International Review of Social Psychology最新文献

Do cynical individuals still engage in prosocial behaviors when they expect the worst from others? While prior research suggests cynical beliefs reduce empathy and trust-key drivers of prosociality-this pathway remains underexplored. We tested four structural equation models (manifest and latent) using data from 239 Romanian adults. Only the manifest model supported an indirect effect via empathic concern; latent models accounting for measurement error did not. This discrepancy highlights how item-level variance may inflate observed relationships. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed considering the social axioms model and empathy-trust mechanisms in prosocial behavior.

Twice in the history of social psychology has there been a crisis of confidence. The first started in the 1960s and lasted until the end of the 1970s, and the second crisis dominated the 2010s. Drawing on extensive quotes from articles published during both crises, I examine the similarities and differences between these psychological crises. In this first of two articles, I focus on how researchers discussed fundamental concerns about the replicability of findings across the two crises. I reflect on five possible reasons why concerns about failed replications received more attention during the second crisis, the continuing lack of incentives to perform replication studies, and the importance of large-scale research projects to instigate change.

During two crises in social psychology, the first from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s, and the second starting in 2010 and still ongoing, researchers discussed the strength of theories in the field, the societal relevance of research, the generalizability of effects, and problematic methodological and statistical practices. Continuing on the first part of this review, which focused on replicability, I compare similarities in the concerns raised across both crises. I consider which issues have prompted meaningful reforms and which have yet to result in significant progress. Finally, I reflect on the extent that the incentives contributed to these crises and argue that a more coordinated approach to scientific research is needed to prevent these concerns from resurfacing in a future third crisis.

Economic inequality negatively impacts the welfare in our societies, yet there is reluctance to support measures aimed at alleviating its effects. To enhance our comprehension of how inequality influences support for redistribution, this paper investigates the mediating role of descriptive meritocracy (i.e., the degree to which meritocracy is perceived to exist in society). Using a cross-sectional study (N = 1536) and a follow-up experimental-causal-chain design in two subsequent experiments (N = 530), we show that the perception of inequality leads to the perception that society is not meritocratic, which, in turn, promotes support for redistribution. These results underscore the significance of perceiving economic inequality in order to dismantle the normative meritocratic narratives that hinder its reduction. We discuss these findings as part of the effects of economic inequality on the normative climate that influences our individual outcomes.

The past decade has emphasised the importance of transparency for robust psychological research. However, transparent research has a cost, and it is hardly compatible with both conceptual novelty and statistical consistency across multiple studies. We propose that these three criteria can be conceptualized as a trilemma: fulfilling two of them considerably reduces the probability of satisfying the third one. An article testing a novel idea and transparently reporting evidence is likely to include empirical failure that impede consistency. An article transparently reporting consistent findings probably will acknowledge a replication effort that does not seek theoretical advances. Finally, an article presenting consistent evidence through multiple studies for a novel idea is not likely to be transparent. At a practical level, we argue that the pressure of the trilemma poses a threat for transparency, which is less tangible and historically important in the evaluation of research articles than the two other criteria. While the open science movement grows in importance, the pressure of the trilemma may encourage an opportunistic use of open science practices as a form of virtue signalling compensating for low transparency. Stakeholders, from editors to reviewers, should be aware of the constraints posed by transparency to continue improving the robustness of psychological science and avoiding a deleterious use of open science practices. We review potential solutions to break the pressure of the trilemma.

Opposition to multiculturalism is common among native majorities. Normatively, this group-based political theory and public policy has been described as being incompatible with the individual justice-based orientation of Western liberal societies. In this research, we account for national majority opposition to multiculturalism by arguing that national identities in classically liberal societies are primarily associated with individual justice beliefs, in opposition to group-based justice beliefs. A correlational (N = 91) and an experimental (N = 172) study in Switzerland first show that the relationship between national identification and opposition to multiculturalism is partially explained by a belief in individual responsibility, a key facet of individual justice. This result was replicated using representative Swiss data from the World Values Survey (N = 1241), as well as in Belgium (N = 362), another Western liberal society. Effects transcended an ethnic conception of national identity and provide a novel perspective on majority multicultural attitudes as rooted in group-based conceptions of social justice.

