Pub Date : 2022-01-31DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2031015
Erol Čopelj
ABSTRACT There is a consensus in the contemporary literature that mindfulness is a kind of attention. From here the literature divides into two opposing camps:the ‘Quietists’ and the ‘Cognitivists’. For the Quietists mindfulness is ‘bare attention’: the kind of attention that remains when all higher-order mental activity is suspended. For the Cognitivists, by contrast, mindfulness is a kind of retentive attention that brings into play specific kinds of cognitive processes . Through a critical analysis of the contemporary literature this essay will try to establish that the common assumption is mistaken, and that mindfulness cannot be identified with any kind of attention. It will be argued that we get much closer to the true nature of mindfulness if we conceive of it as an example of what Matthew Ratcliffe has called ‘feeling of being’ . Mindfulness is the feeling of being tuned in to the intrinsic intelligibility of the things themselves.
{"title":"Mindfulness and attention: Towards a phenomenology of mindfulness as the feeling of being tuned in","authors":"Erol Čopelj","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2031015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2031015","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is a consensus in the contemporary literature that mindfulness is a kind of attention. From here the literature divides into two opposing camps:the ‘Quietists’ and the ‘Cognitivists’. For the Quietists mindfulness is ‘bare attention’: the kind of attention that remains when all higher-order mental activity is suspended. For the Cognitivists, by contrast, mindfulness is a kind of retentive attention that brings into play specific kinds of cognitive processes . Through a critical analysis of the contemporary literature this essay will try to establish that the common assumption is mistaken, and that mindfulness cannot be identified with any kind of attention. It will be argued that we get much closer to the true nature of mindfulness if we conceive of it as an example of what Matthew Ratcliffe has called ‘feeling of being’ . Mindfulness is the feeling of being tuned in to the intrinsic intelligibility of the things themselves.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"126 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43661370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-05DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2004494
Amirhossein Zadyousefi
ABSTRACT It seems Avicenna’s passages regarding God’s knowledge of particulars are susceptible of being given two different types of interpretation. The main difference between these two accounts of his theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars is that one of them, which I call the Neglected Interpretation, appeals to some metaphysical entities as the proxies of concrete particular objects, which are distinct from God’s essence, to explain God’s knowledge of particulars, while the other type does not. The views of post-Avicennian thinkers like Suhrawardī and Ṭūsī of Avicenna’s account are classifiable under the Neglected Interpretation, as shown by their objections to Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. This type of interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has been neglected in the secondary English literature on the issue. In this paper, I will present a reconstructed version of this type of interpretation of the Avicennian theory of divine knowledge.
{"title":"A neglected interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars","authors":"Amirhossein Zadyousefi","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2004494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2004494","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It seems Avicenna’s passages regarding God’s knowledge of particulars are susceptible of being given two different types of interpretation. The main difference between these two accounts of his theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars is that one of them, which I call the Neglected Interpretation, appeals to some metaphysical entities as the proxies of concrete particular objects, which are distinct from God’s essence, to explain God’s knowledge of particulars, while the other type does not. The views of post-Avicennian thinkers like Suhrawardī and Ṭūsī of Avicenna’s account are classifiable under the Neglected Interpretation, as shown by their objections to Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. This type of interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has been neglected in the secondary English literature on the issue. In this paper, I will present a reconstructed version of this type of interpretation of the Avicennian theory of divine knowledge.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"201 - 214"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43760746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2024346
Yong Li
ABSTRACT During the past decade, Si Xiao, Xianglong Zhang, Xiangcheng Sun and others have proposed a Confucian Philosophy of Family (CPF) movement as a response to issues in contemporary China. These issues include high divorce rates, low birth rates, caring for seniors, and other related issues. This proposal is an attempt to modernize traditional Confucianism and to make it relevant in contemporary China. In this paper I argue that this attempt faces external and internal challenges. The external challenges to CPF include the trademarks of contemporary philosophy, such as the methodological naturalism, epistemic pluralism and ethical individualism. Furthermore, there are three competing readings of CPF, which poses its own internal challenge to CPF. CPF scholars have failed to clarify if they are engaged in a project of interpretation, which is to elaborate the idea of family in the Confucian tradition, or as a project of justification, which is to justify Confucian understanding of family as a universal and objective value.
