Review of: Maria A. Blasco y Monica G. Salomone. 2016. Morir joven, a los 140. El papel de los te- lomeros en el envejecimiento y la historia de como trabajan los cientificos para conseguir que vivamos mas y mejor. Barcelona: Paidos
评论:Maria A. Blasco和Monica G. Salomone, 2016。英年早逝，140岁。特洛梅洛斯在衰老中的作用，以及科学家如何努力让我们活得更长更好的故事。巴塞罗那:Paidos
{"title":"María A. Blasco y Mónica G. Salomone. 2016. Morir joven, a los 140. El papel de los telómeros en el envejecimiento y la historia de cómo trabajan los científicos para conseguir que vivamos más y mejor","authors":"Pablo García-Barranquero","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17563","url":null,"abstract":"Review of: Maria A. Blasco y Monica G. Salomone. 2016. Morir joven, a los 140. El papel de los te- lomeros en el envejecimiento y la historia de como trabajan los cientificos para conseguir que vivamos mas y mejor. Barcelona: Paidos","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"25 1","pages":"131-133"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86494916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
La nocion de emergencia acompana a la Filosofia de la Biologia desde finales del siglo XIX, afirmando que las propiedades de los sistemas biologicos no pueden deducirse de las de sus componentes. A lo largo del siglo XX las caracterizaciones de este concepto se han apoyado en cuatro pilares, impredecibilidad, novedad, restriccion y causacion descendente, pilares ligados a la asuncion de una jerarquizacion de la realidad en niveles de organizacion. En este trabajo intento demostrar que puede explicarse la naturaleza de las propiedades biologicas sin hacer referencia a la emergencia utilizando como herramienta la nocion de cuasi-descomponibilidad propuesta originariamente por Herbert Simon.
{"title":"Intervalos de cuasi-descomponibilidad y propiedades emergentes","authors":"Emilio Cáceres Vázquez, Cristian Saborido","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.15718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.15718","url":null,"abstract":"La nocion de emergencia acompana a la Filosofia de la Biologia desde finales del siglo XIX, afirmando que las propiedades de los sistemas biologicos no pueden deducirse de las de sus componentes. A lo largo del siglo XX las caracterizaciones de este concepto se han apoyado en cuatro pilares, impredecibilidad, novedad, restriccion y causacion descendente, pilares ligados a la asuncion de una jerarquizacion de la realidad en niveles de organizacion. En este trabajo intento demostrar que puede explicarse la naturaleza de las propiedades biologicas sin hacer referencia a la emergencia utilizando como herramienta la nocion de cuasi-descomponibilidad propuesta originariamente por Herbert Simon.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"69 1","pages":"89-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76359335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En este articulo, exploro la posibilidad de aplicar los metodos y resultados de la Agregacion de Juicios al problema del desacuerdo logico. Es decir, desarrollo y evaluo maneras en que individuos que desacuerdan logicamente pueden generar una logica colectiva. Pruebo una version de la paradoja discursiva, donde el voto por mayoria en un grupo de logicos estructurales puede generar logicas subestructurales, y luego elaboro un resultado de imposibilidad mas general. Mas adelante, analizo diferentes maneras de evitar la paradoja, en particular aquellas que apelan a restricciones de dominio. Finalmente, analizo brevemente la aplicacion de estos resultados al debate sobre paradojas semanticas.
