Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845
D. Trafimow
ABSTRACT Both naïve and sophisticated falsification arguments depend upon using the logic of modus tollens to employ empirical defeats to conclude that the theory is not true (naïve falsification) or that the conjunction of theory and auxiliary assumptions is not true (sophisticated falsification). However, both types of modus tollens syllogisms depend strongly on the precise form of the major premise. The present goal is to introduce a taxonomy of four types of major premises: positive frame, negative frame, positive-negative frame, and negative-positive frame. For two frames, falsification really is logically superior to verification, but for two other frames, verification is logically superior to falsification. Thus, there is no overall logical basis for preferring falsification to verification or for preferring verification to falsification. Nor are there convincing arguments from Bayesian statistical, frequentist statistical, or empirical standpoints. Thus, the attraction of falsification, whether naïve or sophisticated, comes down, in the end, to something other than an objective philosophical account.
{"title":"A Taxonomy of Major Premises and Implications for Falsification and Verification","authors":"D. Trafimow","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Both naïve and sophisticated falsification arguments depend upon using the logic of modus tollens to employ empirical defeats to conclude that the theory is not true (naïve falsification) or that the conjunction of theory and auxiliary assumptions is not true (sophisticated falsification). However, both types of modus tollens syllogisms depend strongly on the precise form of the major premise. The present goal is to introduce a taxonomy of four types of major premises: positive frame, negative frame, positive-negative frame, and negative-positive frame. For two frames, falsification really is logically superior to verification, but for two other frames, verification is logically superior to falsification. Thus, there is no overall logical basis for preferring falsification to verification or for preferring verification to falsification. Nor are there convincing arguments from Bayesian statistical, frequentist statistical, or empirical standpoints. Thus, the attraction of falsification, whether naïve or sophisticated, comes down, in the end, to something other than an objective philosophical account.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45696916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1943292
M. Andreoletti
ABSTRACT Nowadays, almost everyone seems to agree that science is facing an epistemological crisis – namely the replicability crisis – and that we need to take action. But as to precisely what to do or how to do it, there are no firm answers. Some scholars argue that the current statistical inferential framework is inadequate and therefore we should focus on improving statistical methods. Some others claim instead that the only way to fix science is to change the scientific reward system, promoting quality rather than quantity of scientific publications. However, every positive proposal, either methodological or social, has a valid counterargument. Here I want to make explicit some reasons for explaining the persistence of disagreement on the solutions to the crisis. Focusing on issues which have been overlooked in the debate might help to better evaluate scientific reforms. With this regard, philosophical knowledge can be mobilised to take action in response to the replicability crisis.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464
S. Parigi
This book is a collection of essays, dealing with one of the most interesting topics in the history of ideas, particularly in the history of theories of visual perception: the question posed by Wil...
这本书是一本散文集，涉及思想史上，特别是视觉感知理论史上最有趣的话题之一：Wil。。。
{"title":"Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy","authors":"S. Parigi","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464","url":null,"abstract":"This book is a collection of essays, dealing with one of the most interesting topics in the history of ideas, particularly in the history of theories of visual perception: the question posed by Wil...","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47441846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1950483
Ali Barzegar
ABSTRACT Generally, there are two interpretative approaches to quantum theory: psi-ontic and psi-epistemic. According to the psi-ontic interpretations, quantum theory does/should describe or represent what the world is like. In contrast, according to the psi-epistemic interpretations, rather than representing the way the world is, quantum theory advises us on what to expect from the world and so helps us better navigate our surrounding world. In this paper, we will argue that Edmund Husserl’s philosophy of science especially his notion of lifeworld provides an appropriate framework for better understanding this shift from the psi-ontic to psi-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory. In particular, we analyse Richard Healey’s pragmatic approach to quantum mechanics from a phenomenological point of view.
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Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1951637
Nicholas Danne
ABSTRACT In the debate over whether mathematical facts, properties, or entities explain physical events (in what philosophers call ‘extra-mathematical’ explanations), Aidan Lyon’s (2012) affirmative answer stands out for its employment of the program explanation (PE) methodology of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1990). Juha Saatsi (2012; 2016) objects, however, that Lyon’s examples from the indispensabilist literature are (i) unsuitable for PE, (ii) nominalizable into non-mathematical terms, and (iii) mysterious about the explanatory relation alleged to obtain between the PEs’ mathematical explanantia and physical explananda. In this paper, I propose a counterexample to Saatsi’s objections. My counterexample is Frank Jackson’s (1998a) program explanation for color experience, which I argue needs recasting as an extra-mathematical PE due to its implicit reliance on reflectance, a property that suffers conceptual regress unless redefined with Fourier harmonics. Pace Saatsi, I argue that this recast example is an authoritative PE, non-nominalizable, and minimally esoteric. Important for the indispensability debate at large, moreover, is that my counterexample reifies Fourier harmonics without the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (an argument to which Lyon applies PE as a premise). Indispensabilists have long overlooked the conditionalization of a limited mathematical realism on property realism, and my counterexample to Saatsi exploits this conditionalization.
