Pub Date : 2023-11-07DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2264692
Robin Liefferinckx
AbstractAlthough World War II intelligence and action services are an important research topic in current Belgian intelligence studies, researchers until recently never focused solely on the Benoît network in their studies. However, this organization was of vital importance for the successful transmission of the intelligence that had been gathered by the Belgian government and State Security in London. One of Benoît’s key members was Albert Van Buylaere who was considered “brilliant” by his superiors. This article gives an overview of his motives and actions and gives a first impression of why he was so sought after by various intelligence agencies during the Cold War. After a brief discussion on the organization and activities of this network and the main events around it, the focus will shift to his activities. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Kees Schuyt, Universitair verzet (1940–1945), maatschappelijk verzet en de waarde van wetenschap: Een drieluik (Den Haag: Boom Lemma Uitgevers, 2012), p. 18; Marc Cools, “Universitair verzet, inlichtingen en actie,” in Memorial Volume Intelligence and Action Agents, edited by Roger Coekelbers, Marc Cools, Robin Libert, Veerle Pashley, Jaak Raes, David Stans, and Renaat Vandecasteele (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2015), pp. 95–96.2 Fernand Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45: de inlichtings- en actiediensten in België (Tielt: Lannoo, 1992), p. 19.3 For an overview of the activities of each group, see, for example, Emmanuel Debruyne, La guerre secrète des espions belges 1940–1944 (Bruxelles: Racine, 2008); Marie-Pierre d’Udekem d’Acoz, Voor Koning & vaderland: De Belgische adel in het verzet (Tielt: Lannoo, 2013); Cools, “Universitair verzet, inlichtingen en actie.”4 A period known as the “repression” and “epuration: in Belgium (1944–1949).5 Michael Warner, “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, edited by Loch K. Johnson (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 21-22; Emmanuel Debruyne, “La maison de verre: Agents et réseaux de renseignements en Belgique. 1940-1944” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain, 2006), p. 29.6 Peter Jackson, “Enquiries into the ‘Secret State,’” in Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State, edited by R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 3.7 Jean Fosty, “De Belgische netten in Frankrijk,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Vol. 2 (1972), p. 220.8 Jackson, “Enquiries into the ‘Secret State,’” p. 3.9 Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45, p. 48; Etienne Verhoeyen, België Bezet 1940–1944: Een synthese (Brussel: BRTN-Educatieve Uitgaven, 1993), p. 261.10 Free translation: “A bewildering spectacle of people gathering intelligence, grouping together, and forming a network, but not knowing how to pass on that information.” Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45, p. 21.11 Francis Balace, “Des milliers d’yeux dans la nuit:
虽然二战情报和行动服务是当前比利时情报研究的一个重要研究课题，但直到最近，研究人员才将研究重点放在beno<e:1>网络上。然而，这个组织对于比利时政府和伦敦国家安全局收集的情报的成功传递至关重要。beno<e:1>的主要成员之一是阿尔伯特·范·拜莱尔，他的上司认为他“才华横溢”。本文概述了他的动机和行为，并给出了他在冷战期间受到各种情报机构追捧的第一印象。在简要讨论了该网络的组织和活动以及围绕该网络的主要事件之后，重点将转移到他的活动上。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Kees Schuyt, Universitair verzet (1940-1945)， maatschappelijk verzet en de waarde van wetenschap: Een drieluik (Den Haag: Boom Lemma Uitgevers, 2012)， p. 18;马克·库尔斯，“Universitair verzet, inlichtingen en active”，收录于情报与行动代理纪念册，由罗杰·科克尔伯斯、马克·库尔斯、罗宾·利伯特、维尔勒·帕什利、Jaak Raes、大卫·斯坦斯和Renaat Vandecasteele编辑(安特威彭:马克卢，2015年)，第95-96.2页。Lannoo, 1992)，第19.3页，对每个小组的活动进行概述，例如，见Emmanuel Debruyne, 1940-1944年比利时间谍的秘密活动(布鲁塞尔:拉辛，2008年);Marie-Pierre d 'Udekem d 'Acoz, Voor Koning & vaderland: De Belgische adel in the verzet (Tielt: Lannoo, 2013);“很酷，”Universitair verzzet说，“很活跃。”被称为“镇压”和“清洗”的时期:比利时(1944-1949)Michael Warner，“智力研究的来源和方法”，见Loch K. Johnson编辑的《智力研究手册》(伦敦:Routledge出版社，2007)，第21-22页;Emmanuel Debruyne，“La maison de verre: Agents et r<s:1> seaux de renseignements en Belgique, 1940-1944”(博士论文，Louvain天主教大学，2006)，第29.6页，Peter Jackson，“对‘秘密国家’的调查”，收录于《情报档案探索:对秘密国家的调查》，由R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson和Len Scott编辑(伦敦:Jean Fosty，“De Belgische netten in Frankrijk”，Bijdragen tot De geschiedenis van De Tweede Wereldoorlog, Vol. 2 (1972)， p. 220.8 Jackson，“对‘秘密国家’的调查”，p. 3.9 Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ' 40 - ' 45, p. 48;Etienne Verhoeyen, België Bezet 1940-1944: even synthese(布鲁塞尔:brn - educatieve Uitgaven出版社，1993)，第261.10页意译:“一个令人困惑的景象，人们收集情报，聚集在一起，形成一个网络，但不知道如何传递这些信息。”