Pub Date : 2024-01-09DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2024.2302164
Bima Jon Nanda, I. Permata
{"title":"Persistent norm entrepreneur: Indonesia strategy as ‘homegrown’ democracy promoter in Southeast Asia Region","authors":"Bima Jon Nanda, I. Permata","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2024.2302164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2024.2302164","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"111 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139444508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-18DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2293708
Ronald A. Pernia
{"title":"Causal inference in political science research: global trends and implications on Philippine political scholarship","authors":"Ronald A. Pernia","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2293708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2293708","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139174826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2285288
Thaneshwar Bhusal
{"title":"Nepal’s participatory governance in diverse political systems: a comparative perspective","authors":"Thaneshwar Bhusal","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2285288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2285288","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":" 88","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138611848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-28DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2285928
Zuly Qodir, Bilver Sing, Misran Misran
{"title":"Vigilante groups in Indonesia since the 2019 election: actors, movements, agency, and networking","authors":"Zuly Qodir, Bilver Sing, Misran Misran","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2285928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2285928","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139216384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2270950
Timothy S. Rich
ABSTRACTSurveys increasingly show Americans support efforts to Taiwan from Chinese aggression. Yet few studies unpack how overall views of international commitments as well as specific views of Taiwan and China influence this support, focusing more partisan identification. Through original survey data, I find evaluations of Taiwan playing a larger role than anti-China sentiment in driving support for Taiwan’s defense. In addition, those desiring American engagement in world affairs were also more supportive. The results suggest the scope and limitations of public support for Taiwan’s defense.KEYWORDS: TaiwanChinaForeign PolicyPartisanshipPublic OpinionSurvey Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In the 117th Congress (2021–2022), the House Taiwan Caucus included 89 Republicans and 79 Democrats, while the Senate Taiwan Caucus included 17 Republicans and 14 Democrats.2 Copper (Citation2017) argues that initial beliefs of a dramatic shift away from Taiwan may be exaggerated.3 Although no attention checks were included within the survey, the analysis did flag responses that finished two standard deviations faster than the average, with the assumption such respondents were not paying due attention to the questions. However, excluding such respondents did not alter the findings shown here.4 While acknowledging the limitations of quota sampling, this approach improves upon traditional convenience-based sampling for web survey.5 18–24: 14.18%; 24–34: 18.92%; 35–44: 19.44%; 45–54: 14.29%; 55–64: 12.62%; 65–74: 14.18%;, 75–84: 5.61%; 85+: 0.75%.6 Female: 49.91%.7 Midwest: 20.20%; Northeast: 19.97%; South: 39.81%; West: 20.02%.8 Respondents were asked ‘On a 1–10 scale, with 1 being very negative and 10 very positive, how do you feel about the following countries?’9 Of those not supportive of one of the two largest parties, 81.84% identified as having no party identification, with most of the remaining writing in independent. As such, and with only nine respondents identifying other parties my name, the baseline is treated as just independent. Removing supporters of third parties did not produce substantively different results.10 Less than high school, high school graduate, some college, two-year degree, four-year degree, professional degree, doctorate. Collapsing the last two into a graduate degree did not fundamentally alter the later results.Additional informationNotes on contributorsTimothy S. RichTimothy S. Rich, Professor of Political Science at Western Kentucky University. His research focuses on public opinion and East Asian politics.
