Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1017/s1755048323000287
Murat Akan
Charles Taylor's “radical redefinition of secularism” has a significant place in the post-9/11 research on secularism. He replaces secularism's “old” paradigm, separation between state and religious institutions, with a “new” one, responding to diversity. Taylor appeals to French laïcité in-itself as the old paradigm. With an analysis of the parliamentary debates at the institutional origins of the old paradigm in the Third French Republic, this article questions whether Taylor's redefinition of secularism is truly radical. This historical intervention in Taylor's “radical redefinition” reformulates his novelty as the reconfiguration of the relation between generality of laws and meaning worlds in the institutional response to diversity. The Third Republic pushed generality in laws against diverse meaning worlds. Taylor (with Jocelyn Maclure) demands that general laws reasonably accommodate “meaning-giving convictions.” I explore this reversal and argue that it's questionable Taylor offers a radical redefinition of secularism—or even that we need one.
{"title":"Do we need a radical redefinition of secularism? A critique of Charles Taylor","authors":"Murat Akan","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000287","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Charles Taylor's “radical redefinition of secularism” has a significant place in the post-9/11 research on secularism. He replaces secularism's “old” paradigm, separation between state and religious institutions, with a “new” one, responding to diversity. Taylor appeals to French laïcité in-itself as the old paradigm. With an analysis of the parliamentary debates at the institutional origins of the old paradigm in the Third French Republic, this article questions whether Taylor's redefinition of secularism is truly radical. This historical intervention in Taylor's “radical redefinition” reformulates his novelty as the reconfiguration of the relation between generality of laws and meaning worlds in the institutional response to diversity. The Third Republic pushed generality in laws against diverse meaning worlds. Taylor (with Jocelyn Maclure) demands that general laws reasonably accommodate “meaning-giving convictions.” I explore this reversal and argue that it's questionable Taylor offers a radical redefinition of secularism—or even that we need one.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"116 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139003544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-12DOI: 10.1017/s1755048323000299
Francesco Cavatorta
{"title":"On Salafism. Concepts and Contexts By Azmi Bishara. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2022. vii+228 pp. $60.00 hardcover.","authors":"Francesco Cavatorta","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000299","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"29 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139007372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-04DOI: 10.1017/s1755048323000275
S. Foertsch, Rudra Chakraborty, P. Joosse
QAnon is beginning to gain attention in scholarly circles, but these sources often disagree about how to categorize the movement. This amounts to the meta-dispute between those who view QAnon primarily as a religious “cult,” and those who grant it greater credibility as a political populist movement. Using quantitative and qualitative methods we test the proposition that QAnon could be a mix of both. Results from both analyses suggest that QAnon is best understood primarily as a political populist movement, but one that utilizes religious rhetoric. The findings thus highlight the asymmetric nature of the conflation of religion and politics in the contemporary American civil sphere.
{"title":"Asymmetric conflation: QAnon and the political cooptation of religion","authors":"S. Foertsch, Rudra Chakraborty, P. Joosse","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000275","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 QAnon is beginning to gain attention in scholarly circles, but these sources often disagree about how to categorize the movement. This amounts to the meta-dispute between those who view QAnon primarily as a religious “cult,” and those who grant it greater credibility as a political populist movement. Using quantitative and qualitative methods we test the proposition that QAnon could be a mix of both. Results from both analyses suggest that QAnon is best understood primarily as a political populist movement, but one that utilizes religious rhetoric. The findings thus highlight the asymmetric nature of the conflation of religion and politics in the contemporary American civil sphere.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"9 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138602938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-04DOI: 10.1017/s1755048323000305
Zachary D. Broeren, Paul A. Djupe
A long line of research has established that Americans who subscribe to Christian nationalism have a preference for those inside their group and animosity toward those outside their group. These beliefs may impede the equal application of the rule of law, a link that has been suggested but not formally tested. Utilizing experimental data from a survey conducted in fall 2021, we assess the equal application of the rule of law for in and outgroup members conditional on Christian nationalism and belief in Christian persecution. We suggest that ingroup love may move distinctly from outgroup hate. Our results suggest that Christian nationalists have a preference for the ingroup, but do not automatically denigrate outgroups. However, belief in Christian persecution drives animosity toward outgroups, while not elevating the ingroup. Christian nationalist outgroup hatred must be triggered by threat, which has been the project of movement and party elites.
