Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143129
Benjamin V. Allison
{"title":"For Might and Right: Cold War Defense Spending and the Remaking of American Democracy","authors":"Benjamin V. Allison","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143129","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"869 - 870"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41428663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143118
Michał Wenderski
ABSTRACT This article explores the intertwinement of politics, international affairs and culture during the Cold War through a case study of Polish-Dutch cultural relations and the heterogeneous factors that shaped them. The study centres around the turbulent events of 1968 in Poland, and their impact on the international cultural policies of the Polish People’s Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It demonstrates that the cultural field suffered the most immediate consequences of the political decisions taken by both parties – consequences which lasted for a considerable time – thus making it a metaphorical litmus test for the Cold War international relationships. This article reconstructs and analyses Polish and Dutch reactions to the 1968 events and their use of culture for the sake of their own policies – both as a form of protest and as an anti-crisis tool meant to influence the authorities and citizens of the target country.
{"title":"Culture as Litmus Paper: The Impact of the 1968 Events on the East-West Cultural Relations","authors":"Michał Wenderski","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143118","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores the intertwinement of politics, international affairs and culture during the Cold War through a case study of Polish-Dutch cultural relations and the heterogeneous factors that shaped them. The study centres around the turbulent events of 1968 in Poland, and their impact on the international cultural policies of the Polish People’s Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It demonstrates that the cultural field suffered the most immediate consequences of the political decisions taken by both parties – consequences which lasted for a considerable time – thus making it a metaphorical litmus test for the Cold War international relationships. This article reconstructs and analyses Polish and Dutch reactions to the 1968 events and their use of culture for the sake of their own policies – both as a form of protest and as an anti-crisis tool meant to influence the authorities and citizens of the target country.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"718 - 740"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44651235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143124
J. Ellison
in Gaza, Egypt and Turkey. Third, set against the instability of the Middle East during and after the Arab Spring, the rise of Hezbollah and its patron Iran, and the latter’s nuclear project, highlighted the importance of the cooperation between Israel and the Gulf Monarchies against some common enemies in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East. Last, American retrenchment away from the Middle East since the Obama administration and the underlying assumption by the Gulf Monarchies’ elite that Israel, especially Netanyahu, could influence Trump’s policies on the Middle East and have a strong influence on the US Congress. When this assumption is taken into account, it is unsurprising that Netanyahu’s address to Congress in March 2015 took an opposing stand against an American president in his own political playground, but it was nevertheless an impressive step for the Gulf Monarchies. Although Netanyahu failed to stop the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Iranian deal, which was signed four months later, he still scored important points with the Gulf Monarchies’ media and the ruling elite. Separately, each of these pillars is compelling enough to explain the shift in the relations between Israel and the Gulf Monarchies after the 1993 Oslo accords, but it is the intersection of all these changes which makes Jones and Guzansky’s argument so persuasive. One minor flaw would be that while the authors embed a wide range of secondary sources, they also employ four oral interviews and some informal chats they have conducted over the years with Israel’s intelligence elite. Given the nature of covert diplomacy undertaken by the intelligence elite and the lack of access to Israel’s state archival records that document such activities, oral evidence becomes golden nuggets which weigh even more than usual when apprised at a time archival sources are scarce. With this in mind, one would wish to have a bit more of those intelligence elite voices featured more prominently in the book. Even before the announcement of ‘normalization’ of relations between Israel and the UAE on 13 August 2020, which made this book still more topical, it was a highly recommended textbook and a very useful read for a wide range of audiences that encompasses undergraduates, post-graduate students, practitioners and academics.
