Asian Politics & Policy最新文献

Relying on a networked perspective, this article argues that South Korea is an actor of relative importance in ASEAN's regional network, but it ultimately does not occupy a place that is more crucial than the association's other dialogue partners. In the context of ASEAN seeking to maintain its network power in an evolving Indo-Pacific, South Korea has played a supportive role in ASEAN's pursuit of social access, brokerage links and minimizing its exit potential from the Indo-Pacific network. South Korea's role, however, has been a comparably limited one rooted in specific functional areas and focused on certain ASEAN member states. While these efforts would certainly reinforce ASEAN's network power to some extent, the relatively thin network links between ASEAN and South Korea in other sectors suggest that there is little potential to expand cooperation beyond a functional and socioeconomic trajectory.

Despite China, Russia, and North Korea's attempts to change the status quo in East Asia, South Korea has remained disconnected from the network of regional countries working together to cope with these revisionists. This article adopts a network-centered approach to reveal how South Korea's regional network has narrowly focused on the bilateral ROK–US alliance to counter the North Korean threat. Although South Korea has expanded its role from junior partner to balancer and has often forged regional networks to respond to the changing balance of power, South Korea has ultimately utilized this role and network as leverage against North Korea to improve inter-Korean relations. Now, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is attempting to reconfigure both its self-identified role, describing itself as a “global pivotal state,” and its regional strategy in the Indo-Pacific beyond the Korean Peninsula to align itself with the United States and other like-minded countries.

One of the most important defining features of Japan's “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision is coalition-building. Given the Yoon administration's strong political will to commit to the Indo-Pacific affairs and improve its ties with Japan, can Japan and South Korea finally forge cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region? I argue that Japan has not incorporated South Korea in its FOIP vision because of four main factors: timing, leadership transition, commitment to regional and global strategic affairs, and differing perspectives on China. Particularly, the negative impact of South Korea's leadership change and its fluctuating commitment to regional and global affairs have nurtured Japan's skepticism toward South Korea's potential role in the Indo-Pacific region. In this context, the key to overcoming such difficulties and incorporating South Korea into the Indo-Pacific network depends on the Yoon administration's conceptualization and institutionalization of its Indo-Pacific strategy and Japan's support for South Korea's current diplomatic activism

How do the US allies engage with other actors in the US-led Indo-Pacific security order? This article examines this question in the case of Australia. We argue that the regional strategic network is a key consideration for Australia to facilitate its interaction with a target country in the Indo-Pacific. This article analyzes Australia's approach toward South Korea as an example demonstrating the significance of the regional strategic network in shaping Australia's diplomacy. It does so by addressing the following three questions. First, what is Australia's vision for the Indo-Pacific? Second, how does Australia perceive South Korea's role in the Indo-Pacific? Third, how does Australia's Indo-Pacific vision find the relevance of South Korea for Australia's security interests? The article elucidates that Australia's view on South Korea's place in the Indo-Pacific security network influences Australia's interaction with South Korea and consequently plays an integral part in the US-led regional security order-building process.

China sees South Korea's full access will perfect the Indo-Pacific strategy, dealing a detrimental blow to its national security interests for three reasons, geography, economics, and defense. The Indo-Pacific strategy is also a strategy based on network building. However, the inherent nature of the network limits the membership to allies, “like-minded states,” and supporters to the rule-based order. While Korea still holds reservations about making a full-fledged commitment to the strategy, China is to do its utmost including coercive measures to prevent it from joining it. In this light, the article will first analyze the reasons why China opposes Korea joining the strategy. China's strategic interest against the Indo-Pacific strategy will be inferred to substantiate its objection to Korea's participation. The article will also explain the imperatives for Korea to join the strategy. It will conclude with some remarks that can help the United States. induce Korea's commitment and vice versa.

As the UK seeks to build stronger relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific, an important factor for its relations with South Korea will be the extent to which South Korea can clarify its own geopolitical orientation, including how it grapples with issues linked to China's rise. As the UK projects its leadership in a post-Brexit era, it is identifying, through the Indo-Pacific tilt, aspects where it can exercise influence in the region. Through the process, it will orient itself in new and existing networks and seek to identify reliable partners. There is potential for South Korea to be a bigger partner, but it will depend on how far South Korea can move out of its comfort zone and how deeply it is willing to imbed itself in the transforming networked architecture.

