Pub Date : 2021-02-13DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2020.1864840
Jie Zhang
Abstract Opinions differ among academics concerning the relationship between the Confucian ethic and China’s economic development. This research reveals that the Confucian ethic originated from the practical demand for guaranteeing the smooth operation of households. Later, it developed into a coordinator between the government and individuals, thus bringing about the institutional compromise between the family system and bureaucracy, which is the foundation of the market system specific to China. In the future, the successful development of a market economy will be largely dependent on whether an institutional equilibrium between the government and market forces can be reached, and this will be strongly related to the Confucian ethic. This paper holds that Confucianism involves inherent conflicts between the macro and the micro level. At the macro level, Confucianism sets very high standards for wealth and morals, but at the micro level it pays little attention to how to create wealth. Accordingly, for the ongoing market reform, it is rational to continue introducing Protestant ethics-oriented Western systems since they are more advantageous in terms of increasing wealth accumulation. However, this process lacks stability and inclusiveness and is thus prone to the separation of wealth from morals. This is exactly where Confucianism should step in. This paper concludes that the long separation of wealth accumulation from the Chinese cultural traditions has become the biggest obstacle to China’s economic growth. In the face of intensified social and economic conflicts, the only appropriate option is to revive tradition and root the reform in China’s own cultural soil.
{"title":"Is the Confucian ethic a hindrance to economic development in China?","authors":"Jie Zhang","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2020.1864840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2020.1864840","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Opinions differ among academics concerning the relationship between the Confucian ethic and China’s economic development. This research reveals that the Confucian ethic originated from the practical demand for guaranteeing the smooth operation of households. Later, it developed into a coordinator between the government and individuals, thus bringing about the institutional compromise between the family system and bureaucracy, which is the foundation of the market system specific to China. In the future, the successful development of a market economy will be largely dependent on whether an institutional equilibrium between the government and market forces can be reached, and this will be strongly related to the Confucian ethic. This paper holds that Confucianism involves inherent conflicts between the macro and the micro level. At the macro level, Confucianism sets very high standards for wealth and morals, but at the micro level it pays little attention to how to create wealth. Accordingly, for the ongoing market reform, it is rational to continue introducing Protestant ethics-oriented Western systems since they are more advantageous in terms of increasing wealth accumulation. However, this process lacks stability and inclusiveness and is thus prone to the separation of wealth from morals. This is exactly where Confucianism should step in. This paper concludes that the long separation of wealth accumulation from the Chinese cultural traditions has become the biggest obstacle to China’s economic growth. In the face of intensified social and economic conflicts, the only appropriate option is to revive tradition and root the reform in China’s own cultural soil.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"9 1","pages":"255 - 314"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2021-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2020.1864840","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48939417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-10DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2021.1872854
Victor Edem Sosoo, David Iheke Okorie, Hai-qiang Chen
Abstract Commodity futures have been largely blamed for the price hikes in 2007/mid-2008 and 2010/2011 and the decreased food security around the world, especially in less developed countries. There still exist serious disagreements between most economists and policymakers as to whether this is the case. We run time-series regressions for all samples and subsamples for lower-income, middle-income, and high-income countries respectively. The empirical results show that commodity futures have a more significant negative impact on food security in low-income countries than in middle-income and high-income economies. Financial crises, however, have a significant impact on food security in all the regional divisions as a whole and are seen to exasperate the negative effect of some of the commodity futures on food security. We also find evidence that a certain degree of speculation in some commodities stabilises prices of those commodities as expected by theory. Our results have important policy implications as policymakers must control these speculations but should also be careful not to overregulate the market.
