Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2191238
Anushka Saxena
Abstract As contestation in outer space has evolved into increased militarization since the Cold War era, multiple stakeholders have come to play a significant role in shaping the international regime governing activities of State and non-State actors in outer space. India has interacted with this international regime in a dynamic manner, and currently contributes about 2 per cent to the US$ 360 billion global space industry. Its own security compulsions in outer space are shaped by its national interests vis-a-vis data collection, C4ISR, satellite communications, and of course, deterrence against the rising military might of hostile countries in its neighbourhood—China and Pakistan. In this light, this article looks at the potential of India’s domestic material and policy-based space architecture, including the functioning of ISRO and its collaboration with the private sector, as well as India’s current space-based assets and ASAT capabilities. On the basis of this assessment of India’s current institutional and infrastructural assets for outer space, the article also attempts to chart a trajectory forward for India’s space policy and counter-space capabilities.
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Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2190617
Anuttama Banerji
T he International Relations scholarship in India has rarely paid heed to domestic politics as a variable in foreign policy analysis. Most such attempts have focused on anecdotal discussions; this is mainly to do with the securitised nature of the foreign policy discourse in India. Even in cases where the scholarship has tried to engage with domestic determinants, the focus has been on relations with, or policy towards, specific States or they are treatises on the contribution of statesmen. Consequently, other internal factors that have potentially influenced Indian foreign policy have received scant attention. This is where Rajesh Basrur’s Subcontinental Drift stands apart and reframes ‘a version of realism’, acknowledging ‘the importance of structure of the international system’ and incorporating domestic politics as a determinant of Indian policy-making (p.13). As a neorealist, Basrur introduces the ‘moral dimension’ as an intervening variable in his assessment (p.20) and endorses the view that ‘suboptimal outcomes are more likely under normal conditions, whereas structurally driven policy responses are the norm when the security threats are high’ (p.195). Basrur argues that ‘the problem of political uncertainty has been India’s constant companion’ (p.3), which he calls ‘subcontinental drift’ and classifies as voluntary and involuntary. The notion of involuntary drift is explained as a political scenario in which limited control is exercised by the political leadership due to the intervention of domestic players. He gives the example of relations with the United States and Sri Lanka to explain how domestic factors in both cases hindered or acted as material constraints on policy-making. For instance, Basrur notes, the ‘inordinate influence’ of smaller and regional parties in ‘hindering policy makers’ pursuit of security objectives’ in both cases (p.105). In this vein, Basrur traces the historical growth of India–US bilateral relations and argues that India is now a critical partner of the United States from being just an ‘obdurate proliferator of nuclear weapons’ (p.42). He notes that the shift in semantics occurred due to the growth of an encompassing security partnership that began with the Kicklighter proposals in 1991 that ‘recommended strategic dialogue, training and other exchanges between the two militaries’ (p.50) and reached a crucial juncture with the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005. Basrur has Strategic Analysis, 2023 Vol. 47, No. 2, 183–185, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2023.2190617
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Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2203587
A. Kapur
Introduction I t is possible to argue that India’s nuclear strategy seems to have changed, but this does not necessarily at present mean a change in the fundamentals of India’s nuclear policy as these were outlined in the late 1940s and the 1950s. The nuclear test appears to have damaged the NPT, and the test implies a re-orientation in India’s relations with China and the Super Powers. One may speculate about the effect of the test on Asian politics and suggest an emerging relationship—a broadening of the security dialogue—between SALT and NPT approaches to security. The premises in this argument are as follows: (i) SALT II, like SALT I, is not likely to cut deeply into the arm race and (ii) the Soviet American and the Sino-Soviet balances are stable, i.e. the conflicts are manageable. Given their premises, there are likely to be growing challenges against Super Poweroriented approaches to security by third parties like India. For instance, India does not think that the nuclear business is the exclusive privilege of the advanced industrialized States. In other words, political and commercial motives are also coming into the foreground. In the 1960s the arm control dialogue was not in fact shaped by disarmament ideals—although governments spoke the language of disarmament. Today, as in the 1960s, arms control deals essentially with security concerns but in the 1970s, ‘security’ emphasizes, or makes explicit, the political motives.
