This article advances a research program in military dissent, contributing to growing scholarly interest in the subject. It first outlines a variety of “tactics of dissent,” discriminating among them according to the pathway through which they shape political leaders’ decisions and the related audiences and objectives of the method. These sets of tactics are domestic politics, bureaucratic, coercive, and organizational. The article illustrates these tactics with examples from across advanced democracies, developing democracies and autocracies, and with lengthier treatments of Brazil, Egypt, and the U.S. In so doing, the article helps bridge subfield divides in the study of civil-military relations, arguing that neglecting these tactics truncates variation in the character and intensity of dissent within and across regime types. In addition, it outlines several questions to guide future research, including efforts to better understand the metrics and drivers of dissent, the efficacy of these tactics in undermining civilian initiatives and their larger consequences for democracy and civil-military relations.
{"title":"Slow Rolls, Shoulder-Taps, and Coups: Building a Research Program in Military Dissent Across Regime Types","authors":"Risa A. Brooks, D. Pion-Berlin","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article advances a research program in military dissent, contributing to growing scholarly interest in the subject. It first outlines a variety of “tactics of dissent,” discriminating among them according to the pathway through which they shape political leaders’ decisions and the related audiences and objectives of the method. These sets of tactics are domestic politics, bureaucratic, coercive, and organizational. The article illustrates these tactics with examples from across advanced democracies, developing democracies and autocracies, and with lengthier treatments of Brazil, Egypt, and the U.S. In so doing, the article helps bridge subfield divides in the study of civil-military relations, arguing that neglecting these tactics truncates variation in the character and intensity of dissent within and across regime types. In addition, it outlines several questions to guide future research, including efforts to better understand the metrics and drivers of dissent, the efficacy of these tactics in undermining civilian initiatives and their larger consequences for democracy and civil-military relations.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87234571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the security governance of the Tamil diaspora through a practice lens. It takes as its starting point the observation that the Tamil diaspora community has historically been subjected to complex and multi-scalar security governance. How this continues after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war period remains empirically and theoretically underexamined, with studies focusing instead on Tamil diaspora organizing. This paper addresses this gap by mapping and theorizing contemporary constraints to Tamil transnational political action (TPA), building on the growing literature on the transnational repression of diaspora. Further, it proposes to move beyond the state-centrism and liberal bias inherent in this literature, by centering security governance practices. Based on a review of existing literature and historical and ethnographic data collected through mixed-method fieldwork among the Tamil diaspora community between 2015 and 2018, this paper concludes that key security governance practices that constrain Tamil TPA, such as proscription, counterterrorism policing, and formal diplomatic practices, have continued since the end of the civil war, each revealing complex global security entanglements beyond the diaspora sending state.
{"title":"Constraining Tamil Transnational Political Action: Security Governance Practices beyond the Sending State","authors":"Catherine Ruth Craven","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper examines the security governance of the Tamil diaspora through a practice lens. It takes as its starting point the observation that the Tamil diaspora community has historically been subjected to complex and multi-scalar security governance. How this continues after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war period remains empirically and theoretically underexamined, with studies focusing instead on Tamil diaspora organizing. This paper addresses this gap by mapping and theorizing contemporary constraints to Tamil transnational political action (TPA), building on the growing literature on the transnational repression of diaspora. Further, it proposes to move beyond the state-centrism and liberal bias inherent in this literature, by centering security governance practices. Based on a review of existing literature and historical and ethnographic data collected through mixed-method fieldwork among the Tamil diaspora community between 2015 and 2018, this paper concludes that key security governance practices that constrain Tamil TPA, such as proscription, counterterrorism policing, and formal diplomatic practices, have continued since the end of the civil war, each revealing complex global security entanglements beyond the diaspora sending state.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72885683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do mass publics in nonnuclear weapon states form their preferences over the acquisition of nuclear weapons? We field a survey experiment in Brazil, a possessor of uranium-enrichment capabilities with a long history of nuclear ambitions. Three sets of results support the view that members of the public approach nuclear proliferation strategically, that is, by taking into account how their home state interacts with enemies and allies alike. First, the external security environment is a major driver for individual-level preferences: when security is plentiful, only a small minority of the public in Brazil supports proliferation, but a deterioration of external conditions engenders a high minority in support for nuclear-weapon acquisition. Second, the mere extension by the United States of conventional security assurances suffices to dampen public support for an indigenous nuclear deterrent, restoring a majority view opposing proliferation. Third, conventional security assurances shape public sentiment on nuclear acquisition irrespective of whether they are credible or not. These results contribute to the effort currently unfolding in the scholarly community to make sense of how citizens outside the United States think about international security in a nuclear world.
