Pub Date : 2021-08-06DOI: 10.1017/S1755048321000158
Pavol Minarik
Abstract The article examines the development of state-paid salaries for the clergy introduced by the Communists in Czechoslovakia from their institution in 1949 until they were removed in a major change of church-state relations in 2012. In the initial years of Communist rule, it appears that the salaries were part of a “carrot and stick” strategy aiming to subject churches to the state. Later, the real value of salaries steadily decreased, leaving priests marginalized in the economic structure. Following the collapse of the Communist regime, the salaries of the clergy were significantly increased; although, in subsequent years, they followed a trend similar to the pre-1989 period. The similarity in the development of salaries in the Communist and post-Communist period and the reluctance to restitute the church property after 1989 reflects the attitudes of the Czech population and the political representation toward organized religion and the transition from assertive to passive secularism.
{"title":"From the Communists and Post-Communists Alike: State-Paid Salaries of the Clergy in the Czech Lands 1949–2012","authors":"Pavol Minarik","doi":"10.1017/S1755048321000158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000158","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article examines the development of state-paid salaries for the clergy introduced by the Communists in Czechoslovakia from their institution in 1949 until they were removed in a major change of church-state relations in 2012. In the initial years of Communist rule, it appears that the salaries were part of a “carrot and stick” strategy aiming to subject churches to the state. Later, the real value of salaries steadily decreased, leaving priests marginalized in the economic structure. Following the collapse of the Communist regime, the salaries of the clergy were significantly increased; although, in subsequent years, they followed a trend similar to the pre-1989 period. The similarity in the development of salaries in the Communist and post-Communist period and the reluctance to restitute the church property after 1989 reflects the attitudes of the Czech population and the political representation toward organized religion and the transition from assertive to passive secularism.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74983387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1017/S1755048321000146
Agnieszka Kanas, P. Scheepers, C. Sterkens
Abstract This study examines mechanisms and conditions under which ethnoreligious identification is related to support for out-group violence. It uses unique survey data collected among religious minorities and majorities in conflict and non-conflict regions in Indonesia and the Philippines. We find that strong ethno-religious identification is positively related to support for out-group violence. This relationship is fully mediated by the perception of out-group threat, suggesting that ethno-religious identification facilitates the perception of out-group threat, which, in turn, is positively related to support of violence. While the experience of communal violence increases support for interreligious violence, it does not influence the relationship between perceived group threat and support for violence. Interestingly, there is some evidence that the negative influence of intergroup contact on violence support is weaker for those who experienced communal violence.
{"title":"Ethno-Religious Identification and Support for Interreligious Violence: A Study of Muslim and Christian Students in Indonesia and the Philippines","authors":"Agnieszka Kanas, P. Scheepers, C. Sterkens","doi":"10.1017/S1755048321000146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000146","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study examines mechanisms and conditions under which ethnoreligious identification is related to support for out-group violence. It uses unique survey data collected among religious minorities and majorities in conflict and non-conflict regions in Indonesia and the Philippines. We find that strong ethno-religious identification is positively related to support for out-group violence. This relationship is fully mediated by the perception of out-group threat, suggesting that ethno-religious identification facilitates the perception of out-group threat, which, in turn, is positively related to support of violence. While the experience of communal violence increases support for interreligious violence, it does not influence the relationship between perceived group threat and support for violence. Interestingly, there is some evidence that the negative influence of intergroup contact on violence support is weaker for those who experienced communal violence.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76704058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-19DOI: 10.1017/S1755048322000219
Jack Thompson
Abstract Trump's unwavering support among white evangelicals seems a contradiction considering his seeming irreligiosity and well publicized moral transgressions. This contradiction raises an interesting question concerning whether Trump represents something of a unique case when it comes to white evangelical evaluations of elite religiosity, or whether his support among the group indicative of a new era of evangelical support for candidates that does not assess religiosity as it used to. Drawing on contemporary debates from the religious psychology and Christian nationalism scholarship, I use data from Wave 61 of the American Trends Panel (ATP) to test whether white evangelicals who encounter threats to their religious identities are more likely to view that God played some role in Trump's election. Overall, I find that white evangelicals consider themselves minorities as a result of their beliefs. Most importantly, these beliefs condition white evangelical beliefs about God's role in Trump's election. Specifically, I find that increases in threat perceptions lead to an increase in the probability of a white evangelical believing that Trump's election was part of God's plan. These findings provide a new vantage point for understanding why so many white evangelicals view Trump's election as a divine outcome despite the fact they are indifferent to his irreligiosity.