在关于数学事实、性质或实体是否能解释物理事件(哲学家称之为“非数学”解释)的争论中，Aidan Lyon(2012)的肯定答案因其采用Frank Jackson和Philip Pettit(1990)的程序解释(PE)方法而脱颖而出。Juha Saatsi (2012;然而，Lyon从不可或缺主义文献中举出的例子(i)不适合PE， (ii)可命名为非数学术语，以及(iii) PE的数学解释和物理解释之间据称获得的解释关系是神秘的。在本文中，我提出了一个反例来反驳Saatsi的反对意见。我的反例是Frank Jackson (1998a)对色彩体验的程序解释，我认为它需要重新定义为一个额外的数学PE，因为它隐含地依赖于反射率，除非用傅立叶谐波重新定义，否则反射率会遭受概念上的回归。我认为，这个重塑的例子是一个权威的PE，非名词化的，和最低限度的深奥。此外，对于整个不可或缺性辩论来说，重要的是我的反例在没有增强不可或缺性论证(里昂将PE作为前提的论证)的情况下实现了傅里叶谐波。不可或缺论者长期以来忽视了有限的数学现实主义对财产现实主义的条件化，而我对Saatsi的反例利用了这种条件化。
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Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1888191
Jamie Shaw
ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosing between empirically equal rival theories (Stump 2007. “Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1): 149–159; Ivanova 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1): 58–64; Fairweather 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam (2017). “Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64: 22–29). In this paper, I argue that good sense is irrelevant for theory choice within Duhem’s conception of scientific methodology. Theory choice, for Duhem, is either a pseudo-problem or addressed purely by empirical and formal desiderata depending on how it is understood. I go on to provide a positive interpretation of good sense as a feature of scientific communities that undergo particular forms of education that allow scientists to abandon theory pursuit. I conclude by suggesting that this interpretation entails that virtue epistemological readings of Duhem are insufficient for understanding good sense; we must employ a social epistemological perspective.
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Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1848346
M. D. Beni
ABSTRACT The debate between proponents and opponents of causal foundationalism has recently surfaced as a disparity between causal structuralism and causal anti-foundationalism in the structural realist camp. The paper outlines and dissolves the problem of disparity for (informational) structural realism. I follow John Collier (also Carl T. Bergstrom and Martin Rosvall) to specify causation in terms of the transmission of information. Unlike them, I built upon the reverse quantum data-processing inequality to show how this approach models causation as a symmetric process at the level of fundamental physics (but not special sciences). I show how this suggestion reduces the disparity about causation to a problem of application to diverse contexts.
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Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1866478
D. Goldstick
ABSTRACT ‘Simplicity’ comes up in different senses in scientific methodology. The simplicity criterion at issue here is relied on in all inductive inference, it’s argued. Therefore, it cannot be inductively learned—except by learners who already rely on it. The question whether one is warranted in relying on it is indeed in order, but we all are found on the affirmative side of the question in practice. On the one hand, there is arguably an epistemological lesson in this. On the other hand, there is the question what reality must be like objectively for reliance on simplicity to be so apt to pay off when it comes to forecasting the future.
{"title":"De Facto and De Jure in the Practice of Induction","authors":"D. Goldstick","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1866478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1866478","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT ‘Simplicity’ comes up in different senses in scientific methodology. The simplicity criterion at issue here is relied on in all inductive inference, it’s argued. Therefore, it cannot be inductively learned—except by learners who already rely on it. The question whether one is warranted in relying on it is indeed in order, but we all are found on the affirmative side of the question in practice. On the one hand, there is arguably an epistemological lesson in this. On the other hand, there is the question what reality must be like objectively for reliance on simplicity to be so apt to pay off when it comes to forecasting the future.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1866478","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45115522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1865784
Vincenzo Politi
ABSTRACT In his mature works, Kuhn abandons the concept of a paradigm and becomes more interested in the analysis of the conceptual structure of scientific theories. These changes are interpreted as resulting from a ‘linguistic turn’ that Kuhn underwent sometimes around the 1980s. Much of the philosophical discussions about Kuhn’s post-‘linguistic turn’ philosophy revolves around his views on taxonomic concepts. Apart from taxonomy, however, the mature Kuhn introduces other concepts, such as conceptual networks and lexicons. This article distinguishes these three concepts and shows that adopting each one of them has different impacts on Kuhn’s model of science. After distinguishing and assessing the concepts of taxonomy, network, and lexicon, it will be argued that the latter not only fits the Kuhnian model of science better, but it also helps capture the wide sense of Kuhn’s early concept of a paradigm.
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Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1795781
David Colaço
Experimental philosophy is a popular (and polarising) approach to addressing philosophical questions. Though not without controversy, this approach has impacted epistemology (Weinberg, Nichols, and...
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