{"title":"Confucian philosophy of family: interpretation or justification?","authors":"Yong Li","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2022.2024346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2024346","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT During the past decade, Si Xiao, Xianglong Zhang, Xiangcheng Sun and others have proposed a Confucian Philosophy of Family (CPF) movement as a response to issues in contemporary China. These issues include high divorce rates, low birth rates, caring for seniors, and other related issues. This proposal is an attempt to modernize traditional Confucianism and to make it relevant in contemporary China. In this paper I argue that this attempt faces external and internal challenges. The external challenges to CPF include the trademarks of contemporary philosophy, such as the methodological naturalism, epistemic pluralism and ethical individualism. Furthermore, there are three competing readings of CPF, which poses its own internal challenge to CPF. CPF scholars have failed to clarify if they are engaged in a project of interpretation, which is to elaborate the idea of family in the Confucian tradition, or as a project of justification, which is to justify Confucian understanding of family as a universal and objective value.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"152 - 163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41537880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-30DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1983961
Joseph Suk-Hwan Dowd
ABSTRACT The Pātañjalayogaśāstra (PYŚ) is typically understood to define yoga as thought-suppression. In several publications, Ian Whicher has sought to avoid the conclusion that the PYŚ endorses thought-suppression by proposing that the PYŚ’s definition of yoga refers not to thought-suppression but to liberation from the puruṣa’s misidentification with the mind. I argue that Whicher’s proposal is unsuccessful because the PYŚ portrays thought-suppression as necessary for this liberation.
{"title":"Thought-suppression in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra: against Ian Whicher’s interpretation of Patañjali’s yoga","authors":"Joseph Suk-Hwan Dowd","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1983961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1983961","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Pātañjalayogaśāstra (PYŚ) is typically understood to define yoga as thought-suppression. In several publications, Ian Whicher has sought to avoid the conclusion that the PYŚ endorses thought-suppression by proposing that the PYŚ’s definition of yoga refers not to thought-suppression but to liberation from the puruṣa’s misidentification with the mind. I argue that Whicher’s proposal is unsuccessful because the PYŚ portrays thought-suppression as necessary for this liberation.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"19 - 32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45463039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-30DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1983959
Youru Wang
ABSTRACT This article is one of the author’s serial writings to assimilate Ricoeur’s three-fold ethical investigation into various areas of human acts of forgetting, including 1) the therapeutic or pathological area, 2) the pragmatic area, dealing with individual and group’s self-identity in relation to time and otherness, and 3) the more explicitly ethical-political (social and institutional) area, in a wide context. Corresponding to the second area of the Ricoeurian three-fold investigation, this paper probes the ethical dimension of the Zhuangzian forgetfulness of personal identity in relation to time and otherness. It first examines textual materials of the Zhuangzi to navigate on the narrative meanings of forgetting oneself or personal identity, and then delves into three domains of Zhuangzian conception on the forgetting of one’s fixed identity. Finally, it elaborates on the Zhuangzian notion of relational autonomy or agency that underlies the practice of forgetfulness of oneself or personal identity.
{"title":"Forgetting oneself or personal identity in relation to time and otherness in the Zhuangzi","authors":"Youru Wang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1983959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1983959","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article is one of the author’s serial writings to assimilate Ricoeur’s three-fold ethical investigation into various areas of human acts of forgetting, including 1) the therapeutic or pathological area, 2) the pragmatic area, dealing with individual and group’s self-identity in relation to time and otherness, and 3) the more explicitly ethical-political (social and institutional) area, in a wide context. Corresponding to the second area of the Ricoeurian three-fold investigation, this paper probes the ethical dimension of the Zhuangzian forgetfulness of personal identity in relation to time and otherness. It first examines textual materials of the Zhuangzi to navigate on the narrative meanings of forgetting oneself or personal identity, and then delves into three domains of Zhuangzian conception on the forgetting of one’s fixed identity. Finally, it elaborates on the Zhuangzian notion of relational autonomy or agency that underlies the practice of forgetfulness of oneself or personal identity.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"52 - 72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41795843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-29DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1983960
Yingjin Xu
ABSTRACT To have a coherent picture of Wang Chong’s Lunheng is difficult. Some of Lunheng’s chapters obviously show Wang’s hostility to a large part of the folklore (including the social institutions based on it) and traditional philosophical texts. In some other chapters, however, Wang appears to be more sympathetic to the social institutions related to folk religious beliefs. Esther Sunkyung Klein & Colin Klein attempt to explain this prima facie inconsistency in terms of ‘piecemeal non-reductionism’, which roughly means that Wang would take any testimonial belief for granted until he can find a defeater of such a belief. But this explanation merely depicts Wang as a defeater-seeker rather than a thinker looking for philosophical grounds of his claims in a more positive manner. In contrast, in this paper, I intend to attribute the following epistemological thesis to Wang: A testimonial belief taken from classics or folklore will be judged as unjustified if the knowledge attributor finds a non-negligible defeater of it, and such an attributor would feel more sympathetic to the target belief if it can be at least prima facie justified in the light of analogical reasoning.