{"title":"The Churchill Complex. The Rise and Fall of the Special Relationship","authors":"J. Ellison","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143124","url":null,"abstract":"in Gaza, Egypt and Turkey. Third, set against the instability of the Middle East during and after the Arab Spring, the rise of Hezbollah and its patron Iran, and the latter’s nuclear project, highlighted the importance of the cooperation between Israel and the Gulf Monarchies against some common enemies in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East. Last, American retrenchment away from the Middle East since the Obama administration and the underlying assumption by the Gulf Monarchies’ elite that Israel, especially Netanyahu, could influence Trump’s policies on the Middle East and have a strong influence on the US Congress. When this assumption is taken into account, it is unsurprising that Netanyahu’s address to Congress in March 2015 took an opposing stand against an American president in his own political playground, but it was nevertheless an impressive step for the Gulf Monarchies. Although Netanyahu failed to stop the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Iranian deal, which was signed four months later, he still scored important points with the Gulf Monarchies’ media and the ruling elite. Separately, each of these pillars is compelling enough to explain the shift in the relations between Israel and the Gulf Monarchies after the 1993 Oslo accords, but it is the intersection of all these changes which makes Jones and Guzansky’s argument so persuasive. One minor flaw would be that while the authors embed a wide range of secondary sources, they also employ four oral interviews and some informal chats they have conducted over the years with Israel’s intelligence elite. Given the nature of covert diplomacy undertaken by the intelligence elite and the lack of access to Israel’s state archival records that document such activities, oral evidence becomes golden nuggets which weigh even more than usual when apprised at a time archival sources are scarce. With this in mind, one would wish to have a bit more of those intelligence elite voices featured more prominently in the book. Even before the announcement of ‘normalization’ of relations between Israel and the UAE on 13 August 2020, which made this book still more topical, it was a highly recommended textbook and a very useful read for a wide range of audiences that encompasses undergraduates, post-graduate students, practitioners and academics.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"862 - 864"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42137421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143110
A. Packwood
{"title":"Churchill and Eden: Partners Through War and Peace","authors":"A. Packwood","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143110","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"854 - 855"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45844197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143130
Michael F. Hopkins
{"title":"America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy","authors":"Michael F. Hopkins","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143130","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"870 - 872"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47551243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143112
Jonathan N. Brown
ABSTRACT This analysis revisits the State Department’s initial handling of the infamous Belmonte-Wendler letter during May-September 1941. Previous scholarship has focused heavily on the decision by British intelligence to forge and then share that letter as a means to spur American entry into the Second World War, with little disagreement among scholars about this side of the story. In comparison, however, the understanding of the State Department’s handling of the letter has become thoroughly muddled over time, with scholars regularly offering wildly inconsistent accounts, even despite only citing the same small handful of primary documents. Based on exhaustive archival research in records either overlooked by previous studies or since declassified, this assessment marshals a trove of fresh evidence to paint the most complete or accurate picture of who in the State Department knew the letter was a forgery, when and how they made this determination, and what they did to cover it up.
{"title":"‘No One Knows – Or Will Say’: Revisiting the State Department’s Handling of the Belmonte-Wendler Letter","authors":"Jonathan N. Brown","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143112","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This analysis revisits the State Department’s initial handling of the infamous Belmonte-Wendler letter during May-September 1941. Previous scholarship has focused heavily on the decision by British intelligence to forge and then share that letter as a means to spur American entry into the Second World War, with little disagreement among scholars about this side of the story. In comparison, however, the understanding of the State Department’s handling of the letter has become thoroughly muddled over time, with scholars regularly offering wildly inconsistent accounts, even despite only citing the same small handful of primary documents. Based on exhaustive archival research in records either overlooked by previous studies or since declassified, this assessment marshals a trove of fresh evidence to paint the most complete or accurate picture of who in the State Department knew the letter was a forgery, when and how they made this determination, and what they did to cover it up.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"656 - 680"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47160678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143111
T. Aono
{"title":"The Silent Guns of Two Octobers: Kennedy and Khrushchev Play the Double Game","authors":"T. Aono","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143111","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"856 - 857"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45231303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143119
T. Allcock
ABSTRACT This article assesses President Gerald Ford’s two major tours of Asia that saw him visit Japan, South Korea, China, the Philippines and Indonesia in 1974 and 1975. The trips were intended to reemphasise American commitment to longstanding allies in the Pacific, shore up recent gains in relations with Beijing, and boost his image with voters at home. On the first two points, Ford was broadly successful, but his moderate diplomatic achievements did not translate into electoral success. In assessing both the impact of his diplomacy and failure to leverage this domestically, the article demonstrates the importance of presidential diplomacy in furthering American interests, the power of the media in shaping the narratives of diplomatic travel, and the interconnected nature of domestic and foreign affairs. It also adds depth to our understanding of an often-overlooked administration and its impact on a region of crucial strategic importance to American foreign relations.