Studies have shown that mood could be used as diagnostic information for the assessment of situational demands and that, as such, it can regulate resource mobilization. Accordingly, it was found that negative mood causes overestimation of situational demands, which then leads to effort exertion during performance on easy tasks but disengagement on difficult tasks. The present research investigated whether this mood-motivation relation could be extended to specific emotions to explain the effect of stereotype threat (ST). In order to answer this question, the participants in the standard (fear-based) ST and the no-ST conditions had to perform easy (Study 1) or difficult (Study 2) cognitive tasks. To further explore the hypothetical role of threat-related emotions in each study we introduced another condition in which participants under ST were induced to feel anger (i.e., an emotion theoretically characterized by the perception of low situational demands). Although both ST conditions consistently showed greater stereotype-related concerns compared with the control (no-ST) group, the expected increase in easy task performance (Study 1) and decrease in difficult task performance (Study 2) were observed only in the standard (fear-based) ST condition, but not when participants under ST experienced anger. Our findings suggest that specific emotions emerging under ST could govern motivational processes and account for the effect of ST. Accordingly, the way that individuals appraise ST may have an important impact on task performance.

This paper advances the integration of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and topic detection into the study of Social Representations (SRs). We suggest that a combination of the two analyses helps to detect communities characterised by shared contents and/or social interactions, the two facets that make representations 'social'. Building on Moliner's (2023) proposal we present a step-by-step approach to combine the identification of shared meanings based on lexicometric analysis and identification of social interaction based on social network analysis techniques. To illustrate our proposal, we use a dataset of 396 Brazilian tweets about the Covid-19 pandemic that was collected to investigate the SR of science during the pandemic. The Reinert method was run on the corpus using the Iramuteq R interface and a bipartite network analysis was performed using Gephi software. We thus operationalised 615 users and six topics as nodes, while shared topics and interactions (883 mentions) as arcs. This allowed us to examine both the content of social representations and interactions among different individuals and communities. In our case, the results highlight shared content as the main determinant for community formation; however, some users appear to have linked different communities together: they are associated to a community not because of the topic they share, but because of their interactions with other users. We contend this methodology proves to be a fruitful theoretical-methodological link between SNA and SR theory, as it detects both facets of the relationship between SRs and groups: the shared contents and the communicative interactions between individuals.

Pronin and Kugler (2010) proposed that people believe they have more free will than others. In their Experiment 1 they showed that US students evaluated their own decisions and life events as less predictable than similar decisions and life events of close others, presumably suggesting higher free will attributions. We conducted three pre-registered replications of this study, one with a Hong Kong undergraduate sample (N = 47) and two online samples from the USA (MTurk using CloudResearch: N = 126, Prolific: N = 858) (overall N = 1031). In Studies 1a and 1b that mirrored the target article's mixed design (self-other between, past-future within), we found support for the original findings with weaker effects. In Study 2 we contrasted between-subject versus within-subject designs in a single data collection. We successfully replicated the effects with the between-subject design, whereas we failed to find support for the effect using the within-subjects design. This suggests support for the phenomenon in single evaluation mode assessing either the self or the other, but that people correct for the self-other asymmetry in perceived predictability when the judgment is made in joint evaluations mode. Materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/ykmqp/. Open peer review: https://osf.io/d47kj.

In moral psychology, several approaches to moral judgments coexist, with sometimes contradictory results for different types of judgments. In the current research, we combine two views of moral judgment into a novel three-input processing model. As a first empirical test of this model, the present research investigates the influence of these three classic inputs (i.e., intent, outcome, and causality) on wrongness and blame judgments as well as their underlying dynamics. This preregistered experiment (N = 145) re-uses an adapted mouse-tracking paradigm to analyze these influences over time. Results on final judgments replicate the effects of intent, outcome, and causality, as well as partial evidence for their interaction effects. Mouse trajectory analysis further refines these interaction effects, including evidence for differential dynamics for blame versus wrongness judgments. However, this study does not reveal clear differential weight for intent and outcome inputs in blame versus wrongness judgments. Discussion focuses on the evidence supporting but also contradicting the proposed three-input processing model and insists on the importance of distinguishing between final judgments and underlying dynamics.