{"title":"Public Support for Nuclear Proliferation: Experimental Evidence from Brazil","authors":"M. Spektor, Guilherme N. Fasolin, Juliana Camargo","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do mass publics in nonnuclear weapon states form their preferences over the acquisition of nuclear weapons? We field a survey experiment in Brazil, a possessor of uranium-enrichment capabilities with a long history of nuclear ambitions. Three sets of results support the view that members of the public approach nuclear proliferation strategically, that is, by taking into account how their home state interacts with enemies and allies alike. First, the external security environment is a major driver for individual-level preferences: when security is plentiful, only a small minority of the public in Brazil supports proliferation, but a deterioration of external conditions engenders a high minority in support for nuclear-weapon acquisition. Second, the mere extension by the United States of conventional security assurances suffices to dampen public support for an indigenous nuclear deterrent, restoring a majority view opposing proliferation. Third, conventional security assurances shape public sentiment on nuclear acquisition irrespective of whether they are credible or not. These results contribute to the effort currently unfolding in the scholarly community to make sense of how citizens outside the United States think about international security in a nuclear world.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"49 5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89067587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This introductory essay lays the groundwork for an inductive, relational approach to the study of trust in international relations. It argues that the two main accounts of trust, affective and cognitive, are less separate motivational sources of trust than two constitutive dimensions, albeit in varying degrees, of a trusting relationship. Trust is an emergent property of social relations, and the specific form and content it takes inhere in the relationship that embodies it, whether or not actors involved are deemed trustworthy a priori. In addition to emphasizing contextual manifestations of trust, this article suggests that a relational understanding of trust foregrounds normative expectations created by trusting relationships, which the mutual determination between trustworthiness and trust-responsiveness makes necessary. The article concludes with a presentation of this forum's contributions. It shows that a relational view of trust enables us to reconcile the generic question—why agents trust one another—with contextual concerns—when and how do they exhibit trusting relationships.
{"title":"Renewing the Study of Trust in World Politics: A Relational Agenda","authors":"Thierry Balzacq","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This introductory essay lays the groundwork for an inductive, relational approach to the study of trust in international relations. It argues that the two main accounts of trust, affective and cognitive, are less separate motivational sources of trust than two constitutive dimensions, albeit in varying degrees, of a trusting relationship. Trust is an emergent property of social relations, and the specific form and content it takes inhere in the relationship that embodies it, whether or not actors involved are deemed trustworthy a priori. In addition to emphasizing contextual manifestations of trust, this article suggests that a relational understanding of trust foregrounds normative expectations created by trusting relationships, which the mutual determination between trustworthiness and trust-responsiveness makes necessary. The article concludes with a presentation of this forum's contributions. It shows that a relational view of trust enables us to reconcile the generic question—why agents trust one another—with contextual concerns—when and how do they exhibit trusting relationships.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84043269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The decision to engage in face-to-face diplomacy aimed at reassuring an adversary is one of the most salient ones a state leader will have to make. However, often leaders choose not to engage in such diplomacy because they follow those scholars and pundits who are skeptical of the reassurance value of interpersonal face-to-face diplomacy. This creates an important puzzle. Why do leaders sometimes choose to promote reassurance through meeting personally? And why, in other cases, do they not? The answer we provide in this article is that it depends crucially on the extent to which each leader in the dyad possesses security dilemma sensibility (SDS). We conceptualize SDS as varying both in intensity of the strength of the actor's intention and capacity to exercise it and in the extent to which actors believe the other actor in the dyad may possess SDS. The article develops a typology of three SDS leader types—distrusters, uncertains, and empathics—showing how the strength and orientation of SDS in each type shape their willingness to pursue face-to-face diplomacy. We then illustrate the utility of the typology in three short cases: Reagan and Gorbachev's decisions to engage in 1985 in Geneva, Kennedy and Khrushchev's decisions to meet in 1961 in Vienna, and finally, one of the “dogs that did not bark” (the summits that did not happen), the lack of face-to-face diplomacy between Obama and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong-il. We conclude with implications for future research and recommendations for policymakers.
