Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675
A. Venturelli
ABSTRACT I focus on the concept of the receptive field of a sensory neuron, taking it as a prominent case to address conceptual change in the history of neuroscience. I argue for an interpretation of its role and evolution based on the idea, previously rehearsed in the philosophy of biology, of a problem agenda. I claim that the concept's main contribution to visual neuroscience was that of establishing a problem agenda for the early experimental research on visual processing, thus structuring the field's experimental practices and integration between converging scientific fields. I pay particular attention to the research programme led by Hubel and Wiesel, revolving their famous experiments on the cat's visual cortex during the 60s, when receptive field exploration blossomed. I additionally claim that the concept's more recent evolution, witnessing a loss in its definiteness and centrality, can be accommodated by my account.
{"title":"Conceptual Change in Visual Neuroscience: The Receptive Field Concept","authors":"A. Venturelli","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I focus on the concept of the receptive field of a sensory neuron, taking it as a prominent case to address conceptual change in the history of neuroscience. I argue for an interpretation of its role and evolution based on the idea, previously rehearsed in the philosophy of biology, of a problem agenda. I claim that the concept's main contribution to visual neuroscience was that of establishing a problem agenda for the early experimental research on visual processing, thus structuring the field's experimental practices and integration between converging scientific fields. I pay particular attention to the research programme led by Hubel and Wiesel, revolving their famous experiments on the cat's visual cortex during the 60s, when receptive field exploration blossomed. I additionally claim that the concept's more recent evolution, witnessing a loss in its definiteness and centrality, can be accommodated by my account.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"34 1","pages":"41 - 57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45221241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773
V. Kindi
{"title":"Editorial Report 2020","authors":"V. Kindi","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"259 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46705595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420
S. Psillos, Lisa Zorzato
{"title":"Against Cognitive Instrumentalism","authors":"S. Psillos, Lisa Zorzato","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"247 - 257"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45694694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335
F. Boge
ABSTRACT In ‘Reichenbach's cubical universe and the problem of the external world’, Elliott Sober attempts a refutation of solipsism à la Reichenbach. I here contrast Sober's line of argument with observations a hypothetical scientist makes on what is known as the ‘Mermin contraption’ and show that Sober's extension of Reichenbach's argument fails. However, there is a further line of defense against solipsism, endorsed by some interpreters of the quantum theory whose position is otherwise rather close to solipsism. As I shall argue, this line of defense remains viable, but we still fall short of a story in terms of what Reichenbach calls ‘interphenomena’ in the case of the Mermin contraption.
{"title":"Realism Without Interphenomena: Reichenbach's Cube, Sober's Evidential Realism, and Quantum Solipsism","authors":"F. Boge","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In ‘Reichenbach's cubical universe and the problem of the external world’, Elliott Sober attempts a refutation of solipsism à la Reichenbach. I here contrast Sober's line of argument with observations a hypothetical scientist makes on what is known as the ‘Mermin contraption’ and show that Sober's extension of Reichenbach's argument fails. However, there is a further line of defense against solipsism, endorsed by some interpreters of the quantum theory whose position is otherwise rather close to solipsism. As I shall argue, this line of defense remains viable, but we still fall short of a story in terms of what Reichenbach calls ‘interphenomena’ in the case of the Mermin contraption.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"231 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47573829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108
Alfonso Palacio-Vera
ABSTRACT ‘Situational Analysis’ (SA) constitutes Popper's methodological proposal for the social sciences. There is an apparent inconsistency in the fact that, on the one hand, Popper maintains that we learn by ‘trial and error-elimination’ and, on the other hand, he declares that his ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) has nothing to do with the epistemic account of rationality implicit in his ‘evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning’. We claim that the most likely reason Popper makes such claim is that his formulation of SA is better interpreted as an extension of his view of the ‘method’ of history to the theoretical social sciences. In light of it we argue that the implementation of SA in the latter may require the adoption of an expanded ‘Rationality Principle’ (ERP) whereby scientists assume that individual actors exhibit both practical and epistemic rationality. We identify two variants of SA we denote as SA1 and SA2 according to whether they are grounded on ERP or RP respectively and discuss some approaches in the social sciences that are representative of each of them. We conclude that the adoption of ERP helps mitigating the absence of social interaction in Popper's formulation of SA.