{"title":"Outlooks and affinities: what motivates American public support for defending Taiwan?","authors":"Timothy S. Rich","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2270950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2270950","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTSurveys increasingly show Americans support efforts to Taiwan from Chinese aggression. Yet few studies unpack how overall views of international commitments as well as specific views of Taiwan and China influence this support, focusing more partisan identification. Through original survey data, I find evaluations of Taiwan playing a larger role than anti-China sentiment in driving support for Taiwan’s defense. In addition, those desiring American engagement in world affairs were also more supportive. The results suggest the scope and limitations of public support for Taiwan’s defense.KEYWORDS: TaiwanChinaForeign PolicyPartisanshipPublic OpinionSurvey Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In the 117th Congress (2021–2022), the House Taiwan Caucus included 89 Republicans and 79 Democrats, while the Senate Taiwan Caucus included 17 Republicans and 14 Democrats.2 Copper (Citation2017) argues that initial beliefs of a dramatic shift away from Taiwan may be exaggerated.3 Although no attention checks were included within the survey, the analysis did flag responses that finished two standard deviations faster than the average, with the assumption such respondents were not paying due attention to the questions. However, excluding such respondents did not alter the findings shown here.4 While acknowledging the limitations of quota sampling, this approach improves upon traditional convenience-based sampling for web survey.5 18–24: 14.18%; 24–34: 18.92%; 35–44: 19.44%; 45–54: 14.29%; 55–64: 12.62%; 65–74: 14.18%;, 75–84: 5.61%; 85+: 0.75%.6 Female: 49.91%.7 Midwest: 20.20%; Northeast: 19.97%; South: 39.81%; West: 20.02%.8 Respondents were asked ‘On a 1–10 scale, with 1 being very negative and 10 very positive, how do you feel about the following countries?’9 Of those not supportive of one of the two largest parties, 81.84% identified as having no party identification, with most of the remaining writing in independent. As such, and with only nine respondents identifying other parties my name, the baseline is treated as just independent. Removing supporters of third parties did not produce substantively different results.10 Less than high school, high school graduate, some college, two-year degree, four-year degree, professional degree, doctorate. Collapsing the last two into a graduate degree did not fundamentally alter the later results.Additional informationNotes on contributorsTimothy S. RichTimothy S. Rich, Professor of Political Science at Western Kentucky University. His research focuses on public opinion and East Asian politics.","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"30 22","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136281825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-29DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2276111
Mordechai Chaziza, Shlomo O. Goldman
ABSTRACTOver the past three decades, terrorism has directly threatened China's national security and has played a key role in its foreign policy. The nature of terrorism in China is changing, as is the Chinese government's response to the threat. Despite the issue's importance, there is still little knowledge about the changing face of terrorism in China. Thus, this study fills the gap in the literature on this subject by reviewing the terrorism threat against China after the Cold War from 1989 through 2020, based on the global terrorism database. The study's main findings reveal that China is not a significant target of terrorism when compared to other powers. Terrorism in China is domestic and concentrated in four specific districts, chiefly caused by the Uyghurs Uprising. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the BRI did not cause a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks against Chinese citizens outside China.KEYWORDS: Chinaterrorism threatsBelt and Road InitiativeXinjiangterrorist attacksChinese policy Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Ashkelon Academic College.Notes on contributorsMordechai ChazizaMordechai Chaziza is a senior lecturer at the Department of Politics and Governance and the Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science division at Ashkelon Academic College (Israel) and a Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Department, University of Haifa, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.Shlomo O. GoldmanShlomo O. Goldman has a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2010) and a Post-doc at the Inter-Disciplinary Center (2014). Shlomo was a scientific advisor at the Ministry of Education (2019–2021) and is a lecturer at several academic institutions in Israel. He was a research fellow at the Herzl Institute for Research and Study of Zionism and History at the University of Haifa about democracies coping with terrorism, specializing in terrorism, international, intra-states wars, and globalization.