斯特鲁布，Geheime oorlog ' 40- ' 45，第21.11页。弗朗西斯·巴勒斯，“军队的军事行动:1940-1944年的军事行动的起源和类型学”，收录于《情报和行动特工》纪念册，由罗杰·科克尔伯斯、马克·库尔斯、罗宾·利伯特、维尔勒·帕什利、雅克·拉斯、大卫·斯坦斯和雷纳特·范德卡斯蒂尔编辑(安特卫普:马克卢，2015年)，第77.12页。Robin Libert，“In vogelvlucht: De geschiedenis van 175 jaar Veiligheid van De Staat”，载于De Staatsveiligheid:超过175 jaar Veiligheid van De Staat的论文，由Marc Cools, Koen Dassen, Robin Libert和Paul Ponsaers编辑(布鲁塞尔:Politeia, 2005)，第37.14页。有关该协议的更多信息，请参见:Etienne Verhoeyen和Emmanuel Debruyne，“Les annacimes londoniennes”。《情报与行动特工》，收录于《情报与行动特工》纪念卷，由Roger Coekelbers、Marc Cools、Robin Libert、Veerle Pashley、Jaak Raes、David Stans和Renaat Vandecasteele(安特卫普:Maklu, 2015)编辑，第61-63.15页。Funkabwehr (Funkabwehr der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)是一个无线电反情报机构，成立于1940年，由Oberstleutnant(相当于德国中校)Hans Kopp领导。在整个战争期间，Funkabwehr作为德国主要的信号情报组织，主要是监视和拦截来自被占领土的无线电传输。此外，Funkabwehr的传输本身向盟军提供的信息也很少。他们的x型设备是谜机的一部分，谜机是一种连布莱切利公园的天才们都觉得极难破译的编码系统Paul Louyet, België in de Tweede Wereldoorlog: Deel 4: heet verzet (Kapellen: de Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1984)， 51.17页。Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ' 40 - ' 45, pp. 20-22。然而，这里应该做一个评论。 由walth<s:1> dew<s:1>领导的克拉伦斯特遣队具有高度的专业精神。例如，它是唯一一个拥有真正“董事会”的组织。这可以从历史的角度来解释:克拉伦斯是第一次世界大战情报网络La Dame Blanche的继任者，该网络在内战期间被转变为SIS的“留守网络”，名为“观察军团”。凭借第一次世界大战的经验和与英国的关系，克拉伦斯能够展示出任何其他组织(包括外国组织)无法比拟的效率。克拉伦斯，被伊曼纽尔·德布鲁因恰如其分地描述为“克拉伦斯，一路前进”，因此成为被占领土上所有其他情报组织的榜样利伯特，“在道德上”，第23-48页;Verhoeyen and Debruyne， < Les annesemonines >，第47-68页。罗马人已经使用了这种策略，因为拥有帝国印章的信使可以自由进入城市。这些信使除了履行公务外，还经常递送私人信件和传递有价值的情报Robin Lieffe
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Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2257553
Davide Bellomo
AbstractFor those who command the machine, regulate the satellite, or handle operations in the field, everything depends on the brain, on the human being. According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the sixth domain where conflict will occur and peace will have to be managed is the cognitive one, made official in 2021. It becomes the most important of all. In the end, the match will be won by whoever will have practitioners, analysts, or those deployed in the field with the best brain. Experiments are being carried out in some countries where the human brain gets physically connected to the machine so that the machine can learn how the human brain works. However, a machine will learn from that person’s brain, with all their limitations, biases, and fears, therefore already having numerous flaws in its system, without considering the ethical disputableness of this kind of thing. There is a way to win in the sixth domain: enhancing the intelligence practitioners’ capabilities, which is doable thanks to the latest studies and techniques developed. It is, therefore, possible, without medicines, drugs, or electrical and electronic equipment, to augment the mental capability and plasticity of those who will have to win these challenges. Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Bernard Claverie, Baptiste Prébot, Norbou Buchler, and François Du Cluzel, “Cognitive Warfare,” in First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (Bordeaux: NATO-STO Collaboration Support Office, with the support of NATO-ACT Innovation Hub, Bordeaux ENSC, the French Armed Forces Joint Staff and the Region Nouvelle Aquitaine, 2021).2 Ibid.3 Daniel J. Siegel, La mente relazionale: Neurobiologia dell’esperienza interpersonale [The Relational Mind: Neurobiology of the Interpersonal Experience] (Milan: Raffello Cortina Editore, 2013).4 Sabrina Magris, Perla Di Gioia, Ilaria Lamonato, Livia Stefania Mihalache, and Davide Bellomo, “To Have Alternatives, You Must Be Able to Think of Them,” The Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence, Vol. 28, No. 2–3 (2020), pp. 68–82.5 The physiological bias is the elaboration of internal or external information aimed to cover up what is missed of the real information. The brain creates an ostensible version of what happens—based on the information it has already stored, without codifying new information—because it does not have the reality of what happens. At the neural level, it indicates the deficiency of substances that enable the connections between the parts of the brain involved, causing the noncodification of the information received. Davide Bellomo, What Is Biased Can Be Unbiased: The Neurological Process of Identification and Elimination of Biases Held by Professionals and Victims. Study Conducted Using Subject’s Brain Mapping to Evaluate Biases Caused by Trauma, Culture or Education. Poster presentation, End Violence Against Women International Conference
