Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10034
Volker C. Franke, Erich Wolterstorff, Cody W. Wehlan
Grounded in peacebuilding and negotiation literature, we propose a Three Conditions Model that promotes collaborative engagement and can help advance sustainable solutions to complex problems – domestic and international – through self-governing agreements based on the following three conditions: (1) inclusion of, (2) common understanding among, and (3) trust between all prime actors. Collectively, these conditions make the management of complex problems, and of the conflicts arising from them, more effective and sustainable. Using the coronavirus pandemic as an example, we briefly illustrate the nature of complex problems and self-governing agreements, address the inclusion-trust dilemma that mars many negotiations and assess the utility of each condition to address the coronavirus response in the United States more effectively.
{"title":"The Three Conditions: Solving Complex Problems through Self-Governing Agreements","authors":"Volker C. Franke, Erich Wolterstorff, Cody W. Wehlan","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Grounded in peacebuilding and negotiation literature, we propose a Three Conditions Model that promotes collaborative engagement and can help advance sustainable solutions to complex problems – domestic and international – through self-governing agreements based on the following three conditions: (1) inclusion of, (2) common understanding among, and (3) trust between all prime actors. Collectively, these conditions make the management of complex problems, and of the conflicts arising from them, more effective and sustainable. Using the coronavirus pandemic as an example, we briefly illustrate the nature of complex problems and self-governing agreements, address the inclusion-trust dilemma that mars many negotiations and assess the utility of each condition to address the coronavirus response in the United States more effectively.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49087416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10026
J. Singer
From the perspective of a practitioner who was deeply engaged in the negotiations, this article describes how the Israeli-Palestinian Mutual Recognition Agreement was conceived and negotiated. It explains the process of convincing Israeli and Palestinian leaders to accept mutual recognition, overcoming their initial objections. While not nearly as publicized as the 1993 Declaration of Principles agreed at Oslo, this Agreement became the bedrock for all the Oslo Accords, and set the stage for subsequent negotiations.
{"title":"The Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition Agreement","authors":"J. Singer","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000From the perspective of a practitioner who was deeply engaged in the negotiations, this article describes how the Israeli-Palestinian Mutual Recognition Agreement was conceived and negotiated. It explains the process of convincing Israeli and Palestinian leaders to accept mutual recognition, overcoming their initial objections. While not nearly as publicized as the 1993 Declaration of Principles agreed at Oslo, this Agreement became the bedrock for all the Oslo Accords, and set the stage for subsequent negotiations.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-25"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48184971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-28DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10032
G. Bosse, Moritz Höpner, A. Vieira
In bilateral relations and negotiations with the European Union (EU), smaller and economically weaker states are often unable to express their national preferences. Despite their limited bargaining power, however, some Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries obtained significant concessions from the EU. This article analyzes the factors that explain EaP states’ unexpected negotiation success in the context of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Armenia, and enhanced economic partnership with Belarus. We identify negotiation strategies that are crucial to understanding of the puzzle.
{"title":"Persuading the Giant? Explaining Eastern Partnership States’ (Unexpected) Negotiation Success in Relations with the European Union","authors":"G. Bosse, Moritz Höpner, A. Vieira","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10032","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In bilateral relations and negotiations with the European Union (EU), smaller and economically weaker states are often unable to express their national preferences. Despite their limited bargaining power, however, some Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries obtained significant concessions from the EU. This article analyzes the factors that explain EaP states’ unexpected negotiation success in the context of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Armenia, and enhanced economic partnership with Belarus. We identify negotiation strategies that are crucial to understanding of the puzzle.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48853230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-07DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10033
Larry Crump
This study considers the challenge of operating a regional association that includes combatants and adversaries as members, and the response to such challenges. Conflict type, defined by intensity and duration, is located on the vertical axis, and engagement level (international, regional and bilateral) is fixed along the horizontal axis, to distinguish the conditions supporting confidence-building (one of many peacebuilding approaches). The utility of this framework is examined by applying it to the Union for the Mediterranean – a 42-member association operating in a region where conflict is prevalent (Syrian war, Arab – Israeli conflict, Greece – Turkey conflict, and Algeria – Morocco conflict). The study concludes that confidence-building has relevance to hot and cold intractable conflict but not to contemporary war. Curiously, the intractable conflict literature rarely discusses confidence-building and the Euromed literature does not characterize EU behavior in a confidence-building context. The study builds a research agenda to further examine the confidence-building framework.
