Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1899439
R. Carleo
ABSTRACT What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as ‘freedom.’ This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so?
{"title":"Confucian freedom: assessing the debate","authors":"R. Carleo","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1899439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899439","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as ‘freedom.’ This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so?","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"211 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1899439","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45972574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1919368
Zemian Zheng
ABSTRACT Wang Yangming is the founder of Chinese Enlightenment in the Ming-Qing period, in a similar way Descartes is for the European. The European Enlightenment thinkers such as Leibniz and Voltaire had been inspired by China about the human being’s ethical independence at the collective level, namely, the ability of a community to lead an ethical life independent of God’s revelation. Meanwhile, the Enlightenment thinkers failed to notice the Chinese intellectual resources that encourage human being’s ethical independence at the individual level, namely, the belief that every human individual is equally capable of leading one’s ethical life purely relying on one’s own good judgment. For this point, Wang Yangming is the resources that the West could have drawn upon. Both Wang Yangming and Descartes assert the egalitarianism about every individual’s power of judgment. I label this similarity as the ‘Sino-European juncture of Enlightenment.’ Other similarities between these two thinkers lie, firstly, in their common strategy in defending egalitarianism: both give a psychological account of the sources of error by analyzing the relationship between will and reason; and secondly, in their methodology: both redefine the method of attaining knowledge, and both emphasize that one should start from the plain, simple and insignificant things and then ascend to the complex things at issue.
{"title":"Wang Yangming, Descartes, and the Sino-European juncture of Enlightenment","authors":"Zemian Zheng","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1919368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1919368","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Wang Yangming is the founder of Chinese Enlightenment in the Ming-Qing period, in a similar way Descartes is for the European. The European Enlightenment thinkers such as Leibniz and Voltaire had been inspired by China about the human being’s ethical independence at the collective level, namely, the ability of a community to lead an ethical life independent of God’s revelation. Meanwhile, the Enlightenment thinkers failed to notice the Chinese intellectual resources that encourage human being’s ethical independence at the individual level, namely, the belief that every human individual is equally capable of leading one’s ethical life purely relying on one’s own good judgment. For this point, Wang Yangming is the resources that the West could have drawn upon. Both Wang Yangming and Descartes assert the egalitarianism about every individual’s power of judgment. I label this similarity as the ‘Sino-European juncture of Enlightenment.’ Other similarities between these two thinkers lie, firstly, in their common strategy in defending egalitarianism: both give a psychological account of the sources of error by analyzing the relationship between will and reason; and secondly, in their methodology: both redefine the method of attaining knowledge, and both emphasize that one should start from the plain, simple and insignificant things and then ascend to the complex things at issue.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"336 - 352"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1919368","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46732235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1934218
P. D’Ambrosio
ABSTRACT Some argue that animals and non-human figures in the Zhuangzi help displace the significance of humans. According to others the Zhuangzi suggests a certain time of ‘animalism,’ asking us to be more like various types of fauna and flora that do not share our self-centeredness. In this paper the use of non-human characters in the Zhuangzi will be examined through a survey of traditional Chinese commentary, comparisons with the Lunyu, and placing the use of non-human characters within the larger context of the Zhuangzi. Thus we find that while anti-anthropocentric and animalistic perspectives can be philosophized with the Zhuangzi, the text itself is not overly concerned with these subjects. Animals and non-human characters are mainly allegorical or metaphorical, allowing the Zhuangzito 1) make broadly applicable arguments; 2) playfully discuss ideas that may be unappealing at first glance, and; 3) create a distance that allows the text to resist ossification.
{"title":"Non-humans in the Zhuangzi: Animalism and anti-anthropocentrism","authors":"P. D’Ambrosio","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1934218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1934218","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Some argue that animals and non-human figures in the Zhuangzi help displace the significance of humans. According to others the Zhuangzi suggests a certain time of ‘animalism,’ asking us to be more like various types of fauna and flora that do not share our self-centeredness. In this paper the use of non-human characters in the Zhuangzi will be examined through a survey of traditional Chinese commentary, comparisons with the Lunyu, and placing the use of non-human characters within the larger context of the Zhuangzi. Thus we find that while anti-anthropocentric and animalistic perspectives can be philosophized with the Zhuangzi, the text itself is not overly concerned with these subjects. Animals and non-human characters are mainly allegorical or metaphorical, allowing the Zhuangzito 1) make broadly applicable arguments; 2) playfully discuss ideas that may be unappealing at first glance, and; 3) create a distance that allows the text to resist ossification.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"1 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1934218","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42345504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1933735
Conrong Wang, Qiduan Chen
ABSTRACT Western creativity is usually entrusted to the human imagination, regarded as a mental power capable of envisioning eternally original artefacts, while in the East creativity is entrusted to nature-in-the human, what Taoist philosophy calls qi, a spiritual power capable of reflecting the passing changes of nature in paintings, poems, and other forms of art. It is the intention of this paper to explore and elucidate these differences between the Western and Eastern conceptualizations of creativity, ending with a suggestion of one feature they may have in common.