摘要对于那些指挥机器、调节卫星或处理野外作业的人来说，一切都取决于大脑，取决于人。根据北大西洋公约组织(North Atlantic Treaty Organization)的说法，2021年正式确定的第六个将发生冲突并必须管理和平的领域是认知领域。它成为最重要的。最终，谁拥有从业者、分析师，谁在该领域拥有最聪明的头脑，谁就能赢得这场比赛。一些国家正在进行实验，将人脑与机器物理连接起来，这样机器就可以学习人脑的工作原理。然而，机器将从人的大脑中学习，尽管有局限性、偏见和恐惧，因此它的系统已经有了许多缺陷，而不考虑这种事情的伦理争议。在第六领域取胜的方法是:提高情报从业者的能力，这是可行的，这得益于最新的研究和技术的发展。因此，不需要药物、药物或电子电气设备，就有可能增强那些必须赢得这些挑战的人的心智能力和可塑性。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Bernard Claverie, Baptiste pracimbot, Norbou Buchler和franois Du Cluzel，“认知战”，在第一次北约认知战科学会议上(波尔多:北约- sto协作支持办公室，在北约- act创新中心，波尔多ENSC，法国武装部队联合参谋部和新阿基坦地区的支持下，2021)4 . Daniel J. Siegel, La mente relazionale: Neurobiologia dell 'esperienza interpersonale[关系思维:人际体验的神经生物学](米兰:Raffello Cortina Editore, 2013)Sabrina Magris, Perla Di Gioia, Ilaria Lamonato, Livia Stefania Mihalache和Davide Bellomo，“要有替代方案，你必须能够想到它们”，《澳大利亚专业情报研究所杂志》，第28卷，第2-3期(2020年)，第68-82.5页生理偏见是对内部或外部信息的阐述，旨在掩盖真实信息中遗漏的内容。大脑根据它已经储存的信息创造了一个表面上的版本，而没有编纂新的信息——因为它不知道发生了什么。在神经层面上，它表明缺乏能够连接大脑相关部分的物质，导致接收到的信息不编码。大卫·贝洛莫，有偏见的东西可以是无偏见的:识别和消除专业人员和受害者持有的偏见的神经学过程。利用受试者的大脑映射来评估创伤、文化或教育造成的偏见。5 . 2018年4月3日至5日，美国芝加哥，“制止对妇女的暴力行为国际会议”海报展示Ariel Rokem和Merav Ahissar，“先天失明个体的认知和听觉能力的相互作用”，《神经心理学》，Vol. 47, No. 3 (2009)， pp. 843-848。https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.12.0177同上8 Giacomo Rizzolatti, Luciano Fadiga, Vittorio Gallese和Leonardo Fogassi，“前运动皮层和运动动作的识别”，《大脑研究》。认知脑研究，第3卷，第2期(1996)，第131-141页。https://doi.org/10.1016/0926 - 6410 (95) 00038 - 0;Giacomo Rizzolatti和Laila Craighero，“镜像神经元系统”，《神经科学年鉴》，第27卷，第1期(2004)，第169-192页。https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.1442309 Wayne L. Silver和Thomas E. Finger，“外周鼻三叉神经化学感受的解剖和电生理基础”，《纽约科学院年鉴》，Vol. 1170 (2009)， pp. 202-205。https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.03894.x10 Christopher S. Von Bartheld，“末梢神经及其与球外“嗅觉”投射的关系:来自七鳃鳗和肺鱼的经验”，《显微镜研究与技术》，第65卷，第1-2期(2004)，第13-24页。https://doi.org/10.1002/jemt.20095。Wolfgang Klimesch，“大脑和脑体振荡的频率架构:分析”，欧洲神经科学杂志，Vol. 48 (2018)， pp. 2431-2453。https://doi.org/10.1111/ejn.14192;Joshua H. Balsters, Ian H. Robertson和Vince D. Calhoun，“BOLD频率功率指数工作记忆性能”，《人类神经科学前沿》，第7卷(2013)。https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00207;Charles J. Wysocki和George Preti，“人类信息素的事实、谬误、恐惧和挫折”，《解剖记录》A卷281(2004)，第1201-1211页。https://doi.org/10.1002/ar.a.2012512西格尔，《关系之门》记忆技术，双眼技术，以及与突触重新开放相关的技术。 [14]卢吉·阿诺里和保罗·勒格伦兹，《普通心理学》(博洛尼亚:大众心理学，2001).15“设计意味着一个地方，一个主体所在的地方，如何改变主体的行为。”此外，“设计被转化为谎言的设计，谎言的设计基于存在于地点、物体、文字和图像之间的推理，基于个人如何根据他进入和/或沉浸的地方修改他的行为。”萨布丽娜·马格里斯，La svolta apicale: Come cambiare La mentalitcome aumentare le capacitcomdi leadership[顶点转向:如何改变心态和增强领导技能](Castelfranco Veneto: Panda edition, 2022)几十年来，人们一直认为视力是一种器官，但事实证明视力并不是这种器官。眼见是骗人的。大脑看不见的地方，它就发明，而听觉和嗅觉器官的错误率较低19 .大卫·贝洛莫，“研究成果的介绍”，École国际大学课堂，意大利罗马，2022.18年3月。查尔斯·达尔文，自然选择的进化论(1859)20 .世界卫生组织，《世界卫生统计报告》(2021年)Gaetano Kanizsa，“Margini quasi- perceptivi in campi con stimulmolazione omogenea”[准知觉边缘在均匀刺激场]，Rivista di Psicologia[心理学杂志]，卷49，第1期(1955)，第7-30页;Gaetano Kanizsa和Walter Gerbino，《情态完成:看见还是思考?》Kenneth N. Stevens和Sheila Ellen Blumstein，“顿音发音位置的不变线索”，《美国声学学会杂志》，第64卷，第5期(1978)，第1358-1368页。https://doi.org/10.1121/1.382102;Kenneth