{"title":"Regional-Based Conflict and Confidence-Building Strategies: The Case of the Union for the Mediterranean","authors":"Larry Crump","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10033","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This study considers the challenge of operating a regional association that includes combatants and adversaries as members, and the response to such challenges. Conflict type, defined by intensity and duration, is located on the vertical axis, and engagement level (international, regional and bilateral) is fixed along the horizontal axis, to distinguish the conditions supporting confidence-building (one of many peacebuilding approaches). The utility of this framework is examined by applying it to the Union for the Mediterranean – a 42-member association operating in a region where conflict is prevalent (Syrian war, Arab – Israeli conflict, Greece – Turkey conflict, and Algeria – Morocco conflict). The study concludes that confidence-building has relevance to hot and cold intractable conflict but not to contemporary war. Curiously, the intractable conflict literature rarely discusses confidence-building and the Euromed literature does not characterize EU behavior in a confidence-building context. The study builds a research agenda to further examine the confidence-building framework.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46760702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-07DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10037
Yuval Benziman
There are conflicts in which the opposing sides perceive and define their adversary as a “non-partner” with whom they are unable or unwilling to negotiate. However, notwithstanding this reciprocal mistrust, negotiate they do. This research fills a theoretical gap in the study of negotiations by mapping five distinct practices of negotiations with a so-called non-partner: firstly, negotiate while claiming that no negotiations are taking place; secondly, use third parties as mediators or what I term “mediators+”; thirdly, negotiate agreements “over the head” of the so-called non-partner; fourthly, act unilaterally; and fifthly, negotiate relatively minor issues. Two alternative negotiation practices are also discussed: one is to negotiate agreements in non-related conflicts that may eventually influence the conflict actually on the table, and the other is to negotiate within the ingroup on the nature of negotiations should they take place. This study uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a test case.
{"title":"Negotiating with a So-called ‘Non-Partner’: Lessons from Palestinian-Israel Negotiation Practices (2000–2020)","authors":"Yuval Benziman","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000There are conflicts in which the opposing sides perceive and define their adversary as a “non-partner” with whom they are unable or unwilling to negotiate. However, notwithstanding this reciprocal mistrust, negotiate they do. This research fills a theoretical gap in the study of negotiations by mapping five distinct practices of negotiations with a so-called non-partner: firstly, negotiate while claiming that no negotiations are taking place; secondly, use third parties as mediators or what I term “mediators+”; thirdly, negotiate agreements “over the head” of the so-called non-partner; fourthly, act unilaterally; and fifthly, negotiate relatively minor issues. Two alternative negotiation practices are also discussed: one is to negotiate agreements in non-related conflicts that may eventually influence the conflict actually on the table, and the other is to negotiate within the ingroup on the nature of negotiations should they take place. This study uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a test case.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48995569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-07DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10024
Allard Duursma
Past research has found that third party pressure makes the signing of a ceasefire more likely, but also more likely to break down. What explains this variation? I argue that third party pressure is more likely to lead to a durable ceasefire if pressure is applied to persuade the conflict parties to continue to negotiate and produce a detailed ceasefire document, whereas pressure solely aimed at making the conflict parties sign a ceasefire document undermines the durability of the ceasefire. A comparison of four ceasefires concluded in Sudan supports this argument. Third party pressure that led to the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire and the Agreement on Security Arrangements helped move the negotiations on security arrangements forward. By contrast, the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement were imposed on the parties without regard for political and technical aspects of the ceasefire. This explains why violence soon resumed.
