Asian Politics & Policy最新文献

In the 21st century, India significantly enhanced its engagements with the Gulf region driven by domestic economic and security considerations. New Delhi followed a policy of strengthening bilateral ties and maintained neutrality on intraregional disputes, tensions, and rivalries. Hence, the Gulf policy followed the fine print of a multialigned foreign policy, a concept frequently used to describe the post-Cold War shifts in India's external relations. However, given the transitions in the regional security scenario both because of regional developments and systemic factors, India's multialigned policy in the Gulf faces serious challenges. The Indian response reveals that despite different regional and international factors pulling in different directions, the Gulf policy continues to be guided by multialignment.

As both India and South Korea build their ties on the basis of democratic partnership and ASEAN centrality, the need for Seoul to emerge as a strong partner in India's Indo-Pacific initiatives is vital. India's quest for a more serious multilateral network is continuously growing in the security sphere, and Korea's induction in the same via the “Plus” framework of the quadrilateral hints at potential for successful connects with other multilateral frameworks or bodies like the AIIB to balance economic assistance and development. Ultimately, the natural upgradation of India-South Korea relations relies intensely upon the degree to which Seoul will embrace the Indo-Pacific account that India's AEP is pitching. The merging of soft and hard power by the middle and rising power is critical to India to ensure a rules-based international order; finding a formal place for Seoul in its Indo-Pacific prism must emerge as a necessary focus of New Delhi.

How do regional actors perceive South Korea's role in the Indo-Pacific? Using South Korea as a reference point, this introductory paper to the Special Issue adopts the analogy of “network structures” to examine how the network of Indo-Pacific relations shapes actors' perceptions and interactions with other states in the region. South Korea's relationship with other actors in the Indo-Pacific is not just a function of bilateral relations. It is influenced by the larger strategic environment and the dynamic relationships that exist among network actors. By analyzing the Indo-Pacific strategies of several states comparatively, we aim to better understand South Korea's role and place within the broader regional strategic network. We advocate a relational approach to understanding regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific that moves past traditional international relations paradigms.

This article challenges the presumption that American commitment to the greater Indo-Pacific region has positive effects on regional stability. It argues that the degree to which America's strategic choices in Asia embrittle or consolidate peace depends on how they intersect with relational configurations of regional order. An accommodative strategy of restraint and mutual threat reduction offers the greatest stability with the least risk either when China's ties to a unified Asia are predatory or when Asia is fractured but China's ties to it are cooperative. A balance-of-power strategy offers the greatest stability and least risk when China's ties to a fractured Asia are confrontational or predatory. And an institutional strategy offers the greatest stability with the least risk when China enjoys broadly cooperative ties to Asia regardless of whether Asian states are unified or fractured. Crucially, a strategy of primacy or containment embrittles regional peace because it conflicts with every foreseeable configuration of relational order. America's role as a Pacific Power should adapt to local relational conditions if it is to serve the greater purpose of regional peace.