{"title":"Does it Matter if the President Isn't Pious? White Evangelicals and Elite Religiosity in the Trump Era","authors":"Jack Thompson","doi":"10.1017/S1755048322000219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048322000219","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Trump's unwavering support among white evangelicals seems a contradiction considering his seeming irreligiosity and well publicized moral transgressions. This contradiction raises an interesting question concerning whether Trump represents something of a unique case when it comes to white evangelical evaluations of elite religiosity, or whether his support among the group indicative of a new era of evangelical support for candidates that does not assess religiosity as it used to. Drawing on contemporary debates from the religious psychology and Christian nationalism scholarship, I use data from Wave 61 of the American Trends Panel (ATP) to test whether white evangelicals who encounter threats to their religious identities are more likely to view that God played some role in Trump's election. Overall, I find that white evangelicals consider themselves minorities as a result of their beliefs. Most importantly, these beliefs condition white evangelical beliefs about God's role in Trump's election. Specifically, I find that increases in threat perceptions lead to an increase in the probability of a white evangelical believing that Trump's election was part of God's plan. These findings provide a new vantage point for understanding why so many white evangelicals view Trump's election as a divine outcome despite the fact they are indifferent to his irreligiosity.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76269020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1017/s1755048321000079
{"title":"RAP volume 14 issue 2 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s1755048321000079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048321000079","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82060926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1017/s1755048321000067
{"title":"RAP volume 14 issue 2 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s1755048321000067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048321000067","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86206797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-06DOI: 10.1017/S1755048321000134
Christian Lamour
Abstract There is one European state leader from the moderate Christian-democrat center right who has developed a discourse and policies showing his progressive move toward the radical right: Viktor Orbán. Can Christianity be considered from a Laclauian perspective, as a “nodal point” of Orbán's radical right discourse; that is, a key element around which his antagonistic narratives are structured? Based on an analysis of segments of Orbán's speeches between 2014 and 2019 that mention Christianity, the research reveals that this religion is a nodal point for three main reasons: (1) the density of Christian references used to shape a negative and antagonistic discourse, strategically adjusted to his audience; (2) the use of Christianity to ground the three ideological pillars of the radical right (populism, nativism, and authoritarianism); and (3) the mobilization of Christianity to organize a hegemonic struggle against the dominant political force that has defined the meaning of this religion in the European public sphere—the moderate center right.
{"title":"Orbán Urbi et Orbi: Christianity as a Nodal Point of Radical-right Populism","authors":"Christian Lamour","doi":"10.1017/S1755048321000134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000134","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is one European state leader from the moderate Christian-democrat center right who has developed a discourse and policies showing his progressive move toward the radical right: Viktor Orbán. Can Christianity be considered from a Laclauian perspective, as a “nodal point” of Orbán's radical right discourse; that is, a key element around which his antagonistic narratives are structured? Based on an analysis of segments of Orbán's speeches between 2014 and 2019 that mention Christianity, the research reveals that this religion is a nodal point for three main reasons: (1) the density of Christian references used to shape a negative and antagonistic discourse, strategically adjusted to his audience; (2) the use of Christianity to ground the three ideological pillars of the radical right (populism, nativism, and authoritarianism); and (3) the mobilization of Christianity to organize a hegemonic struggle against the dominant political force that has defined the meaning of this religion in the European public sphere—the moderate center right.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76173526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-21DOI: 10.1017/S175504832100002X
Samuel L. Perry, Andrew L. Whitehead, Joshua B. Grubbs
Abstract Christian nationalist ideology was among the strongest predictors of Americans voting for Trump in 2016 and remained a strong predictor of intent to vote for him prior to the 2020 election. This study uses national data to examine whether Christian nationalism could potentially convert the previously-unconverted to supporting Trump or, conversely, prevent apostatizing from Trump. Among Americans who did not vote for Trump in 2016, Christian nationalism increased the likelihood that they intended to vote for Trump in 2020, but only those who earlier did not vote at all or voted third party. Conversely, among Americans who did vote for Trump in 2016, Christian nationalism reduced the likelihood that they planned on voting for a Democratic or third party candidate. Christian nationalism thus potentially inclined Americans who previously did not vote for Trump in 2016 to vote his way in 2020 and inoculated previous Trump-voters from considering other candidates in 2020.