{"title":"Not All Ceasefires Are Created Equal: The Role of Third Party Manipulation in Sudan’s Major Ceasefire Agreements","authors":"Allard Duursma","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Past research has found that third party pressure makes the signing of a ceasefire more likely, but also more likely to break down. What explains this variation? I argue that third party pressure is more likely to lead to a durable ceasefire if pressure is applied to persuade the conflict parties to continue to negotiate and produce a detailed ceasefire document, whereas pressure solely aimed at making the conflict parties sign a ceasefire document undermines the durability of the ceasefire. A comparison of four ceasefires concluded in Sudan supports this argument. Third party pressure that led to the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire and the Agreement on Security Arrangements helped move the negotiations on security arrangements forward. By contrast, the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement were imposed on the parties without regard for political and technical aspects of the ceasefire. This explains why violence soon resumed.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49063061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-26DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10013
S. Hellmüller
This article analyzes how the internationalization of civil wars influences conflict parties’ consent to UN mediation processes. Illustrated by the UN mediation in Syria, I argue that internationalization influences consent directly by obstructing the advent of a costly stalemate and the parties’ perception of mediation as a ‘way out,’ and indirectly by reducing mediators’ leverage and perceived impartiality thereby limiting their tools to foster consent. The article makes three contributions. First, it presents a novel conceptual framework to understand the impact of internationalization on conflict parties’ consent. Second, it provides a long-term analysis of UN mediation in Syria from 2012–2020. Third, it contributes to a broader discussion about how civil wars end. This is of particular relevance as the prioritization of a political over a military end to civil wars, which was dominant in the early post-Cold War period, is no longer unquestioned.
{"title":"The Challenge of Forging Consent to UN Mediation in Internationalized Civil Wars: The Case of Syria","authors":"S. Hellmüller","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article analyzes how the internationalization of civil wars influences conflict parties’ consent to UN mediation processes. Illustrated by the UN mediation in Syria, I argue that internationalization influences consent directly by obstructing the advent of a costly stalemate and the parties’ perception of mediation as a ‘way out,’ and indirectly by reducing mediators’ leverage and perceived impartiality thereby limiting their tools to foster consent. The article makes three contributions. First, it presents a novel conceptual framework to understand the impact of internationalization on conflict parties’ consent. Second, it provides a long-term analysis of UN mediation in Syria from 2012–2020. Third, it contributes to a broader discussion about how civil wars end. This is of particular relevance as the prioritization of a political over a military end to civil wars, which was dominant in the early post-Cold War period, is no longer unquestioned.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41758376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-05DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10018
J. Plahe, Nitesh Kukreja, S. Ponnamperuma
Under Article 27.3(b) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), all members are required to extend private property rights to life forms. Using official WTO documents, this article analyzes the negotiating positions of WTO members on life patents during a review of Article 27.3(b) which commenced in 1999 and is currently ongoing. Initially, developing countries raised serious ethical concerns regarding life patents, creating a clear North-South divide. However, over time the position of Brazil and India moved away from the ethics of life patents to the prevention of bio-piracy, a position supported by China. Russia too is supportive of life patents. A group of small developing countries have, however, continued to question the morality of life patents despite this “BRIC wall,” changing the dynamics of the negotiations from a North-South divide to one which now includes a South-South divide.
{"title":"Review of Article 27.3(b) and the Patenting of Life Forms: Hitting a BRIC Wall in the WTO?","authors":"J. Plahe, Nitesh Kukreja, S. Ponnamperuma","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Under Article 27.3(b) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), all members are required to extend private property rights to life forms. Using official WTO documents, this article analyzes the negotiating positions of WTO members on life patents during a review of Article 27.3(b) which commenced in 1999 and is currently ongoing. Initially, developing countries raised serious ethical concerns regarding life patents, creating a clear North-South divide. However, over time the position of Brazil and India moved away from the ethics of life patents to the prevention of bio-piracy, a position supported by China. Russia too is supportive of life patents. A group of small developing countries have, however, continued to question the morality of life patents despite this “BRIC wall,” changing the dynamics of the negotiations from a North-South divide to one which now includes a South-South divide.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":"26 1","pages":"289-318"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43499993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-05DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10025
Rachel Xian
Political psychology and social constructivism exist in an “ideational alliance” against realism; however, both have overlooked behavioral conditioning, the basis of animal learning. Through six stages situated in international negotiation behaviors, the theory of Conditioning Constructs shows how behavioral conditioning can take parties from specific to diffuse reciprocity, rationalist to constructivist cooperation, and crisis to durable peace. In stages 1, 2 and 3, parties use negotiated agreements to exit prisoner’s dilemmas, continuously reinforce cooperation during agreement implementation, and satiate to rewards as initial implementation finalizes. In stages 4, 5 and 6, parties receive fresh rewards with new negotiations, undergo intermittent reinforcement with periodic agreements thereafter, and finally attribute cooperative behavior to actor constructs. Conditioning Constructs demonstrates that agency is possible in socially constructed structures through willful participation in conditioning through negotiation; and that, while Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy is suited to initial cooperation, intermittent reinforcement better preserves late-stage cooperation.