{"title":"Eastern and Western creativity of tradition","authors":"Conrong Wang, Qiduan Chen","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1933735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1933735","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Western creativity is usually entrusted to the human imagination, regarded as a mental power capable of envisioning eternally original artefacts, while in the East creativity is entrusted to nature-in-the human, what Taoist philosophy calls qi, a spiritual power capable of reflecting the passing changes of nature in paintings, poems, and other forms of art. It is the intention of this paper to explore and elucidate these differences between the Western and Eastern conceptualizations of creativity, ending with a suggestion of one feature they may have in common.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"402 - 413"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1933735","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48812956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-14DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1928201
Davood Hosseini
ABSTRACT Mirdamad, a prominent philosopher of the Late Medieval Period active in the Islamic world, regards existence as nothing in reality. In this paper, I employ methods devised by contemporary analytic philosophers to reinterpret his theory of existence. Based on my interpretation, this theory of existence has many aspects. Metaphysically, existence is nothing in reality. In effect, it is not a property of individuals. Logically, ‘existence’ is a first-order predicate. In order to make these two claims consistent, he develops a sparse theory of properties, proposes an analysis of the meaning of ‘existence’, appeals to a meta-metaphysical view about the language of metaphysics, develops a truthmaker theory of truth, and commits to a specific theory of grounding. Arguably, this theory of existence seems to be tenable from a contemporary analytic perspective.
{"title":"Existence as a first-order predicate: Themes from Mirdamad","authors":"Davood Hosseini","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1928201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1928201","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mirdamad, a prominent philosopher of the Late Medieval Period active in the Islamic world, regards existence as nothing in reality. In this paper, I employ methods devised by contemporary analytic philosophers to reinterpret his theory of existence. Based on my interpretation, this theory of existence has many aspects. Metaphysically, existence is nothing in reality. In effect, it is not a property of individuals. Logically, ‘existence’ is a first-order predicate. In order to make these two claims consistent, he develops a sparse theory of properties, proposes an analysis of the meaning of ‘existence’, appeals to a meta-metaphysical view about the language of metaphysics, develops a truthmaker theory of truth, and commits to a specific theory of grounding. Arguably, this theory of existence seems to be tenable from a contemporary analytic perspective.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"353 - 367"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1928201","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44121863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-07DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1924437
Dawid Rogacz
ABSTRACT It is commonly assumed that historical materialism was first developed by Karl Marx, whose philosophy is often equated with this idea. The following paper challenges this opinion by showing that historical materialism, understood as a general position within the philosophy of history, can be traced back to two generally unheralded Chinese thinkers: Liu Zongyuan (773–819) and Li Gou (1009–1059). Historical materialism is here understood as a standpoint built on three tenets: (1) a belief in the dependence of culture on the material fundaments of social life; (2) the interpretation of human history through the prism of structural transformations; and (3) understanding political and economic relationships in terms of antagonism between social groups. After elaborating upon the presence of these tenets in the thought of Liu and Li, the paper analyzes the influence of their ideas and, finally, points out the main differences between the premodern and modern forms of historical materialism.
{"title":"Historical materialism in medieval China: The cases of Liu Zongyuan (773-819) and Li Gou (1009-1059)","authors":"Dawid Rogacz","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1924437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1924437","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is commonly assumed that historical materialism was first developed by Karl Marx, whose philosophy is often equated with this idea. The following paper challenges this opinion by showing that historical materialism, understood as a general position within the philosophy of history, can be traced back to two generally unheralded Chinese thinkers: Liu Zongyuan (773–819) and Li Gou (1009–1059). Historical materialism is here understood as a standpoint built on three tenets: (1) a belief in the dependence of culture on the material fundaments of social life; (2) the interpretation of human history through the prism of structural transformations; and (3) understanding political and economic relationships in terms of antagonism between social groups. After elaborating upon the presence of these tenets in the thought of Liu and Li, the paper analyzes the influence of their ideas and, finally, points out the main differences between the premodern and modern forms of historical materialism.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"385 - 401"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1924437","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41532387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384
Kaili Wang
ABSTRACT In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: (1) the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance (wu-zhi 無知), (2) the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing (qian-zhi 淺知), and (3) the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge (zhen-zhi 真知). In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句 (Interpretation of The Great Learning), thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.