{"title":"The Devil That You Know: Christian Nationalism and Intent to Change One's Voting Behavior For or Against Trump in 2020","authors":"Samuel L. Perry, Andrew L. Whitehead, Joshua B. Grubbs","doi":"10.1017/S175504832100002X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S175504832100002X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Christian nationalist ideology was among the strongest predictors of Americans voting for Trump in 2016 and remained a strong predictor of intent to vote for him prior to the 2020 election. This study uses national data to examine whether Christian nationalism could potentially convert the previously-unconverted to supporting Trump or, conversely, prevent apostatizing from Trump. Among Americans who did not vote for Trump in 2016, Christian nationalism increased the likelihood that they intended to vote for Trump in 2020, but only those who earlier did not vote at all or voted third party. Conversely, among Americans who did vote for Trump in 2016, Christian nationalism reduced the likelihood that they planned on voting for a Democratic or third party candidate. Christian nationalism thus potentially inclined Americans who previously did not vote for Trump in 2016 to vote his way in 2020 and inoculated previous Trump-voters from considering other candidates in 2020.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79718920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.1017/S1755048321000043
Kimberly H. Conger
Abstract The contemporary Religious Left (RL) in the United States has proven to be somewhat of an enigma, both for academics and for the activists and voters who desire such a movement to thrive. In this paper, I look at one piece of the puzzle: is the RL able to mobilize supporters to political activity? Combining data from both the individual and movement level, this paper tests whether activity at the movement level of the RL can translate into individual supporters' political activity. Using existing data for 2008 and newly collected data on the RL in the 2016 election cycle, I find that the movement was successful in mobilizing constituents in 2008, but not in 2016. This can be linked to the Democrats' effort to engage religious voters in 2008, and its inability to do so in 2016.
{"title":"Mobilizing the Religious Left: Linking the Movement to Individual Political Activity","authors":"Kimberly H. Conger","doi":"10.1017/S1755048321000043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The contemporary Religious Left (RL) in the United States has proven to be somewhat of an enigma, both for academics and for the activists and voters who desire such a movement to thrive. In this paper, I look at one piece of the puzzle: is the RL able to mobilize supporters to political activity? Combining data from both the individual and movement level, this paper tests whether activity at the movement level of the RL can translate into individual supporters' political activity. Using existing data for 2008 and newly collected data on the RL in the 2016 election cycle, I find that the movement was successful in mobilizing constituents in 2008, but not in 2016. This can be linked to the Democrats' effort to engage religious voters in 2008, and its inability to do so in 2016.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83617196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.1017/S1755048321000055
Kathleen Marchetti
Abstract Although prior research has explored the demographic characteristics, religious practices, and beliefs of modern Pagans, their political attitudes and actions have yet to be studied in depth. Further, most extant research is based on non-random samples of Pagans which calls into question the generalizability of prior findings. This article examines Pagans' political attitudes and behavior using a representative sample of Pagans in the United States drawn from the 2014 Pew Religious Landscape Study. Descriptive and multivariate analyses show that Pagan religious identity shapes political views and behavior despite the varied and decentralized nature of Paganism. Overall, Pagans are relatively liberal and supportive of issues common across Pagan traditions like the environment and LGBTQ rights. However, Pagans are somewhat less politically engaged than non-Pagans as evidenced by their lower levels of party identity and voter registration.
{"title":"A Political Profile of U.S. Pagans","authors":"Kathleen Marchetti","doi":"10.1017/S1755048321000055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although prior research has explored the demographic characteristics, religious practices, and beliefs of modern Pagans, their political attitudes and actions have yet to be studied in depth. Further, most extant research is based on non-random samples of Pagans which calls into question the generalizability of prior findings. This article examines Pagans' political attitudes and behavior using a representative sample of Pagans in the United States drawn from the 2014 Pew Religious Landscape Study. Descriptive and multivariate analyses show that Pagan religious identity shapes political views and behavior despite the varied and decentralized nature of Paganism. Overall, Pagans are relatively liberal and supportive of issues common across Pagan traditions like the environment and LGBTQ rights. However, Pagans are somewhat less politically engaged than non-Pagans as evidenced by their lower levels of party identity and voter registration.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74232012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.1017/S1755048321000109
Kate Dannies
{"title":"Disciples of the State? Religion and State-Building in the Former Ottoman World. By Kristin Fabbe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. xxi + 291 pp. $99.99 cloth. $34.99 paper","authors":"Kate Dannies","doi":"10.1017/S1755048321000109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000109","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84920611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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