Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.1163/15718069-bja10040
T. Tieku, Megan Payler
This article explores the working relationship between the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in mediating conflicts in West Africa and the Sahel regions. We argue that through the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the UN, ECOWAS and the AU are working on mediation efforts to transcend traditional conceptualizations of the relationship between the world body and regional organizations. We show that the partnership is grounded on the logic of subsidiarity, informality, elite networks, technical competence, soft skills, and robust social trust. For heuristic purposes, we call the six principles the Chambas Formula, with reference to the centrality of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, and the emergence and consistent application of the principles in the mediation setting in West Africa and the Sahel regions.
{"title":"From Paternalism to the Chambas Formula for Mediation: Conceptualizing Cooperation between the UN and Regional Organizations in Mediating Conflicts","authors":"T. Tieku, Megan Payler","doi":"10.1163/15718069-bja10040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-bja10040","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article explores the working relationship between the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in mediating conflicts in West Africa and the Sahel regions. We argue that through the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the UN, ECOWAS and the AU are working on mediation efforts to transcend traditional conceptualizations of the relationship between the world body and regional organizations. We show that the partnership is grounded on the logic of subsidiarity, informality, elite networks, technical competence, soft skills, and robust social trust. For heuristic purposes, we call the six principles the Chambas Formula, with reference to the centrality of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, and the emergence and consistent application of the principles in the mediation setting in West Africa and the Sahel regions.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41473850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-15DOI: 10.1163/15718069-bja10041
Julian Bergmann
This article examines UN–EU cooperation over peace mediation. It compares their conceptual approaches to peace mediation and the evolution of their institutional capacities, demonstrating that the EU has learned from the UN, while actively supporting the strengthening of UN mediation capacity. The most important difference concerns the embeddedness of mediation in a broader foreign policy agenda in the case of the EU compared to the UN. The article also examines models of EU–UN cooperation in mediation practice. Drawing on an overview of cases of UN–EU cooperation, the article develops a typology of the constellations through which the two organizations have engaged with and supported each other. A case study on the Geneva International Discussions on South Ossetia and Abkhazia investigates the effectiveness of this coordination. The findings point to a high degree of effectiveness, although this has not yet translated into tangible mediation outcomes.
{"title":"“Sisters in Peace”: Analyzing the Cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union in Peace Mediation","authors":"Julian Bergmann","doi":"10.1163/15718069-bja10041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-bja10041","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article examines UN–EU cooperation over peace mediation. It compares their conceptual approaches to peace mediation and the evolution of their institutional capacities, demonstrating that the EU has learned from the UN, while actively supporting the strengthening of UN mediation capacity. The most important difference concerns the embeddedness of mediation in a broader foreign policy agenda in the case of the EU compared to the UN. The article also examines models of EU–UN cooperation in mediation practice. Drawing on an overview of cases of UN–EU cooperation, the article develops a typology of the constellations through which the two organizations have engaged with and supported each other. A case study on the Geneva International Discussions on South Ossetia and Abkhazia investigates the effectiveness of this coordination. The findings point to a high degree of effectiveness, although this has not yet translated into tangible mediation outcomes.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48270999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1163/15718069-bja10035
B. Steiner
This article pits two diplomatic strategies in competition for policy officials’ support. Distributive strategies promote one party’s goals at the expense of another. Integrative strategies promote goals that are in conflict with those of another state. The focus is strategy choice and strategy’s bargaining potential of less developed countries (LDC) coalitions in the GATT/WTO regime. Amrita Narlikar, whose study of LDC coalitions is relied upon here, finds that many LDC states employ distributive strategy because of asymmetric structure, which emphasizes the gap between LDC and developed state capabilities, yet she critiques that strategy as ineffective in supporting LDC objectives. This disconnect is probed in this article, which concludes that LDC distributive strategy must be improved and that the integrative strategy’s success in attaining LDC objectives can be important enough to override the structural argument for distributive strategy.
{"title":"Developing State Coalition-Building: A Focused Comparison","authors":"B. Steiner","doi":"10.1163/15718069-bja10035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-bja10035","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article pits two diplomatic strategies in competition for policy officials’ support. Distributive strategies promote one party’s goals at the expense of another. Integrative strategies promote goals that are in conflict with those of another state. The focus is strategy choice and strategy’s bargaining potential of less developed countries (LDC) coalitions in the GATT/WTO regime. Amrita Narlikar, whose study of LDC coalitions is relied upon here, finds that many LDC states employ distributive strategy because of asymmetric structure, which emphasizes the gap between LDC and developed state capabilities, yet she critiques that strategy as ineffective in supporting LDC objectives. This disconnect is probed in this article, which concludes that LDC distributive strategy must be improved and that the integrative strategy’s success in attaining LDC objectives can be important enough to override the structural argument for distributive strategy.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49399010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10019
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli
Since the end of the revolution that toppled the rule of Muammar Qaddafi in October 2011, Libya has never known peace. The country descended into civil war with different factions contending for control. In this milieu, the United Nations attempted to mediate an end to the crisis but its efforts have failed to gain traction partly as a result of other mediation initiatives undertaken by several European actors. Sub-regional and continental organizations, including the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the African Union (AU) respectively, that should have taken the lead in the mediation have been absent. Meanwhile, continued fighting has hampered a mediated settlement, and terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda have taken advantage of the situation to establish a presence in the country. In the end, rather than ending the crisis, Libya has provided the ground for competing mediation processes which have prolonged the crisis.