{"title":"Auditory and Olfactory Copying in Intelligence: Brain and Thought Modifications Beyond the Word","authors":"Davide Bellomo","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2257553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2257553","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractFor those who command the machine, regulate the satellite, or handle operations in the field, everything depends on the brain, on the human being. According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the sixth domain where conflict will occur and peace will have to be managed is the cognitive one, made official in 2021. It becomes the most important of all. In the end, the match will be won by whoever will have practitioners, analysts, or those deployed in the field with the best brain. Experiments are being carried out in some countries where the human brain gets physically connected to the machine so that the machine can learn how the human brain works. However, a machine will learn from that person’s brain, with all their limitations, biases, and fears, therefore already having numerous flaws in its system, without considering the ethical disputableness of this kind of thing. There is a way to win in the sixth domain: enhancing the intelligence practitioners’ capabilities, which is doable thanks to the latest studies and techniques developed. It is, therefore, possible, without medicines, drugs, or electrical and electronic equipment, to augment the mental capability and plasticity of those who will have to win these challenges. Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Bernard Claverie, Baptiste Prébot, Norbou Buchler, and François Du Cluzel, “Cognitive Warfare,” in First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (Bordeaux: NATO-STO Collaboration Support Office, with the support of NATO-ACT Innovation Hub, Bordeaux ENSC, the French Armed Forces Joint Staff and the Region Nouvelle Aquitaine, 2021).2 Ibid.3 Daniel J. Siegel, La mente relazionale: Neurobiologia dell’esperienza interpersonale [The Relational Mind: Neurobiology of the Interpersonal Experience] (Milan: Raffello Cortina Editore, 2013).4 Sabrina Magris, Perla Di Gioia, Ilaria Lamonato, Livia Stefania Mihalache, and Davide Bellomo, “To Have Alternatives, You Must Be Able to Think of Them,” The Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence, Vol. 28, No. 2–3 (2020), pp. 68–82.5 The physiological bias is the elaboration of internal or external information aimed to cover up what is missed of the real information. The brain creates an ostensible version of what happens—based on the information it has already stored, without codifying new information—because it does not have the reality of what happens. At the neural level, it indicates the deficiency of substances that enable the connections between the parts of the brain involved, causing the noncodification of the information received. Davide Bellomo, What Is Biased Can Be Unbiased: The Neurological Process of Identification and Elimination of Biases Held by Professionals and Victims. Study Conducted Using Subject’s Brain Mapping to Evaluate Biases Caused by Trauma, Culture or Education. Poster presentation, End Violence Against Women International Conference ","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135933158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2261824
Eleni Braat
Military dictatorships critically rely on the armed forces and intelligence agencies for the maintenance of their regime. They strengthen these through the allocation of substantial staff and personal resources. We know little about the behavior of intelligence and security services in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This article examines the Greek Intelligence Service (KYP) and, since 1986, the National Intelligence Service as its successor. A principal ingredient for the democratic embedment of the service was a break with this dictatorial past and, consequently, its demilitarization. This article shows that the de facto demilitarization of the service was a protracted process that was largely independent from the de jure formal demilitarization in 1986. It both preceded and lagged the legislative decision in 1986. This article particularly focusses on personnel policies aimed at distancing the service from its former ties to the junta regime (1967–1974), the “old KYP.” Its methodological contribution lies in its reliance on original, oral history interviews with former employees of the service and in its systematic analysis of newspaper publications for research on the KYP. I argue and show that internal organizational factors, most notably professionalization and shifting responsibilities, rather than external factors such as party politics or a prodemocratic ideological vision, are the key explanations for a change in the otherwise persistent military staffing of the intelligence service.