在过去的三十年里，恐怖主义直接威胁着中国的国家安全，并在中国的外交政策中发挥了关键作用。中国恐怖主义的性质正在发生变化，中国政府对恐怖主义威胁的反应也在发生变化。尽管这个问题很重要，但人们对中国恐怖主义面貌的变化仍然知之甚少。因此，本研究以全球恐怖主义数据库为基础，回顾了1989年至2020年冷战后中国面临的恐怖主义威胁，填补了这一主题文献的空白。该研究的主要发现表明，与其他大国相比，中国并不是恐怖主义的重要目标。中国的恐怖主义是国内的，集中在四个特定的地区，主要是由维吾尔人起义引起的。与传统观点相反，“一带一路”倡议并没有导致境外针对中国公民的恐怖袭击大幅增加。关键词:中国恐怖主义威胁“一带一路”倡议新疆恐怖袭击中国政策披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。本研究得到了亚实基伦学院的支持。作者简介mordechai Chaziza，以色列亚什基伦学院政治与治理系及社会科学多学科研究系高级讲师，海法大学亚洲研究系研究员，研究方向为中国外交与战略关系。Shlomo O. Goldman, 2010年获得耶路撒冷希伯来大学博士学位，2014年获得跨学科中心博士后学位。Shlomo是教育部的科学顾问(2019-2021)，并在以色列的几所学术机构担任讲师。他是海法大学赫茨尔犹太复国主义和历史研究所的研究员，研究民主国家应对恐怖主义，专门研究恐怖主义、国际战争、国内战争和全球化。
{"title":"Reviewing terrorism threat on China after the cold war","authors":"Mordechai Chaziza, Shlomo O. Goldman","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2276111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2276111","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTOver the past three decades, terrorism has directly threatened China's national security and has played a key role in its foreign policy. The nature of terrorism in China is changing, as is the Chinese government's response to the threat. Despite the issue's importance, there is still little knowledge about the changing face of terrorism in China. Thus, this study fills the gap in the literature on this subject by reviewing the terrorism threat against China after the Cold War from 1989 through 2020, based on the global terrorism database. The study's main findings reveal that China is not a significant target of terrorism when compared to other powers. Terrorism in China is domestic and concentrated in four specific districts, chiefly caused by the Uyghurs Uprising. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the BRI did not cause a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks against Chinese citizens outside China.KEYWORDS: Chinaterrorism threatsBelt and Road InitiativeXinjiangterrorist attacksChinese policy Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Ashkelon Academic College.Notes on contributorsMordechai ChazizaMordechai Chaziza is a senior lecturer at the Department of Politics and Governance and the Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science division at Ashkelon Academic College (Israel) and a Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Department, University of Haifa, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.Shlomo O. GoldmanShlomo O. Goldman has a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2010) and a Post-doc at the Inter-Disciplinary Center (2014). Shlomo was a scientific advisor at the Ministry of Education (2019–2021) and is a lecturer at several academic institutions in Israel. He was a research fellow at the Herzl Institute for Research and Study of Zionism and History at the University of Haifa about democracies coping with terrorism, specializing in terrorism, international, intra-states wars, and globalization.","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"13 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136134426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2270947
Rendy Pahrun Wadipalapa
This article investigates rumours of a communist resurgence as a recurring theme invoked in Indonesian politics. In both the 2014 and 2019 presidential contests, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was accused of being a PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) adherent, and a false narrative that he was the ‘communists’ candidate’ persisted throughout the campaigns. Despite the PKI having been banned and effectively defunct since 1966, large amounts of political disinformation that centred on its rebirth and the threat from communists dominated media narratives. The attack was expanded to include many key figures, including political elites and Jokowi’s allies and sympathizers. Using interviews with elite individuals and documentary research, this article argues that the ‘communist imaginary’ was deployed by campaign managers in the elections through the exploitation of constant anxieties regarding perceived villains. Furthermore, it has also been used as an excuse for military, as well as paramilitary factions, to grab greater power within the electoral context, as evidenced by their aggressive speeches and actions. The rumour of a communist threat, I will argue, provides a simple, effective way to distract the public from actual electoral issues.