{"title":"Roles of commodity futures derivatives and financial crises in global food security","authors":"Victor Edem Sosoo, David Iheke Okorie, Hai-qiang Chen","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2021.1872854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2021.1872854","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Commodity futures have been largely blamed for the price hikes in 2007/mid-2008 and 2010/2011 and the decreased food security around the world, especially in less developed countries. There still exist serious disagreements between most economists and policymakers as to whether this is the case. We run time-series regressions for all samples and subsamples for lower-income, middle-income, and high-income countries respectively. The empirical results show that commodity futures have a more significant negative impact on food security in low-income countries than in middle-income and high-income economies. Financial crises, however, have a significant impact on food security in all the regional divisions as a whole and are seen to exasperate the negative effect of some of the commodity futures on food security. We also find evidence that a certain degree of speculation in some commodities stabilises prices of those commodities as expected by theory. Our results have important policy implications as policymakers must control these speculations but should also be careful not to overregulate the market.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"9 1","pages":"336 - 357"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2021-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2021.1872854","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48008576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-25DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2020.1865620
Daniele Carminati
Abstract Soft power is commonly presented as an alternative or a complement to harder forms of power, such as military and economic might. However, while it is safer to say that soft power does not depend on military capabilities, it is not as straightforward to separate soft power from its economic counterpart. Juxtaposing various soft power rankings with a country’s economic assets may reveal how soft power relies on economic resources. Moreover, when closely scrutinised, it is possible to appreciate how dynamics of attraction are also closely intertwined with economic gains. In an increasingly connected world, soft power could prove to be instrumental in achieving economic success. Economic effects are expected to be more consistent, observable, and attainable when compared to political ones, such as spreading democracy. Far from arguing that soft power is unable to assist in achieving political goals in the long term, this paper aims instead to highlight how a narrow culture-centred analysis of soft power greatly limits the understanding of this power in the real world, and results in the underestimation of its value and impact. China’s quest to connect the world through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a topical case through which to further explore the soft–economic power nexus.
{"title":"The economics of soft power: Reliance on economic resources and instrumentality in economic gains","authors":"Daniele Carminati","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2020.1865620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2020.1865620","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Soft power is commonly presented as an alternative or a complement to harder forms of power, such as military and economic might. However, while it is safer to say that soft power does not depend on military capabilities, it is not as straightforward to separate soft power from its economic counterpart. Juxtaposing various soft power rankings with a country’s economic assets may reveal how soft power relies on economic resources. Moreover, when closely scrutinised, it is possible to appreciate how dynamics of attraction are also closely intertwined with economic gains. In an increasingly connected world, soft power could prove to be instrumental in achieving economic success. Economic effects are expected to be more consistent, observable, and attainable when compared to political ones, such as spreading democracy. Far from arguing that soft power is unable to assist in achieving political goals in the long term, this paper aims instead to highlight how a narrow culture-centred analysis of soft power greatly limits the understanding of this power in the real world, and results in the underestimation of its value and impact. China’s quest to connect the world through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a topical case through which to further explore the soft–economic power nexus.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"10 1","pages":"19 - 43"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2020.1865620","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48701819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2020.1827500
Jim Engle-Warnick, J. Heroux, C. Montmarquette
Abstract At the core of the decision to invest in prevention are individuals who face immediate real costs against future and uncertain benefits. In this paper, we elicit subjects’ willingness to pay to reduce future risk. In our experiments, subjects are given a cash endowment and a risky lottery. They report their willingness to pay to exchange the risky lottery for a safe one. Subjects play the lottery either immediately, eight weeks later, or 25 weeks later. Thus, both the lottery and the future are sources of uncertainty in our experiments. In two additional treatments, we control for future uncertainty with a continuation probability (a stopping rule), constant and independent across periods, that simulates the chances of not being able to return to play the lottery after 8 and 25 periods. We find evidence for a present bias in both the time-delay sessions and the continuation probability sessions, suggesting that this bias robustly persists in environments including both risk and future uncertainty. Therefore, eliciting prevention behaviour is a major challenge.
{"title":"Willingness to pay to reduce future risk: a fundamental issue to invest in prevention behaviour","authors":"Jim Engle-Warnick, J. Heroux, C. Montmarquette","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2020.1827500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2020.1827500","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract At the core of the decision to invest in prevention are individuals who face immediate real costs against future and uncertain benefits. In this paper, we elicit subjects’ willingness to pay to reduce future risk. In our experiments, subjects are given a cash endowment and a risky lottery. They report their willingness to pay to exchange the risky lottery for a safe one. Subjects play the lottery either immediately, eight weeks later, or 25 weeks later. Thus, both the lottery and the future are sources of uncertainty in our experiments. In two additional treatments, we control for future uncertainty with a continuation probability (a stopping rule), constant and independent across periods, that simulates the chances of not being able to return to play the lottery after 8 and 25 periods. We find evidence for a present bias in both the time-delay sessions and the continuation probability sessions, suggesting that this bias robustly persists in environments including both risk and future uncertainty. Therefore, eliciting prevention behaviour is a major challenge.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"9 1","pages":"17 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2020.1827500","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41915329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2020.1815397
Anne Corcos, François Pannequin, C. Montmarquette
Abstract Based on experimental data, this paper confirms, in a controlled environment, converging theoretical and empirical results that, when individuals insure, they choose to insure themselves with a full cover. This insurance behaviour creates an opportunity for the public authority to drive people to enter the insurance market where they would buy full insurance. This paper also sheds light on the risks of an opportunistic insurers’ behaviour. This heuristic challenges the efficiency of separating contracts designed to address adverse selection issues. Indeed, a strong preference for full contracts may encourage low-risk individuals to turn to (full) contracts designed for high-risk individuals, yielding advantageous selection opportunities for insurers. However, if this heuristic strengthens the high-risks’ reluctance for partial insurance, it may increase the efficiency of the separating contracts, and the low-risk individuals suffer less from adverse selection.
