Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1848346
M. D. Beni
ABSTRACT The debate between proponents and opponents of causal foundationalism has recently surfaced as a disparity between causal structuralism and causal anti-foundationalism in the structural realist camp. The paper outlines and dissolves the problem of disparity for (informational) structural realism. I follow John Collier (also Carl T. Bergstrom and Martin Rosvall) to specify causation in terms of the transmission of information. Unlike them, I built upon the reverse quantum data-processing inequality to show how this approach models causation as a symmetric process at the level of fundamental physics (but not special sciences). I show how this suggestion reduces the disparity about causation to a problem of application to diverse contexts.
{"title":"Causal Informational Structural Realism","authors":"M. D. Beni","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1848346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1848346","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The debate between proponents and opponents of causal foundationalism has recently surfaced as a disparity between causal structuralism and causal anti-foundationalism in the structural realist camp. The paper outlines and dissolves the problem of disparity for (informational) structural realism. I follow John Collier (also Carl T. Bergstrom and Martin Rosvall) to specify causation in terms of the transmission of information. Unlike them, I built upon the reverse quantum data-processing inequality to show how this approach models causation as a symmetric process at the level of fundamental physics (but not special sciences). I show how this suggestion reduces the disparity about causation to a problem of application to diverse contexts.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"117 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1848346","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46925351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1888191
Jamie Shaw
ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosing between empirically equal rival theories (Stump 2007. “Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1): 149–159; Ivanova 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1): 58–64; Fairweather 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam (2017). “Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64: 22–29). In this paper, I argue that good sense is irrelevant for theory choice within Duhem’s conception of scientific methodology. Theory choice, for Duhem, is either a pseudo-problem or addressed purely by empirical and formal desiderata depending on how it is understood. I go on to provide a positive interpretation of good sense as a feature of scientific communities that undergo particular forms of education that allow scientists to abandon theory pursuit. I conclude by suggesting that this interpretation entails that virtue epistemological readings of Duhem are insufficient for understanding good sense; we must employ a social epistemological perspective.
{"title":"Duhem on Good Sense and Theory Pursuit: From Virtue to Social Epistemology","authors":"Jamie Shaw","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1888191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1888191","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosing between empirically equal rival theories (Stump 2007. “Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1): 149–159; Ivanova 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1): 58–64; Fairweather 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam (2017). “Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64: 22–29). In this paper, I argue that good sense is irrelevant for theory choice within Duhem’s conception of scientific methodology. Theory choice, for Duhem, is either a pseudo-problem or addressed purely by empirical and formal desiderata depending on how it is understood. I go on to provide a positive interpretation of good sense as a feature of scientific communities that undergo particular forms of education that allow scientists to abandon theory pursuit. I conclude by suggesting that this interpretation entails that virtue epistemological readings of Duhem are insufficient for understanding good sense; we must employ a social epistemological perspective.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"67 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2021.1888191","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43317408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1866478
D. Goldstick
ABSTRACT ‘Simplicity’ comes up in different senses in scientific methodology. The simplicity criterion at issue here is relied on in all inductive inference, it’s argued. Therefore, it cannot be inductively learned—except by learners who already rely on it. The question whether one is warranted in relying on it is indeed in order, but we all are found on the affirmative side of the question in practice. On the one hand, there is arguably an epistemological lesson in this. On the other hand, there is the question what reality must be like objectively for reliance on simplicity to be so apt to pay off when it comes to forecasting the future.
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Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1865784
Vincenzo Politi
ABSTRACT In his mature works, Kuhn abandons the concept of a paradigm and becomes more interested in the analysis of the conceptual structure of scientific theories. These changes are interpreted as resulting from a ‘linguistic turn’ that Kuhn underwent sometimes around the 1980s. Much of the philosophical discussions about Kuhn’s post-‘linguistic turn’ philosophy revolves around his views on taxonomic concepts. Apart from taxonomy, however, the mature Kuhn introduces other concepts, such as conceptual networks and lexicons. This article distinguishes these three concepts and shows that adopting each one of them has different impacts on Kuhn’s model of science. After distinguishing and assessing the concepts of taxonomy, network, and lexicon, it will be argued that the latter not only fits the Kuhnian model of science better, but it also helps capture the wide sense of Kuhn’s early concept of a paradigm.
{"title":"Taxonomies, Networks, and Lexicons: A Study of Kuhn’s Post-‘Linguistic Turn’ Philosophy","authors":"Vincenzo Politi","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1865784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1865784","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In his mature works, Kuhn abandons the concept of a paradigm and becomes more interested in the analysis of the conceptual structure of scientific theories. These changes are interpreted as resulting from a ‘linguistic turn’ that Kuhn underwent sometimes around the 1980s. Much of the philosophical discussions about Kuhn’s post-‘linguistic turn’ philosophy revolves around his views on taxonomic concepts. Apart from taxonomy, however, the mature Kuhn introduces other concepts, such as conceptual networks and lexicons. This article distinguishes these three concepts and shows that adopting each one of them has different impacts on Kuhn’s model of science. After distinguishing and assessing the concepts of taxonomy, network, and lexicon, it will be argued that the latter not only fits the Kuhnian model of science better, but it also helps capture the wide sense of Kuhn’s early concept of a paradigm.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"87 - 103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1865784","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41346158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1795781
David Colaço
Experimental philosophy is a popular (and polarising) approach to addressing philosophical questions. Though not without controversy, this approach has impacted epistemology (Weinberg, Nichols, and...