这篇文章调查了共产主义死灰复燃的传言，这是印尼政治中反复出现的主题。在2014年和2019年的总统竞选中，佐科·维多多(Jokowi)都被指控是印尼共产党(Communist Party of Indonesia)的追随者，他是“共产党候选人”的错误说法在整个竞选过程中一直存在。尽管印尼共产党自1966年以来已被取缔，实际上已经不复存在，但大量以其重生和共产党威胁为中心的政治虚假信息主导了媒体叙事。袭击扩大到许多关键人物，包括政治精英和佐科维的盟友和同情者。通过对精英人士的采访和文献研究，本文认为，“共产主义想象”是由竞选经理在选举中利用对被认为是坏人的持续焦虑而部署的。此外，它还被用作军事和准军事派别在选举范围内攫取更大权力的借口，其侵略性的言论和行动就是明证。我认为，共产主义威胁的谣言提供了一种简单而有效的方法，将公众的注意力从实际的选举问题上转移开。
{"title":"The communist imaginary in Indonesia’s 2014 and 2019 presidential elections","authors":"Rendy Pahrun Wadipalapa","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2270947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2270947","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates rumours of a communist resurgence as a recurring theme invoked in Indonesian politics. In both the 2014 and 2019 presidential contests, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was accused of being a PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) adherent, and a false narrative that he was the ‘communists’ candidate’ persisted throughout the campaigns. Despite the PKI having been banned and effectively defunct since 1966, large amounts of political disinformation that centred on its rebirth and the threat from communists dominated media narratives. The attack was expanded to include many key figures, including political elites and Jokowi’s allies and sympathizers. Using interviews with elite individuals and documentary research, this article argues that the ‘communist imaginary’ was deployed by campaign managers in the elections through the exploitation of constant anxieties regarding perceived villains. Furthermore, it has also been used as an excuse for military, as well as paramilitary factions, to grab greater power within the electoral context, as evidenced by their aggressive speeches and actions. The rumour of a communist threat, I will argue, provides a simple, effective way to distract the public from actual electoral issues.","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"106 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135512309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2265372
Raghav Kumar, Sudarsan Padmanabhan, P. Srikant
ABSTRACTIn this article, we study how the introduction of a None of the Above (NOTA) option in Indian elections since 2013 has affected voting patterns and election outcomes. First, we examine the relationship between position on the ballot with electoral outcomes by constructing a simple statistic that measures relative performance by position on the ballot or Electronic Voting Machines. Within non-party options, we show that the last option on the EVM ends up being a salient choice, which is an inversion of the usual findings in the literature on order effects, where earlier options are generally preferred. Second, the NOTA option is the salient choice for voters who choose not to vote for a party, and thereby substituting for independent candidates. This share is more than can be explained by ballot position alone. We argue that the existence of a NOTA option is not merely a procedural technicality; instead, voters use NOTA as a strategic option to express their protest.KEYWORDS: None of the AboveIndian ElectionsOrder of CandidatesStrategic ChoiceDemocracyIndependents AcknowledgementWe would like to acknowledge insightful discussions with T.S. Krishnamurthy, Jagdeep Chokhar. V. Suresh, Brinda Viswananthan and Manjushree Hegde.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For details, see People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (Citation2013): Writ Petition (Civil) No 161 of 2004, Supreme Court judgment dated 27 September 2013.2 Specifically, rules 41(2), 41(3) and 49-O. 41(2) and (3) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 directed the voter who took the ballot and decided not to use it to return it to the presiding officer. These ballots were then kept in a separate packet. Rule 49-O catered to the voter who, in the polling booth, chose not to cast vote and put it on record.3 For more details on the rules see https://indiankanoon.org/doc/152734757/ and https://eci.gov.in/faqs/evm/general-qa/electronic-voting-machine-r2/, accessed on 17 July 2022.4 Past analyses of elections have included metrics like the Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squares of percentage shares (this is minimized for a uniform distribution); and the Kullback-Leibler distance, which is an entropy-based measure