{"title":"Overcoming the Four Horsemen of Reassurance Diplomacy: Explaining Variation in Face-to-Face Engagement","authors":"N. Wheeler, Marcus Holmes","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The decision to engage in face-to-face diplomacy aimed at reassuring an adversary is one of the most salient ones a state leader will have to make. However, often leaders choose not to engage in such diplomacy because they follow those scholars and pundits who are skeptical of the reassurance value of interpersonal face-to-face diplomacy. This creates an important puzzle. Why do leaders sometimes choose to promote reassurance through meeting personally? And why, in other cases, do they not? The answer we provide in this article is that it depends crucially on the extent to which each leader in the dyad possesses security dilemma sensibility (SDS). We conceptualize SDS as varying both in intensity of the strength of the actor's intention and capacity to exercise it and in the extent to which actors believe the other actor in the dyad may possess SDS. The article develops a typology of three SDS leader types—distrusters, uncertains, and empathics—showing how the strength and orientation of SDS in each type shape their willingness to pursue face-to-face diplomacy. We then illustrate the utility of the typology in three short cases: Reagan and Gorbachev's decisions to engage in 1985 in Geneva, Kennedy and Khrushchev's decisions to meet in 1961 in Vienna, and finally, one of the “dogs that did not bark” (the summits that did not happen), the lack of face-to-face diplomacy between Obama and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong-il. We conclude with implications for future research and recommendations for policymakers.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74659865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charles W Mahoney, Benjamin K Tkach, Craig J Rethmeyer
Private equity firms have become important financial actors in the US defense industry in recent years—acquiring over 500 defense contractors since the early 2000s. This inquiry describes how increased capital flows into private equity funds, rising national security budgets, Pentagon policy, and rapid industry consolidation have spurred private equity investment in the businesses of American defense. Subsequently, the study demonstrates two ways private equity acquisitions of corporations in the defense industry affect US national security. First, because private equity firms often fund acquisitions through leveraged buyouts, the debt obligations of private equity–owned defense contractors are characterized by a relatively high risk of credit default. Second, the debt burden private equity firms place on defense contractors often reduces these companies’ free cash flow. As an increasing number of defense contractors are acquired by private equity firms, aggregate corporate reinvestment in the defense industry may well decline, thus diminishing the ability of contractors to perform their national security obligations. entreprises du secteur de la défense sociétés de capital-investissement et sécurité nationale aux états-unis
{"title":"Defense Contractors, Private Equity Firms, and US National Security","authors":"Charles W Mahoney, Benjamin K Tkach, Craig J Rethmeyer","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Private equity firms have become important financial actors in the US defense industry in recent years—acquiring over 500 defense contractors since the early 2000s. This inquiry describes how increased capital flows into private equity funds, rising national security budgets, Pentagon policy, and rapid industry consolidation have spurred private equity investment in the businesses of American defense. Subsequently, the study demonstrates two ways private equity acquisitions of corporations in the defense industry affect US national security. First, because private equity firms often fund acquisitions through leveraged buyouts, the debt obligations of private equity–owned defense contractors are characterized by a relatively high risk of credit default. Second, the debt burden private equity firms place on defense contractors often reduces these companies’ free cash flow. As an increasing number of defense contractors are acquired by private equity firms, aggregate corporate reinvestment in the defense industry may well decline, thus diminishing the ability of contractors to perform their national security obligations.