{"title":"Diplomacy, the Media, and a Search for Legitimacy: Reassessing Gerald Ford’s Pacific Tours","authors":"T. Allcock","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143119","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article assesses President Gerald Ford’s two major tours of Asia that saw him visit Japan, South Korea, China, the Philippines and Indonesia in 1974 and 1975. The trips were intended to reemphasise American commitment to longstanding allies in the Pacific, shore up recent gains in relations with Beijing, and boost his image with voters at home. On the first two points, Ford was broadly successful, but his moderate diplomatic achievements did not translate into electoral success. In assessing both the impact of his diplomacy and failure to leverage this domestically, the article demonstrates the importance of presidential diplomacy in furthering American interests, the power of the media in shaping the narratives of diplomatic travel, and the interconnected nature of domestic and foreign affairs. It also adds depth to our understanding of an often-overlooked administration and its impact on a region of crucial strategic importance to American foreign relations.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"741 - 771"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47745672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2022.2143108
John W. Young
ABSTRACT The decision to send the British Expeditionary Force to France has been much discussed from the perspective of its long-term military-strategic background. Yet where the eventual decision to despatch the Force in August 1914 is concerned, limited attention has been paid to the role of the British Cabinet, which gave political approval to the step. Some historians have highlighted a Cabinet decision of 1 August against sending the BEF abroad and pointed out that Prime Minister H.H. Asquith and two key ministerial allies – Lord Haldane and Sir Edward Grey – accepted it. No one has provided a full analysis of why this trio of ministers consistently stuck to their position over the following days. Nor does a full explanation exist of the Cabinet’s eventual agreement, on 6 August, to approve the despatch of the Force. This analysis addresses these questions, arguing that far from being some reluctant step forced on the interventionists by their anti-war colleagues, Asquith, Haldane, and Grey pre-emptively decided to delay the despatch of the BEF. They did this as a way of preventing the disintegration of the government, while leaving open the possibility that Britain would go to war.
从英国远征军出征法国的长期军事战略背景来看，人们对英国远征军出征法国的决定进行了很多讨论。然而，就1914年8月派遣该部队的最终决定而言，人们对英国内阁的作用给予了有限的注意，英国内阁在政治上批准了这一步骤。一些历史学家强调了8月1日的内阁决定，反对将英国远道军派往海外，并指出首相阿斯奎斯(H.H. Asquith)和两位重要的大臣盟友霍尔丹勋爵(Lord Haldane)和爱德华·格雷爵士(Sir Edward Grey)接受了这一决定。没有人对这三位部长为何在接下来的几天里一直坚持自己的立场提供全面的分析。内阁最终于8月6日同意核可派遣该部队的原因也没有得到充分解释。这篇分析论述了这些问题，认为阿斯奎斯、霍尔丹和格雷并不是被他们的反战同事强加给干涉主义者的不情愿的一步，而是先发制人地决定推迟英国远战部队的派遣。他们这样做是为了防止政府解体，同时避免英国参战的可能性。
{"title":"The Asquith Cabinet and the Decision to Send an Expeditionary Force to France in 1914","authors":"John W. Young","doi":"10.1080/09592296.2022.2143108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2022.2143108","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The decision to send the British Expeditionary Force to France has been much discussed from the perspective of its long-term military-strategic background. Yet where the eventual decision to despatch the Force in August 1914 is concerned, limited attention has been paid to the role of the British Cabinet, which gave political approval to the step. Some historians have highlighted a Cabinet decision of 1 August against sending the BEF abroad and pointed out that Prime Minister H.H. Asquith and two key ministerial allies – Lord Haldane and Sir Edward Grey – accepted it. No one has provided a full analysis of why this trio of ministers consistently stuck to their position over the following days. Nor does a full explanation exist of the Cabinet’s eventual agreement, on 6 August, to approve the despatch of the Force. This analysis addresses these questions, arguing that far from being some reluctant step forced on the interventionists by their anti-war colleagues, Asquith, Haldane, and Grey pre-emptively decided to delay the despatch of the BEF. They did this as a way of preventing the disintegration of the government, while leaving open the possibility that Britain would go to war.","PeriodicalId":44804,"journal":{"name":"Diplomacy & Statecraft","volume":"33 1","pages":"611 - 631"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47925577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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