of the right-wing extremist group ‘Identitarian Movement’ in German-speaking countries as a starting point, this article will reconstruct their key narratives with regard to gender policy, and identify the discourses and forms of organization that are used to integrate women into the Identitarian context. An overview of the origins and characteristics of the Identitarians is followed by a classification of Identitarian gender policy into three phases: its beginning (2012–2015), its peak (2016–2018) and its demise (2019–2020). As can be seen, during the first years it had been necessary to negotiate fundamental questions of the group's gender concepts, whereas during the peak years the focus shifted to threat scenarios involving ‘our women’. At the same time, female activists started to find their own projects. Since 2019, however, the group has started to fall apart, women's issues have lost their appeal and women activists have been leaving. Notwithstanding this decline, the question still remains of what to make of the gender-political commitment of Identitarian women in the context of feminist debates.
{"title":"‘Patriotism is not just a Man’s Thing’: Right-wing Extremist Gender Policies within the so-called Identitarian Movement","authors":"J. Goetz","doi":"10.1177/16118944221110714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221110714","url":null,"abstract":"Taking an analysis of relevant statements and campaigns of the right-wing extremist group ‘Identitarian Movement’ in German-speaking countries as a starting point, this article will reconstruct their key narratives with regard to gender policy, and identify the discourses and forms of organization that are used to integrate women into the Identitarian context. An overview of the origins and characteristics of the Identitarians is followed by a classification of Identitarian gender policy into three phases: its beginning (2012–2015), its peak (2016–2018) and its demise (2019–2020). As can be seen, during the first years it had been necessary to negotiate fundamental questions of the group's gender concepts, whereas during the peak years the focus shifted to threat scenarios involving ‘our women’. At the same time, female activists started to find their own projects. Since 2019, however, the group has started to fall apart, women's issues have lost their appeal and women activists have been leaving. Notwithstanding this decline, the question still remains of what to make of the gender-political commitment of Identitarian women in the context of feminist debates.","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46759000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.1177/16118944221113610
N. Olsen, R. Andersen
For decades, a large and influential group of free-market conservative think tanks has been pushing climate change scepticism, thereby contributing to a weakening of US commitment to environmental protection. What unite organizations such as the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Heartland Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute is a libertarian commitment to free markets and low taxes, as well as a critique of ‘big government’. These positions form the ideological bedrock of free-market think tanks’ efforts to halt climate action. But what are the historical roots of anti-environmentalism in libertarian thought? In which contexts did it emerge, who gave voice to it, and what are the themes, arguments and beliefs underpinning it? This essay locates the roots of modern libertarian anti-environmentalism in the strong reactions of libertarian figureheads, such as Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard, to the rise of environmentalism as a mass social movement and as a new area of government policy in the 1960s and 1970s. It shows how Rand and Rothbard perceived environmentalism as a collectivist leftist attempt to dismantle the American system of free enterprise capitalism and the whole of modern civilization in the name of environmental protection. In a fierce defence of modern industrial capitalism, Rand and
{"title":"Shielding the Market from the Masses: The Origins of Libertarian Anti-environmentalism in the 1960s and 1970s","authors":"N. Olsen, R. Andersen","doi":"10.1177/16118944221113610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221113610","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, a large and influential group of free-market conservative think tanks has been pushing climate change scepticism, thereby contributing to a weakening of US commitment to environmental protection. What unite organizations such as the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Heartland Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute is a libertarian commitment to free markets and low taxes, as well as a critique of ‘big government’. These positions form the ideological bedrock of free-market think tanks’ efforts to halt climate action. But what are the historical roots of anti-environmentalism in libertarian thought? In which contexts did it emerge, who gave voice to it, and what are the themes, arguments and beliefs underpinning it? This essay locates the roots of modern libertarian anti-environmentalism in the strong reactions of libertarian figureheads, such as Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard, to the rise of environmentalism as a mass social movement and as a new area of government policy in the 1960s and 1970s. It shows how Rand and Rothbard perceived environmentalism as a collectivist leftist attempt to dismantle the American system of free enterprise capitalism and the whole of modern civilization in the name of environmental protection. In a fierce defence of modern industrial capitalism, Rand and","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41809911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.1177/16118944221113607
Iva Peša
The troubling reality is that the abundance of our natural resources – coltan, cobalt and other strategic minerals – is the root cause of war, extreme violence and abject poverty. [ … When you your electric you use your smart phone or jewellery, a minute to fl ect on the human cost of these objects. [ …
