Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2022.2041969
Erez Firt, M. Hemmo, O. Shenker
ABSTRACT According to the so-called Hempel’s Dilemma, the thesis of physicalism is either false or empty. Our intention in this paper is not to propose a solution to the Dilemma, but rather to argue as follows: to the extent that Hempel’s Dilemma applies to physicalism it equally applies to any theory that gives a deep-structure and changeable account of our experience or of high-level theories. In particular, we will show that it also applies to mind–body dualistic theories. The scope of Hempel’s Dilemma turns out to be very wide: it is a special case of a general sceptical argument against changeable deep-structure theories in and outside science.
{"title":"Hempel’s Dilemma: Not Only for Physicalism*","authors":"Erez Firt, M. Hemmo, O. Shenker","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2022.2041969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2041969","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to the so-called Hempel’s Dilemma, the thesis of physicalism is either false or empty. Our intention in this paper is not to propose a solution to the Dilemma, but rather to argue as follows: to the extent that Hempel’s Dilemma applies to physicalism it equally applies to any theory that gives a deep-structure and changeable account of our experience or of high-level theories. In particular, we will show that it also applies to mind–body dualistic theories. The scope of Hempel’s Dilemma turns out to be very wide: it is a special case of a general sceptical argument against changeable deep-structure theories in and outside science.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44820364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786
V. Matarese
ABSTRACT The paper explores a particular line of objection against wave-function realism. This view, advocated by Bell (1987) and presently defended by Albert (1996), North (2013) and Ney (2016), claims that the quantum wave function is a high-dimensional physical field. Normally, wave-function realism has been criticized for its ontological commitments, which are regarded as empirically unsupportable in principle and as violating empirical coherence. In this paper, I investigate whether there are any methodological arguments for endorsing such an ontology and whether they are sound. In particular, I home in on and discuss three arguments that may be used to support wave-function realism: (i) the argument from laws; (ii) the argument from the complete information of the system; (iii) the argument from explanation. My conclusion is that these arguments do not provide any good methodological grounds for inferring the existence of a high-dimensional physical field from quantum theory.
{"title":"On The Methodological Arguments for Wave−Function Realism","authors":"V. Matarese","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2024786","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper explores a particular line of objection against wave-function realism. This view, advocated by Bell (1987) and presently defended by Albert (1996), North (2013) and Ney (2016), claims that the quantum wave function is a high-dimensional physical field. Normally, wave-function realism has been criticized for its ontological commitments, which are regarded as empirically unsupportable in principle and as violating empirical coherence. In this paper, I investigate whether there are any methodological arguments for endorsing such an ontology and whether they are sound. In particular, I home in on and discuss three arguments that may be used to support wave-function realism: (i) the argument from laws; (ii) the argument from the complete information of the system; (iii) the argument from explanation. My conclusion is that these arguments do not provide any good methodological grounds for inferring the existence of a high-dimensional physical field from quantum theory.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42680534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1978038
Slobodan Perović
ABSTRACT Ian Hacking has argued that the notions of experiment and observation are distinct, not even the opposite ends of a continuum. More recently, other authors have emphasised their continuity, saying it is futile to distinguish between them as they belong on a continuum of epistemic activities. I take a middle road by suggesting that in scientific practice, experiment and observation constitute a continuum, but we can identify methodological and pragmatic aspects that define it, as well as various points on it that meaningfully delineate scientific practices. I explain the implications of the location of research projects on the continuum for scientists’ epistemic responsibilities and their ethical and funding concerns.
{"title":"Observation, Experiment, and Scientific Practice","authors":"Slobodan Perović","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1978038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1978038","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Ian Hacking has argued that the notions of experiment and observation are distinct, not even the opposite ends of a continuum. More recently, other authors have emphasised their continuity, saying it is futile to distinguish between them as they belong on a continuum of epistemic activities. I take a middle road by suggesting that in scientific practice, experiment and observation constitute a continuum, but we can identify methodological and pragmatic aspects that define it, as well as various points on it that meaningfully delineate scientific practices. I explain the implications of the location of research projects on the continuum for scientists’ epistemic responsibilities and their ethical and funding concerns.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42129411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1980650
A. Tympas
For Harry Collins, the key to understanding the limits and prospects of artificial intelligence is ‘context’, that is, the way computers become ‘embedded’ (or fail to do so) in human society. Incre...
{"title":"Artifictional Intelligence: Against Humanity’s Surrender to Computers","authors":"A. Tympas","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1980650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1980650","url":null,"abstract":"For Harry Collins, the key to understanding the limits and prospects of artificial intelligence is ‘context’, that is, the way computers become ‘embedded’ (or fail to do so) in human society. Incre...","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41447716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.2001723
Quentin Ruyant
ABSTRACT I critically examine the assumption that the theoretical structure that varies under theoretical symmetries is redundant and should be eliminated from a metaphysical picture of the universe, following a ‘symmetry to reality’ inference. I do so by analysing the status of coordinate change symmetries taking a pragmatic approach. I argue that coordinate systems function as indexical devices, and play an important pragmatic role for representing concrete physical systems. I examine the implications of considering this pragmatic role seriously, taking what I call a perspectivist stance. My conclusion is that under a perspectivist stance, all symmetries (including local gauge symmetries) potentially have a direct empirical status: they point to dynamical aspects that are invariant under changes of operationalisation, and they constitute a guide not to reality, but to nomology and kinship.