{"title":"Democratization of Intelligence: Demilitarizing the Greek Intelligence Service after the Junta","authors":"Eleni Braat","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2261824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2261824","url":null,"abstract":"Military dictatorships critically rely on the armed forces and intelligence agencies for the maintenance of their regime. They strengthen these through the allocation of substantial staff and personal resources. We know little about the behavior of intelligence and security services in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This article examines the Greek Intelligence Service (KYP) and, since 1986, the National Intelligence Service as its successor. A principal ingredient for the democratic embedment of the service was a break with this dictatorial past and, consequently, its demilitarization. This article shows that the de facto demilitarization of the service was a protracted process that was largely independent from the de jure formal demilitarization in 1986. It both preceded and lagged the legislative decision in 1986. This article particularly focusses on personnel policies aimed at distancing the service from its former ties to the junta regime (1967–1974), the “old KYP.” Its methodological contribution lies in its reliance on original, oral history interviews with former employees of the service and in its systematic analysis of newspaper publications for research on the KYP. I argue and show that internal organizational factors, most notably professionalization and shifting responsibilities, rather than external factors such as party politics or a prodemocratic ideological vision, are the key explanations for a change in the otherwise persistent military staffing of the intelligence service.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135933167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2261823
Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández
{"title":"Spanish Intelligence in the Early Days of Late-Francoism: Fault Lines and Continuity","authors":"Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2261823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2261823","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135871163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-30DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2259743
Kevin Riehle
{"title":"Flood of Erroneous Details on Soviet IntelligenceBoris Volodarsky <b>:</b> <i>The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police: Lenin and History’s Greatest Heist 1917–1927</i> Frontline Books, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2023, 393 p., £25.00 (hardbound).","authors":"Kevin Riehle","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2259743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2259743","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136104859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2255507
Simon Oleszkiewicz, Dominick J. Atkinson, Steven Kleinman, Christian A. Meissner
Drawing on the scientific literature on trust and the experiences of distinguished interviewers, two primary trust-building tactics with potential application in investigative and intelligence interviewing were identified and assessed for their efficacy in this context. Trust-building tactics that demonstrate trustworthiness and demonstrate a willingness to trust portray the interviewer as reliable and dependable (i.e., perceptions of cognitive trust) as well as convey goodwill and warmth (i.e., perceptions of affective trust) were viewed as likely to increase a source’s willingness to disclose critical information. Across three experiments, both tactics were found to be influential in engaging the reciprocity principle in a manner that elicited the sources’ cooperation and enhanced information yield. However, perceptions of cognitive trust were found to function as a direct encouragement to reveal information. In contrast, perceptions of affective trust first facilitated a willingness to cooperate that had the potential for subsequently manifesting as an instrumental form of cooperation.
{"title":"Building Trust to Enhance Elicitation","authors":"Simon Oleszkiewicz, Dominick J. Atkinson, Steven Kleinman, Christian A. Meissner","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2255507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2255507","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on the scientific literature on trust and the experiences of distinguished interviewers, two primary trust-building tactics with potential application in investigative and intelligence interviewing were identified and assessed for their efficacy in this context. Trust-building tactics that demonstrate trustworthiness and demonstrate a willingness to trust portray the interviewer as reliable and dependable (i.e., perceptions of cognitive trust) as well as convey goodwill and warmth (i.e., perceptions of affective trust) were viewed as likely to increase a source’s willingness to disclose critical information. Across three experiments, both tactics were found to be influential in engaging the reciprocity principle in a manner that elicited the sources’ cooperation and enhanced information yield. However, perceptions of cognitive trust were found to function as a direct encouragement to reveal information. In contrast, perceptions of affective trust first facilitated a willingness to cooperate that had the potential for subsequently manifesting as an instrumental form of cooperation.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-10DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2257544
Simon Oleszkiewicz, Pär Anders Granhag, Timothy J. Luke
In the United States, it is permissible to place an undercover police officer in the jail cell with a suspect. This tactical move is rare and launched only for serious crimes, and it takes place before any charges have been filed. This tactic goes under the name of Perkins operations, from the case ruling that if an individual speaks freely to someone whom they believe is a fellow inmate it is allowed to take advantage of their misplaced trust (Illinois v. Perkins, 1990). In this study, we examine 22 Perkins operations, 60 hours of secretly taped interactions in the cells, and we describe and categorize the different approaches and tactics that the undercover officers used. Based on the descriptive analysis, we conceptualize two pathways to information elicitation (direct and relational) and explore the undercover officers’ use of risky interview tactics. The findings suggest that undercover officers use four broader approaches to establish relationships and gather information, and we were able to identify only a few instances of risky tactics in this sample. The relevance of the findings for human intelligence gathering and counterintelligence are discussed.
{"title":"Perkins Operations: Tactics Used in Undercover Interactions","authors":"Simon Oleszkiewicz, Pär Anders Granhag, Timothy J. Luke","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2257544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2257544","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, it is permissible to place an undercover police officer in the jail cell with a suspect. This tactical move is rare and launched only for serious crimes, and it takes place before any charges have been filed. This tactic goes under the name of Perkins operations, from the case ruling that if an individual speaks freely to someone whom they believe is a fellow inmate it is allowed to take advantage of their misplaced trust (Illinois v. Perkins, 1990). In this study, we examine 22 Perkins operations, 60 hours of secretly taped interactions in the cells, and we describe and categorize the different approaches and tactics that the undercover officers used. Based on the descriptive analysis, we conceptualize two pathways to information elicitation (direct and relational) and explore the undercover officers’ use of risky interview tactics. The findings suggest that undercover officers use four broader approaches to establish relationships and gather information, and we were able to identify only a few instances of risky tactics in this sample. The relevance of the findings for human intelligence gathering and counterintelligence are discussed.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136353378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-10DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2254490
John A. Gentry
Intelligence studies (IS) is a new and rapidly evolving academic discipline. Scholars periodically assess its status, noting considerable progress, but they have barely begun to assess the origins and implications of a significant recent development in IS: infiltration of the discipline by people determined to alter intelligence studies for ideological reasons. This commentary focuses on the destructive impact of neo-Marxian “critical intelligence studies” on IS generally. It addresses the origins and implications of this infection and suggests ways to inoculate IS against further damage.