{"title":"The ingroup love and outgroup hate of Christian Nationalism: experimental evidence about the implementation of the rule of law","authors":"Zachary D. Broeren, Paul A. Djupe","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000305","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A long line of research has established that Americans who subscribe to Christian nationalism have a preference for those inside their group and animosity toward those outside their group. These beliefs may impede the equal application of the rule of law, a link that has been suggested but not formally tested. Utilizing experimental data from a survey conducted in fall 2021, we assess the equal application of the rule of law for in and outgroup members conditional on Christian nationalism and belief in Christian persecution. We suggest that ingroup love may move distinctly from outgroup hate. Our results suggest that Christian nationalists have a preference for the ingroup, but do not automatically denigrate outgroups. However, belief in Christian persecution drives animosity toward outgroups, while not elevating the ingroup. Christian nationalist outgroup hatred must be triggered by threat, which has been the project of movement and party elites.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"7 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138603006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1017/s175504832300024x
Bryan P. Kelly
Abstract This paper examines the Holy See as a political actor amid hard power conflict. While many debate the legal and religious personalities of the Holy See, few engage with an approach that illustrates the Holy See and its citizen-like laity in light of its combinative religious–political dynamic. This paper argues that resulting from this dynamic, the Holy See's sui generis statehood enables the comprehension of a similar sui generis citizenry. These citizens, which this paper labels pseudo-citizens, are the result of connections between the recognized sovereignty of the Holy See and its role over the Roman Catholic Church. This paper examines this connection contextually amid the Holy See's interaction with the underlying international moral framework on just conflict and the protective motivating factors associated with its pseudo-citizens. This motivation is consistent with historical Holy See positions, and is significant for understanding the Holy See's approach amid future hard power events.
{"title":"The power politics of the Holy See: the church, the state, and its citizens","authors":"Bryan P. Kelly","doi":"10.1017/s175504832300024x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s175504832300024x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the Holy See as a political actor amid hard power conflict. While many debate the legal and religious personalities of the Holy See, few engage with an approach that illustrates the Holy See and its citizen-like laity in light of its combinative religious–political dynamic. This paper argues that resulting from this dynamic, the Holy See's sui generis statehood enables the comprehension of a similar sui generis citizenry. These citizens, which this paper labels pseudo-citizens, are the result of connections between the recognized sovereignty of the Holy See and its role over the Roman Catholic Church. This paper examines this connection contextually amid the Holy See's interaction with the underlying international moral framework on just conflict and the protective motivating factors associated with its pseudo-citizens. This motivation is consistent with historical Holy See positions, and is significant for understanding the Holy See's approach amid future hard power events.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136262611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1017/s1755048323000251
Matthew L. Layton
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
此内容的摘要不可用，因此提供了预览。有关如何访问此内容的信息，请使用上面的获取访问链接。
{"title":"<i>Evangelicals and Electoral Politics in Latin America: A Kingdom of this World</i> By Taylor C. Boas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023. ix+317 pp. $99.99 cloth.","authors":"Matthew L. Layton","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000251","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"225 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136261944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1017/s1755048323000226
Jason Adkins, Paul A. Djupe, Jacob R. Neiheisel
Abstract Research on disaster preparedness finds little connection between religious variables, such as beliefs surrounding the end of the world (apocalypticism), and physical preparations (e.g., having three days of food and water stored). In light of rhetoric from evangelical elites urging the faithful to prepare for the apocalypse given recent events, such as the 2020 election, we sought to re-evaluate the connection between physical preparations for difficult times and religious variables including Christian nationalism, apocalypticism, church attendance, and the belief that Christians are being persecuted in the country. Results from an original survey conducted in early 2021 reveal a strong positive association between apocalypticism and measures of disaster preparedness. Other religious variables (Christian nationalism, in particular) do not always relate to preparedness behavior in expected ways. While it remains unclear what role, if any, Christian elites played in convincing the faithful to prepare not only their souls for the apocalypse, but also their pantries, it is evident that apocalyptic beliefs track with physical preparedness behavior.
{"title":"Preparedness Behavior and the apocalypse: religion and politics in the post 2020 election era","authors":"Jason Adkins, Paul A. Djupe, Jacob R. Neiheisel","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000226","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research on disaster preparedness finds little connection between religious variables, such as beliefs surrounding the end of the world (apocalypticism), and physical preparations (e.g., having three days of food and water stored). In light of rhetoric from evangelical elites urging the faithful to prepare for the apocalypse given recent events, such as the 2020 election, we sought to re-evaluate the connection between physical preparations for difficult times and religious variables including Christian nationalism, apocalypticism, church attendance, and the belief that Christians are being persecuted in the country. Results from an original survey conducted in early 2021 reveal a strong positive association between apocalypticism and measures of disaster preparedness. Other religious variables (Christian nationalism, in particular) do not always relate to preparedness behavior in expected ways. While it remains unclear what role, if any, Christian elites played in convincing the faithful to prepare not only their souls for the apocalypse, but also their pantries, it is evident that apocalyptic beliefs track with physical preparedness behavior.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135244211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1017/s1755048323000238
Julia Köbrich, Lisa Hoffmann
Abstract Interreligious relations remain an important dimension of human coexistence and we currently observe an increase in religiously motivated violence and discrimination. Hence, we need to better understand determinants of interreligious peace. Building on a new concept of interreligious peace which includes but exceeds the absence of interreligious physical violence, we provide a systematic review of 83 quantitative empirical studies examining religious determinants of interreligious physical violence, hostile attitudes, threat perceptions, trust, and cooperation. We find that religious ideas foster or hinder interreligious peace depending on their content. Religious identities have negative effects but must be considered in context. Evidence regarding the role of religious practice is mixed and the role of religious actors and institutions remains understudied. Our results show the need for (1) more conceptual clarity, (2) replications in different contexts, (3) research on dimensions of religion beyond identities, and (4) a better integration of different strands of literature.