{"title":"Decarbonization, Democracy and Climate Justice: The Connections Between African Mining and European Politics","authors":"Iva Peša","doi":"10.1177/16118944221113607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221113607","url":null,"abstract":"The troubling reality is that the abundance of our natural resources – coltan, cobalt and other strategic minerals – is the root cause of war, extreme violence and abject poverty. [ … When you your electric you use your smart phone or jewellery, a minute to fl ect on the human cost of these objects. [ …","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49636550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.1177/16118944221120875
A. Graff
This article demonstrates how anti-gender discourse – originating in the Vatican and spreading through ultra-conservative networks such as the World Congress of Families – draws on traditions of conspiratorial anti-Semitism. The repressed link takes two forms: displacement (Judaization of sexual minorities) and attribution of blame (Jews having invented ‘gender’ to destroy Christianity). The first section outlines the structural and historical kinship between the two discourses. Anti-gender discourse continues the 19th-century strand of European anti-Semitism that operates as a cultural code for anti-modernism, reproducing its conspiratorial and polarizing structure and repeating the stereotypes of gendered anti-Semitism. Part two examines an example of disguised anti-Semitic subtext: Gabriele Kuby's Global Sexual Revolution (2015), a central text of anti-genderism, is shown to draw on the writings of E. Michael Jones, a ‘Radical Catholic Traditionalist’. Jones claims that Jews have been plotting for centuries to destroy Western Civilization and enjoys a certain popularity with the Polish right. The final section reflects on the elusiveness of the anti-Semitic subtext and its dependence on cultural context. The displacement of Jews by ‘gender’ facilitates the mainstreaming of right-wing extremism and helps legitimize radical-right groups as political players.
{"title":"Jewish Perversion as Strategy of Domination: The anti-Semitic Subtext of Anti-gender Discourse","authors":"A. Graff","doi":"10.1177/16118944221120875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221120875","url":null,"abstract":"This article demonstrates how anti-gender discourse – originating in the Vatican and spreading through ultra-conservative networks such as the World Congress of Families – draws on traditions of conspiratorial anti-Semitism. The repressed link takes two forms: displacement (Judaization of sexual minorities) and attribution of blame (Jews having invented ‘gender’ to destroy Christianity). The first section outlines the structural and historical kinship between the two discourses. Anti-gender discourse continues the 19th-century strand of European anti-Semitism that operates as a cultural code for anti-modernism, reproducing its conspiratorial and polarizing structure and repeating the stereotypes of gendered anti-Semitism. Part two examines an example of disguised anti-Semitic subtext: Gabriele Kuby's Global Sexual Revolution (2015), a central text of anti-genderism, is shown to draw on the writings of E. Michael Jones, a ‘Radical Catholic Traditionalist’. Jones claims that Jews have been plotting for centuries to destroy Western Civilization and enjoys a certain popularity with the Polish right. The final section reflects on the elusiveness of the anti-Semitic subtext and its dependence on cultural context. The displacement of Jews by ‘gender’ facilitates the mainstreaming of right-wing extremism and helps legitimize radical-right groups as political players.","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41928466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-26DOI: 10.1177/16118944221113271
S. Couperus, Liesbeth van de Grift
Heightened awareness and alarmism about climate change have prompted politicians, public intellectuals and scholars alike to reconsider the political values, structures and institutions with which to confront it. A number of recurring directions of thought and experiment may be distinguished. For one, ecological authoritarianism – the strand of thought that proposes to abolish or suspend democracy for the sake of achieving ‘green’ goals – testifies to the perceived shortcomings of democratic politics when it comes to immediate collective environmental action. Alternatively, and on the flipside of the same coin, democratic innovations (e.g. citizens’ assemblies, mini-publics and juries) are contemplated to improve popular input, inclusive and deliberative decision-making, and, ultimately, democratic legitimacy in the realm of environmental politics. Meanwhile, technological solutionism has permeated democratic and non-democratic policy-making alike, adding to the fragile balance of immediacy, legitimacy and technology in contemporary climate politics. What seems to be lacking in contemporary discussions about the relationship between democracy and climate change, however, is a critical-historical reflection on (or awareness of) some of the deeply ingrained hegemonic assumptions that inform it. These assumptions revolve around three interrelated and recurring orientations toward climate politics: (1) the inclination to anthropocentrism in understanding the state and development of the natural world (as opposed to a multispecies