\u0000 entreprises du secteur de la défense sociétés de capital-investissement et sécurité nationale aux états-unis","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85386507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While scholars of nonviolent resistance recognize that large-scale campaigns are more likely to be successful campaigns, we currently have little understanding of why some nonviolent protests grow into mass movements while others do not. In this article, we explore campaign size and, in particular, the role of individual and collective motives in facilitating the growth of nonviolent campaigns. We start by assuming that, after campaign onset, barriers to growth emerge because some aggrieved individuals who are sympathetic to the cause are wary of incurring the (opportunity) costs of participating in campaign rallies. On occasion, we argue, organizers respond to this challenge by staging events that generate rewarding emotional experiences for participants and spectators, such as concerts, mass singing, or other collective expressive acts. Since the feelings of empowerment, solidarity, catharsis, or glee that accompany these events can only be enjoyed by those who are physically present at campaign rallies, the provision of such “emotive events” creates an individual-level incentive for passive supporters to mobilize. As this incentive attracts new participants, campaigns can grow—potentially into large-scale phenomena. To assess the plausibility of our argument, we code original data on emotive events and investigate whether the provision of such events in the course of nonviolent campaigns is associated with the size and scale of those campaigns. Finding this to be the case, we conclude that campaigns that are more creative, humorous, cathartic, and/or fun are also more likely to be large-scale campaigns.
{"title":"Glee and Grievance: Emotive Events and Campaign Size in Nonviolent Resistance","authors":"J. Gledhill, Allard Duursma, C. Shay","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 While scholars of nonviolent resistance recognize that large-scale campaigns are more likely to be successful campaigns, we currently have little understanding of why some nonviolent protests grow into mass movements while others do not. In this article, we explore campaign size and, in particular, the role of individual and collective motives in facilitating the growth of nonviolent campaigns. We start by assuming that, after campaign onset, barriers to growth emerge because some aggrieved individuals who are sympathetic to the cause are wary of incurring the (opportunity) costs of participating in campaign rallies. On occasion, we argue, organizers respond to this challenge by staging events that generate rewarding emotional experiences for participants and spectators, such as concerts, mass singing, or other collective expressive acts. Since the feelings of empowerment, solidarity, catharsis, or glee that accompany these events can only be enjoyed by those who are physically present at campaign rallies, the provision of such “emotive events” creates an individual-level incentive for passive supporters to mobilize. As this incentive attracts new participants, campaigns can grow—potentially into large-scale phenomena. To assess the plausibility of our argument, we code original data on emotive events and investigate whether the provision of such events in the course of nonviolent campaigns is associated with the size and scale of those campaigns. Finding this to be the case, we conclude that campaigns that are more creative, humorous, cathartic, and/or fun are also more likely to be large-scale campaigns.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86144120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Policymakers have long assumed, and scholars have long argued, that how a government raises military manpower affects public support for military action through two obvious mechanisms: the likelihood any given individual will be personally affected by the conflict, and the expected aggregate cost of the conflict. Increased costs are thought to cause the public to be more critical of the use of military force. But do they? We gain leverage on this question in the US context by employing a survey experiment that allows us both to compare reactions to a range of manpower policies—an all-volunteer standing force, conscription, and mobilization of the reserves—and to explicitly test multiple mechanisms—expectations of bearing personal cost, expectations of aggregate cost, and effects not explained by these cost expectations. Our results strongly suggest that manpower policies’ effects are not straightforward. Consistent with previous studies, we find that an expectation of conscription lowers public support for military action. Mobilization of the reserves, however, fails to diminish support, despite the fact that it should also affect more people and signal a larger conflict. While casualty estimates (proxy for scale) are negatively correlated with mission support, personal cost expectations are not. Furthermore, much of the variation between manpower treatments is not explained by either tested cost mechanism, suggesting a role for norms and values. These findings have implications for whether military manpower policies designed to impose political costs on policymakers are likely to work and for wider discussions of public support for military operations.
