Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.2022822
Wiebe Koopal
ABSTRACT In this article I venture the hypothesis that music confronts education with the possibility to think violence in ways that are both inherently educational and radically affirmative. Beginning with a reflection on a poem by Elizabeth Barrett Browning, which emphatically evokes the violence within the genesis of music, I then move in a different direction in the second section, which surveys how extant (music-) educational has thematized violence so far. Concluding that this thematization, notwithstanding many nuances, invariably implies a negative validation of violence, I devote the third section to a search for more affirmative concepts of educational violence. Eventually, this culminates in a return to the issue of a possibly intrinsic, positive relation between violence and music education. I first discuss this possibility more generally, connecting the discussed affirmative concepts of violence to the antipodal music-educational ideas of Plato and Nietzsche. Finally, in the last section, returning to Browning’s poem, I specify it by reclaiming the particular violence of music’s instrumental aspects for music education.
{"title":"To beat or not to beat? On music, violence, and education","authors":"Wiebe Koopal","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.2022822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.2022822","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article I venture the hypothesis that music confronts education with the possibility to think violence in ways that are both inherently educational and radically affirmative. Beginning with a reflection on a poem by Elizabeth Barrett Browning, which emphatically evokes the violence within the genesis of music, I then move in a different direction in the second section, which surveys how extant (music-) educational has thematized violence so far. Concluding that this thematization, notwithstanding many nuances, invariably implies a negative validation of violence, I devote the third section to a search for more affirmative concepts of educational violence. Eventually, this culminates in a return to the issue of a possibly intrinsic, positive relation between violence and music education. I first discuss this possibility more generally, connecting the discussed affirmative concepts of violence to the antipodal music-educational ideas of Plato and Nietzsche. Finally, in the last section, returning to Browning’s poem, I specify it by reclaiming the particular violence of music’s instrumental aspects for music education.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"17 1","pages":"117 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45277293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-21DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.2013634
L. Campbell
ABSTRACT In discussions of the regulation of teaching, there are a number of issues which arise concerning how teachers understand the professional expectations upon them and the role that such standards play in supporting and maintaining the ethical dimensions of teachers’ practice. Arguably, teachers’ professional standards evolve to meet the needs of the societies in which they exist. Consequently, they provide a locus for analysis of the desires, aspirations and philosophical perspectives of the social and educational systems to which they belong. Durkheim’s ideas about professional ethics provide a means of making sense of the complex and varied landscape of teacher regulation. They provide a way of seeing teacher professional standards as not constrained by neoliberal conceptions of regulation in which the fear of sanction may limit imaginative engagement with the profession. Instead, even within highly managerial systems, we begin to see professional standards as a prompt to engaged and ethical action for the greater good. In this sense, Durkheim’s work facilitates a way of seeing professional standards as having the capacity to magnify teachers’ innate potential for positive social impact regardless of the context in which they work.
{"title":"Teacher regulation and agency through the lens of Durkheim’s professional ethics","authors":"L. Campbell","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.2013634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.2013634","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In discussions of the regulation of teaching, there are a number of issues which arise concerning how teachers understand the professional expectations upon them and the role that such standards play in supporting and maintaining the ethical dimensions of teachers’ practice. Arguably, teachers’ professional standards evolve to meet the needs of the societies in which they exist. Consequently, they provide a locus for analysis of the desires, aspirations and philosophical perspectives of the social and educational systems to which they belong. Durkheim’s ideas about professional ethics provide a means of making sense of the complex and varied landscape of teacher regulation. They provide a way of seeing teacher professional standards as not constrained by neoliberal conceptions of regulation in which the fear of sanction may limit imaginative engagement with the profession. Instead, even within highly managerial systems, we begin to see professional standards as a prompt to engaged and ethical action for the greater good. In this sense, Durkheim’s work facilitates a way of seeing professional standards as having the capacity to magnify teachers’ innate potential for positive social impact regardless of the context in which they work.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"17 1","pages":"30 - 43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42486964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-13DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.2015127
Wiebe Koopal, J. Vlieghe, Thomas De Baets
ABSTRACT This article problematizes the view that music education is primarily justified on account of its uniquely humanizing influence. Not only does this general humanist argument clearly fail to convince policy-makers to actually revalidate public music education, but moreover it often seems to rest on highly questionable premises. Without contesting the idea itself that music education can be a humanizing agency, we will try to show that such humanization cannot be achieved without acknowledging music’s inhuman, animal forces. While first this paradox is elaborated through a philosophical reading of the Ancient myth of Midas’s donkey ears, a second part will expand on its implications for the political bearing of music’s contemporary public-educational (ir)relevance. Ultimately, we claim that by paying closer attention to the ways in which music allows animal ‘nonsense’ to disrupt processes of collective human sense-making, we can start thinking of practices of music education that might truly engender a renewed sense of humanity.
