For small groups fighting in multi-actor civil wars, joining a larger coalition is often a way to survive. Yet, it is not only rebel or pro-government non-state armed groups that form alliances; in many cases, jihadists have been surprisingly successful in building winning coalitions in civil wars. This is puzzling because jihadists attract fierce international opposition and are therefore very risky teams to join. Jihadists are also typically excluded from the political process, which means that they are unlikely to enjoy the spoils of a peace agreement. Why then would any local groups choose to join jihadist coalitions, rather than other rebel or pro-government coalitions in a conflict theatre? In this paper, we argue that ideology fails to explain this choice; rather, we contend that competition among rebel and pro-government coalitions inevitably produces winners and losers. Under these conditions, jihadists serve as an attractive spoiler coalition, drawing support from groups that see no chance of benefitting from an existing or future peace agreement. By offering these ‘losers’ a wider network and reference group, jihadists can expand their coalition base and territorial reach. By courting support from marginalized groups across ethnic and tribal lines, jihadists can create a winning coalition out of a diverse mix of losers.
{"title":"A Winning Team of Losers: The Logic of Jihadist Coalitions in Civil Wars","authors":"Aisha Ahmad, O. Diallo","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac029","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 For small groups fighting in multi-actor civil wars, joining a larger coalition is often a way to survive. Yet, it is not only rebel or pro-government non-state armed groups that form alliances; in many cases, jihadists have been surprisingly successful in building winning coalitions in civil wars. This is puzzling because jihadists attract fierce international opposition and are therefore very risky teams to join. Jihadists are also typically excluded from the political process, which means that they are unlikely to enjoy the spoils of a peace agreement. Why then would any local groups choose to join jihadist coalitions, rather than other rebel or pro-government coalitions in a conflict theatre? In this paper, we argue that ideology fails to explain this choice; rather, we contend that competition among rebel and pro-government coalitions inevitably produces winners and losers. Under these conditions, jihadists serve as an attractive spoiler coalition, drawing support from groups that see no chance of benefitting from an existing or future peace agreement. By offering these ‘losers’ a wider network and reference group, jihadists can expand their coalition base and territorial reach. By courting support from marginalized groups across ethnic and tribal lines, jihadists can create a winning coalition out of a diverse mix of losers.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73124065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article seeks to bridge the interdisciplinary gap between just war theory (JWT) and international relations (IR) by introducing into the former discipline key theoretical and empirical insights from the latter discipline. Specifically, the article argues that traditional JWT is deficient as a normative account of war because it constitutes what Kenneth Waltz calls a “unit-level” theory, operating at the level of the individual state and evaluating the morality of a given war solely by reference to a list of state-level factors (e.g., just cause, proportionality, etc.). In this manner, JWT fails to take account of the systemic, or structural, correlates of international armed conflict. In particular, it fails to incorporate insights from the leading mainstream IR theories of neorealism, institutionalism, and constructivism in regard to how the international distribution of material capabilities, institutions, and ideas codetermines the nature and likelihood of war. To remedy these inadequacies of JWT, a “multilevel” approach to the morality of war is put forward according to which unit-level factors are required to be weighted by systemic factors. Pursuant to this approach, if a state has initiated or participated in a war that is assessed as unjust through the unit-level lens of traditional JWT, the state itself can still sometimes be partially excused for that war once systemic factors have been considered.
