{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab035","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88426263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"State Compliance and the Track Record of International Security Institutions: Evidence from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime","authors":"J. Kaplow","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90226064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars expect operational compromises by humanitarian organizations to follow attacks on aid workers. However, in response to the War in Syria, organizations compromised aid and adopted clandestine, cross-border, remote management, and conflict-actor aligned approaches, which best protected international aid workers. This was despite declining rates of attack against them, relative to their national staff counterparts. This article asks why international aid workers were withdrawn and aid was compromised in the wake of the Arab Uprisings by traditional risk-taking organizations: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Drawing on political ethnography and interviews with aid workers, I show that shocking violent events, everyday insecurity, and changes in the nature of threat have significant effect on threat perception and explain compromises where rates of attack do not. This paper offers a picture of the micro- and field-level foundations of organizational threat perception and decisions about whose security matters.
{"title":"Compromising Aid to Protect International Staff: The Politics of Humanitarian Threat Perception after the Arab Uprisings","authors":"E. Scott","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scholars expect operational compromises by humanitarian organizations to follow attacks on aid workers. However, in response to the War in Syria, organizations compromised aid and adopted clandestine, cross-border, remote management, and conflict-actor aligned approaches, which best protected international aid workers. This was despite declining rates of attack against them, relative to their national staff counterparts. This article asks why international aid workers were withdrawn and aid was compromised in the wake of the Arab Uprisings by traditional risk-taking organizations: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Drawing on political ethnography and interviews with aid workers, I show that shocking violent events, everyday insecurity, and changes in the nature of threat have significant effect on threat perception and explain compromises where rates of attack do not. This paper offers a picture of the micro- and field-level foundations of organizational threat perception and decisions about whose security matters.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90302959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Davenport, Babak RezaeeDaryakenari, Reed M. Wood
With few exceptions, prior research on leadership survival focuses largely on state institutional characteristics or economic context. We shift this orientation by explicitly considering the important role contentious interactions between the incumbent regime and dissident actors play in determining the duration of leader tenure as well as the manner in which a leader is removed. Specifically, we focus on the severity of the incumbent leader's response to dissident challenges. We contend that the severity of this response represents a critical signal which informs the decisions of specific audiences that ultimately determine the incumbent's survival. To evaluate our argument, we employ detailed information on dissent–repression dynamics and leader survival for a leader-month sample of 69 African and Latin American states between 1990 and 2006. Our results suggest that incumbents are vulnerable to coup d’ état when government repression is perceived as weaker than would normally be expected for a given challenge. By contrast, removal via revolution becomes increasingly likely when repression dramatically exceeds the levels that would normally be warranted given the extant challenge.
{"title":"Tenure through Tyranny? Repression, Dissent, and Leader Removal in Africa and Latin America, 1990–2006","authors":"C. Davenport, Babak RezaeeDaryakenari, Reed M. Wood","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 With few exceptions, prior research on leadership survival focuses largely on state institutional characteristics or economic context. We shift this orientation by explicitly considering the important role contentious interactions between the incumbent regime and dissident actors play in determining the duration of leader tenure as well as the manner in which a leader is removed. Specifically, we focus on the severity of the incumbent leader's response to dissident challenges. We contend that the severity of this response represents a critical signal which informs the decisions of specific audiences that ultimately determine the incumbent's survival. To evaluate our argument, we employ detailed information on dissent–repression dynamics and leader survival for a leader-month sample of 69 African and Latin American states between 1990 and 2006. Our results suggest that incumbents are vulnerable to coup d’ état when government repression is perceived as weaker than would normally be expected for a given challenge. By contrast, removal via revolution becomes increasingly likely when repression dramatically exceeds the levels that would normally be warranted given the extant challenge.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81599295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What types of relationships do armed groups have with states? How do different levels of ties and power relations affect both armed group and government behavior? This article develops a spectrum across which armed group–state relationships can move, focusing on three key types of relationships—delegation, sponsorship, and autonomy. An armed group–state relationship may be classified depending on the degree to which the armed group receives material or security support from a state, whether it pursues the strategic aims of the state, and the balance of power between the armed group and the state. I examine cases and empirical examples of relationships between states and armed groups ranging from criminal organizations to Cold War-era rebels to pro-government and communal militias to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and al-Qaeda. As lines between categories of armed groups and between state and non-state actors are increasingly blurred, the integrated framework enhances our ability to analyze the behavior and liabilities of both armed groups and states and to understand sources of leverage for protecting human rights and resolving conflicts.