{"title":"The Competing Mediations in the Post-Qaddafi Libyan Political Crisis","authors":"Kasaija Phillip Apuuli","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Since the end of the revolution that toppled the rule of Muammar Qaddafi in October 2011, Libya has never known peace. The country descended into civil war with different factions contending for control. In this milieu, the United Nations attempted to mediate an end to the crisis but its efforts have failed to gain traction partly as a result of other mediation initiatives undertaken by several European actors. Sub-regional and continental organizations, including the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the African Union (AU) respectively, that should have taken the lead in the mediation have been absent. Meanwhile, continued fighting has hampered a mediated settlement, and terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda have taken advantage of the situation to establish a presence in the country. In the end, rather than ending the crisis, Libya has provided the ground for competing mediation processes which have prolonged the crisis.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65002249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10038
Muhammad Imran Mehsud
This article analyzes six major crises in Pakistan’s Indus diplomacy which shaped Pakistan’s water (in)security vis-à-vis upstream rival India on the Indus river system. These include first, when Pakistan failed to comply with the Standstill Agreement of 1947; second, when it signed the Inter-Dominion Agreement; third, when it acquiesced to the Nehru-Lilienthal-favored functional approach to the Indus water dispute in 1951; fourth, when the World Bank Proposal of 1954 apportioned exclusive use of the Western Rivers to Pakistan and the Eastern Rivers to India, but Pakistan delayed accepting the Proposal; fifth, when India secured rights on the Western Rivers in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960; and sixth, several challenges that have emerged under the Indus Waters Treaty.
{"title":"Pakistan’s Indus Diplomacy: From Troubled Waters to a Troubled Treaty","authors":"Muhammad Imran Mehsud","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10038","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article analyzes six major crises in Pakistan’s Indus diplomacy which shaped Pakistan’s water (in)security vis-à-vis upstream rival India on the Indus river system. These include first, when Pakistan failed to comply with the Standstill Agreement of 1947; second, when it signed the Inter-Dominion Agreement; third, when it acquiesced to the Nehru-Lilienthal-favored functional approach to the Indus water dispute in 1951; fourth, when the World Bank Proposal of 1954 apportioned exclusive use of the Western Rivers to Pakistan and the Eastern Rivers to India, but Pakistan delayed accepting the Proposal; fifth, when India secured rights on the Western Rivers in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960; and sixth, several challenges that have emerged under the Indus Waters Treaty.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44331536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10014
Joana Amaral
Peace referendums can be exploited by political actors who may gain politically from opposing a peace process. This article explores how political opposition affects peace negotiations, particularly when a referendum is used to ratify an agreement, through the study of the Colombian peace negotiations between the government of President Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). It finds that the exclusive character of the negotiations, coupled with their confidentiality, contributed to the political opposition’s capacity to influence public opinion against the peace process and to reject the peace agreement in the 2016 referendum. This qualitative study is based on the content analysis of reports, memoirs and interviews with key negotiation delegates, journalists and representatives of the referendum campaigns. It argues that political inclusion in peace negotiations can help prevent referendum spoiling, while public information and education during the negotiations can reduce the impact of disinformation and manipulation campaigns.
{"title":"“Spoiling” in the Public Sphere: Political Opposition to Peace Negotiations and the Referendum Campaign in Colombia","authors":"Joana Amaral","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Peace referendums can be exploited by political actors who may gain politically from opposing a peace process. This article explores how political opposition affects peace negotiations, particularly when a referendum is used to ratify an agreement, through the study of the Colombian peace negotiations between the government of President Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). It finds that the exclusive character of the negotiations, coupled with their confidentiality, contributed to the political opposition’s capacity to influence public opinion against the peace process and to reject the peace agreement in the 2016 referendum. This qualitative study is based on the content analysis of reports, memoirs and interviews with key negotiation delegates, journalists and representatives of the referendum campaigns. It argues that political inclusion in peace negotiations can help prevent referendum spoiling, while public information and education during the negotiations can reduce the impact of disinformation and manipulation campaigns.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49582818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10030
J. Singer
This article tells the story of how and why, when negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords in 1993–95, the author developed the concept of dividing the West Bank into three areas with differing formulas for allocating responsibilities between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in each. The origin of how these areas were named is also discussed. This negotiation demonstrates that parties are prepared to modify ideological positions when detailed and practical options are presented that constitute a hybrid to the parties’ former positions.