{"title":"System Structure, Unjust War, and State Excusability","authors":"David Rubin","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article seeks to bridge the interdisciplinary gap between just war theory (JWT) and international relations (IR) by introducing into the former discipline key theoretical and empirical insights from the latter discipline. Specifically, the article argues that traditional JWT is deficient as a normative account of war because it constitutes what Kenneth Waltz calls a “unit-level” theory, operating at the level of the individual state and evaluating the morality of a given war solely by reference to a list of state-level factors (e.g., just cause, proportionality, etc.). In this manner, JWT fails to take account of the systemic, or structural, correlates of international armed conflict. In particular, it fails to incorporate insights from the leading mainstream IR theories of neorealism, institutionalism, and constructivism in regard to how the international distribution of material capabilities, institutions, and ideas codetermines the nature and likelihood of war. To remedy these inadequacies of JWT, a “multilevel” approach to the morality of war is put forward according to which unit-level factors are required to be weighted by systemic factors. Pursuant to this approach, if a state has initiated or participated in a war that is assessed as unjust through the unit-level lens of traditional JWT, the state itself can still sometimes be partially excused for that war once systemic factors have been considered.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73461299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) have often been characterized as a “poor man's atomic bomb”: a cheap and easy to acquire alternative to nuclear weapons that is particularly appealing to so-called Third World states. This idea is also reflected in Western government and expert estimates that have long exaggerated the spread of CBWs, especially among states in the Global South. In this article, I break down the ways in which the idea that the spread of CBWs is prevalent and that it primarily happens among states in the Global South has come to exist and persist. By dissecting an oft-cited dataset on CBW spread, I unravel frequently occurring methodological flaws—such as conceptual confusion, misinterpretation of sources, and a bias toward proliferation charges originating from the US government—that breed and sustain inflated estimates and faulty allegations. Subsequently, I show that a dominant cognitive framework that centers on the metaphorical use of the terms “proliferation” and “poor man's atomic bomb” primes analysts and policymakers to interpret the history and future of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as being characterized by inevitable spread, particularly among the non-Western “Other.” In conclusion, I offer ways to counter the orthodoxies of this ideology in teaching, research, and policy.
{"title":"The Myth of the “Poor Man's Atomic Bomb”: Knowledge, Method, and Ideology in the Study of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons","authors":"Biejan Poor Toulabi","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) have often been characterized as a “poor man's atomic bomb”: a cheap and easy to acquire alternative to nuclear weapons that is particularly appealing to so-called Third World states. This idea is also reflected in Western government and expert estimates that have long exaggerated the spread of CBWs, especially among states in the Global South. In this article, I break down the ways in which the idea that the spread of CBWs is prevalent and that it primarily happens among states in the Global South has come to exist and persist. By dissecting an oft-cited dataset on CBW spread, I unravel frequently occurring methodological flaws—such as conceptual confusion, misinterpretation of sources, and a bias toward proliferation charges originating from the US government—that breed and sustain inflated estimates and faulty allegations. Subsequently, I show that a dominant cognitive framework that centers on the metaphorical use of the terms “proliferation” and “poor man's atomic bomb” primes analysts and policymakers to interpret the history and future of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as being characterized by inevitable spread, particularly among the non-Western “Other.” In conclusion, I offer ways to counter the orthodoxies of this ideology in teaching, research, and policy.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"374 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76898628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B. W. Reeder, Dong-Wook Kwak, J. R. Smith, M. Wales
What explains the ebbs and flows of government–rebel battles during civil conflict? We posit that rebels, as actors dissatisfied with the status quo, challenge the government when they can sustain fighting and absorb losses on the battlefield. This is possible when the group's resource base is stable and unlikely to be undermined by market forces, government action, or external interveners. If, however, rebel portfolios are extraordinarily profitable, rebels will focus on profiting from their investments, making the escalation of armed conflict less likely. Using a measure that captures the efficiency of rebel resource portfolios and two illustrative cases, we find evidence for this curvilinear relationship: conflicts escalate as resource portfolio efficiency increases but de-escalate slightly when portfolios are very efficient. Thus, the decision to escalate a conflict is revealed to be a function of the entire bundle of resources controlled by rebels and the market value of those resources. By accounting for the entirety of rebel resource portfolios, this study refines the insurgent–resource nexus, leading to a better understanding of civil conflict dynamics.
{"title":"Rebel Resource Efficiency and the Escalation of Civil Conflict","authors":"B. W. Reeder, Dong-Wook Kwak, J. R. Smith, M. Wales","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What explains the ebbs and flows of government–rebel battles during civil conflict? We posit that rebels, as actors dissatisfied with the status quo, challenge the government when they can sustain fighting and absorb losses on the battlefield. This is possible when the group's resource base is stable and unlikely to be undermined by market forces, government action, or external interveners. If, however, rebel portfolios are extraordinarily profitable, rebels will focus on profiting from their investments, making the escalation of armed conflict less likely. Using a measure that captures the efficiency of rebel resource portfolios and two illustrative cases, we find evidence for this curvilinear relationship: conflicts escalate as resource portfolio efficiency increases but de-escalate slightly when portfolios are very efficient. Thus, the decision to escalate a conflict is revealed to be a function of the entire bundle of resources controlled by rebels and the market value of those resources. By accounting for the entirety of rebel resource portfolios, this study refines the insurgent–resource nexus, leading to a better understanding of civil conflict dynamics.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76340578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The US allies’ decisions to ban or allow Huawei from building fifth-generation (5G) mobile broadband are significant to various actors, but their decisions have not been examined systematically. While related literatures point to relative bargaining power or domestic political constraints, I argue that strengths of pre-existing ideas, across national leader and national security institutional levels of analysis, help explain US allies’ positions. Specifically, I argue that the following three understandings are key: (1) China has aggressive intentions, (2) information and communications technology (ICT) system requires security, and (3) data privacy needs state protection. I argue that when the three key understandings are strong across national leader and national security institutional levels, the leader would likely adopt the Huawei 5G ban. On the other hand, when the three key understandings are weak across two levels, the leader would likely allow Huawei to partake in building 5G networks without tougher controls. I conduct a plausibility probe-based comparison of the decision cases of Australia and South Korea and find support for my hypotheses. The cross-national evidence calls for more attention to specific understandings—particular to action contexts—across at least two levels of analysis in explaining decisions of interest.