of how different a distribution is from the uniform. Our statistic is much easier to calculate, and has the following properties—A candidate with a lower percentage share than the overall average will have a negative DPS value, and a candidate with a higher percentage share than the overall average will have a positive DPS value. The minimum value of the statistic, −1/N, is reached when the candidate in question gets 0 votes and the maximum value, 1−1/N, when he gets all the votes. Further, DPSi values always sum up to zero over all candidates for a given election5 Subramanian Swamy vs A. Raja on 24 August 2012; In 2017, all the accused in the 2G scam were acquitted by the Special CBI Court Judge O. P
在本文中，我们研究了自2013年以来在印度选举中引入“以上皆非”(NOTA)选项对投票模式和选举结果的影响。首先，我们通过构建一个简单的统计数据来衡量选票上的位置或电子投票机的相对表现，从而检查选票上的位置与选举结果之间的关系。在非政党选项中，我们表明EVM上的最后一个选项最终是一个突出的选择，这是关于顺序效应的文献中通常发现的反转，其中较早的选项通常更受欢迎。其次，NOTA选项是选择不投票给某一政党的选民的突出选择，从而取代了独立候选人。这一比例超出了单凭投票情况所能解释的范围。我们认为，NOTA选项的存在不仅仅是程序上的技术性问题;相反，选民使用NOTA作为表达抗议的战略选择。关键词:以上都不是印度选举候选人顺序战略选择民主独立承认我们要感谢与T.S.克里希那穆尔蒂，贾格迪普乔克哈尔的深刻讨论。V. Suresh, Brinda Viswananthan和manjusthree Hegde。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1有关详细信息，请参见公民自由人民联盟诉印度联盟(Citation2013):最高法院2013年9月27日判决的2004年第161号书面请愿书(民事)。具体而言，规则41(2)，41(3)和49-O。1961年《选举规则》第41(2)和(3)条指示拿了选票但决定不使用的选民将选票交还给主持选举的官员。然后这些选票被保存在一个单独的包里。规则49- 0迎合了那些在投票站选择不投票并将其记录在案的选民有关规则的更多细节，请参阅https://indiankanoon.org/doc/152734757/和https://eci.gov.in/faqs/evm/general-qa/electronic-voting-machine-r2/，访问日期为20222年7月17日。过去对选举的分析包括像赫芬达尔指数这样的指标，定义为百分比份额的平方和(这是均匀分布的最小值);以及Kullback-Leibler距离，这是一种基于熵的测量分布与均匀分布的差异程度的方法。我们的统计数据更容易计算，并且具有以下属性—具有低于总体平均值的百分比的候选值将具有负DPS值，并且具有高于总体平均值的百分比的候选值将具有正DPS值。当候选人获得0票时，统计值达到最小值- 1/N，当他获得所有选票时，统计值达到最大值1 - 1/N。此外，在特定选举中，所有候选人的DPSi值总和总是为零(2012年8月24日Subramanian Swamy vs a . Raja);2017年，特别CBI法庭法官o.p. Saini宣布2G诈骗案中的所有被告无罪释放，因为控方无法证明这一案件。raghav Kumar在印度金奈马德拉斯经济学院获得硕士学位后，从事数据科学工作。他的论文集中在印度引入NOTA后投票模式的变化。Sudarsan Padmanabhan是印度金奈马德拉斯印度理工学院人文与社会科学系副教授。Sudarsan专门研究社会和政治哲学，印度哲学和文化。苏达桑的研究重点是法律、政治和伦理在公共领域的融合。SrikantP。Srikant是印度金奈马德拉斯经济学院的客座教授。Srikant专门研究金融。
{"title":"NOTA: a strategic choice with a positive impact on Indian elections","authors":"Raghav Kumar, Sudarsan Padmanabhan, P. Srikant","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2265372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2265372","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn this article, we study how the introduction of a None of the Above (NOTA) option in Indian elections since 2013 has affected voting patterns and election outcomes. First, we examine the relationship between position on the ballot with electoral outcomes by constructing a simple statistic that measures relative performance by position on the ballot or Electronic Voting Machines. Within non-party options, we show that the last option on the EVM ends up being a salient choice, which is an inversion of the usual findings in the literature on order effects, where earlier options are generally preferred. Second, the NOTA option is the salient choice for voters who choose not to vote for a party, and thereby substituting for independent candidates. This share is more than can be explained by ballot position alone. We argue that the existence of a NOTA option is not merely a procedural technicality; instead, voters use NOTA as a strategic option to express their protest.KEYWORDS: None of the AboveIndian ElectionsOrder of CandidatesStrategic ChoiceDemocracyIndependents AcknowledgementWe would like to acknowledge insightful discussions with T.S. Krishnamurthy, Jagdeep Chokhar. V. Suresh, Brinda Viswananthan and Manjushree Hegde.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For details, see People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (Citation2013): Writ Petition (Civil) No 161 of 2004, Supreme Court judgment dated 27 September 2013.2 Specifically, rules 41(2), 41(3) and 49-O. 41(2) and (3) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 directed the voter who took the ballot and decided not to use it to return it to the presiding officer. These ballots were then kept in a separate packet. Rule 49-O catered to the voter who, in the polling booth, chose not to cast vote and put it on record.3 For more details on the rules see https://indiankanoon.org/doc/152734757/ and https://eci.gov.in/faqs/evm/general-qa/electronic-voting-machine-r2/, accessed on 17 July 2022.4 Past analyses of elections have included metrics like the Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squares of percentage shares (this is minimized for a uniform distribution); and the Kullback-Leibler distance, which is an entropy-based measure of how different a distribution is from the uniform. Our statistic is much easier to calculate, and has the following properties—A candidate with a lower percentage share than the overall average will have a negative DPS value, and a candidate with a higher percentage share than the overall average will have a positive DPS value. The minimum value of the statistic, −1/N, is reached when the candidate in question gets 0 votes and the maximum value, 1−1/N, when he gets all the votes. Further, DPSi values always sum up to zero over all candidates for a given election5 Subramanian Swamy vs A. Raja on 24 August 2012; In 2017, all the accused in the 2G scam were acquitted by the Special CBI Court Judge O. P","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135093918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2265326
Wang Jie, Liang Ce
ABSTRACTThis research contributes to an understanding of the ‘intertwined destiny’ of China’s twin initiatives, the BRI and the CSD. We find that the security implications of the twin initiatives drive different patterns of responses among ASEAN states. The dynamism emanates from diversifying preferences of ASEAN states amid complex interdependence. The BRI does a better job of projecting China’s material and soft power, as it aligns closely with ASEAN states’ comprehensive national interests. The CSD fares less well because it seeks to impose Beijing’s hegemonic claims on the SCS, thereby posing a security challenge to claimant states in the region. The nuances suggest that the charm of the BRI cannot be readily converted into a passport for the CSD. For some ASEAN states, power asymmetry inherent in their relations with China requires a security commitment from this giant northern neighbour, which Beijing is still reluctant to provide.KEYWORDS: ASEANChinabelt and road initiativea shared future for mankinda community of shared destinyXi Jinping diplomacySouth China Sea disputes AcknowledgmentThe authors express gratitude to Rose Yahui GU for data collection assistance. She worked at International SOS (Singapore, Headquarters) as a security risk specialist, in APAC between 2019–2021, and continues to provide advice afterward.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Guangzhou University: [Grant Number 2900603999; 69-6209190].Notes on contributorsWang JieWang Jie is an Assistant Professor at the Public Administration School, Guangzhou University, China. Postal address: 230 Wai Huan Xi Road, Guangzhou Higher Education Mega Center, Guangzhou 510006 China; e-mail: wangjie@u.nus.edu. She received Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. She is a research associate at the Institute of Rural Revitalization GZHU (Guangzhou daxue xiangcun zhenxing yanjiu yuan).Liang CeLiang Ce received Ph.D. from the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge. She was a Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy between 2016 and 2017. Email: cl714@cantab.ac.uk
{"title":"ASEAN states’ responses to China-driven regional cooperation initiatives: the BRI and the CSD revisited","authors":"Wang Jie, Liang Ce","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2265326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2265326","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis research contributes to an understanding of the ‘intertwined destiny’ of China’s twin initiatives, the BRI and the CSD. We find that the security implications of the twin initiatives drive different patterns of responses among ASEAN states. The dynamism emanates from diversifying preferences of ASEAN states amid complex interdependence. The BRI does a better job of projecting China’s material and soft power, as it aligns closely with ASEAN states’ comprehensive national interests. The CSD fares less well because it seeks to impose Beijing’s hegemonic claims on the SCS, thereby posing a security challenge to claimant states in the region. The nuances suggest that the charm of the BRI cannot be readily converted into a passport for the CSD. For some ASEAN states, power asymmetry inherent in their relations with China requires a security commitment from this giant northern neighbour, which Beijing is still reluctant to provide.KEYWORDS: ASEANChinabelt and road initiativea shared future for mankinda community of shared destinyXi Jinping diplomacySouth China Sea disputes AcknowledgmentThe authors express gratitude to Rose Yahui GU for data collection assistance. She worked at International SOS (Singapore, Headquarters) as a security risk specialist, in APAC between 2019–2021, and continues to provide advice afterward.