{"title":"On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi’s moral psychology","authors":"Kaili Wang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: (1) the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance (wu-zhi 無知), (2) the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing (qian-zhi 淺知), and (3) the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge (zhen-zhi 真知). In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句 (Interpretation of The Great Learning), thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"414 - 429"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42253254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-29DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1918367
R. Lau
ABSTRACT In the ‘Cook Ding cutting up an ox’ parable, Zhuangzi advanced a doctrine on craft and its relationship with Dao. With reference to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in conjunction with an analysis of Zhuangzi’s epistemological position, we argue that Zhuangzi understood craft as involving the supersession of the cognitive. In craft, the relationship between human and world is non-cognitive and ‘pre-objective’, the living of this kind of relationship gives rise to a non-cognitive ‘practical sense’ which enables the craftsman’s movements to spontaneously constitute wuwei. Zhuangzi’s ideal is that this kind of relationship is generalized to life as a whole, thereby enabling human actions to spontaneously constitute wuwei generally. This is why he stipulated ‘doing away with knowing’ as a self-cultivation technique required for attaining Dao. Thus, craft constitutes an embodiment of Dao in the double-sense of wuwei and the non-cognitive and ‘pre-objective’ relationship between human and world which enables wuwei.
{"title":"Re-visiting the role of craft in Zhuangzi’s philosophy","authors":"R. Lau","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1918367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1918367","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the ‘Cook Ding cutting up an ox’ parable, Zhuangzi advanced a doctrine on craft and its relationship with Dao. With reference to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in conjunction with an analysis of Zhuangzi’s epistemological position, we argue that Zhuangzi understood craft as involving the supersession of the cognitive. In craft, the relationship between human and world is non-cognitive and ‘pre-objective’, the living of this kind of relationship gives rise to a non-cognitive ‘practical sense’ which enables the craftsman’s movements to spontaneously constitute wuwei. Zhuangzi’s ideal is that this kind of relationship is generalized to life as a whole, thereby enabling human actions to spontaneously constitute wuwei generally. This is why he stipulated ‘doing away with knowing’ as a self-cultivation technique required for attaining Dao. Thus, craft constitutes an embodiment of Dao in the double-sense of wuwei and the non-cognitive and ‘pre-objective’ relationship between human and world which enables wuwei.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"368 - 384"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1918367","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41501036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1882724
Ady van Den Stock
ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the controversial concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ (neizai chaoyue 内在超越) in the work of the Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995). After a series of introductory remarks on the semantic and conceptual range of the terms ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in comparative philosophy, I go on to provide a historically sensitive analysis of the origins of thenotion of ‘immanent transcendence’ in Mou’s work. In doing so, I argue that rather than merely reflecting a blanket ontological or epistemological claim serving todifferentiate Chinese from Western culture and thought, the paradoxical concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ has a profoundly socio-political dimension and testifies Mou’s efforts to maintain a form of continuity between the normative and the factual in the face of the unprecedented challenges faced by the Confucian tradition in the modern era.
{"title":"‘Immanent transcendence’: Toward a genealogical analysis of a key concept in the philosophy of Mou Zongsan (1909–1995)","authors":"Ady van Den Stock","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1882724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1882724","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the controversial concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ (neizai chaoyue 内在超越) in the work of the Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995). After a series of introductory remarks on the semantic and conceptual range of the terms ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in comparative philosophy, I go on to provide a historically sensitive analysis of the origins of thenotion of ‘immanent transcendence’ in Mou’s work. In doing so, I argue that rather than merely reflecting a blanket ontological or epistemological claim serving todifferentiate Chinese from Western culture and thought, the paradoxical concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ has a profoundly socio-political dimension and testifies Mou’s efforts to maintain a form of continuity between the normative and the factual in the face of the unprecedented challenges faced by the Confucian tradition in the modern era.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"195 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1882724","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41573208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1882723
A. K. Jayesh
ABSTRACT The paper focuses on Nāgārjuna, the founder of the middle way school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It argues that while Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the notion of ontological independence is justified and correct, his philosophical project is incomplete. This stems from the fact that Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the Abhidharma conception of time is not supplemented with the development of an alternative. The paper insists that Nāgārjuna’s endorsement of the doctrine of impermanence without first developing a non-foundationalist conception of time is indefensible. The paper concludes by offering a description of the nature of time which, it submits, will complete the Madhyamaka project.
{"title":"Nāgārjuna and the concept of time","authors":"A. K. Jayesh","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1882723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1882723","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper focuses on Nāgārjuna, the founder of the middle way school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It argues that while Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the notion of ontological independence is justified and correct, his philosophical project is incomplete. This stems from the fact that Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the Abhidharma conception of time is not supplemented with the development of an alternative. The paper insists that Nāgārjuna’s endorsement of the doctrine of impermanence without first developing a non-foundationalist conception of time is indefensible. The paper concludes by offering a description of the nature of time which, it submits, will complete the Madhyamaka project.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"121 - 142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1882723","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41370452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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