{"title":"Who Supports the Huawei 5G Ban? Advancing a Two-Level Ideational Approach in International Relations","authors":"Yoon Jin Lee","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The US allies’ decisions to ban or allow Huawei from building fifth-generation (5G) mobile broadband are significant to various actors, but their decisions have not been examined systematically. While related literatures point to relative bargaining power or domestic political constraints, I argue that strengths of pre-existing ideas, across national leader and national security institutional levels of analysis, help explain US allies’ positions. Specifically, I argue that the following three understandings are key: (1) China has aggressive intentions, (2) information and communications technology (ICT) system requires security, and (3) data privacy needs state protection. I argue that when the three key understandings are strong across national leader and national security institutional levels, the leader would likely adopt the Huawei 5G ban. On the other hand, when the three key understandings are weak across two levels, the leader would likely allow Huawei to partake in building 5G networks without tougher controls. I conduct a plausibility probe-based comparison of the decision cases of Australia and South Korea and find support for my hypotheses. The cross-national evidence calls for more attention to specific understandings—particular to action contexts—across at least two levels of analysis in explaining decisions of interest.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73722699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article evaluates emerging progressive ideas about US grand strategy. Progressives’ distinctive analytic premise is that structural inequality undermines America's national interests. To combat this problem, progressives recommend retrenching US primacy in a manner that resembles the grand strategy of restraint. However, progressives also seek to build a more democratic international order that can facilitate new forms of global collective action. Progressives thus advocate ambitious international goals at the same time as they reject the institutional arrangements that the United States has traditionally used to promote its global agenda. No other grand strategy shares those attributes. After articulating the core elements of a progressive grand strategy, the article explores that strategy's unique risks and tradeoffs and raises several concerns about the theoretical and practical viability of progressive ideas.
{"title":"Progressive Grand Strategy: A Synthesis and Critique","authors":"J. Friedman","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac032","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article evaluates emerging progressive ideas about US grand strategy. Progressives’ distinctive analytic premise is that structural inequality undermines America's national interests. To combat this problem, progressives recommend retrenching US primacy in a manner that resembles the grand strategy of restraint. However, progressives also seek to build a more democratic international order that can facilitate new forms of global collective action. Progressives thus advocate ambitious international goals at the same time as they reject the institutional arrangements that the United States has traditionally used to promote its global agenda. No other grand strategy shares those attributes. After articulating the core elements of a progressive grand strategy, the article explores that strategy's unique risks and tradeoffs and raises several concerns about the theoretical and practical viability of progressive ideas.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75173182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do allies free ride? Although plausible, the concept of free riding relies upon a counterfactual: if the ally did not have a powerful patron, then it would invest more in its own defense. However, these claims are often asserted, not shown. The concept of free riding, although influential in the field of security studies, is almost unfalsifiable. In this article, we show logically how difficult it is to ascertain actual free riding. Rather than dismiss the entire concept, however, we attempt to provide two hypotheses and one scope condition that moves closer to a direct assessment of claims of free riding: first, if the ally is free riding, as the patron's commitment decreases, the ally should spend more on its own defense; second, all things being equal, a state with a powerful patron should spend less than one without. The key scope condition is whether the ally cares sufficiently about the issue to fight. We use the case of East Asia—and in particular the Philippines—to illustrate these dynamics. We conclude that the low defense spending of US allies and non-allies in East Asia is not free riding but rather a reflection of their low threat perceptions.