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Guangzhou University: [Grant Number 2900603999; 69-6209190].Notes on contributorsWang JieWang Jie is an Assistant Professor at the Public Administration School, Guangzhou University, China. Postal address: 230 Wai Huan Xi Road, Guangzhou Higher Education Mega Center, Guangzhou 510006 China; e-mail: wangjie@u.nus.edu. She received Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. She is a research associate at the Institute of Rural Revitalization GZHU (Guangzhou daxue xiangcun zhenxing yanjiu yuan).Liang CeLiang Ce received Ph.D. from the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge. She was a Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy between 2016 and 2017. Email: cl714@cantab.ac.uk","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134975605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2023.2226879
Bama Andika Putra
ABSTRACT The use of maritime constabulary forces and coast guards as diplomatic instruments in disputed waters has been a growing occurrence in the Indo-Pacific region. The challenges presented to Indonesia amid the rise of foreign vessel intrusions pose great obstacles to Jokowi’s decisive and non-negotiable stance on Indonesia’s sovereignty in the North Natuna Seas. Challenged by Vietnam and China due to overlapping EEZ and continental shelf zones, the North Natuna Seas continues to be filled with the presence of maritime paramilitary agencies, foreign fishing fleets, and other sea intrusions to Indonesia’s maritime boundaries. This article argues that as an attempt to respond to contemporary challenges in the Natuna Seas, Jokowi has empowered Indonesian coast guards as a paragunboat diplomatic strategy to respond to coercion at sea. By evaluating the development and mandates given to the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency since 2014, this article further justifies Indonesia’s turn to paragunboat diplomacy due to the need for a non-confrontational and non-coercive maritime diplomacy strategy, and as a posturing strategy to compel adversaries away from Indonesian waters due to the promising tactical flexibility of using non-military maritime constabulary forces.
{"title":"The rise of paragunboat diplomacy as a maritime diplomatic instrument: Indonesia’s constabulary forces and tensions in the North Natuna Seas","authors":"Bama Andika Putra","doi":"10.1080/02185377.2023.2226879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2023.2226879","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The use of maritime constabulary forces and coast guards as diplomatic instruments in disputed waters has been a growing occurrence in the Indo-Pacific region. The challenges presented to Indonesia amid the rise of foreign vessel intrusions pose great obstacles to Jokowi’s decisive and non-negotiable stance on Indonesia’s sovereignty in the North Natuna Seas. Challenged by Vietnam and China due to overlapping EEZ and continental shelf zones, the North Natuna Seas continues to be filled with the presence of maritime paramilitary agencies, foreign fishing fleets, and other sea intrusions to Indonesia’s maritime boundaries. This article argues that as an attempt to respond to contemporary challenges in the Natuna Seas, Jokowi has empowered Indonesian coast guards as a paragunboat diplomatic strategy to respond to coercion at sea. By evaluating the development and mandates given to the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency since 2014, this article further justifies Indonesia’s turn to paragunboat diplomacy due to the need for a non-confrontational and non-coercive maritime diplomacy strategy, and as a posturing strategy to compel adversaries away from Indonesian waters due to the promising tactical flexibility of using non-military maritime constabulary forces.","PeriodicalId":44333,"journal":{"name":"Asian Journal of Political Science","volume":"31 1","pages":"106 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43458514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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