{"title":"Growing donkey ears: the animal politics of music education","authors":"Wiebe Koopal, J. Vlieghe, Thomas De Baets","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.2015127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.2015127","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article problematizes the view that music education is primarily justified on account of its uniquely humanizing influence. Not only does this general humanist argument clearly fail to convince policy-makers to actually revalidate public music education, but moreover it often seems to rest on highly questionable premises. Without contesting the idea itself that music education can be a humanizing agency, we will try to show that such humanization cannot be achieved without acknowledging music’s inhuman, animal forces. While first this paradox is elaborated through a philosophical reading of the Ancient myth of Midas’s donkey ears, a second part will expand on its implications for the political bearing of music’s contemporary public-educational (ir)relevance. Ultimately, we claim that by paying closer attention to the ways in which music allows animal ‘nonsense’ to disrupt processes of collective human sense-making, we can start thinking of practices of music education that might truly engender a renewed sense of humanity.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"17 1","pages":"44 - 58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42439840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-13DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.2013635
J. Dahlbeck
Abstract To what extent should teachers promote the view from nowhere as an ideal to strive for in education? To address this question, I will use Mark Twain’s The Mysterious Stranger as an example, illustrating the stakes involved when the view from nowhere is taken to be an attainable educational ideal. I will begin this essay by offering a description of Thomas Nagel’s view from nowhere. Having done this, I will return to Twain’s story, providing some further examples of how access to the view from nowhere comes to influence the educational process in different ways. I will then connect the educational question raised by Twain’s story to two radically different versions of the exemplar found in the works of Benedict de Spinoza: the philosopher and the prophet. These figures will help illustrate how the striving for philosophical truth can sometimes be educationally inapt, as education always needs to account for humans being human, all too human.
{"title":"Satan as teacher: the view from nowhere vs. the moral sense","authors":"J. Dahlbeck","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.2013635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.2013635","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract To what extent should teachers promote the view from nowhere as an ideal to strive for in education? To address this question, I will use Mark Twain’s The Mysterious Stranger as an example, illustrating the stakes involved when the view from nowhere is taken to be an attainable educational ideal. I will begin this essay by offering a description of Thomas Nagel’s view from nowhere. Having done this, I will return to Twain’s story, providing some further examples of how access to the view from nowhere comes to influence the educational process in different ways. I will then connect the educational question raised by Twain’s story to two radically different versions of the exemplar found in the works of Benedict de Spinoza: the philosopher and the prophet. These figures will help illustrate how the striving for philosophical truth can sometimes be educationally inapt, as education always needs to account for humans being human, all too human.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"17 1","pages":"14 - 29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46679091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-03DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.2013636
N. Davids
ABSTRACT As academics, we do not only produce and reproduce knowledge; we also produce our citizenship as a social and agonistic space. There are nuances embedded within academic citizenship – unqualifiable, but compelling in their production and reproduction of power dynamics, bringing into disrepute notions of academic citizenship as a homogenous or inclusive space. There are ways of being and becoming within citizenship that might be less readily conceivable, and hence, slip beneath the radar of scholarly scrutiny and debates.We have yet to delve into how we come into the presence of one another. In offering an expanded understanding of academic citizenship as alterity, I argue that academic citizenship has to involve wading into a curious uncertainty about the other so that the immensity of diversity, its unknown-ness, is brought to bear on the university, not as fear and estrangement, but as a rupture with a continuity of Othering.