{"title":"Conditioning Constructs: A Psychological Theory of International Negotiated Cooperation","authors":"Rachel Xian","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Political psychology and social constructivism exist in an “ideational alliance” against realism; however, both have overlooked behavioral conditioning, the basis of animal learning. Through six stages situated in international negotiation behaviors, the theory of Conditioning Constructs shows how behavioral conditioning can take parties from specific to diffuse reciprocity, rationalist to constructivist cooperation, and crisis to durable peace. In stages 1, 2 and 3, parties use negotiated agreements to exit prisoner’s dilemmas, continuously reinforce cooperation during agreement implementation, and satiate to rewards as initial implementation finalizes. In stages 4, 5 and 6, parties receive fresh rewards with new negotiations, undergo intermittent reinforcement with periodic agreements thereafter, and finally attribute cooperative behavior to actor constructs. Conditioning Constructs demonstrates that agency is possible in socially constructed structures through willful participation in conditioning through negotiation; and that, while Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy is suited to initial cooperation, intermittent reinforcement better preserves late-stage cooperation.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":"26 1","pages":"319-356"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45025633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-08DOI: 10.1163/15718069-BJA10029
Ayal Feinberg, J. Greig
The literature on ethnic kin-groups primarily focuses on their role in perpetuating conflict. Less attention has been devoted to how ethnic kin-groups might encourage mediation in disputes affecting their kin in other nations. We argue that transborder kin-groups’ collective concern for the welfare of their fellow members in other states can motivate interstate mediation efforts. Utilizing the Ethnic Power Relations and the Issue Correlates of War datasets, we examine how transborder kin-group connections shape the likelihood of mediation, as well as who provides it. Our findings suggest that the deeper the network of transborder kin-group connections among target states of territorial disputes, the more likely mediation is to occur. Alternatively, challenger transborder kin-group connections reduce the likelihood of mediation. While transborder kin-group connections help explain the likelihood of mediation, mediation is often not provided by the connected third-party state. Instead, these connections promote mediation from international organizations, particularly regional organizations.
{"title":"Does the Distribution of Ethnic Kin-Groups Explain Mediation in Territorial Conflicts?","authors":"Ayal Feinberg, J. Greig","doi":"10.1163/15718069-BJA10029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10029","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The literature on ethnic kin-groups primarily focuses on their role in perpetuating conflict. Less attention has been devoted to how ethnic kin-groups might encourage mediation in disputes affecting their kin in other nations. We argue that transborder kin-groups’ collective concern for the welfare of their fellow members in other states can motivate interstate mediation efforts. Utilizing the Ethnic Power Relations and the Issue Correlates of War datasets, we examine how transborder kin-group connections shape the likelihood of mediation, as well as who provides it. Our findings suggest that the deeper the network of transborder kin-group connections among target states of territorial disputes, the more likely mediation is to occur. Alternatively, challenger transborder kin-group connections reduce the likelihood of mediation. While transborder kin-group connections help explain the likelihood of mediation, mediation is often not provided by the connected third-party state. Instead, these connections promote mediation from international organizations, particularly regional organizations.","PeriodicalId":45224,"journal":{"name":"International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice","volume":" ","pages":"1-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47212372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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