{"title":"How an All-or-Nothing insurance behaviour challenges economic policies: an experimental approach","authors":"Anne Corcos, François Pannequin, C. Montmarquette","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2020.1815397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2020.1815397","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Based on experimental data, this paper confirms, in a controlled environment, converging theoretical and empirical results that, when individuals insure, they choose to insure themselves with a full cover. This insurance behaviour creates an opportunity for the public authority to drive people to enter the insurance market where they would buy full insurance. This paper also sheds light on the risks of an opportunistic insurers’ behaviour. This heuristic challenges the efficiency of separating contracts designed to address adverse selection issues. Indeed, a strong preference for full contracts may encourage low-risk individuals to turn to (full) contracts designed for high-risk individuals, yielding advantageous selection opportunities for insurers. However, if this heuristic strengthens the high-risks’ reluctance for partial insurance, it may increase the efficiency of the separating contracts, and the low-risk individuals suffer less from adverse selection.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"9 1","pages":"4 - 16"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2020.1815397","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49109445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2020.1818930
Loukas Balafoutas, Alexander Libman, Vasileios Selamis, B. Vollan
Abstract Conspiracy theories are widespread in the modern information era. Being exposed to conspiracy theories may affect behaviour, for example, by spreading mistrust among people and within organisations, even if it does not necessarily generate widespread beliefs in the conspiracy narrative. Our paper investigates the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on strategic sophistication. We present evidence from a laboratory experiment, in which we prime half of our participants with exposure to a conspiracy theory. We find that such exposure leads to increased strategic sophistication. Using a causal mediation analysis we confirm that the effect on sophistication arises independently of whether people believe in the content or not.
{"title":"Exposure to conspiracy theories in the lab","authors":"Loukas Balafoutas, Alexander Libman, Vasileios Selamis, B. Vollan","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2020.1818930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2020.1818930","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Conspiracy theories are widespread in the modern information era. Being exposed to conspiracy theories may affect behaviour, for example, by spreading mistrust among people and within organisations, even if it does not necessarily generate widespread beliefs in the conspiracy narrative. Our paper investigates the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on strategic sophistication. We present evidence from a laboratory experiment, in which we prime half of our participants with exposure to a conspiracy theory. We find that such exposure leads to increased strategic sophistication. Using a causal mediation analysis we confirm that the effect on sophistication arises independently of whether people believe in the content or not.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"9 1","pages":"90 - 112"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2020.1818930","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41335153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2020.1837553
M. Villeval
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"M. Villeval","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2020.1837553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2020.1837553","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"9 1","pages":"1 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2020.1837553","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44799951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2021.1933768
Victor Menaldo, Nicolas Wittstock
Abstract Decades of spectacular economic growth have made China into an important geopolitical player. As Chinese companies improve their capabilities across several areas of advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, some US policymakers and pundits lament the country’s ‘unfair trade practices’ and serial ‘theft of American intellectual property’, particularly through so-called forced technology transfer. China hawks claim these practices hurt US companies, workers, and consumers. Do Chinese technology practices harm economic efficiency? What are their distributional consequences? To address these questions, we explore the different modalities of international technology transfer and flesh out their economic consequences. We also investigate the recent history of technology transfer, providing examples from the industrialisation experiences of European countries and the Asian Tigers. We surmise that current Chinese processes are neither novel nor alarming from the standpoint of either economic efficiency or distribution: US firms are collecting record royalty payments for their intellectual property from China and generating gangbuster profits due to their access to Chinese labour, suppliers, and the country’s growing consumer market. American consumers benefit from US–China economic interdependence and so do some workers. The consequences for the US economy as a whole are positive. While we are agnostic about whether these practices threaten America’s national security, we offer ideas for how to prevent China from acquiring its most sensitive military technology.