{"title":"Ideology in Costume: A Growing Threat to Intelligence Studies","authors":"John A. Gentry","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2254490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2254490","url":null,"abstract":"Intelligence studies (IS) is a new and rapidly evolving academic discipline. Scholars periodically assess its status, noting considerable progress, but they have barely begun to assess the origins and implications of a significant recent development in IS: infiltration of the discipline by people determined to alter intelligence studies for ideological reasons. This commentary focuses on the destructive impact of neo-Marxian “critical intelligence studies” on IS generally. It addresses the origins and implications of this infection and suggests ways to inoculate IS against further damage.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136353221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2257549
Adrian Wolfberg
AbtractDecisionmakers expect intelligence assessments to be insightful. Still, intelligence professionals do not understand the insight process well enough to achieve consistently such indispensable outcomes. Little, if any, research has studied how intelligence analysts achieve insights. A qualitative, interview-based unclassified study was conducted to understand how insight emerges in 36 intelligence analysts who solved novel problems. The results include an emergence process consisting of two interacting elements—internalized tensions and priming—across the emotion–cognition and individual–social dimensions, and that the relationship between the two elements is complex. The emergence of insight is not predictable or controllable, which has significant challenges for the management of intelligence analysts because intelligence agencies typically are hierarchical organizations that emphasize order and control, conditions antithetical for nurturing emergence. This conundrum requires a major individual and cultural shift by management. The study suggests that the findings are generalizable across intelligence analysts in any national security organization, domestic or international. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 339. https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/; Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 560. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-WMD2 Jacob W. Getzels and Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, “From Problem Solving to Problem Finding,” in Perspectives in Creativity, edited by Irving A. Taylor and Jacob W. Getzels (Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1975), pp. 90–115.3 Robert J. Sternberg, “A Three-Facet Model of Creativity,” in The Nature of Creativity, edited by Robert J. Sternberg (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 125–147.4 Stephen Marrin, “Understanding and Improving Intelligence Analysis by Learning from Others,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 32, No. 5 (2017), pp. 539–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310913; Joseph Soeters, Management and Military Studies: Classical and Current Foundations (New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 1–10.5 Peter A. Corning, “The Re-Emergence of ‘Emergence’: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory,” Complexity, Vol. 7, No. 6 (2002), pp. 18–30. https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.100436 Steve W. J. Kozlowski and Katherine J. Klein, “A Multilevel Approach to Theory and Research in Organizations: Contextual, Temporal, and Emergent Processes,” in Multilevel Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions, edited by Katherine J. Klein