The United States and South Korea are both shifting their engagement in the Indo-Pacific, but in fundamentally different ways. In recent years, Washington has altered the format of its engagement in the region—shifting toward an increasingly minilateral approach seen in the Quad and AUKUS arrangements. On the other hand, Seoul has sought primarily to alter the focus of its engagement—shifting from a narrow focus on the Korean Peninsula toward a broader regional approach. In other words, American leaders have adjusted the format of their engagement while Korean leaders have adjusted the focus of their engagement. This has created a disconnect. As South Korea has aligned its focus to that of the United States, Seoul has expected Washington to integrate South Korea more deeply into American regional strategy. Yet, US efforts to build minilaterals have seldom included South Korea. Addressing this divide will require leaders in both capitals to adjust their approaches to both focus and format in the Indo-Pacific.

The possible crisis in the Taiwan Strait is a looming regional flashpoint that could potentially drag many Asian states into an armed international conflict. Countries like the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and others might become frontline states in any militarized confrontation involving Taiwan. Beyond geographic proximity, the intensified superpower rivalry between the United States and China substantially frames the current precarity of the regional security environment.

Restraint and responsible behavior must remain the guiding norms of behavior for all states in the Indo-Pacific over the Taiwan strait. The repercussions in the region and the globe are too serious and far-reaching if conflict erupts. The Philippines, for example, will suffer a lot. First, the country's economy is heavily intertwined with both China and Taiwan. China is the second-ranked trade partner of the Philippines with US$6.63 billion worth of trade in 2021. That same year, Taiwan ranked 9th with $2.5 billion worth of trade. It is highly likely that the Philippines will suffer a major economic blow if cross-strait relations reach its lowest point. Moreover, there are 150,000 overseas Filipino workers in Taiwan and around the same number are in Hong Kong. They will likely need to be repatriated in any militarized conflict which could almost be a logistical nightmare of epic proportions for the Philippine government. Given the global economic slowdown and economic hardship currently experienced by the country, another economic downturn caused by geopolitical conflict is the last thing the country needs.

Apart from the massive economic implications of the crisis in the strait, the Philippines might also be at the receiving end of a major humanitarian crisis. A protracted military conflict will possibly generate thousands if not millions of refugees. Among ASEAN countries, it is the Philippines that signed all major international conventions on sheltering and protecting stateless persons. Historically, the country has been a haven for refugees and other displaced persons. This has been the historical identity of the Philippines in the past and it will not shirk from opening its borders to the Taiwanese people of the need arises.

Another strategic imperative for the Philippines is its shared identity as a small state that also has a territorial and maritime dispute with China. Though the 2016 Arbitral Award has resolved this dispute in favor of the Philippines, China had remained adamant on the triviality of this piece of international law and has continued to assert its dominant presence in the West Philippine Sea. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is too near an event for the Philippine government to forget that undue intrusion and even invasion of a superpower to a less powerful country has no place in 21st century international relations. Thus, the Philippines and other neighboring states should not simply dismiss the need for solidarity again

How to balance the market and the government to promote local economic development and provide sufficient public services has always been a challenging issue for leaders, in face of the existence of varied interests and values of different stakeholders. Conflicting values between the market and the government are directly related to the competing logics between market orientation and bureaucratic/administrative dominance. Since China's transition from the planned economy or government dominance to marketization in 1978, a series of national and local innovations has been launched. Among those reforms, policy entrepreneurs played a critical role. Administrative licensing reform was one of key changes from the planned economy to the marketized economy. Through a local case in administrative licensing reform, this study explores how a policy entrepreneur at local level applied reform strategies to balance conflicting values and constrain the self-interested bureaucracy to achieve the marketization reform.

We examine the institutional drivers of subjective well-being (SWB). Using a repeated cross-sectional data set from the Philippines spanning three decades, we estimate the relationship of people's trust in public institutions and SWB, measured in terms of people's satisfaction with their lives. Our findings, based on estimates which control for a range of individual-level characteristics, show that people's trust in public institutions is strongly associated with their well-being. In particular, a great deal of trust in the Police, Congress, and Judiciary is positively associated with people's satisfaction with their lives while a lack of trust in Congress, Civil Service, and Executive is negatively related to life satisfaction. Findings are discussed vis-à-vis their implications for Philippine public policy and to well-being-oriented policy regimes more generally.