{"title":"What do we know about religion and interreligious peace? A review of the quantitative literature","authors":"Julia Köbrich, Lisa Hoffmann","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000238","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Interreligious relations remain an important dimension of human coexistence and we currently observe an increase in religiously motivated violence and discrimination. Hence, we need to better understand determinants of interreligious peace. Building on a new concept of interreligious peace which includes but exceeds the absence of interreligious physical violence, we provide a systematic review of 83 quantitative empirical studies examining religious determinants of interreligious physical violence, hostile attitudes, threat perceptions, trust, and cooperation. We find that religious ideas foster or hinder interreligious peace depending on their content. Religious identities have negative effects but must be considered in context. Evidence regarding the role of religious practice is mixed and the role of religious actors and institutions remains understudied. Our results show the need for (1) more conceptual clarity, (2) replications in different contexts, (3) research on dimensions of religion beyond identities, and (4) a better integration of different strands of literature.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135199074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Secularism—i.e., the separation between the state and religious institutions—is a fundamental characteristic of liberal democracies, yet support for secular arrangements varies significantly across Western countries. In Canada, such attitudinal divergences are observable at the regional level, with citizens from Quebec displaying higher levels of support for secularism than other Canadians. In this paper, we test three hypotheses to account for this regional discrepancy: religiosity, liberal values, and out-group prejudice. Using data from an online panel survey (n = 2,000), our findings suggest that support for secularism in Quebec is mostly explained by the province's lower baseline levels of religiosity, anticlerical feelings, and by its distinctive understanding of liberalism. These factors are likely to result from Quebec's unique religious and sociohistorical history. Results also suggest that while negative feelings toward religious minorities are positively correlated with support for secularism across the entire country, negative feelings toward ethnic minorities are associated with lower support for secularism in Quebec. These findings disprove the commonly held assumption according to which support for secularism is driven by ethnic prejudice in Quebec.
{"title":"Religiosity matters: assessing competing explanations of support for secularism in Quebec and Canada","authors":"Alexis Bibeau, Evelyne Brie, Yannick Dufresne, Gilles Gagné","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000196","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Secularism—i.e., the separation between the state and religious institutions—is a fundamental characteristic of liberal democracies, yet support for secular arrangements varies significantly across Western countries. In Canada, such attitudinal divergences are observable at the regional level, with citizens from Quebec displaying higher levels of support for secularism than other Canadians. In this paper, we test three hypotheses to account for this regional discrepancy: religiosity, liberal values, and out-group prejudice. Using data from an online panel survey (n = 2,000), our findings suggest that support for secularism in Quebec is mostly explained by the province's lower baseline levels of religiosity, anticlerical feelings, and by its distinctive understanding of liberalism. These factors are likely to result from Quebec's unique religious and sociohistorical history. Results also suggest that while negative feelings toward religious minorities are positively correlated with support for secularism across the entire country, negative feelings toward ethnic minorities are associated with lower support for secularism in Quebec. These findings disprove the commonly held assumption according to which support for secularism is driven by ethnic prejudice in Quebec.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84326074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-25DOI: 10.1017/s1755048323000184
H. Overos, Jeffery Sauer
European political parties, particularly radical right parties (RRPs), increasingly use religious symbols during elections. Despite the prevalence of these symbols, evidence on the association between religion and far-right vote share is mixed. We compare two leading arguments explaining the relationship between religion and RRPs. We hypothesize that the number of religious buildings, identifiable as Islamic or Catholic, will be associated with higher RRP support. We test this as a most likely crucial case using results from the French 2017 presidential election. Controlling for other demographic factors, more Catholic buildings in a commune are associated with a decrease in votes for the Front Nationale (FN). An increase in the number of mosques in non-urban communes is associated with increased support for FN. We argue these findings are evidence that RRPs use religious symbolism to draw on nativist or anti-Islamic support rather than traditional religious support.
{"title":"Dieu dans la commune: religion and voting in the 2017 French election","authors":"H. Overos, Jeffery Sauer","doi":"10.1017/s1755048323000184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048323000184","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 European political parties, particularly radical right parties (RRPs), increasingly use religious symbols during elections. Despite the prevalence of these symbols, evidence on the association between religion and far-right vote share is mixed. We compare two leading arguments explaining the relationship between religion and RRPs. We hypothesize that the number of religious buildings, identifiable as Islamic or Catholic, will be associated with higher RRP support. We test this as a most likely crucial case using results from the French 2017 presidential election. Controlling for other demographic factors, more Catholic buildings in a commune are associated with a decrease in votes for the Front Nationale (FN). An increase in the number of mosques in non-urban communes is associated with increased support for FN. We argue these findings are evidence that RRPs use religious symbolism to draw on nativist or anti-Islamic support rather than traditional religious support.","PeriodicalId":45674,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Religion","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84455180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：