{"title":"Review of Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Science","authors":"David Colaço","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1795781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1795781","url":null,"abstract":"Experimental philosophy is a popular (and polarising) approach to addressing philosophical questions. Though not without controversy, this approach has impacted epistemology (Weinberg, Nichols, and...","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"57 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1795781","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46438945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1829833
Miranda Nell
Dominic Smith’s Exceptional Technologies has a specific project, a bridge it is hoping to build, between a philosophy of technology which has become too standardised and a continental tradition tha...
{"title":"Exceptional Technologies: A Continental Philosophy of Technology","authors":"Miranda Nell","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1829833","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1829833","url":null,"abstract":"Dominic Smith’s Exceptional Technologies has a specific project, a bridge it is hoping to build, between a philosophy of technology which has become too standardised and a continental tradition tha...","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"62 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1829833","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48164770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1788348
Moti Mizrahi
ABSTRACT It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing (or confirmation) is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are concerned, some emphasize the role of deduction in confirmation (e.g. the H-D method), whereas others emphasize the role of induction in confirmation (e.g. Bayesian theories of confirmation). The aim of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of scientific confirmation (or hypothesis testing) in scientific practice by taking an empirical approach. I propose that it would be illuminating to learn how practicing scientists describe their methods when they test hypotheses and/or theories. I use the tools of data science and corpus linguistics to study patterns of usage in a large corpus of scientific publications mined from the JSTOR database. Overall, the results of this empirical survey suggest that there is an emphasis on mostly the inductive aspects of confirmation in the life sciences and the social sciences, but not in the physical and the formal sciences. The results also point to interesting and significant differences between the scientific subjects within these disciplinary groups that are worth investigating in future studies.
{"title":"Hypothesis Testing in Scientific Practice: An Empirical Study","authors":"Moti Mizrahi","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1788348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1788348","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing (or confirmation) is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are concerned, some emphasize the role of deduction in confirmation (e.g. the H-D method), whereas others emphasize the role of induction in confirmation (e.g. Bayesian theories of confirmation). The aim of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of scientific confirmation (or hypothesis testing) in scientific practice by taking an empirical approach. I propose that it would be illuminating to learn how practicing scientists describe their methods when they test hypotheses and/or theories. I use the tools of data science and corpus linguistics to study patterns of usage in a large corpus of scientific publications mined from the JSTOR database. Overall, the results of this empirical survey suggest that there is an emphasis on mostly the inductive aspects of confirmation in the life sciences and the social sciences, but not in the physical and the formal sciences. The results also point to interesting and significant differences between the scientific subjects within these disciplinary groups that are worth investigating in future studies.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"1 - 21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1788348","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45918443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1796038
M. Andreoletti
Among the philosophies of special sciences, Philosophy of Medicine is an emerging field, even though the relationship between philosophy and medicine dates back to ancient times. Since the 1980s, t...
{"title":"Care & Cure. An Introduction to Philosophy of Medicine","authors":"M. Andreoletti","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1796038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1796038","url":null,"abstract":"Among the philosophies of special sciences, Philosophy of Medicine is an emerging field, even though the relationship between philosophy and medicine dates back to ancient times. Since the 1980s, t...","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"59 - 62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1796038","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44152154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258
S. Hansson
ABSTRACT This is a reply to a comment by Kåre Letrud [Letrud, Kåre. 2019. “The Gordian Knot of Demarcation: Tying Up Some Loose Ends.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (1): 3–11. doi:10.1080/02698595.2019.1618031] on the author's definition of pseudoscience. Pseudosciences are doctrines. An epistemic discipline that is defined solely by its area of study cannot be a pseudoscience, but if a discipline is bound to a doctrine, then it will be pseudoscientific if that doctrine is a pseudoscience. Contrary to most other types of shortcomings in science, pseudoscience involves the sustained promotion of teachings that block or impede the self-correcting and self-improving mechanisms in science. What makes pseudoscience more dangerous than other types of bad science is its doctrinal resistance to correction.
{"title":"Disciplines, Doctrines, and Deviant Science","authors":"S. Hansson","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is a reply to a comment by Kåre Letrud [Letrud, Kåre. 2019. “The Gordian Knot of Demarcation: Tying Up Some Loose Ends.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (1): 3–11. doi:10.1080/02698595.2019.1618031] on the author's definition of pseudoscience. Pseudosciences are doctrines. An epistemic discipline that is defined solely by its area of study cannot be a pseudoscience, but if a discipline is bound to a doctrine, then it will be pseudoscientific if that doctrine is a pseudoscience. Contrary to most other types of shortcomings in science, pseudoscience involves the sustained promotion of teachings that block or impede the self-correcting and self-improving mechanisms in science. What makes pseudoscience more dangerous than other types of bad science is its doctrinal resistance to correction.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"43 - 52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46604405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1813530
James Read
ABSTRACT I draw together some recent literature on the debate between dynamical versus geometrical approaches to spacetime theories, in order to argue that (i) there exist defensible versions of the geometrical approach; (ii) these versions of the geometrical approach can provide constructive explanations (in the sense of Einstein) of dynamical effects; (iii) light can be shed upon different relationalist views about spacetime which have been articulated in the context of this debate by appeal to the distinction between modal versus non-modal relationalism.
{"title":"Geometrical Constructivism and Modal Relationalism: Further Aspects of the Dynamical/Geometrical Debate","authors":"James Read","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1813530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1813530","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I draw together some recent literature on the debate between dynamical versus geometrical approaches to spacetime theories, in order to argue that (i) there exist defensible versions of the geometrical approach; (ii) these versions of the geometrical approach can provide constructive explanations (in the sense of Einstein) of dynamical effects; (iii) light can be shed upon different relationalist views about spacetime which have been articulated in the context of this debate by appeal to the distinction between modal versus non-modal relationalism.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"23 - 41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1813530","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46906271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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