Asian Politics & Policy最新文献

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined by a motive: the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries. This review article considers the motives of one donor, South Korea, with a close reading and comparison of three authoritative texts. It argues that Korean ODA is primarily motivated by increasing status and influence, and supporting the overseas expansion of Korean companies. There is also a contribution from secondary motivations more clearly related to the definition of ODA: humanitarianism and being a good global citizen.

This article explains the role of political parties in influencing a democratic state's international security cooperation policy. It focuses on Japan's expanded security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries pushed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The LDP as the ruling party saw Japan's expanded security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries as an effort to success Abe's “Take Back Japan” campaign and to overperform the previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration. Moreover, Japan was able to expand its security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries because LDP and its junior coalition partner New Komeito, using its preliminary review system in foreign and security policy making, and its stable power in parliament, were able to pass security legislations allowing Japan's to have more security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.

本文解释了政党在影响民主国家的国际安全合作政策方面的作用。本文聚焦于安倍晋三首相领导下的自民党所推动的日本与东南亚国家扩大安全和防御合作。作为执政党的自民党认为，日本扩大与东南亚国家的安全合作是为了实施安倍的“夺回日本”运动，并超越前日本民主党政府。此外，日本能够扩大与东南亚国家的安全合作，这归因于自民党及其初级联盟伙伴（即新公明党）能够通过安全立法，使日本能够与东南亚国家进行更多的安全和防御合作

Este artículo explica el papel de los partidos políticos a la hora de influir en la política de cooperación en materia de seguridad internacional de un estado democrático. Se centra en la ampliación de la cooperación en materia de seguridad y defensa de Japón con los países del sudeste asiático impulsada por el Partido Liberal Democrático (PLD) del primer ministro Abe Shinzo. El PLD, como partido gobernante, vio la ampliación de la cooperación en materia de seguridad de Japón con los países del Sudeste Asiático como un esfuerzo por simplificar la campaña de Abe “Recuperar Japón” y superar a la anterior administración del Partido Demócrata de Japón (PDJ). Además, Japón pudo ampliar su cooperación en materia de seguridad con los países del sudeste asiático porque el PLD y su socio menor de coalición, New Komeito, pudieron aprobar una legislación de seguridad que permitió a Japón tener una mayor cooperación en materia de seguridad y defensa con los países del sudeste asiático.

Even before the presidential election, held on February 14, 2024, Indonesia was already scrutinized for the declining trajectory of its democratization process (Aspinall et al., 2020; Ulum, 2020; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). The Economist Intelligence Unit gives an overall score of 6.3, placing it in 56th place, two places lower than its previous position (EIU Report, 2024). Freedom House places the country under the “partly free” category, scoring 58 out of 100 (Freedom House, 2024). Prodemocracy groups predicted possibility of electoral fraud. The most noteworthy was the release of the documentary “Dirty Vote” on YouTube 3 days before the election (PSHK Indonesia, 2024), which presented three legal scholars/activists exposing signals of electoral fraud committed by the three presidential candidates (Anies Baswedan, Prabowo Subianto, and Ganjar Pranowo) and their teams. However, they mainly directed their criticism at Prabowo Subianto. Thus, when he won the election with 58.58% of the votes, countless voices of disappointment emerged. Activists and academia declared their concerns for the future of Indonesia's democracy.

Why and how politicians violated laws and norms to falsify electoral outcomes constitute indeed a set of topics of importance. Understanding it is not only essential to the history of many democratic systems but also to shed light on political behaviors and their sociological aspects (Molina & Lehoucq, 1999). Unsurprisingly, previous research efforts have identified many structural factors associated with reductions in the integrity of the electoral process. Defined as clandestine efforts to shape election results (Lehoucq, 2003), electoral fraud may include the extent of who is allowed to vote, who is allowed to run, who is allowed to win, and the presence or absence of repression during the process (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009).