决策者期望情报评估具有洞察力。尽管如此，情报专业人员对洞察过程的了解还不够充分，无法持续实现这些不可或缺的结果。很少有研究研究情报分析师是如何获得洞见的。我们进行了一项定性的、基于访谈的非分类研究，以了解36名解决新问题的情报分析师是如何产生洞察力的。结果表明，在情绪认知和个人社会维度上，出现了一个由两个相互作用的因素——内化紧张和启动——组成的出现过程，这两个因素之间的关系是复杂的。洞察力的出现是不可预测或可控的，这对情报分析人员的管理构成了重大挑战，因为情报机构通常是强调秩序和控制的等级组织，而这些条件与培养洞察力是对立的。这个难题需要管理层在个人和文化上做出重大转变。该研究表明，这些发现适用于任何国家安全组织的情报分析师，无论是国内还是国际。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Thomas H. Kean和Lee Hamilton，《9/11委员会报告:美国恐怖袭击国家委员会的最终报告》(华盛顿特区:美国政府印刷局，2004年)，第339页。https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/;Laurence H. Silberman和Charles S. Robb，《美国关于大规模杀伤性武器的情报能力委员会》(华盛顿特区:美国政府印刷局，2005年)，第560页。https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-WMD2 Jacob W. Getzels和Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi，“从解决问题到发现问题”，见Irving A. Taylor和Jacob W. Getzels编辑的《创造力的视角》(芝加哥，IL: Aldine, 1975)，第90-115.3页。Robert J. Sternberg，“创造力的三方面模型”，见《创造力的本质》，Robert J. Sternberg编辑的《创造力的本质》(剑桥，英国)。斯蒂芬·马林，《通过向他人学习来理解和改进情报分析》，《情报与国家安全》，第32卷，第5期(2017)，第539-547页。https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310913;约瑟夫·索特斯，《管理与军事研究:古典与现代基础》(纽约:劳特利奇，2020)，第1-10.5页。彼得·A·康宁，“‘涌现’的重新出现:一个寻求理论的可敬概念”，《复杂性》，第7卷，第6期(2002)，第18-30页。https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.100436 Steve W. J. Kozlowski和Katherine J. Klein，“组织中理论和研究的多层次方法:语境、时间和突发过程”，《组织中的多层次理论、研究和方法:基础、扩展和新方向》，由Katherine J. Klein和Steve W. J. Kozlowski编辑(旧金山，CA);Gary Klein和Andrea Jarosz，“洞察力的自然主义研究”，《认知工程与决策杂志》，第5卷，第4期(2011)，第335-351页。https://doi.org/10.1177/15553434114270138布鲁诺·拉图尔，科学在行动:如何跟随科学家和工程师通过社会(剑桥，马萨诸塞州:哈佛大学出版社，1987年)，第2-3.9米哈里·奇克森特米哈里和基思·索耶，“创造性的洞察力:孤独时刻的社会维度”，在洞察力的本质，由罗伯特J.斯滕伯格和珍妮特E.戴维森编辑(剑桥，马萨诸塞州:斯特兰·奥尔森，“洞察力和相关现象的信息处理解释”，载于马克·t·基恩和肯尼斯·j·吉尔胡利编辑的《思维心理学进展》(亨普斯特德，英国:收割机麦穗，1992)，第1-44页;斯特兰·奥尔森，“常规与创造性认知之间的辩证法”，载于洞察力:关于新思想的起源，由弗雷德里克·韦利-图朗高编辑(纽约:劳特利奇出版社，2018年)，第8-29.11页。伊万·阿什，本杰明·d·吉和詹妮弗·威利，“调查洞察力作为突然学习”，《问题解决杂志》，第4卷，第2期(2012年)，第1-27页。https://doi.org/10.7771/1932-6246.1123.12同上13 Ohlsson，“洞察力和相关现象的信息处理解释”，第1-44.14页同上15 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow(纽约:Farrar, Straus and Giroux出版社，2011)，第19-30页;William Taggart和Daniel Robey，“思想和管理者:关于人类信息处理和管理的双重性”，《管理评论学会》，第6卷，第2期(1981)，第187-195页。https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1981.4287774;Michael L. Tushman和David A. Nadler，“信息处理作为组织设计中的集成概念”，《管理评论》，1978年第3卷第3期，第613-624页。https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1981。 428777416 Leon Festinger，《认知失调理论》(斯坦福，加州:斯坦福大学出版社，1957年)，第9.17页。John A. Bargh和Tanya L. Chartrand，“在中间研究心灵:启动和自动性研究的实用指南”，《社会和人格心理学研究方法手册》，Harry T. Reis和Charles M. Judd编辑(纽约:剑桥大学出版社，2000年)，第253-285.18页。《边界与有机体》，《创造行为杂志》，第43卷，第1期(2009)，第1 - 28页。https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2162-6057.2009.tb01303.x19 Thomas Fingar，《减少不确定性:情报分析与国家安全》(斯坦福，CA)《斯坦福安全研究》，2011年)，第1-18.20页。国家情报总监办公室，情报共同体指令203，《分析标准》，2015年1月2日，https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards.pdfAdditional信息。关于投稿人的说明。sadrian Wolfberg开始他的情报生涯时是一名EA-3B喷气式航空母舰海军飞行军官，然后是一名民用情报分析师。Adrian的研究集中在大型复杂组织中的挑战，在这些组织中，知识生产者和高级决策者之间的知识交换接受、吸收和处理知识。他在凯斯西储大学韦瑟黑德管理学院获得博士学位，在国家战争学院获得国家安全战略理学硕士学位。可以通过awolfberg@gmail.com与作者联系
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Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2252181
Ryan Shaffer
AbstractThis article explores intelligence in the English-speaking West Indies by examining institutions, capabilities, and objectives. It highlights how the British Overseas Territories and independent nations separately and collectively gather and utilize intelligence. The article argues the territories and countries’ sizes and resources as well as their geographic locations significantly shape intelligence networks that collect, share, and use vital security information. In doing so, this article provides the first academic analysis of the region’s intelligence as a whole in understanding how intelligence is viewed, utilized, and shared within territories and countries that are not usually examined in the intelligence studies literature. Disclosure statementThe author reports there are no competing interests to declare.Notes1 For example, see: Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 477–480; Biko Agozino, Ben Bowling, Elizabeth Ward, and Godfrey St Bernard, “Guns, Crime and Social Order in the West Indies,” Criminology & Criminal Justice, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009). doi:10.1177/1748895809336378; Don D. Marshall and Aretha M. Campbell, “The Consequences of Global Policy Initiatives Against Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Tax Evasion on Financial Centres in the Caribbean Region,” in Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Tax Evasion (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), pp. 267–324.2 Some examples include: Owen L. Sirrs, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations (New York: Routledge, 2017); Bob de Graaff, “Elements of an Asian Intelligence Culture,” in Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference, edited