{"title":"Professing the vulnerabilities of academic citizenship","authors":"N. Davids","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.2013636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.2013636","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As academics, we do not only produce and reproduce knowledge; we also produce our citizenship as a social and agonistic space. There are nuances embedded within academic citizenship – unqualifiable, but compelling in their production and reproduction of power dynamics, bringing into disrepute notions of academic citizenship as a homogenous or inclusive space. There are ways of being and becoming within citizenship that might be less readily conceivable, and hence, slip beneath the radar of scholarly scrutiny and debates.We have yet to delve into how we come into the presence of one another. In offering an expanded understanding of academic citizenship as alterity, I argue that academic citizenship has to involve wading into a curious uncertainty about the other so that the immensity of diversity, its unknown-ness, is brought to bear on the university, not as fear and estrangement, but as a rupture with a continuity of Othering.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"17 1","pages":"1 - 13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44115142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.1979283
Aline Nardo, M. Gaydos
ABSTRACT In this paper we discuss the potential of digital games to create meaningful educational experiences that contribute to the learning of ethics in higher education (HE) Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) degrees. We describe the design of a new digital ethics game with a focus on the challenges we encountered when applying existing theoretical frameworks for educational games and propose ways to address these challenges. We contend that existing design frameworks fail to account for the ‘wickedness’ of ethical problems – i.e. their inconclusive, complex, and sometimes inherently contradictory nature – as they are centred around consequentiality and consistent game-system feedback to players’ actions. Drawing from a Deweyan account of the ‘educative experience’ we seek to contribute to a domain-adequate theory of transformational experience and transformational play in the context of educational ethics game design.
{"title":"‘Wicked problems’ as catalysts for learning in educational ethics games","authors":"Aline Nardo, M. Gaydos","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.1979283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.1979283","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper we discuss the potential of digital games to create meaningful educational experiences that contribute to the learning of ethics in higher education (HE) Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) degrees. We describe the design of a new digital ethics game with a focus on the challenges we encountered when applying existing theoretical frameworks for educational games and propose ways to address these challenges. We contend that existing design frameworks fail to account for the ‘wickedness’ of ethical problems – i.e. their inconclusive, complex, and sometimes inherently contradictory nature – as they are centred around consequentiality and consistent game-system feedback to players’ actions. Drawing from a Deweyan account of the ‘educative experience’ we seek to contribute to a domain-adequate theory of transformational experience and transformational play in the context of educational ethics game design.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"16 1","pages":"492 - 509"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48911766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-07DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.1970907
J. Goodman
ABSTRACT The jurisdiction of schools has long been contested. Initially, under the sway of loco parentis, parents delegated all authority to educators. With ascendency of the common school movement in the 19th century, however, the doctrine confronted reverses. As the student body increased in size and heterogeneity, families no longer spoke with a single voice. The courts granted parental requests for a more determinative role in their children’s education, prohibited schools from giving religious instruction, and guaranteed students some civil rights. This curtailment of school authority has been countered in recent years by the emphasis on educating the “whole child” with schools taking on responsibilities, such as character development and mental health, arguably a home preserve. While acknowledging the large overlap between school and home, I argue they have differing agendas and capacities. Schools stress the collective, cultivating “we-ness” and agreed upon norms, whereas homes cultivate privacy, individualism, and particularistic values; schools stress equality while homes stress equity; schools are constrained in their use of discipline whereas homes take more liberties. In urging schools to circumscribe and differentiate their role, I nonetheless recognize the problems of doing so.
{"title":"Should schools be in loco parentis? Cautionary thoughts","authors":"J. Goodman","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.1970907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.1970907","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The jurisdiction of schools has long been contested. Initially, under the sway of loco parentis, parents delegated all authority to educators. With ascendency of the common school movement in the 19th century, however, the doctrine confronted reverses. As the student body increased in size and heterogeneity, families no longer spoke with a single voice. The courts granted parental requests for a more determinative role in their children’s education, prohibited schools from giving religious instruction, and guaranteed students some civil rights. This curtailment of school authority has been countered in recent years by the emphasis on educating the “whole child” with schools taking on responsibilities, such as character development and mental health, arguably a home preserve. While acknowledging the large overlap between school and home, I argue they have differing agendas and capacities. Schools stress the collective, cultivating “we-ness” and agreed upon norms, whereas homes cultivate privacy, individualism, and particularistic values; schools stress equality while homes stress equity; schools are constrained in their use of discipline whereas homes take more liberties. In urging schools to circumscribe and differentiate their role, I nonetheless recognize the problems of doing so.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"16 1","pages":"407 - 423"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48700913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-24DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.1970906
Michalinos Zembylas
ABSTRACT Should educators encourage students to learn moral outrage in teaching about social (in)justice? If moral outrage is a catalyst for social change, to what extent can educators nurture this moral and political emotion in the classroom? These questions are at the heart of this essay. The aim is not to take sides for or against using moral outrage in education to motivate students towards change for the better, but rather to engage in an analysis and sorting through of various discourses about moral outrage as a moral and political emotion, and to figure out how those discourses operate to create particular meanings for moral outrage that are circulated through educational research and practice. The author argues for a broader theorization of the relationship between moral outrage, political emotion, and education, tentatively suggesting a renewed attention to the productive possibilities as well as risks of encouraging moral outrage in education.