Elections present a space for contestation through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and even defeat incumbents (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Elite coalitions and the opposition may want to reduce their risk of violent removal from office (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). When incumbents perceive that the upcoming election will be tight and the electoral rules are majoritarian, the political risks of the ruling party becoming an absolute loser increase. Under such high uncertainty, limiting political competition is of interest, and electoral misconducts may be part of the incumbents' strategy to survive in power (Ruiz-Rufino, 2018).

Electoral fraud also tends to occur when elections are largely about access to state resources. As the state controls a vast public sector and state-dependent private economy, citizens from all economic strata remain dependent on the state. Here, voters tend to support

In response to public complaints about the chaotic management of donations during the emergency, the site of the first identified COVID-19 case, Wuhan (in central China), underwent a contingent governance transition. And given the public complaints about the disorganized management of donations during the early stage of emergency management in Wuhan in January 2020, local governments initiated a minor governance transition in philanthropy, involving multiple stakeholders such as public and private charities, as well as private enterprises. In contrast to the abundance of literature on governance actors such as the state, the market, and societal actors, this review discusses the changes in governance mechanisms using publicly available data from governmental websites, policy documents, and news reports. It examines a minor governance change in local philanthropy from hierarchical bureaucratic governance to embryotic non-monocentric governance and to expedient collaborative/interactive governance. Moreover, it highlights the yet-to-be institutionalized characteristics of the newly emerging governance models in China, a country where the traditional mode of hierarchical governance is dominant. This article not only adds to the body of evidence on governance failures caused by monocentric bureaucracy, but it also contributes to the literature on public governance transition in China's philanthropic sector and the state-society relations more broadly.

This article investigates how a district administration in Bangladesh managed COVID-19 pandemic risk governance. Interviews were conducted with civil administrators, local government representatives, and representatives from community-based organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The findings indicate that, despite limited health facilities, widespread ignorance of the virus, joblessness among wage earners, economic pressure, and a massive outbreak of COVID-19, the district administration has demonstrated its diligence, professionalism, local knowledge, and promptness in providing optimal public services through coordination and information sharing among all stakeholders. The synergies and coordination between local administration, security forces, and local government representatives were great challenges in implementing nonpharmaceutical polices and support programs.

Australia has historically been a prominent diplomatic partner for the Pacific Island countries, providing development assistance to support their social and economic progress. China gradually heightened its political and economic influence in the Pacific area by integrating the region into its Belt and Road Initiative. This development has encouraged scholars to examine Australia's diplomatic engagements in the Pacific region in response to China's growing presence. This article approaches this issue by using the concept of economic statecraft as an analytical tool. It argues that Australia's reactions to China's presence through the infusion of strategic motivations into foreign aid and the use of multilateral agreements and initiatives can be seen as positive economic statecraft with two characterizations: emulation of China's successful strategies and differentiation from Chinese approaches through the incorporation of multilateral and ideational methods.

历史上，澳大利亚一直是太平洋岛国的重要外交伙伴，提供发展援助以支持其社会和经济进步。中国通过将太平洋地区纳入“一带一路”倡议，逐步提升其在太平洋地区的政治和经济影响力。这一事态发展鼓励学者研究澳大利亚为应对中国日益增长的影响力而在太平洋地区进行的外交活动。通过使用经济治国方略的概念作为分析工具，本文研究了该问题。本文论证，澳大利亚通过在对外援助中注入战略动机以及利用多边协议和倡议来应对中国的影响力，这能被视为积极的经济治国方略，此方略具有两个特点:效仿中国的成功战略，以及通过融入多边方法和理念方法来区别于中国的做法

Históricamente, Australia ha sido un destacado socio diplomático de los países insulares del Pacífico, proporcionando asistencia para el desarrollo para apoyar su progreso social y económico. China aumentó gradualmente su influencia política y económica en el área del Pacífico al integrar la región en su Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta. Este acontecimiento ha alentado a los académicos a examinar los compromisos diplomáticos de Australia en la región del Pacífico en respuesta a la creciente presencia de China. Este artículo aborda esta cuestión utilizando el concepto de arte de gobernar económico como herramienta analítica. El artículo sostiene que las reacciones de Australia a la presencia de China mediante la infusión de motivaciones estratégicas en la ayuda exterior y el uso de acuerdos e iniciativas multilaterales pueden verse como un arte de gobernar económico positivo con dos caracterizaciones: emulación de las estrategias exitosas de China y diferenciación de los enfoques chinos mediante la incorporación de métodos multilaterales e ideacionales.

The idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) has gained increasing currency in Russian foreign policy. The Russia–China partnership has been presented as its bedrock through a partnership between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative, further expanding to include other regional powers from across East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and Middle East as well as nonwestern multilateral groupings (SCO, ASEAN). Given the centrality of Asia-Pacific to this expansive concept, GEP has to deal with the challenges posed by the evolving regional geopolitics of the East and the rise of the Indo-Pacific amidst heightened US–China rivalry. The paper seeks to conduct a policy review of GEP and its proposed development format in light of ongoing changes in the East to determine the likely future of the concept in a contested region that also remains at the center of this expansive Russian vision.

Debates on allies' contributions to alliances focus mainly on the material dimension. Accordingly, smaller partners are often belittled for failing to contribute their fair share to their defensive alliances with more powerful allies. While acknowledging that junior partners’ contributions do not match the same level of material capabilities provided by a more significant power like the United States, this study highlights the importance of other intangible contributions. We argue that defensive alliances during peacetime require a crucial, albeit overlooked, ideational contribution by all allies. We examine the US–Japan and ANZUS alliances to explore the process through which junior partners advance the interests of an alliance through ideational contributions. Our findings reveal that Japan and Australia contribute to their respective alliances with the United States by mobilizing fundamental ideas and norms that sustain and promote a specific global order and security vision. We maintain that such intangible contributions are necessary for alliance success.

关于盟友对联盟贡献的辩论主要集中于物质层面。因此，较小的联盟伙伴常常因为未能为“与更强大盟友的防御联盟作出应有的贡献”而受到贬低。虽然本文承认，较小联盟伙伴的贡献无法与美国等更重要的国家提供的同等物质能力水平相提并论，但本文强调了其他无形贡献的重要性。我们论证，和平时期的防御联盟需要所有盟友作出关键的（尽管被忽视的）理念贡献。我们研究了美日同盟和澳新美联盟，以探究较小联盟伙伴通过理念贡献进而促进联盟利益的过程。我们的研究结果表明，日本和澳大利亚通过动员一系列用于维持和促进特定全球秩序和安全愿景的基本思想和规范，进而为各自与美国的联盟作贡献。我们认为，这种无形的贡献对于联盟的成功是必要的

Los debates sobre las contribuciones de los aliados a las alianzas se centran principalmente en la dimensión material. En consecuencia, los socios más pequeños a menudo son menospreciados por no contribuir con su parte justa a sus alianzas defensivas con aliados más poderosos. Si bien se reconoce que las contribuciones de los socios menores no coinciden con el mismo nivel de capacidades materiales proporcionadas por una potencia más importante como Estados Unidos, este artículo destaca la importancia de otras contribuciones intangibles. Sostenemos que las alianzas defensivas en tiempos de paz requieren una contribución ideacional crucial, aunque pasada por alto, por parte de todos los aliados. Examinamos las alianzas entre Estados Unidos y Japón y ANZUS para explorar el proceso a través del cual los socios menores promueven los intereses de una alianza a través de contribuciones ideacionales. Nuestros hallazgos revelan que Japón y Australia contribuyen a sus respectivas alianzas con Estados Unidos movilizando ideas y normas fundamentales que sostienen y promueven un orden global y una visión de seguridad específicos. Sostenemos que dichas contribuciones intangibles son necesarias para el éxito de la alianza.