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Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2203076
K. Subrahmanyam
T he Pokhran test carried out by the Indian Atomic Energy Commission on 18 May 1974, by and large, evoked predictable reactions. Those countries that had come to accept the conventional wisdom on the issue of nuclear proliferation expressed regrets ranging from mild to profound. Some Third World countries expressed satisfaction but Pakistan reacted very strongly. The Indian Government’s declaration that the test was part of a series to exploit nuclear explosive technology and that India did not intend to manufacture nuclear weapons was accepted by many governments, while others expressed varying kinds of reservations about it. Within the country, we were proud of the achievements of our scientific and technological community and angry at what we considered to be double standards of those who muted their protests about the tests of the five nuclear weapon powers but came out loud against the safe and well-contained test at Pokhran. Since then, the declaration that this country does not intend to manufacture weapons has been repeated in many forums, both inside and outside the country. At the same time, India’s right to conduct peaceful underground explosions for developing technology has been reasserted and it has been pointed out that this country did not break any treaty but had reserved the right to carry out these explosions since 1967, when it had protested against the prohibition of such peaceful explosions under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was one of the reasons why India abstained from that treaty. It has been highlighted that in the matter of development of nuclear energy, India had a long and independent tradition and had taken a long-range view about the future developments in the constructive uses of nuclear energy. As early as 12 March 1944, Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha, in a letter written to the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust proposing the setting up of an institute for fundamental research, prophesied: ‘When nuclear energy has been successfully applied for power production, in say, a couple of decades from now, India will not have to look abroad for its experts but will find them ready at hand’. India was among the first eight countries where an Atomic Energy Commission was set up. In the first Atoms for Peace Conference in Geneva, Dr Bhabha predicted the coming in of fusion power in the next two to three decades. In Asia, India set up its first research reactor, Apsara, in 1956 ahead of China and Japan. Similarly, the first plutonium separation facility outside the nuclear weapons States was also established in India entirely through indigenous efforts. India also formulated a long-term three-stage strategy for the development of nuclear
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2176060
Laxman Kumar Behera
T he outcome of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in October 2022, was on predictable lines. It was no surprise that President Xi Jinping was chosen CPC supremo for an unprecedented third time, defying the two-term limit set by Deng Xiaoping to prevent a single person from gaining absolute and autocratic power like Mao Zedong. Xi, considered the most powerful leader in China since Mao, is determined to put China on the ‘rejuvenation’ path and attain superpower status for the Middle Kingdom by mid-century. What approach has Xi adopted to fulfil his ambitions of transforming China into a major economic, technological and military superpower? Will he succeed and what are the obstacles going forward? What does it mean for the existing international order that is still dominated by the US? Simply, what kind of China is Xi building? Tai Ming Cheung’s, Innovate to Dominate: The Rise of the Chinese TechnoSecurity State examines these pertinent questions and argues that Xi is transforming China into a techno-security State, where the interests of national security, economic development and innovation converge. Tai, an accomplished scholar of China’s strategic innovation and military affairs, opens his exploration by defining a technosecurity State to conceptualize the nature of Xi’s China and to differentiate it from other techno-security States, particularly the US. He defines a techno-security State as an ‘innovation-centred, security maximizing regime that prioritizes the building of technological, defence and national security capabilities to meet expansive national security requirements based on heightened threat perceptions and the powerful influence of domestic pro-security coalitions’ (pp. 2–3). The author then examines Xi’s efforts in building a techno-security State and identifies five key components: 1) creation of a national security State; 2) innovation-driven development strategy; 3) military strengthening; 4) military-civilian fusion; and 5) economic securitization. Like several noted books in recent times—such as Susan L. Shirk’s Overreach: How China Derailed its Peaceful Rise and Elizabeth C. Economy’s The World According to China—Tai’s book eloquently explains that Xi’s China is intensely focused on security than any other leader prior to him, since Deng downplayed it in favour of economic development. From Xi’s worldview, China faces grave dangers from both internal and external sources and to thwart them, the People’s Republic Strategic Analysis, 2023 Vol. 47, No. 1, 79–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2023.2176060