{"title":"Delegation, Sponsorship, and Autonomy: An Integrated Framework for Understanding Armed Group–State Relationships","authors":"Kai M. Thaler","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What types of relationships do armed groups have with states? How do different levels of ties and power relations affect both armed group and government behavior? This article develops a spectrum across which armed group–state relationships can move, focusing on three key types of relationships—delegation, sponsorship, and autonomy. An armed group–state relationship may be classified depending on the degree to which the armed group receives material or security support from a state, whether it pursues the strategic aims of the state, and the balance of power between the armed group and the state. I examine cases and empirical examples of relationships between states and armed groups ranging from criminal organizations to Cold War-era rebels to pro-government and communal militias to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and al-Qaeda. As lines between categories of armed groups and between state and non-state actors are increasingly blurred, the integrated framework enhances our ability to analyze the behavior and liabilities of both armed groups and states and to understand sources of leverage for protecting human rights and resolving conflicts.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84017962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A vast body of literature suggests that resource exploitation is linked to armed conflict. However, the role of voluntary internal migration in resource conflict has been overlooked. Does internal migration interact with resource exploitation and contribute to violent conflict in resource-rich regions of multinational states? And if so, how? Using a comparative ethnography approach, I inductively developed a four-part theory based on in-depth ethnographic fieldwork in resource-rich Inner Mongolia, China, before evaluating my theory against empirical evidence from Riau province, Indonesia. In contrast to the current literature that either sidesteps the role of voluntary internal migrants in resource conflict, or portrays them as mere negative externalities of resource exploitation, I show how migrants’ ownership of, and employment in, many of the companies that exploit and destroy local resources have marginalized local people and threatened their lifestyle and economic subsistence. As local elites resort to nativist frames to resist such practices and mobilize local people around these issues, companies hire brutal non-locally born, security guards or thugs to protect their assets, escalating the violence. Finally, states’ reliance on domestic population movements for resource exploitation and national development projects also affects their ability and willingness to intervene in resource conflict, contributing to their protracted nature. This article illustrates the problem with studying resource conflict in isolation from migration dynamics, as the two processes interact with one another, intensifying grievances and providing added motives and opportunities for violence.
{"title":"Internal Migration and Resource Conflict: Evidence from Riau, Indonesia","authors":"Isabelle Côté","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A vast body of literature suggests that resource exploitation is linked to armed conflict. However, the role of voluntary internal migration in resource conflict has been overlooked. Does internal migration interact with resource exploitation and contribute to violent conflict in resource-rich regions of multinational states? And if so, how? Using a comparative ethnography approach, I inductively developed a four-part theory based on in-depth ethnographic fieldwork in resource-rich Inner Mongolia, China, before evaluating my theory against empirical evidence from Riau province, Indonesia. In contrast to the current literature that either sidesteps the role of voluntary internal migrants in resource conflict, or portrays them as mere negative externalities of resource exploitation, I show how migrants’ ownership of, and employment in, many of the companies that exploit and destroy local resources have marginalized local people and threatened their lifestyle and economic subsistence. As local elites resort to nativist frames to resist such practices and mobilize local people around these issues, companies hire brutal non-locally born, security guards or thugs to protect their assets, escalating the violence. Finally, states’ reliance on domestic population movements for resource exploitation and national development projects also affects their ability and willingness to intervene in resource conflict, contributing to their protracted nature. This article illustrates the problem with studying resource conflict in isolation from migration dynamics, as the two processes interact with one another, intensifying grievances and providing added motives and opportunities for violence.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"99 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81365616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While social pressures have long been a theme in the targeting scholarship, this article develops and evaluates a theory for how social forces affect militant groups’ tactical choices to target civilians. It first identifies a class of groups that exhibit community ties, which occur when a group operates in proximity to a referent society that is geographically concentrated and comprised of dense social networks. Through observable indicators of endorsement and condemnation to their tactics, groups gain information and are subjected to normative pressures from community members, which constrain their leaders’ willingness to harm civilians. The argument is evaluated through within-case process tracing in qualitative case studies of the Provisional IRA during the Troubles and Palestinian Hamas in the 1990s. The findings demonstrate that both groups modified their tactics in conformity with social pressures, even when it was costly and contrary to their ideology, strategic, and organizational goals.
{"title":"Tying the Hands of Militants: Civilian Targeting and Societal Pressures in the Provisional IRA and Palestinian Hamas","authors":"Risa A. Brooks","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 While social pressures have long been a theme in the targeting scholarship, this article develops and evaluates a theory for how social forces affect militant groups’ tactical choices to target civilians. It first identifies a class of groups that exhibit community ties, which occur when a group operates in proximity to a referent society that is geographically concentrated and comprised of dense social networks. Through observable indicators of endorsement and condemnation to their tactics, groups gain information and are subjected to normative pressures from community members, which constrain their leaders’ willingness to harm civilians. The argument is evaluated through within-case process tracing in qualitative case studies of the Provisional IRA during the Troubles and Palestinian Hamas in the 1990s. The findings demonstrate that both groups modified their tactics in conformity with social pressures, even when it was costly and contrary to their ideology, strategic, and organizational goals.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89423398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the excessive epistemic narrowing of debate about lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), and specifically the concept of meaningful human control, which has emerged as central to regulatory debates in both the scholarly literature and policy fora. Through reviewing work drawing on international relations, security studies, international law and ethics, and technology policy, I argue all share a common epistemological position. This draws on a philosophical and analytical tradition that is Western and modernist, and places a “meaningful human” at the center of debates over controlling LAWS who reflects archetypes associated with a Western, rational, white, male. This epistemological location, I argue, excludes epistemological perspectives relevant to communities who both are most likely to experience LAWS, because they live in areas where deployment is most likely, and have the greatest experience of the effects of key LAWS precursors, such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Drawing on insights from decolonial approaches, I establish a research agenda that challenges this epistemological closure and looks to relocate debates about meaningful human control over LAWS in research that makes space for far more diverse perspectives on a crucial issue that may shape humankind's common future.