{"title":"The inconsistencies in Wang Chong’s Lunheng eliminated in the light of analogical reasoning","authors":"Yingjin Xu","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1983960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1983960","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT To have a coherent picture of Wang Chong’s Lunheng is difficult. Some of Lunheng’s chapters obviously show Wang’s hostility to a large part of the folklore (including the social institutions based on it) and traditional philosophical texts. In some other chapters, however, Wang appears to be more sympathetic to the social institutions related to folk religious beliefs. Esther Sunkyung Klein & Colin Klein attempt to explain this prima facie inconsistency in terms of ‘piecemeal non-reductionism’, which roughly means that Wang would take any testimonial belief for granted until he can find a defeater of such a belief. But this explanation merely depicts Wang as a defeater-seeker rather than a thinker looking for philosophical grounds of his claims in a more positive manner. In contrast, in this paper, I intend to attribute the following epistemological thesis to Wang: A testimonial belief taken from classics or folklore will be judged as unjustified if the knowledge attributor finds a non-negligible defeater of it, and such an attributor would feel more sympathetic to the target belief if it can be at least prima facie justified in the light of analogical reasoning.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"73 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43429255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-16DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1977464
Yuzhou Yang
ABSTRACT The contextual dimension of ren or li is celebrated in English studies of Confucian ethics. However, it often gives way to the issue of individual practice in studies concerning the relationship between ren and li due perhaps to an excessive focus on personal moral development. Inspired by a painting metaphor from the Analects, the present study reassesses this unbalanced approach to the ren-li relationship through the proposed theme of contextual individuality. In the wake of relationally constituted individuality in Confucian philosophy, this study shows that the moral endowment of caring for others in human nature, which constitutes the moral foundation of ren and li, calls for a contextually practical approach to the ren-li relationship. This approach is crucial for the recognition that one’s moral development may not be truly accomplished unless undertaken in the context of the moral development of fellow human beings.
{"title":"Ren 仁 (Humaneness) and Li 禮 (Ritual) in a painting metaphor from the perspective of contextual individuality","authors":"Yuzhou Yang","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1977464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1977464","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The contextual dimension of ren or li is celebrated in English studies of Confucian ethics. However, it often gives way to the issue of individual practice in studies concerning the relationship between ren and li due perhaps to an excessive focus on personal moral development. Inspired by a painting metaphor from the Analects, the present study reassesses this unbalanced approach to the ren-li relationship through the proposed theme of contextual individuality. In the wake of relationally constituted individuality in Confucian philosophy, this study shows that the moral endowment of caring for others in human nature, which constitutes the moral foundation of ren and li, calls for a contextually practical approach to the ren-li relationship. This approach is crucial for the recognition that one’s moral development may not be truly accomplished unless undertaken in the context of the moral development of fellow human beings.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"88 - 103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46546475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-30DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1967571
Ołena Łucyszyna
ABSTRACT One of the lively polemics between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas is devoted to the question of whether each pramāṇa—means of knowledge—has an independent scope of validity, which does not overlap the scopes of other pramāṇas, or whether more than one pramāṇa can be applied to the same object. Dignāga and continuators of his thought defend pramāṇa-vyavasthā, ‘autonomy of [the object spheres of] pramāṇas,’ while Naiyāyikas defend the opposing conception, called pramāṇa-samplava, ‘coalescence of [the object spheres of] pramāṇas.’ Scholars usually ascribe pramāṇa-vyavasthā to Sāṃkhya. This paper explores the classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya view of the scope of the pramāṇas and shows that Sāṃkhya did not follow pramāṇa-vyavasthā. In Sāṃkhya, the scopes of perception and inference for knowing perceptible objects overlap, while inference for knowing supersensible objects and reliable verbal testimony have autonomous object spheres. However, there is also a tendency toward pramāṇa-vyavasthā in Sāṃkhya, which is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya theory of pramāṇas.
