Pub Date : 2021-09-10DOI: 10.30950/jcer.v17i3.1165
Nandor Revesz
This article applies a mixed-methods approach through semi-structured interviews and document analysis to provide a comprehensive account of administrative and behavioural adaptation within the UK Houses of Parliament (HoP) to the EU’s subsidiarity monitoring mechanism, the Early Warning System (EWS). The article also tests theoretical assumptions regarding the adaptation and use of the EWS on this basis, confirming that Eurosceptic MPs bolster the use of the EWS and finding that the HoP are an outlier among bicameral legislatures, as the lower chamber was the primary user of the EWS. Overall, results demonstrate that both the House of Commons and the House of Lords treated the EWS as an optional bolt-on when adapting to the mechanism. Furthermore, the EWS did not encourage the HoP to increase engagement with UK devolved legislatures, but the mechanism contributed to the mainstreaming of EU scrutiny in the case of the Welsh and Scottish legislatures.
{"title":"The Difficulty in Engaging the Engaged: Administrative Adaptation to the Early Warning System within the UK Houses of Parliament","authors":"Nandor Revesz","doi":"10.30950/jcer.v17i3.1165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v17i3.1165","url":null,"abstract":"This article applies a mixed-methods approach through semi-structured interviews and document analysis to provide a comprehensive account of administrative and behavioural adaptation within the UK Houses of Parliament (HoP) to the EU’s subsidiarity monitoring mechanism, the Early Warning System (EWS). The article also tests theoretical assumptions regarding the adaptation and use of the EWS on this basis, confirming that Eurosceptic MPs bolster the use of the EWS and finding that the HoP are an outlier among bicameral legislatures, as the lower chamber was the primary user of the EWS. Overall, results demonstrate that both the House of Commons and the House of Lords treated the EWS as an optional bolt-on when adapting to the mechanism. Furthermore, the EWS did not encourage the HoP to increase engagement with UK devolved legislatures, but the mechanism contributed to the mainstreaming of EU scrutiny in the case of the Welsh and Scottish legislatures.","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43416351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-10DOI: 10.30950/jcer.v17i3.1204
Zane Sime
UACES is an influential association of European Studies. It is an intellectual platform that allows the co-creating of Europe and defining of the future of European Studies. Nevertheless, it has received surprisingly little scholarly attention as an object of study. Developments in 2020 have proven the dynamism and inclusiveness of UACES and therefore that the association deserves more in-depth attention in its own right.
{"title":"Ahead of the 55th anniversary of UACES: Where is the academic interest in the association?","authors":"Zane Sime","doi":"10.30950/jcer.v17i3.1204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v17i3.1204","url":null,"abstract":"UACES is an influential association of European Studies. It is an intellectual platform that allows the co-creating of Europe and defining of the future of European Studies. Nevertheless, it has received surprisingly little scholarly attention as an object of study. Developments in 2020 have proven the dynamism and inclusiveness of UACES and therefore that the association deserves more in-depth attention in its own right.","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45981011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-10DOI: 10.30950/JCER.V17I3.1150
Laura Gómez Urquijo
{"title":"The progressive gendering of the European Union’s economic governance architecture","authors":"Laura Gómez Urquijo","doi":"10.30950/JCER.V17I3.1150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/JCER.V17I3.1150","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46684495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1186
B. Farrand, Helena Carrapico
Debates in and over the European Union (EU) are increasingly characterised as being based in arguments that are either ‘populist’ or ‘technocratic’. As systems of communication, this article argues, populism and technocracy possess dramatically different logics of argumentation, modes of communication and meaning-making, distinct narratives, with appeals to distinct sources of legitimacy. As such, actors adopting either political style construct their identity in a way that seeks to legitimise its own political action, while in turn delegitimising that of its opponents. This results in an atmosphere of distrust between actors using these different communication styles, making any form of negotiation or cooperation between them exceedingly difficult. In the context of the Brexit negotiations, which this article uses as a case study, the UK Government has adopted a populist style characterised by narratives of taking back control, legitimised by the will of the people, communicating often in a ‘low’ political style and using a narrative of crisis and threat. In comparison, the EU has adopted a technocratic style characterised by narratives of technical policy making and the need for rationality, legitimised through the laws, rules and processes by which it is governed, communicating in a ‘high’ political style while using a narrative of stability and continuity. These radically different views of the world have resulted in an increasing of tensions and distrust by the parties to Brexit negotiations that were already heightened by a sense of ‘betrayal’ over Brexit.
