Asia Europe Journal最新文献

How did Britons view China in 2020, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic? This paper presents new, detailed evidence of the negative and worsening perceptions of China in the UK across three domains: public opinion (based on survey data collected in autumn 2020), political elites in parliament, and the media. The worsening of perceptions of China emerged in the context of a changing and more contested China policy from the UK government and a greater level of public debate about China, partly a consequence of the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. The paper places analysis of these perceptions in the context of the development of relations between the UK and China. Together with deteriorating Chinese views of the UK’s China policy and controversy over a number of developments in China, widespread negative views about China among the British public and in political circles will constrain UK-China relations from developing in a more positive direction.

Climate change has been socially constructed crisscrossed by public and private interests, asymmetries and world-view conflicts. When it comes to the legitimacy of norms to address the complexities of social conditions of vulnerability and effective actions to fulfil distributive and climate justice principles, climate change still faces a discrepancy between political announcements and incongruous practices of international actors. While analysing the cases of China and the European Union, we point out contradictions stemming from their policy goals guided by strategic interests. From a global climate justice perspective, we analyze recent power dynamics that operate at two levels: first, economic relations and negotiations between Brazil and the two poles of power, considering the scenario of socio-environmental injustice and climate insecurity; second, policy practices of both global players in climate governance, bearing in mind the notions of climate justice and development as conceptual guides to understand when and where contradictions emerge. To do so, this article is structured around three sections: (i) a brief historical account of China’s and the EU’s roles in international climate policy; (ii) their legacies in climate governance and the inextricable relationship between their normative behaviour and their development objectives; (iii) an overview of the signing of the strategic memorandum of understanding for economic and trade agreement between Mercosur and the EU in 2019, as well as Sino-Brazilian relations facilitating investments and trade in multiple segments vis-à-vis the most recent multifaceted backlash in Brazil’s socio-environmental and climate policies.

Abstract

Poland was among vocal critics of the acceleration and finalization of CAI talks by the end of 2020. Among the reasons were doubts about the timing and political circumstances in the EU such as the role of Germany as a driving force for CAI due to its economic dependence on China, and Commission mandate for talks that was granted several years ago in a very different situation both in China and Europe. Poland was also critical about bypassing the USA, in a sense of bringing CAI talks up to speed during the transition period, before Biden sworn. However, after finalization of the agreement, Polish government (as well as the biggest opposition party) presents a rather positive assessment of CAI and opts for ratification. Notwithstanding, all Polish MEPs have endorsed the European Parliament resolution to freeze ratification process.

This research responds to an increasing volume of scholarly literature unpacking the recent dynamics of EU foreign policy discourses and practices vis-à-vis China. Drawing on the theoretical approach of collective securitisation, this article shows that EU foreign policy towards China since the mid-2010s has witnessed increasing collective securitisation moves directed at multiple policy frames, including Asian regional security frame, economic security frame, political security frame and information and technology and cybersecurity frame. The EU’s attempts to securitise China as an existential threat across multiple issue areas have been triggered by a combination of long-term trends and specific sets of precipitating events, which contributed to galvanising the EU’s collective securitising discourses and subsequent policy initiatives. However, this research finds that the EU’s securitising moves and relevant speech acts have not resulted in a coherent audience response among the EU member states. The divergent views held by the EU’s internal audience on whether China should be perceived as an existential threat have hampered the implementation of the EU’s collective policy outputs.

In the context of globalization and internationalization, several common development trends and challenges have emerged in higher education systems around the world. These will have an impact on the individual university governance structures. Since the international university network gets an increasing importance and several university functions are shared within that network, it is crucial to take the international context into account when reshaping the university governance structure. Although several publications are dedicated to the countrywide or regional governance principles in the EU member states, it is often impossible to assimilate these global descriptions to the individual governance structure of a particular university. In this paper, we conduct case studies on five Chinese universities and five European universities from the perspective of governance structure, from four dimensions of the internal democratic nature, the external involvement, the level of centralization of decision-making authority, and the level of individual responsibility. This study analyzes the differences and commonalities between both. Chinese universities have a unified governance structure that is statutory based on the “President Responsibility System” in which the university’s party committee is officially designated to play the core role of leading the university. EU universities are more diversified in their governance principles, and each of them has its own unique features. To achieve better and deeper cooperation and collaboration between EU and Chinese universities, it is critical to understand and acknowledge these differences. Future research can add more dimensions and factors to broaden the scope of the analysis.

Abstract

Nowadays, China increasingly sees education as a critical component of becoming a world emerging power. Since 2015, China has implemented its new education strategy, named the “World first-class universities and world first-class disciplines” project. In this context, the university’s internal governance has become a critical factor for the Chinese standards to construct world first-class universities. The Chinese government has published a series of related documents to enhance university autonomy and improve external conditions with university governance’s mechanism reform. The paper firstly discusses the research statutes and proposes the analytical framework based on the stakeholder theory and quadrilateral model. Secondly, it presents the history and progress of the university’s internal governance in China and Europe and summarizes their experiences and characteristics. Thirdly, it discusses the similarities and differences between Europe and China in the universities’ internal governance, which focuses on the internal governance framework and the power distribution. In this way, the university budget and finance, teacher’s appointment and promotion, enrollment power, curriculum design, research, and even the housing and equipment assignment are all analyzed. Finally, it summarizes China and Europe’s internal governance models with the key factors and prominent features in the different models. It also discusses the common issues that the universities are facing in internal governance.

This paper assesses the economic impact of the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) on all EU member states as well as Japan. The novelty of this study is that it refers to all EU countries and provides an overview of the expected output effects of JEEPA for all member states in a detailed sectoral breakdown. This impact is investigated using the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) framework. Calculations revealed that economic returns from JEEPA vary among the EU countries. Some of the more highly developed EU countries will experience beneficial effects from tariff reductions to a greater extent than others, while some of the newer, less-developed EU members will experience losses, caused by the lower competitiveness of these countries. Beneficial effects in the EU countries are expected mainly in the primary sector industries like meat and animal products, leather, grains, and crops; while in Japan, economic gains are expected in the motor vehicle and transport equipment industries. Despite the overall optimism accompanying the signing of the JEEPA, it is worth paying attention to the sectors that are expected to shrink as a result.