{"title":"Locating LAWS: Lethal Autonomous Weapons, Epistemic Space, and “Meaningful Human” Control","authors":"John Williams","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogab015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper analyzes the excessive epistemic narrowing of debate about lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), and specifically the concept of meaningful human control, which has emerged as central to regulatory debates in both the scholarly literature and policy fora. Through reviewing work drawing on international relations, security studies, international law and ethics, and technology policy, I argue all share a common epistemological position. This draws on a philosophical and analytical tradition that is Western and modernist, and places a “meaningful human” at the center of debates over controlling LAWS who reflects archetypes associated with a Western, rational, white, male. This epistemological location, I argue, excludes epistemological perspectives relevant to communities who both are most likely to experience LAWS, because they live in areas where deployment is most likely, and have the greatest experience of the effects of key LAWS precursors, such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Drawing on insights from decolonial approaches, I establish a research agenda that challenges this epistemological closure and looks to relocate debates about meaningful human control over LAWS in research that makes space for far more diverse perspectives on a crucial issue that may shape humankind's common future.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73984019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper develops a framework for examining the grand strategies of great powers through the use of the role contestation literature. We first identify national role conceptions advocated by leaders and political factions, and then compare them to detect contestation between their favored foreign policy roles. We argue that long-term consensus on certain roles may coalesce into the enduring ingredients of grand strategies, while the existence of a high amount of role contestation between leaders and political factions over roles may suggest foreign policy is guided by more temporary foreign policy beliefs. We explore this argument through an illustrative case of contemporary China. Our findings identify substantial variation between the national role conceptions of China's leaders and their factions over time. Of particular note, we find that (1) President Xi Jinping seems to be experiencing a much higher amount of role contestation within the party on more nationalistic and aggressive roles than his predecessors, and (2) certain roles, such as developer, Tianxia, regional leadership, and internal developer, are very consistent among both leaders and their factions over time such that these roles can be considered as part of China's grand strategy. This study shows how role theory might inform the analysis of grand strategy by offering a means of observing enduring features of grand strategy that could be applied more broadly to other countries.
{"title":"A Role Theory Approach to Grand Strategy: Horizontal Role Contestation and Consensus in the Case of China","authors":"Cagla Demirduzen, Cameron G. Thies","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper develops a framework for examining the grand strategies of great powers through the use of the role contestation literature. We first identify national role conceptions advocated by leaders and political factions, and then compare them to detect contestation between their favored foreign policy roles. We argue that long-term consensus on certain roles may coalesce into the enduring ingredients of grand strategies, while the existence of a high amount of role contestation between leaders and political factions over roles may suggest foreign policy is guided by more temporary foreign policy beliefs. We explore this argument through an illustrative case of contemporary China. Our findings identify substantial variation between the national role conceptions of China's leaders and their factions over time. Of particular note, we find that (1) President Xi Jinping seems to be experiencing a much higher amount of role contestation within the party on more nationalistic and aggressive roles than his predecessors, and (2) certain roles, such as developer, Tianxia, regional leadership, and internal developer, are very consistent among both leaders and their factions over time such that these roles can be considered as part of China's grand strategy. This study shows how role theory might inform the analysis of grand strategy by offering a means of observing enduring features of grand strategy that could be applied more broadly to other countries.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79828277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the testimony of fifty-seven torture victims in Saddam Hussein's Iraq to illustrate the processes by which torture fails to gain true confessions or accurate information. Theoretical analyses have identified several ways in which torture is likely to fail, but this is the first study to examine empirically how this occurs. In the study sample, victims stated that torture frequently led to inaccurate results, with respondents who were guilty of anti-regime activity refusing to confess or give information, innocent victims giving false information and confessions, and guilty victims giving accurate information followed by inaccurate information when the torture continued. The majority of victims stated that they resisted torture and did not confess or give any information. They did so because they knew that the regime relied on confessions to get criminal convictions and because they knew that confessing or providing information would only lead to more torture.
{"title":"How Torture Fails: Evidence of Misinformation from Torture-Induced Confessions in Iraq","authors":"Christopher J. Einolf","doi":"10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the testimony of fifty-seven torture victims in Saddam Hussein's Iraq to illustrate the processes by which torture fails to gain true confessions or accurate information. Theoretical analyses have identified several ways in which torture is likely to fail, but this is the first study to examine empirically how this occurs. In the study sample, victims stated that torture frequently led to inaccurate results, with respondents who were guilty of anti-regime activity refusing to confess or give information, innocent victims giving false information and confessions, and guilty victims giving accurate information followed by inaccurate information when the torture continued. The majority of victims stated that they resisted torture and did not confess or give any information. They did so because they knew that the regime relied on confessions to get criminal convictions and because they knew that confessing or providing information would only lead to more torture.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91070133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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