{"title":"Encouraging moral outrage in education: a pedagogical goal for social justice or not?","authors":"Michalinos Zembylas","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.1970906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.1970906","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Should educators encourage students to learn moral outrage in teaching about social (in)justice? If moral outrage is a catalyst for social change, to what extent can educators nurture this moral and political emotion in the classroom? These questions are at the heart of this essay. The aim is not to take sides for or against using moral outrage in education to motivate students towards change for the better, but rather to engage in an analysis and sorting through of various discourses about moral outrage as a moral and political emotion, and to figure out how those discourses operate to create particular meanings for moral outrage that are circulated through educational research and practice. The author argues for a broader theorization of the relationship between moral outrage, political emotion, and education, tentatively suggesting a renewed attention to the productive possibilities as well as risks of encouraging moral outrage in education.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"16 1","pages":"424 - 439"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45741515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-20DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.1965300
Alkis Kotsonis
ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to challenge the neo-Aristotelian tradition, currently dominant in contemporary theories of virtue education, by proposing the Platonic pedagogical methodology for virtue cultivation as a worthy alternative to the Aristotelian theory of education. I highlight that, in contrast to Aristotle’s limited remarks concerning virtue education, Plato conceptualizes and develops a rigorous educational theory in the Republic that considers many different facets of education – i.e. moral character education, intellectual character education, exemplarism and educational corruption. Given Plato’s immense contribution to virtue education theory, I conclude that his educational program merits more attention. It can serve as inspiration both for improving existing theories of character education and for developing new ones.
{"title":"On the Platonic pedagogical methodology: an alternative to the Aristotelian theory of education","authors":"Alkis Kotsonis","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.1965300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.1965300","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to challenge the neo-Aristotelian tradition, currently dominant in contemporary theories of virtue education, by proposing the Platonic pedagogical methodology for virtue cultivation as a worthy alternative to the Aristotelian theory of education. I highlight that, in contrast to Aristotle’s limited remarks concerning virtue education, Plato conceptualizes and develops a rigorous educational theory in the Republic that considers many different facets of education – i.e. moral character education, intellectual character education, exemplarism and educational corruption. Given Plato’s immense contribution to virtue education theory, I conclude that his educational program merits more attention. It can serve as inspiration both for improving existing theories of character education and for developing new ones.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"16 1","pages":"464 - 477"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41325586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-13DOI: 10.1080/17449642.2021.1965302
M. Papastephanou
ABSTRACT The politics of lifelong learning and learnification have triggered educational philosophy’s justified indignation and blanket critiques of learning. The market logic of learning has, meanwhile, seized the city and caused a further educational-philosophical reactive response, which I critique in the form that it has taken inter alia in many prominent recent educational-philosophical works. After explaining what I mean by ‘reactive response’ I focus on the educational-philosophical reaction to the shift toward lifelong learning. Then I move to how this shift has been translated into a discourse of city learning and how some educational theory responds to this discourse. My critique concludes with suggestions for an ethic of stereoscopically tackling facets of learning.
{"title":"Learning in the city and responding reactively","authors":"M. Papastephanou","doi":"10.1080/17449642.2021.1965302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.1965302","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The politics of lifelong learning and learnification have triggered educational philosophy’s justified indignation and blanket critiques of learning. The market logic of learning has, meanwhile, seized the city and caused a further educational-philosophical reactive response, which I critique in the form that it has taken inter alia in many prominent recent educational-philosophical works. After explaining what I mean by ‘reactive response’ I focus on the educational-philosophical reaction to the shift toward lifelong learning. Then I move to how this shift has been translated into a discourse of city learning and how some educational theory responds to this discourse. My critique concludes with suggestions for an ethic of stereoscopically tackling facets of learning.","PeriodicalId":45613,"journal":{"name":"Ethics and Education","volume":"16 1","pages":"440 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43899307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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