Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1784585
T. Arabatzis
As indicated by its title, this book provides an overview of philosophy of science in the twentieth century. It focuses mostly on post-WWII philosophy of science, but it discusses earlier developme...
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Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1767893
T. Grammenos
{"title":"Metaphysical experiments – Physics and the invention of the universe","authors":"T. Grammenos","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1767893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1767893","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"232 - 234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1767893","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46673019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1814040
V. Kindi
{"title":"Editorial Report 2019","authors":"V. Kindi","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2019.1814040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2019.1814040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"235 - 236"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2019.1814040","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49564506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1767890
C. Howson
ABSTRACT Kripke's theory of partial truth offers a natural solution of the Liar paradox and an appealing explanation of why the Liar sentence seems to lack definite content. It seems vulnerable, however, to the objection that it cannot state important facts about partial truth. I point out that the same vulnerability infects the quantum logic developed by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann, among others. It is often claimed that the only way to record these facts is within a classical metalanguage, but Kripke showed that the same language can function both as the language of partial truth and also as a classically bivalent language. An explanation of why we need a classical explanation of a non-classical system was advanced in the context of quantum mechanics by Niels Bohr, and it applies also, I argue, to the partial truth situation.
摘要克里普克的部分真理理论为说者悖论提供了一个自然的解决方案，并对为什么说者句子似乎缺乏明确的内容做出了有吸引力的解释。然而，它似乎很容易受到反对，即它不能陈述关于部分真相的重要事实。我指出，同样的漏洞也感染了Garrett Birkhoff和John von Neumann等人开发的量子逻辑。人们经常声称，记录这些事实的唯一方法是在古典元语言中，但克里普克表明，同一种语言既可以作为部分真理的语言，也可以作为经典的二价语言。尼尔斯·玻尔在量子力学的背景下提出了一种解释，解释为什么我们需要对非经典系统进行经典解释，我认为这也适用于部分真理的情况。
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Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1767891
A. Fasce
ABSTRACT In this article, I develop a philosophical framework, or ‘metacriterion’, for the demarcation of pseudoscience. Firstly, ‘gradualist demarcation’ is discussed in depth, considering an approach to the demarcation problem that presupposes the existence of a spectrum between science and pseudoscience; six general problems are found by means of this analysis. Secondly, based on the subsequent discussion of these problems, a discriminant metacriterion composed of four philosophical requirements is proposed. Lastly, it is shown that this metacriterion is able to guide the development of a workable and well-founded demarcation criterion for pseudoscience.
{"title":"Are Pseudosciences Like Seagulls? A Discriminant Metacriterion Facilitates the Solution of the Demarcation Problem","authors":"A. Fasce","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1767891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1767891","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, I develop a philosophical framework, or ‘metacriterion’, for the demarcation of pseudoscience. Firstly, ‘gradualist demarcation’ is discussed in depth, considering an approach to the demarcation problem that presupposes the existence of a spectrum between science and pseudoscience; six general problems are found by means of this analysis. Secondly, based on the subsequent discussion of these problems, a discriminant metacriterion composed of four philosophical requirements is proposed. Lastly, it is shown that this metacriterion is able to guide the development of a workable and well-founded demarcation criterion for pseudoscience.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"155 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1767891","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46260334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1768014
William Peden
ABSTRACT Philosophers such as Goodman (1954), Scheffler (1963) and Glymour (1983) aim to answer the Paradox of the Ravens by distinguishing between confirmation simpliciter and selective confirmation. The latter evidential relation occurs when data not only confirms a hypothesis, but also disconfirms one of its ‘rival’ hypotheses. The appearance of paradox is allegedly due to a conflation of valid intuitions about selective confirmation with our intuitions about confirmation simpliciter. Theories of evidence, like the standard Bayesian analysis, should only be understood as explications of confirmation simpliciter; when we disambiguate between selective confirmation and confirmation simpliciter, there is no longer a paradox from these theories. Bandyopadhyay and Brittan (2006) have revived this answer within a sophisticated Bayesian analysis of confirmation and severe testing. I argue that, despite the attractive features of the Selective Confirmation Answer, there is no analysis of this evidential relation that satisfactorily answers the Paradox of the Ravens, and the prospects for any answer along these lines are bleak. We must look elsewhere.
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Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1788347
C. DesRoches
ABSTRACT Ecological economics is an interdisciplinary science that is primarily concerned with developing interventions to achieve sustainable ecological and economic systems. While ecological economists have, over the last few decades, made various empirical, theoretical, and conceptual advancements, there is one concept in particular that remains subject to confusion: critical natural capital. While critical natural capital denotes parts of the environment that are essential for the continued existence of our species, the meaning of terms commonly associated with this concept, such as ‘non-substitutable’ and ‘impossible to substitute,’ require a clearer formulation then they tend to receive. With the help of equations and graphs, this article develops new definite account of critical natural capital that makes explicit what it means for objective environmental conditions to be essential for continued existence. The second main part of this article turns to the question of formally modelling the priority of conserving critical natural capital. While some ecological economists have maintained that, beyond a certain threshold, critical natural capital possesses absolute infinite value, absolute infinite utility models encounter significant problems. This article shows that a relative infinite utility model provides a better way to model the priority of conserving critical natural capital.
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Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1704615
Manuel Pérez Otero
ABSTRACT I present some puzzling cases regarding knowledge and its relation to rational credence. They seem to entail a failure of an apparently correct principle: (a) if S knows P, then the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. The cases at issue involve the following two conflicting facts, relative to a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context. Firstly, some people have a very strong intuition that: (b) S has perceptual knowledge of P. Secondly, all of us, when reflecting on the relevant data, have a very strong intuition for this other thesis: (c) the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. The cases seem to be instances of the base-rate fallacy, so that—apparently—the subject would be irrational if she believed proposition P. My main aim here is to present the puzzle. But, I also provide a solution for it that preserves thesis (b) without renouncing Bayesian epistemology, which is the basis for thesis (c).
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Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1767892
Tomoji Shogenji
{"title":"Hume’s Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction","authors":"Tomoji Shogenji","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1767892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1767892","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"229 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2020.1767892","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47174765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2019.1644722
M. Carrier, J. Lenhard
ABSTRACT The paper discusses modelling uncertainties in climate models and how they can be addressed based on physical principles as well as based on how the models perform in light of empirical data. We argue that the reliability of climate models can be judged by three kinds of standards: striking confirmation, supplementing independent causal arguments, and judging the causal core of models by establishing model robustness. We also use model robustness for delimiting confirmational holism. We survey recent results of climate modelling and identify salient results that fulfil each of the three standards. Our conclusion is that climate models can be considered reliable for some qualitative gross features and some long-term tendencies of the climate system as well as for quantitative aspects of some smaller-scale mechanisms. The adequacy of climate models for other purposes is less convincing. Among the latter are probability estimates, in particular, those concerning rare events. On the whole, climate models suffer from important deficits and are difficult to verify, but are still better confirmed and more reliable than parts of the methodological literature suggest.
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