by Bob de Graaff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2020), pp. 461–470; Dheeraj Chaya, India’s Intelligence Culture and Strategic Surprises Spying for South Block (New York: Routledge, 2023); Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” African Intelligence Services: Early Postcolonial and Contemporary Challenges, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021), pp. 3–22; Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” The Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), pp. xvii–xxvi; Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” The Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), pp. xii–xxi; Ryan Shaffer, “Following in Footsteps: The History of Kenya’s Post-Colonial Intelligence Services,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2019), pp. 23–40.3 For example, see: Kevin Peters, “Bahamas-Trinidad Tobago-Jamaica,” in The Handbook of Latin American and Caribbean Intelligence Cultures, edited by Florina Cristiana Matei, Carolyn Halladay, and Eduardo E. Estévez (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022), pp. 227–244; Glenn E. McPhee, “Barriers to Collecting ‘Secret Intelligence’ in the Bahamas,”
摘要本文通过考察制度、能力和目标来探讨讲英语的西印度群岛的智力。它突出了英国海外领土和独立国家如何单独或集体地收集和利用情报。这篇文章认为，领土和国家的大小、资源以及地理位置显著地塑造了情报网络，这些网络收集、共享和使用重要的安全信息。在这样做的过程中，本文提供了第一个对该地区情报作为一个整体的学术分析，以了解情报是如何在情报研究文献中通常没有研究过的领土和国家内被看待、利用和共享的。披露声明作者报告无竞争利益需要申报。注1例如，参见:Christopher Andrew，《保卫王国:军情五处的授权历史》(伦敦:Allen Lane出版社，2009)，第477-480页;Biko Agozino, Ben Bowling, Elizabeth Ward和Godfrey St Bernard，“西印度群岛的枪支，犯罪和社会秩序”，犯罪学与刑事司法，第9卷，第3期(2009)。doi: 10.1177 / 1748895809336378;Don D. Marshall和Aretha M. Campbell，“全球反洗钱、恐怖主义融资和逃税政策举措对加勒比地区金融中心的影响”，载于《洗钱、恐怖主义融资和逃税》(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021)，第267-324.2页。一些例子包括:Owen L. Sirrs，《巴基斯坦三军情报局:秘密行动和内部行动》(纽约:Routledge, 2017);鲍勃·德·格拉夫，“亚洲情报文化的要素”，《亚洲和中东的情报社区和文化:综合参考》，由鲍勃·德·格拉夫编辑(博尔德，CO: Lynne Rienner出版社，2020)，第461-470页;Dheeraj Chaya，印度的情报文化和战略惊喜间谍南区(纽约:劳特利奇，2023);Ryan Shaffer，“介绍，”非洲情报服务:早期后殖民和当代挑战，由Ryan Shaffer编辑(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021)，第3-22页;Ryan Shaffer，“引言”，《非洲情报文化手册》，由Ryan Shaffer编辑(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023)，第17 - 26页;Ryan Shaffer，“引言”，《亚洲智力文化手册》，由Ryan Shaffer编辑(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023)，第12 - 21页;Ryan Shaffer，“跟随脚步:肯尼亚后殖民情报服务的历史”，情报研究，第63卷，第1期(2019)，第23-40.3页例如，参见:Kevin Peters，“巴哈马-特立尼达多巴哥-牙买加”，在拉丁美洲和加勒比情报文化手册中，由Florina Cristiana Matei, Carolyn Halladay和Eduardo E. estvez (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022)，第227-244页;Glenn E. McPhee，“在巴哈马收集‘秘密情报’的障碍”，《国际情报、安全和公共事务杂志》，第18卷，第2期(2016)，第93-109页。doi: 10.1080 / 23800992.2016.1196937。另见:Derron Mc Clean，情报改革:特立尼达和多巴哥的考虑(未发表的硕士论文，海军研究生院，2018)。https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1069660.pdf4例如，参见:查尔斯·考利，《冲突中的殖民地:英国海外领土的历史》(泰恩河畔纽卡斯尔:剑桥学者出版社，2015)菲利普·洛夫特，《英国海外领土及其总督》，第9583号(伦敦:下议院图书馆，2022年6月30日)，第7页。https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9583/CBP-9583.pdf6海外领土和内政部(伦敦:内政部，2012)，第1页。https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98668/overseas-territories.pdf7 Loft，英国海外领土及其总督，第5.8页“军情五处的资源和联系”，安全服务，2022年，https://www.mi5.gov.uk/resources-and-links9“我们做什么”，安全服务，2022年，https://www.mi5.gov.uk/what-we-do10海外领土:国防部的贡献(伦敦:国防部，未注明日期)。https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27626/overseas_territories.pdf11同上12关于英国情报风格在后殖民时期肯尼亚的连续性的一个例子，请参见:Ryan Shaffer，“更多的事情变化:肯尼亚在独立十年中的特殊分支”，非洲情报部门:早期后殖民和当代挑战，由Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD)编辑。罗曼和利特菲尔德，2021)，第33-46.13 Loft，英国海外领土及其总督，第13.14页“特立尼达和多巴哥被FATF从灰名单中删除”特立尼达和多巴哥政府(2020)，http://www.news.gov.tt/content/trinidad-tobago-removed-grey-list-fatf#。 108朱莉塔·彼得，“台湾圣卢西亚联手打击跨国犯罪”，圣卢西亚民政、司法和国家安全部，2018年2月5日，https://homeaffairs.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-taiwan-join-forces-on-transnational-crime109“圣卢西亚委员会会议”，圣卢西亚内政、司法和国家安全部，2019年11月15日，https://homeaffairs.govt.lc/news/the-franco-saint-lucian-committee-meets110“圣卢西亚警察情报不足”，《加勒比全球新闻》，2021年5月5日，https://www.caribbeannewsglobal.com/st-lucia-police-intelligence-found-wanting/111中央情报局，“圣文森特和格林纳丁斯”，《世界概况》(2022年)，https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines/112“部门联系人名单”，圣文森特和格林纳丁斯国家安全部(2022年)，http://www.security.gov.vc/security/index.php?option=com_conte
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