{"title":"The scope of the pramāṇas in classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya","authors":"Ołena Łucyszyna","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1967571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1967571","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One of the lively polemics between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas is devoted to the question of whether each pramāṇa—means of knowledge—has an independent scope of validity, which does not overlap the scopes of other pramāṇas, or whether more than one pramāṇa can be applied to the same object. Dignāga and continuators of his thought defend pramāṇa-vyavasthā, ‘autonomy of [the object spheres of] pramāṇas,’ while Naiyāyikas defend the opposing conception, called pramāṇa-samplava, ‘coalescence of [the object spheres of] pramāṇas.’ Scholars usually ascribe pramāṇa-vyavasthā to Sāṃkhya. This paper explores the classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya view of the scope of the pramāṇas and shows that Sāṃkhya did not follow pramāṇa-vyavasthā. In Sāṃkhya, the scopes of perception and inference for knowing perceptible objects overlap, while inference for knowing supersensible objects and reliable verbal testimony have autonomous object spheres. However, there is also a tendency toward pramāṇa-vyavasthā in Sāṃkhya, which is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya theory of pramāṇas.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 1","pages":"33 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46029846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-30DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1960677
Yun Wu, Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi
ABSTRACT A longstanding orthodoxy holds that the Mohists regard the promotion of li (benefit, 利) as their ultimate normative criterion, meaning that they measure what is yi (just, 義) or buyi (unjust, 不義) depending on whether it maximizes li or not. This orthodoxy dates back at least to Joseph Edkins (1859), who saw Mozi as a utilitarian and an ally of Bentham. In this paper, we will argue that this orthodoxy should be reconsidered because it does not square with several passages from the Mozi. That the Mohists place a strong weight on the promotion of ‘li for the whole world (tianxia zhi li, 天下之利)’ is uncontroversial. We argue, however, that in certain cases the Mohist moral calculus diverges in its rationale or outcome from li-promotionalism. This position rejects the orthodoxy by showing that Mohism and li-promotionalism are not entirely coterminous.
{"title":"Is Mohism really li-promotionalism?","authors":"Yun Wu, Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1960677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1960677","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A longstanding orthodoxy holds that the Mohists regard the promotion of li (benefit, 利) as their ultimate normative criterion, meaning that they measure what is yi (just, 義) or buyi (unjust, 不義) depending on whether it maximizes li or not. This orthodoxy dates back at least to Joseph Edkins (1859), who saw Mozi as a utilitarian and an ally of Bentham. In this paper, we will argue that this orthodoxy should be reconsidered because it does not square with several passages from the Mozi. That the Mohists place a strong weight on the promotion of ‘li for the whole world (tianxia zhi li, 天下之利)’ is uncontroversial. We argue, however, that in certain cases the Mohist moral calculus diverges in its rationale or outcome from li-promotionalism. This position rejects the orthodoxy by showing that Mohism and li-promotionalism are not entirely coterminous.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"430 - 440"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1960677","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43606472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1917157
Vahid Taebnia
ABSTRACT Despite all fundamental divergences, the similarities formed between some interpretations of the later-Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion and the tradition of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), can yet be philosophically recognized. These basic analogies are as follows: 1) The inextricability of belief and practice and the priority of practice over knowledge 2) The characterization of the core religious beliefs as the primal ground of man’s perception and understanding, in contrast to the view that considers fundamental religious beliefs as theoretical conclusions derived from purely rational courses of reflection 3) A new practice-laden narrative of religious realism. Given that, one can even shed a new Wittgensteinian light on even the most abstract and metaphysical elements of the mystical worldview. If fundamental religious beliefs are interpreted not as metaphysical doctrines but as a set of descriptions arising from a specific form of practical life, then the ability to see a sort of transcendent and sacred unity in the whole universe will be based on a way of purposive engagement and wayfaring in the natural and social world.
{"title":"Differences and similarities between the later-Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion and the Islamic mystical tradition","authors":"Vahid Taebnia","doi":"10.1080/09552367.2021.1917157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1917157","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Despite all fundamental divergences, the similarities formed between some interpretations of the later-Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion and the tradition of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), can yet be philosophically recognized. These basic analogies are as follows: 1) The inextricability of belief and practice and the priority of practice over knowledge 2) The characterization of the core religious beliefs as the primal ground of man’s perception and understanding, in contrast to the view that considers fundamental religious beliefs as theoretical conclusions derived from purely rational courses of reflection 3) A new practice-laden narrative of religious realism. Given that, one can even shed a new Wittgensteinian light on even the most abstract and metaphysical elements of the mystical worldview. If fundamental religious beliefs are interpreted not as metaphysical doctrines but as a set of descriptions arising from a specific form of practical life, then the ability to see a sort of transcendent and sacred unity in the whole universe will be based on a way of purposive engagement and wayfaring in the natural and social world.","PeriodicalId":44358,"journal":{"name":"ASIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"31 1","pages":"271 - 287"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09552367.2021.1917157","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49088390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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