{"title":"Popper's ‘Rationality Principle’ and ‘Epistemic’ Rationality: an Attempt at Reconciliation","authors":"Alfonso Palacio-Vera","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT ‘Situational Analysis’ (SA) constitutes Popper's methodological proposal for the social sciences. There is an apparent inconsistency in the fact that, on the one hand, Popper maintains that we learn by ‘trial and error-elimination’ and, on the other hand, he declares that his ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) has nothing to do with the epistemic account of rationality implicit in his ‘evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning’. We claim that the most likely reason Popper makes such claim is that his formulation of SA is better interpreted as an extension of his view of the ‘method’ of history to the theoretical social sciences. In light of it we argue that the implementation of SA in the latter may require the adoption of an expanded ‘Rationality Principle’ (ERP) whereby scientists assume that individual actors exhibit both practical and epistemic rationality. We identify two variants of SA we denote as SA1 and SA2 according to whether they are grounded on ERP or RP respectively and discuss some approaches in the social sciences that are representative of each of them. We conclude that the adoption of ERP helps mitigating the absence of social interaction in Popper's formulation of SA.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"195 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42395603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845
D. Trafimow
ABSTRACT Both naïve and sophisticated falsification arguments depend upon using the logic of modus tollens to employ empirical defeats to conclude that the theory is not true (naïve falsification) or that the conjunction of theory and auxiliary assumptions is not true (sophisticated falsification). However, both types of modus tollens syllogisms depend strongly on the precise form of the major premise. The present goal is to introduce a taxonomy of four types of major premises: positive frame, negative frame, positive-negative frame, and negative-positive frame. For two frames, falsification really is logically superior to verification, but for two other frames, verification is logically superior to falsification. Thus, there is no overall logical basis for preferring falsification to verification or for preferring verification to falsification. Nor are there convincing arguments from Bayesian statistical, frequentist statistical, or empirical standpoints. Thus, the attraction of falsification, whether naïve or sophisticated, comes down, in the end, to something other than an objective philosophical account.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1943292
M. Andreoletti
ABSTRACT Nowadays, almost everyone seems to agree that science is facing an epistemological crisis – namely the replicability crisis – and that we need to take action. But as to precisely what to do or how to do it, there are no firm answers. Some scholars argue that the current statistical inferential framework is inadequate and therefore we should focus on improving statistical methods. Some others claim instead that the only way to fix science is to change the scientific reward system, promoting quality rather than quantity of scientific publications. However, every positive proposal, either methodological or social, has a valid counterargument. Here I want to make explicit some reasons for explaining the persistence of disagreement on the solutions to the crisis. Focusing on issues which have been overlooked in the debate might help to better evaluate scientific reforms. With this regard, philosophical knowledge can be mobilised to take action in response to the replicability crisis.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464
S. Parigi
This book is a collection of essays, dealing with one of the most interesting topics in the history of ideas, particularly in the history of theories of visual perception: the question posed by Wil...
这本书是一本散文集，涉及思想史上，特别是视觉感知理论史上最有趣的话题之一：Wil。。。
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Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1951637
Nicholas Danne
ABSTRACT In the debate over whether mathematical facts, properties, or entities explain physical events (in what philosophers call ‘extra-mathematical’ explanations), Aidan Lyon’s (2012) affirmative answer stands out for its employment of the program explanation (PE) methodology of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1990). Juha Saatsi (2012; 2016) objects, however, that Lyon’s examples from the indispensabilist literature are (i) unsuitable for PE, (ii) nominalizable into non-mathematical terms, and (iii) mysterious about the explanatory relation alleged to obtain between the PEs’ mathematical explanantia and physical explananda. In this paper, I propose a counterexample to Saatsi’s objections. My counterexample is Frank Jackson’s (1998a) program explanation for color experience, which I argue needs recasting as an extra-mathematical PE due to its implicit reliance on reflectance, a property that suffers conceptual regress unless redefined with Fourier harmonics. Pace Saatsi, I argue that this recast example is an authoritative PE, non-nominalizable, and minimally esoteric. Important for the indispensability debate at large, moreover, is that my counterexample reifies Fourier harmonics without the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (an argument to which Lyon applies PE as a premise). Indispensabilists have long overlooked the conditionalization of a limited mathematical realism on property realism, and my counterexample to Saatsi exploits this conditionalization.
在关于数学事实、性质或实体是否能解释物理事件(哲学家称之为“非数学”解释)的争论中，Aidan Lyon(2012)的肯定答案因其采用Frank Jackson和Philip Pettit(1990)的程序解释(PE)方法而脱颖而出。Juha Saatsi (2012;然而，Lyon从不可或缺主义文献中举出的例子(i)不适合PE， (ii)可命名为非数学术语，以及(iii) PE的数学解释和物理解释之间据称获得的解释关系是神秘的。在本文中，我提出了一个反例来反驳Saatsi的反对意见。我的反例是Frank Jackson (1998a)对色彩体验的程序解释，我认为它需要重新定义为一个额外的数学PE，因为它隐含地依赖于反射率，除非用傅立叶谐波重新定义，否则反射率会遭受概念上的回归。我认为，这个重塑的例子是一个权威的PE，非名词化的，和最低限度的深奥。此外，对于整个不可或缺性辩论来说，重要的是我的反例在没有增强不可或缺性论证(里昂将PE作为前提的论证)的情况下实现了傅里叶谐波。不可或缺论者长期以来忽视了有限的数学现实主义对财产现实主义的条件化，而我对Saatsi的反例利用了这种条件化。
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Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1950483
Ali Barzegar
ABSTRACT Generally, there are two interpretative approaches to quantum theory: psi-ontic and psi-epistemic. According to the psi-ontic interpretations, quantum theory does/should describe or represent what the world is like. In contrast, according to the psi-epistemic interpretations, rather than representing the way the world is, quantum theory advises us on what to expect from the world and so helps us better navigate our surrounding world. In this paper, we will argue that Edmund Husserl’s philosophy of science especially his notion of lifeworld provides an appropriate framework for better understanding this shift from the psi-ontic to psi-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory. In particular, we analyse Richard Healey’s pragmatic approach to quantum mechanics from a phenomenological point of view.
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