{"title":"Citizens to Soldiers: Mobilization, Cost Perceptions, and Support for Military Action","authors":"Jessica D. Blankshain, Lindsay P. Cohn, D. Kriner","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Policymakers have long assumed, and scholars have long argued, that how a government raises military manpower affects public support for military action through two obvious mechanisms: the likelihood any given individual will be personally affected by the conflict, and the expected aggregate cost of the conflict. Increased costs are thought to cause the public to be more critical of the use of military force. But do they? We gain leverage on this question in the US context by employing a survey experiment that allows us both to compare reactions to a range of manpower policies—an all-volunteer standing force, conscription, and mobilization of the reserves—and to explicitly test multiple mechanisms—expectations of bearing personal cost, expectations of aggregate cost, and effects not explained by these cost expectations. Our results strongly suggest that manpower policies’ effects are not straightforward. Consistent with previous studies, we find that an expectation of conscription lowers public support for military action. Mobilization of the reserves, however, fails to diminish support, despite the fact that it should also affect more people and signal a larger conflict. While casualty estimates (proxy for scale) are negatively correlated with mission support, personal cost expectations are not. Furthermore, much of the variation between manpower treatments is not explained by either tested cost mechanism, suggesting a role for norms and values. These findings have implications for whether military manpower policies designed to impose political costs on policymakers are likely to work and for wider discussions of public support for military operations.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76765340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cognitive warfare—controlling others’ mental states and behaviors by manipulating environmental stimuli—is a significant and ever-evolving issue in global conflict and security, especially during the COVID-19 crisis. In this article, we aim to contribute to the field by proposing a two-dimensional framework to evaluate China's cognitive warfare and explore promising ways of counteracting it. We first define the problem by clarifying relevant concepts and then present a case study of China's attack on Taiwan. Next, based on predictive coding theory from the cognitive sciences, we offer a framework to explain how China's cognitive warfare works and to what extent it succeeds. We argue that this framework helps identify vulnerable targets and better explains some of the conflicting data in the literature. Finally, based on the framework, we predict China's strategy and discuss Taiwan's options in terms of cognitive and structural interventions.
{"title":"How China's Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan's Anti-Disinformation Wars","authors":"Tzu-Chieh Hung, Tzu-wei Hung","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Cognitive warfare—controlling others’ mental states and behaviors by manipulating environmental stimuli—is a significant and ever-evolving issue in global conflict and security, especially during the COVID-19 crisis. In this article, we aim to contribute to the field by proposing a two-dimensional framework to evaluate China's cognitive warfare and explore promising ways of counteracting it. We first define the problem by clarifying relevant concepts and then present a case study of China's attack on Taiwan. Next, based on predictive coding theory from the cognitive sciences, we offer a framework to explain how China's cognitive warfare works and to what extent it succeeds. We argue that this framework helps identify vulnerable targets and better explains some of the conflicting data in the literature. Finally, based on the framework, we predict China's strategy and discuss Taiwan's options in terms of cognitive and structural interventions.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85202463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
At the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council broadened its view on what constitutes a “threat to international peace and security.” With the rise of the concept of human security and increased focus on human rights, the Council has been more willing to act in response to domestic political issues such as human rights abuses. Despite an increased commitment to human security, the Council's attention on these issues has been uneven. What determines whose rights capture the Council's attention? What role do efforts by NGOs to “name and shame” play in the setting of the Council's agenda? We find that human rights abuses lead to countries being placed on the Council's agenda, but human rights organization naming and shaming results in more action by the Council—in terms of both meetings held and resolutions passed.
{"title":"The United Nations Security Council and Human Rights: Who Ends Up in the Spotlight?","authors":"S. Allen, Sam R. Bell","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 At the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council broadened its view on what constitutes a “threat to international peace and security.” With the rise of the concept of human security and increased focus on human rights, the Council has been more willing to act in response to domestic political issues such as human rights abuses. Despite an increased commitment to human security, the Council's attention on these issues has been uneven. What determines whose rights capture the Council's attention? What role do efforts by NGOs to “name and shame” play in the setting of the Council's agenda? We find that human rights abuses lead to countries being placed on the Council's agenda, but human rights organization naming and shaming results in more action by the Council—in terms of both meetings held and resolutions passed.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88996796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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