{"title":"West Bank Areas A, B and C – How Did They Come into Being?","authors":"J. Singer","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10030","url":null,"abstract":"This article tells the story of how and why, when negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords in 1993–95, the author developed the concept of dividing the West Bank into three areas with differing formulas for allocating responsibilities between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in each. The origin of how these areas were named is also discussed. This negotiation demonstrates that parties are prepared to modify ideological positions when detailed and practical options are presented that constitute a hybrid to the parties’ former positions.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42945983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10036
J. Singer
This article analyzes one procedural prenegotiation issue that may seem minor in comparison to the substantive questions at hand, but can become consequential regarding its impact on the negotiation and its outcome. How the negotiating table is configured and where the parties will sit is the focus of our analysis. We examine how these questions were addressed in advance of key Vietnam and Middle East peace talks. The study assesses various strategies that were employed effectively to blur potential visual manifestations of symbolic and precedential advantage by one side.
{"title":"Where You Sit is Where You Stand: Table Arrangement Battles in Middle East Peace Conferences","authors":"J. Singer","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10036","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes one procedural prenegotiation issue that may seem minor in comparison to the substantive questions at hand, but can become consequential regarding its impact on the negotiation and its outcome. How the negotiating table is configured and where the parties will sit is the focus of our analysis. We examine how these questions were addressed in advance of key Vietnam and Middle East peace talks. The study assesses various strategies that were employed effectively to blur potential visual manifestations of symbolic and precedential advantage by one side.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42137939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10039
D. Lanz
This article seeks to make sense of the dynamics of competition in African mediation processes and to outline approaches for effective cooperation between mediators. To this end, it analyzes four cases of recent peace processes: Sudan (1994–2005), Kenya (2008), Madagascar (2009–2013) and South Sudan (2013–2015). The article identifies four driving forces of competition among mediators: clashing interests of states involved in mediation, overlapping mediation mandates, incompatible norms guiding conflict resolution, and mediators’ lack of performance. These factors risk undermining peace processes unless the involved mediators and guarantors take active steps to mitigate the negative effects of competition. This can be done through ‘hierarchical coordination,’ where a recognized authority takes the lead and allocates roles to other actors, or through ‘collaborative cooperation,’ where partners have unity of purpose and decide on a division of labor based on comparative strengths.
{"title":"Envoy Envy? Competition in African Mediation Processes and Ways to Overcome It","authors":"D. Lanz","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article seeks to make sense of the dynamics of competition in African mediation processes and to outline approaches for effective cooperation between mediators. To this end, it analyzes four cases of recent peace processes: Sudan (1994–2005), Kenya (2008), Madagascar (2009–2013) and South Sudan (2013–2015). The article identifies four driving forces of competition among mediators: clashing interests of states involved in mediation, overlapping mediation mandates, incompatible norms guiding conflict resolution, and mediators’ lack of performance. These factors risk undermining peace processes unless the involved mediators and guarantors take active steps to mitigate the negative effects of competition. This can be done through ‘hierarchical coordination,’ where a recognized authority takes the lead and allocates roles to other actors, or through ‘collaborative cooperation,’ where partners have unity of purpose and decide on a division of labor based on comparative strengths.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48733682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10034
Volker C. Franke, Erich Wolterstorff, Cody W. Wehlan
Grounded in peacebuilding and negotiation literature, we propose a Three Conditions Model that promotes collaborative engagement and can help advance sustainable solutions to complex problems – domestic and international – through self-governing agreements based on the following three conditions: (1) inclusion of, (2) common understanding among, and (3) trust between all prime actors. Collectively, these conditions make the management of complex problems, and of the conflicts arising from them, more effective and sustainable. Using the coronavirus pandemic as an example, we briefly illustrate the nature of complex problems and self-governing agreements, address the inclusion-trust dilemma that mars many negotiations and assess the utility of each condition to address the coronavirus response in the United States more effectively.
{"title":"The Three Conditions: Solving Complex Problems through Self-Governing Agreements","authors":"Volker C. Franke, Erich Wolterstorff, Cody W. Wehlan","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Grounded in peacebuilding and negotiation literature, we propose a Three Conditions Model that promotes collaborative engagement and can help advance sustainable solutions to complex problems – domestic and international – through self-governing agreements based on the following three conditions: (1) inclusion of, (2) common understanding among, and (3) trust between all prime actors. Collectively, these conditions make the management of complex problems, and of the conflicts arising from them, more effective and sustainable. Using the coronavirus pandemic as an example, we briefly illustrate the nature of complex problems and self-governing agreements, address the inclusion-trust dilemma that mars many negotiations and assess the utility of each condition to address the coronavirus response in the United States more effectively.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49087416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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