2022年10月举行的中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会的结果是可以预测的。 Xi被认为是自毛以来中国最强大的领导人，他决心让中国走上“复兴”的道路，并在本世纪中叶前为中王国获得超级大国地位。Xi采取了什么方法来实现他将中国转变为一个主要的经济、技术和军事超级大国的雄心？他会成功吗？前进的障碍是什么？这对仍然由美国主导的现有国际秩序意味着什么？简单地说，Xi正在建设一个什么样的中国？张泰铭（Tai Ming Cheung）的《创新统治：中国技术安全国家的崛起》（Innovate to Dominate:The Rise of The Chinese TechnoSecurity State）探讨了这些相关问题，并认为Xi正在将中国转变为一个技术安全国家，国家安全、经济发展和创新的利益在这里交汇。泰是一位研究中国战略创新和军事的杰出学者，他通过定义技术安全国家来展开探索，以概念化Xi领导下的中国的性质，并将其与其他技术安全国家，特别是美国区分开来，安全最大化制度，优先建设技术、国防和国家安全能力，以满足基于高度威胁感知和国内亲安全联盟强大影响力的广泛国家安全要求”（第2-3页）。然后，作者考察了Xi在建设技术安全国家方面的努力，并确定了五个关键组成部分：1）建立国家安全国家；2） 创新驱动发展战略；3） 军事强化；4） 军民融合；（5）经济证券化。就像最近几本著名的书一样，比如Susan L.Shirk的《越权：中国如何破坏其和平崛起》和Elizabeth C.Economy的《中国的世界》。中台的书雄辩地解释说，Xi领导下的中国比他之前的任何一位领导人都更关注安全，因为邓为了经济发展而淡化了安全。从Xi的世界观来看，中国面临着来自内部和外部的严重危险，并挫败了这些危险，《中华人民共和国战略分析》，2023年第47卷，第1期，79-81，https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2023.2176060
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2188530
S. Varma
I T wo phenomenal developments characterized the change in the international system in the years after the Second World War: (i) the spread of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and (ii) the rise of a Third World, with its pluralization of political systems, economic forms and social doctrines. While the former is an important factor in the North–South relationship, the latter development has brought about new changes in the international economic system. While not exercising any direct political power, the MNCs are economic giants, mostly belonging to the United States. The emergence of more than 500 MNCs has drastically changed the character of the international system, and while academics continue to discuss whether they are benevolent giants engaged in the task of abolishing poverty and creating a world community, or parasites preying upon the life-blood of the host country, they are spreading their economic tentacles. The MNCs have become the dominant actors in the international system, and several of them today exercise more collective influence than most of the nation states. However, it would be incorrect to regard American MNCs as a tool of American imperialism. They are quite capable of undertaking policies independently of the US Government. Nor are the MNCs completely independent actors, capable of pursuing objectives incompatible with the US national interest. The US Government and the American MNCs function independently of each other, though occasionally the former adopts policies and positions in the field of international relations, which suit the interests of MNCs. In spite of a plurality of States replacing bipolarity in the political field, economic power continues to emanate from the United States. While the socialist countries have been able to resist political and military pressures, including the nuclear might of the United States, they seem to have willingly accepted the economic influence of the multinationals. The Cold War has been replaced by détente in the political field, and cooperation between the two Super Powers is more pronounced in the economic field. The extensive trade agreements signed between the United States and the From the Archives
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2176061
B. Poornima
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2176063
Sunil Khatri
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2179750
Shafat Yousuf, Rafiullah Azmi
Abstract The killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 again brought the religio-cultural significance of ‘martyrdom’ into limelight in Iran. He got recognized as the ‘Defender-Martyr of Holy Shrine’ given his role against ISIS in protecting the Shi’i holy shrines. This article analyses the relationship between ‘shrines and ‘martyrdom’ in Iran’s strategy against ISIS. It uses the strategic culture approach to understand Iran’s threat perception of ISIS and how the narratives of ‘defence of shrines’ and ‘martyrdom-seeking’ reinforce each other in Iran’s support to the ‘Defenders of Holy Shrines’. It analyses socialization in the Shi’i religious culture on the part of the Iranian policy elite, which influenced Iran’s strategic preferences against ISIS.
{"title":"Iran’s Strategic Behaviour Against ISIS: Religio-Cultural Context of Shrines and Martyrdom","authors":"Shafat Yousuf, Rafiullah Azmi","doi":"10.1080/09700161.2023.2179750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2023.2179750","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 again brought the religio-cultural significance of ‘martyrdom’ into limelight in Iran. He got recognized as the ‘Defender-Martyr of Holy Shrine’ given his role against ISIS in protecting the Shi’i holy shrines. This article analyses the relationship between ‘shrines and ‘martyrdom’ in Iran’s strategy against ISIS. It uses the strategic culture approach to understand Iran’s threat perception of ISIS and how the narratives of ‘defence of shrines’ and ‘martyrdom-seeking’ reinforce each other in Iran’s support to the ‘Defenders of Holy Shrines’. It analyses socialization in the Shi’i religious culture on the part of the Iranian policy elite, which influenced Iran’s strategic preferences against ISIS.","PeriodicalId":45012,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Analysis","volume":"47 1","pages":"1 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47606739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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