{"title":"‘People like that cannot be trusted’: populist and technocratic political styles, legitimacy, and distrust in the context of Brexit negotiations","authors":"B. Farrand, Helena Carrapico","doi":"10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1186","url":null,"abstract":"Debates in and over the European Union (EU) are increasingly characterised as being based in arguments that are either ‘populist’ or ‘technocratic’. As systems of communication, this article argues, populism and technocracy possess dramatically different logics of argumentation, modes of communication and meaning-making, distinct narratives, with appeals to distinct sources of legitimacy. As such, actors adopting either political style construct their identity in a way that seeks to legitimise its own political action, while in turn delegitimising that of its opponents. This results in an atmosphere of distrust between actors using these different communication styles, making any form of negotiation or cooperation between them exceedingly difficult. In the context of the Brexit negotiations, which this article uses as a case study, the UK Government has adopted a populist style characterised by narratives of taking back control, legitimised by the will of the people, communicating often in a ‘low’ political style and using a narrative of crisis and threat. In comparison, the EU has adopted a technocratic style characterised by narratives of technical policy making and the need for rationality, legitimised through the laws, rules and processes by which it is governed, communicating in a ‘high’ political style while using a narrative of stability and continuity. These radically different views of the world have resulted in an increasing of tensions and distrust by the parties to Brexit negotiations that were already heightened by a sense of ‘betrayal’ over Brexit.","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41305417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-13DOI: 10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1183
W. Outhwaite
This commentary examines the EU’s halting development of territorial policy, most recently in macro-regional planning, and the responses of member states’ local and national governmental elites. Whether populist or not in their overall programmes, these elites have tended to resist EU initiatives in the name of a perceived national interest or to instrumentalise them in order to maximise their domestic political pay-off. These ‘sovereignty games’ (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008) have been a constant feature of the European integration process, but transnational territorial initiatives, involving a flexible mix of European and sub-regional bodies as well as national states (both members and non-members of the EU) tend to raise the stakes in these games.
{"title":"Technocratic Planning and Political Strategies: Territorial Policy in the EU","authors":"W. Outhwaite","doi":"10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1183","url":null,"abstract":"This commentary examines the EU’s halting development of territorial policy, most recently in macro-regional planning, and the responses of member states’ local and national governmental elites. Whether populist or not in their overall programmes, these elites have tended to resist EU initiatives in the name of a perceived national interest or to instrumentalise them in order to maximise their domestic political pay-off. These ‘sovereignty games’ (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008) have been a constant feature of the European integration process, but transnational territorial initiatives, involving a flexible mix of European and sub-regional bodies as well as national states (both members and non-members of the EU) tend to raise the stakes in these games.","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42976475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-11DOI: 10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1184
Franco Zappettini, M. Maccaferri
This paper analyses the digital communication of Italian parties Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle during their campaigns for the European Parliament elections (January-May 2019). We focus on the Italian case as it is representative of a generalised shift in European public discourse towards an overt delegitimation of the European project and its re-imagination. In the Italian case, Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle, which were in a Government coalition for fourteen months, have been instrumental in Italy’s shift from a strong Europhile country to one of the most Eurosceptic. However, while Lega has definitely aligned itself with a strong right-wing populist agenda, Movimento 5 Stelle has promoted a populist technocratic vision of democracy. Our analysis shows that the articulation of Eurosceptic discourses from both parties by and large reflects the two stances above with Lega’s messages (primarily produced by its leader Matteo Salvini) characterised by a ‘hyperled’ style of communication and stronger nativist elements (for example the appeal to an ethno-centric and ‘sovereign’ idea of Italy) than those of Movimento 5 Stelle, which instead relied on a ‘horizontal’ communicative style. However, our data also shows that the delegitimation of Europe in both parties occur along a similar domestication of European affairs into the national political agenda and the call for a reformed Europe along nationalistic logics which both parties claimed to champion.
{"title":"Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy: The Case of Italian Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle","authors":"Franco Zappettini, M. Maccaferri","doi":"10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1184","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the digital communication of Italian parties Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle during their campaigns for the European Parliament elections (January-May 2019). We focus on the Italian case as it is representative of a generalised shift in European public discourse towards an overt delegitimation of the European project and its re-imagination. In the Italian case, Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle, which were in a Government coalition for fourteen months, have been instrumental in Italy’s shift from a strong Europhile country to one of the most Eurosceptic. However, while Lega has definitely aligned itself with a strong right-wing populist agenda, Movimento 5 Stelle has promoted a populist technocratic vision of democracy. Our analysis shows that the articulation of Eurosceptic discourses from both parties by and large reflects the two stances above with Lega’s messages (primarily produced by its leader Matteo Salvini) characterised by a ‘hyperled’ style of communication and stronger nativist elements (for example the appeal to an ethno-centric and ‘sovereign’ idea of Italy) than those of Movimento 5 Stelle, which instead relied on a ‘horizontal’ communicative style. However, our data also shows that the delegitimation of Europe in both parties occur along a similar domestication of European affairs into the national political agenda and the call for a reformed Europe along nationalistic logics which both parties claimed to champion.","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43045006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-03DOI: 10.30950/JCER.V17I1.1212
N. Ferreira
{"title":"Review of Anne Wesemann (2020). Citizenship in the European Union: constitutionalism, rights and norms. Elgar studies in European law and policy. Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN: 978 1 83910 316 2, 192pp.","authors":"N. Ferreira","doi":"10.30950/JCER.V17I1.1212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/JCER.V17I1.1212","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46120784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-03DOI: 10.30950/JCER.V17I1.1059
Petr Kaniok
EU Council working groups still represent a topic that is neglected in EU research. If they are analysed, the effect of socialisation is particularly tested while rationally motivated factors such as a Left-Right position, green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) and traditionalism/authority/nationalism (TAN) positions or approaches towards the EU are left aside. This article analyses how such factors shape the member states’ oral communication at the working groups level. Based on a dataset gathered by non-participatory observation of interventions, the analysis suggests that none of the rationally constructed variables plays a significant role in shaping the audible communication of representatives of the EU member states. The article thus confirms the effect of socialisation on oral communication as well as the influence of structural factors such as member states’ power and the character of the document under discussion.