{"title":"Toward Measuring Free-Riding: Counterfactuals, Alliances, and US–Philippine Relations","authors":"Xinru Ma, David C. Kang","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac033","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do allies free ride? Although plausible, the concept of free riding relies upon a counterfactual: if the ally did not have a powerful patron, then it would invest more in its own defense. However, these claims are often asserted, not shown. The concept of free riding, although influential in the field of security studies, is almost unfalsifiable. In this article, we show logically how difficult it is to ascertain actual free riding. Rather than dismiss the entire concept, however, we attempt to provide two hypotheses and one scope condition that moves closer to a direct assessment of claims of free riding: first, if the ally is free riding, as the patron's commitment decreases, the ally should spend more on its own defense; second, all things being equal, a state with a powerful patron should spend less than one without. The key scope condition is whether the ally cares sufficiently about the issue to fight. We use the case of East Asia—and in particular the Philippines—to illustrate these dynamics. We conclude that the low defense spending of US allies and non-allies in East Asia is not free riding but rather a reflection of their low threat perceptions.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85512813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Same Same but Different? Ideological Differentiation and Intra-jihadist Competition in the Syrian Civil War","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88253736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cybersecurity poses new questions for old alliances. These questions emerge with special force in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Russian Federation wields substantial cyber capabilities, but NATO members have been ambivalent about stating what sorts of attacks would trigger the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5 collective self-defense provisions. Nevertheless, NATO officials state that there are some attacks that would trigger Article 5. This leads to a puzzle: why would an explicit alliance guarantee designed to ensure collective defense against certain forms of attack be informally extended to include others? Because the policy of the United States toward such questions will likely be of great significance in determining NATO policy, we use a series of survey experiments to test American public opinion regarding support for defending allies and friendly countries against cyber operations. Respondents are likelier to support a response to an attack that causes fatalities and when the victim has a treaty alliance with the United States. In contrast, support falls if US participation is likely to provoke further retaliation or the target attacked is civilian rather than military.
{"title":"New Questions for an Old Alliance: NATO in Cyberspace and American Public Opinion","authors":"Lindsey Guenther, P. Musgrave","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Cybersecurity poses new questions for old alliances. These questions emerge with special force in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Russian Federation wields substantial cyber capabilities, but NATO members have been ambivalent about stating what sorts of attacks would trigger the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5 collective self-defense provisions. Nevertheless, NATO officials state that there are some attacks that would trigger Article 5. This leads to a puzzle: why would an explicit alliance guarantee designed to ensure collective defense against certain forms of attack be informally extended to include others? Because the policy of the United States toward such questions will likely be of great significance in determining NATO policy, we use a series of survey experiments to test American public opinion regarding support for defending allies and friendly countries against cyber operations. Respondents are likelier to support a response to an attack that causes fatalities and when the victim has a treaty alliance with the United States. In contrast, support falls if US participation is likely to provoke further retaliation or the target attacked is civilian rather than military.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"645 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76830742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article presents the first comprehensive collation of available information on China's provision of security force assistance (SFA) to African countries over the last two decades. While China is engaged in donating arms, military equipment, and training abroad, knowledge of the nature of its SFA programmes has been at best fragmented and partial. In this article, we fill this gap by outlining China's stated rationale for providing SFA, the level of funding, which states received it, and what they received. We contextualize our analysis in light of current debates over China's rise and great power competition, as well as its broader engagement in African security. Based on our original data, we argue that in providing SFA to most African states, China aims to strengthen long-term relations and protect its economic interests. While we find no evidence that China is attempting to supplant the US and other providers’ role in Africa, we point to some unintended consequences.
{"title":"Great Power Competition and China's Security Assistance to Africa: Arms, Training, and Influence","authors":"Ilaria Carrozza, Nicholas J Marsh","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac027","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article presents the first comprehensive collation of available information on China's provision of security force assistance (SFA) to African countries over the last two decades. While China is engaged in donating arms, military equipment, and training abroad, knowledge of the nature of its SFA programmes has been at best fragmented and partial. In this article, we fill this gap by outlining China's stated rationale for providing SFA, the level of funding, which states received it, and what they received. We contextualize our analysis in light of current debates over China's rise and great power competition, as well as its broader engagement in African security. Based on our original data, we argue that in providing SFA to most African states, China aims to strengthen long-term relations and protect its economic interests. While we find no evidence that China is attempting to supplant the US and other providers’ role in Africa, we point to some unintended consequences.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91037019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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