{"title":"Symmetries, Indexicality and the Perspectivist Stance","authors":"Quentin Ruyant","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2001723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2001723","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I critically examine the assumption that the theoretical structure that varies under theoretical symmetries is redundant and should be eliminated from a metaphysical picture of the universe, following a ‘symmetry to reality’ inference. I do so by analysing the status of coordinate change symmetries taking a pragmatic approach. I argue that coordinate systems function as indexical devices, and play an important pragmatic role for representing concrete physical systems. I examine the implications of considering this pragmatic role seriously, taking what I call a perspectivist stance. My conclusion is that under a perspectivist stance, all symmetries (including local gauge symmetries) potentially have a direct empirical status: they point to dynamical aspects that are invariant under changes of operationalisation, and they constitute a guide not to reality, but to nomology and kinship.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49145336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675
A. Venturelli
ABSTRACT I focus on the concept of the receptive field of a sensory neuron, taking it as a prominent case to address conceptual change in the history of neuroscience. I argue for an interpretation of its role and evolution based on the idea, previously rehearsed in the philosophy of biology, of a problem agenda. I claim that the concept's main contribution to visual neuroscience was that of establishing a problem agenda for the early experimental research on visual processing, thus structuring the field's experimental practices and integration between converging scientific fields. I pay particular attention to the research programme led by Hubel and Wiesel, revolving their famous experiments on the cat's visual cortex during the 60s, when receptive field exploration blossomed. I additionally claim that the concept's more recent evolution, witnessing a loss in its definiteness and centrality, can be accommodated by my account.
{"title":"Conceptual Change in Visual Neuroscience: The Receptive Field Concept","authors":"A. Venturelli","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I focus on the concept of the receptive field of a sensory neuron, taking it as a prominent case to address conceptual change in the history of neuroscience. I argue for an interpretation of its role and evolution based on the idea, previously rehearsed in the philosophy of biology, of a problem agenda. I claim that the concept's main contribution to visual neuroscience was that of establishing a problem agenda for the early experimental research on visual processing, thus structuring the field's experimental practices and integration between converging scientific fields. I pay particular attention to the research programme led by Hubel and Wiesel, revolving their famous experiments on the cat's visual cortex during the 60s, when receptive field exploration blossomed. I additionally claim that the concept's more recent evolution, witnessing a loss in its definiteness and centrality, can be accommodated by my account.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45221241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773
V. Kindi
{"title":"Editorial Report 2020","authors":"V. Kindi","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46705595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420
S. Psillos, Lisa Zorzato
{"title":"Against Cognitive Instrumentalism","authors":"S. Psillos, Lisa Zorzato","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45694694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335
F. Boge
ABSTRACT In ‘Reichenbach's cubical universe and the problem of the external world’, Elliott Sober attempts a refutation of solipsism à la Reichenbach. I here contrast Sober's line of argument with observations a hypothetical scientist makes on what is known as the ‘Mermin contraption’ and show that Sober's extension of Reichenbach's argument fails. However, there is a further line of defense against solipsism, endorsed by some interpreters of the quantum theory whose position is otherwise rather close to solipsism. As I shall argue, this line of defense remains viable, but we still fall short of a story in terms of what Reichenbach calls ‘interphenomena’ in the case of the Mermin contraption.
{"title":"Realism Without Interphenomena: Reichenbach's Cube, Sober's Evidential Realism, and Quantum Solipsism","authors":"F. Boge","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In ‘Reichenbach's cubical universe and the problem of the external world’, Elliott Sober attempts a refutation of solipsism à la Reichenbach. I here contrast Sober's line of argument with observations a hypothetical scientist makes on what is known as the ‘Mermin contraption’ and show that Sober's extension of Reichenbach's argument fails. However, there is a further line of defense against solipsism, endorsed by some interpreters of the quantum theory whose position is otherwise rather close to solipsism. As I shall argue, this line of defense remains viable, but we still fall short of a story in terms of what Reichenbach calls ‘interphenomena’ in the case of the Mermin contraption.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47573829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108
Alfonso Palacio-Vera
ABSTRACT ‘Situational Analysis’ (SA) constitutes Popper's methodological proposal for the social sciences. There is an apparent inconsistency in the fact that, on the one hand, Popper maintains that we learn by ‘trial and error-elimination’ and, on the other hand, he declares that his ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) has nothing to do with the epistemic account of rationality implicit in his ‘evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning’. We claim that the most likely reason Popper makes such claim is that his formulation of SA is better interpreted as an extension of his view of the ‘method’ of history to the theoretical social sciences. In light of it we argue that the implementation of SA in the latter may require the adoption of an expanded ‘Rationality Principle’ (ERP) whereby scientists assume that individual actors exhibit both practical and epistemic rationality. We identify two variants of SA we denote as SA1 and SA2 according to whether they are grounded on ERP or RP respectively and discuss some approaches in the social sciences that are representative of each of them. We conclude that the adoption of ERP helps mitigating the absence of social interaction in Popper's formulation of SA.
{"title":"Popper's ‘Rationality Principle’ and ‘Epistemic’ Rationality: an Attempt at Reconciliation","authors":"Alfonso Palacio-Vera","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT ‘Situational Analysis’ (SA) constitutes Popper's methodological proposal for the social sciences. There is an apparent inconsistency in the fact that, on the one hand, Popper maintains that we learn by ‘trial and error-elimination’ and, on the other hand, he declares that his ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) has nothing to do with the epistemic account of rationality implicit in his ‘evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning’. We claim that the most likely reason Popper makes such claim is that his formulation of SA is better interpreted as an extension of his view of the ‘method’ of history to the theoretical social sciences. In light of it we argue that the implementation of SA in the latter may require the adoption of an expanded ‘Rationality Principle’ (ERP) whereby scientists assume that individual actors exhibit both practical and epistemic rationality. We identify two variants of SA we denote as SA1 and SA2 according to whether they are grounded on ERP or RP respectively and discuss some approaches in the social sciences that are representative of each of them. We conclude that the adoption of ERP helps mitigating the absence of social interaction in Popper's formulation of SA.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42395603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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