{"title":"Environment and Democracy: An Introduction","authors":"S. Couperus, Liesbeth van de Grift","doi":"10.1177/16118944221113271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221113271","url":null,"abstract":"Heightened awareness and alarmism about climate change have prompted politicians, public intellectuals and scholars alike to reconsider the political values, structures and institutions with which to confront it. A number of recurring directions of thought and experiment may be distinguished. For one, ecological authoritarianism – the strand of thought that proposes to abolish or suspend democracy for the sake of achieving ‘green’ goals – testifies to the perceived shortcomings of democratic politics when it comes to immediate collective environmental action. Alternatively, and on the flipside of the same coin, democratic innovations (e.g. citizens’ assemblies, mini-publics and juries) are contemplated to improve popular input, inclusive and deliberative decision-making, and, ultimately, democratic legitimacy in the realm of environmental politics. Meanwhile, technological solutionism has permeated democratic and non-democratic policy-making alike, adding to the fragile balance of immediacy, legitimacy and technology in contemporary climate politics. What seems to be lacking in contemporary discussions about the relationship between democracy and climate change, however, is a critical-historical reflection on (or awareness of) some of the deeply ingrained hegemonic assumptions that inform it. These assumptions revolve around three interrelated and recurring orientations toward climate politics: (1) the inclination to anthropocentrism in understanding the state and development of the natural world (as opposed to a multispecies","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49202468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-21DOI: 10.1177/16118944221113611
Julie Ault
Contemporary debates about ‘ ecological authoritarianism ’ underscore the relationship between physical environments and the political systems that seek to control and alter them. At the forefront of these issues, today is a political body ’ s ability to react to climate change and implement carbon-reducing policies. 2 As one of the world ’ s largest economies and an authoritarian state, China has been at the centre of the discourse on ecological authoritarianism. 3 This new attention to authoritarian regimes suggests that, over the last four or fi ve decades, scholarship has tended to privilege environmental movements and politics in democratic systems. The plethora of social science and historical literature on green movements and environmental regulation in liberal democracies, such as West Germany, Sweden and the United States, supports this assertion. 4 If the subject of dictatorship and environment was broached, it tended to be in the context of extreme pollution and ecological devastation. 5
{"title":"Dictatorship and Environment: East Germany and the Limits of Change","authors":"Julie Ault","doi":"10.1177/16118944221113611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221113611","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary debates about ‘ ecological authoritarianism ’ underscore the relationship between physical environments and the political systems that seek to control and alter them. At the forefront of these issues, today is a political body ’ s ability to react to climate change and implement carbon-reducing policies. 2 As one of the world ’ s largest economies and an authoritarian state, China has been at the centre of the discourse on ecological authoritarianism. 3 This new attention to authoritarian regimes suggests that, over the last four or fi ve decades, scholarship has tended to privilege environmental movements and politics in democratic systems. The plethora of social science and historical literature on green movements and environmental regulation in liberal democracies, such as West Germany, Sweden and the United States, supports this assertion. 4 If the subject of dictatorship and environment was broached, it tended to be in the context of extreme pollution and ecological devastation. 5","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47468591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-18DOI: 10.1177/16118944221110101
A. Stern
This article explores gender and the far-right in the United States with specific attention to female actors and gendered ideologies in the realms of culture and media. By focusing on several female extremists, I show how traditional and rigid ideas of home, marriage, family and community bolster the xenophobia and racism of white nationalism in the United States. This article includes a historical overview of the concept of metapolitics and emphasizes its centrality to the mainstreaming of the contemporary far-right. I suggest that the internet and social media have become the far-right's premier metapolitical spaces, which can help to explain both the normalization of white nationalism and the unique role of female extremists. Several case studies of far-right women elucidate how gender norms are performed online, and how they reinforce anxious narratives of white erasure and victimhood, while fomenting antagonism towards feminism, globalism and multiculturalism. This article explores how female actors are galvanizing white nationalism in the United States, as they build on earlier eras of far-right activism and amplify the far-right via social media.
{"title":"Gender and the Far-right in the United States: Female Extremists and the Mainstreaming of Contemporary White Nationalism","authors":"A. Stern","doi":"10.1177/16118944221110101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/16118944221110101","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores gender and the far-right in the United States with specific attention to female actors and gendered ideologies in the realms of culture and media. By focusing on several female extremists, I show how traditional and rigid ideas of home, marriage, family and community bolster the xenophobia and racism of white nationalism in the United States. This article includes a historical overview of the concept of metapolitics and emphasizes its centrality to the mainstreaming of the contemporary far-right. I suggest that the internet and social media have become the far-right's premier metapolitical spaces, which can help to explain both the normalization of white nationalism and the unique role of female extremists. Several case studies of far-right women elucidate how gender norms are performed online, and how they reinforce anxious narratives of white erasure and victimhood, while fomenting antagonism towards feminism, globalism and multiculturalism. This article explores how female actors are galvanizing white nationalism in the United States, as they build on earlier eras of far-right activism and amplify the far-right via social media.","PeriodicalId":44275,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Modern European History","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47323244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}