{"title":"Member States and Audible Communication within the EU Council Working Groups","authors":"Petr Kaniok","doi":"10.30950/JCER.V17I1.1059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/JCER.V17I1.1059","url":null,"abstract":"EU Council working groups still represent a topic that is neglected in EU research. If they are analysed, the effect of socialisation is particularly tested while rationally motivated factors such as a Left-Right position, green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) and traditionalism/authority/nationalism (TAN) positions or approaches towards the EU are left aside. This article analyses how such factors shape the member states’ oral communication at the working groups level. Based on a dataset gathered by non-participatory observation of interventions, the analysis suggests that none of the rationally constructed variables plays a significant role in shaping the audible communication of representatives of the EU member states. The article thus confirms the effect of socialisation on oral communication as well as the influence of structural factors such as member states’ power and the character of the document under discussion.","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48811087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-08DOI: 10.30950/JCER.V16I3.1097
Brice Didier
The crisis of the Liberal International Order (LIO) has resulted in, and been amplified by, the unilateral turn taken by the United States (US) under the Trump presidency. In this sense, ‘America First’ resulted in revisionism by the system leader vis-à-vis an order the US created and led for decades. This shift away from a historical US liberal hegemony has been even more consequential as it resulted in a leadership crisis and translated into episodes of rupture within the transatlantic community, which constitutes the backbone of the LIO. While the European Union (EU) initially positioned itself as a follower of the US, today it appears to oppose American ‘illiberalism’ through its rhetoric of ‘principled pragmatism’, expressed in an increasing number of issues. Building on the concept of leadership, this article analyses whether and to what extent the EU has the willingness to uphold LIO leadership and to what extent it is strategically equipped to do so. Following an analysis of the 2003 European Security Strategy and 2016 EU Global Strategy in order to comprehend better the EU’s relationship with the LIO and its willingness to lead, the article builds on two brief case studies: the America First trade policy and the Iran nuclear agreement. In turn, this facilitates examination of the EU’s capacity to lead and determination of the extent to which this leadership is accepted by other actors. The article argues that, while being limited by American preponderance over international issues, the EU is faced with a willingness-capacity gap but still attempts to uphold the LIO through pragmatic leadership by hedging.
{"title":"The European Union and the Liberal International Order in the Age of ‘America First’: Attempted Hedging and the Willingness-Capacity Gap","authors":"Brice Didier","doi":"10.30950/JCER.V16I3.1097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30950/JCER.V16I3.1097","url":null,"abstract":" \u0000The crisis of the Liberal International Order (LIO) has resulted in, and been amplified by, the unilateral turn taken by the United States (US) under the Trump presidency. In this sense, ‘America First’ resulted in revisionism by the system leader vis-à-vis an order the US created and led for decades. This shift away from a historical US liberal hegemony has been even more consequential as it resulted in a leadership crisis and translated into episodes of rupture within the transatlantic community, which constitutes the backbone of the LIO. While the European Union (EU) initially positioned itself as a follower of the US, today it appears to oppose American ‘illiberalism’ through its rhetoric of ‘principled pragmatism’, expressed in an increasing number of issues. Building on the concept of leadership, this article analyses whether and to what extent the EU has the willingness to uphold LIO leadership and to what extent it is strategically equipped to do so. Following an analysis of the 2003 European Security Strategy and 2016 EU Global Strategy in order to comprehend better the EU’s relationship with the LIO and its willingness to lead, the article builds on two brief case studies: the America First trade policy and the Iran nuclear agreement. In turn, this facilitates examination of the EU’s capacity to lead and determination of the extent to which this leadership is accepted by other actors. The article argues that, while being limited by American preponderance over international issues, the EU is faced with a willingness-capacity gap but still attempts to uphold the LIO through pragmatic leadership by hedging.","PeriodicalId":44985,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary European Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43242483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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