{"title":"Does technology transfer from the US to China harm American firms, workers, and consumers? A historical and analytic investigation","authors":"Victor Menaldo, Nicolas Wittstock","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2021.1933768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2021.1933768","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Decades of spectacular economic growth have made China into an important geopolitical player. As Chinese companies improve their capabilities across several areas of advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, some US policymakers and pundits lament the country’s ‘unfair trade practices’ and serial ‘theft of American intellectual property’, particularly through so-called forced technology transfer. China hawks claim these practices hurt US companies, workers, and consumers. Do Chinese technology practices harm economic efficiency? What are their distributional consequences? To address these questions, we explore the different modalities of international technology transfer and flesh out their economic consequences. We also investigate the recent history of technology transfer, providing examples from the industrialisation experiences of European countries and the Asian Tigers. We surmise that current Chinese processes are neither novel nor alarming from the standpoint of either economic efficiency or distribution: US firms are collecting record royalty payments for their intellectual property from China and generating gangbuster profits due to their access to Chinese labour, suppliers, and the country’s growing consumer market. American consumers benefit from US–China economic interdependence and so do some workers. The consequences for the US economy as a whole are positive. While we are agnostic about whether these practices threaten America’s national security, we offer ideas for how to prevent China from acquiring its most sensitive military technology.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"9 1","pages":"417 - 446"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2021.1933768","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49636647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-03DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2020.1837335
James P. Habyarimana, Daniel Houser, Stuti Khemani, Viktor Brech, Ginny Seung Choi, Moumita Roy
Abstract Electoral clientelism or vote buying has been regarded as undermining democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of the state towards its citizens, especially the poor. Social identity as a form of political mobilisation may contribute to this, enabling support to be won with clientelist transfers. This paper reports data from a novel laboratory experiment designed to examine whether clientelism can be sustained as a political strategy, and whether identity impacts the nature or efficacy of clientelism. Specifically, we design a voting and leadership game in order to examine whether individuals vote for clientelist allocations by a leader even at the expense of more efficient and egalitarian allocations. We find group identity does not significantly impact the prevalence of clientelist plans. Leaders are more likely, however, to choose allocations that provide fewer benefits (lower rents) to themselves when they are part of the majority in-group than when they are in the minority.
{"title":"Clientelism and identity","authors":"James P. Habyarimana, Daniel Houser, Stuti Khemani, Viktor Brech, Ginny Seung Choi, Moumita Roy","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2020.1837335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2020.1837335","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Electoral clientelism or vote buying has been regarded as undermining democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of the state towards its citizens, especially the poor. Social identity as a form of political mobilisation may contribute to this, enabling support to be won with clientelist transfers. This paper reports data from a novel laboratory experiment designed to examine whether clientelism can be sustained as a political strategy, and whether identity impacts the nature or efficacy of clientelism. Specifically, we design a voting and leadership game in order to examine whether individuals vote for clientelist allocations by a leader even at the expense of more efficient and egalitarian allocations. We find group identity does not significantly impact the prevalence of clientelist plans. Leaders are more likely, however, to choose allocations that provide fewer benefits (lower rents) to themselves when they are part of the majority in-group than when they are in the minority.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"9 1","pages":"113 - 133"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/20954816.2020.1837335","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48849230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-30DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2022.2107783
Gaofeng Han, Hui Miao, Yabin Wang
Abstract We construct a daily liquidity index of China’s government bond market using transaction data from the national interbank market during 2001–2020. The index is a composite of popular price-based and quantity-based metrics of liquidity. The composite indices, obtained by averaging across different metrics and by applying the principal component analysis, respectively, both point to a better liquidity condition after 2010. Market liquidity swings appear to be highly correlated with domestic funding liquidity and financial market volatility, but display fewer correlations with global macrofinancial indicators. Our findings suggest that the further deepening of the government bond market would support domestic financial stability and monetary operations down the road.
{"title":"Liquidity of China’s government bond market: Measures and driving forces","authors":"Gaofeng Han, Hui Miao, Yabin Wang","doi":"10.1080/20954816.2022.2107783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2107783","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We construct a daily liquidity index of China’s government bond market using transaction data from the national interbank market during 2001–2020. The index is a composite of popular price-based and quantity-based metrics of liquidity. The composite indices, obtained by averaging across different metrics and by applying the principal component analysis, respectively, both point to a better liquidity condition after 2010. Market liquidity swings appear to be highly correlated with domestic funding liquidity and financial market volatility, but display fewer correlations with global macrofinancial indicators. Our findings suggest that the further deepening of the government bond market would support domestic financial stability and monetary operations down the road.","PeriodicalId":44280,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Studies-EPS","volume":"11 1","pages":"99 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45141610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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