{"title":"Desacuerdo lógico y agregación","authors":"Diego Tajer","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.15716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.15716","url":null,"abstract":"En este articulo, exploro la posibilidad de aplicar los metodos y resultados de la Agregacion de Juicios al problema del desacuerdo logico. Es decir, desarrollo y evaluo maneras en que individuos que desacuerdan logicamente pueden generar una logica colectiva. Pruebo una version de la paradoja discursiva, donde el voto por mayoria en un grupo de logicos estructurales puede generar logicas subestructurales, y luego elaboro un resultado de imposibilidad mas general. Mas adelante, analizo diferentes maneras de evitar la paradoja, en particular aquellas que apelan a restricciones de dominio. Finalmente, analizo brevemente la aplicacion de estos resultados al debate sobre paradojas semanticas.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"18 1","pages":"63-87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90463950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bourbaki nos enseno el potencial que guarda el concepto de estructura matematica para reorganizar, sistematizar y unificar el entramado matematico. Pero la evolucion de la matematica, en las ultimas decadas deja patente las limitaciones de este enfoque. En este articulo analizamos las contribuciones de Bourbaki a lo que denominamos fundamentacion “interna” de la matematica y senalamos, a su vez, las que a nuestro juicio son sus principales carencias. A continuacion bosquejamos brevemente algunas evidencias sobre las que sustentamos la perspectiva denominada funcionalismo estructuralista . Segun esta, la nocion general de morfismo caracteriza la naturaleza dinamica de la matematica actual.
{"title":"Lo que nos dio y no nos dio Bourbaki","authors":"E. Ezenarro","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.15199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.15199","url":null,"abstract":"Bourbaki nos enseno el potencial que guarda el concepto de estructura matematica para reorganizar, sistematizar y unificar el entramado matematico. Pero la evolucion de la matematica, en las ultimas decadas deja patente las limitaciones de este enfoque. En este articulo analizamos las contribuciones de Bourbaki a lo que denominamos fundamentacion “interna” de la matematica y senalamos, a su vez, las que a nuestro juicio son sus principales carencias. A continuacion bosquejamos brevemente algunas evidencias sobre las que sustentamos la perspectiva denominada funcionalismo estructuralista . Segun esta, la nocion general de morfismo caracteriza la naturaleza dinamica de la matematica actual.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"30 1","pages":"25-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91231274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Two entities are weakly discernible when an irreflexive and symmetric relation holds between them. That weak discernibility holds in quantum mechanics is fairly uncontroversial nowadays. The ontological consequences of weak discernibility, however, are far from clear. Part of the literature seems to imply that weak discernibility points to a definite metaphysics to quantum mechanics. In this paper we shall discuss the metaphysical contribution of weak discernibility to quantum mechanics and argue that, contrary to part of current literature, it does not provide for a fully naturalistic determination of metaphysics. Underdetermination of the metaphysics still plagues the way of the naturalist.
{"title":"Does weak discernibility determine metaphysics","authors":"J. Arenhart","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.15870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.15870","url":null,"abstract":"Two entities are weakly discernible when an irreflexive and symmetric relation holds between them. That weak discernibility holds in quantum mechanics is fairly uncontroversial nowadays. The ontological consequences of weak discernibility, however, are far from clear. Part of the literature seems to imply that weak discernibility points to a definite metaphysics to quantum mechanics. In this paper we shall discuss the metaphysical contribution of weak discernibility to quantum mechanics and argue that, contrary to part of current literature, it does not provide for a fully naturalistic determination of metaphysics. Underdetermination of the metaphysics still plagues the way of the naturalist.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"17 1","pages":"109-125"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85482132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
espanolE. Machery y algunos colaboradores suyos han utilizado datos sobre encuestas para criticar el anti-descriptivismo sobre los nombres propios de Kripke. Presento aqui diversos inconvenientes de esas encuestas. Algunas de mis objeciones conciernen a su ambiguedad. En particular, las respuestas que —segun Machery et al.— revelan intuiciones descriptivistas pueden interpretarse como respuestas anti-descriptivistas, por razones que —por lo que yo se— nadie ha destacado hasta ahora. Ademas, los casos presentados a los encuestados son aparentemente inconsistentes. Tambien abordo otras cuestiones relacionadas con el papel de las intuiciones en la filosofia; las tesis de Machery et al. dependen de un supuesto injustificado: no existen capacidades expertas respecto a las intuiciones EnglishE. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that–according to them–reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses (for reasons that have not been pointed out so far). Furthermore, their vignettes are inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depends on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions.
{"title":"Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones","authors":"M. Otero","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.15463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.15463","url":null,"abstract":"espanolE. Machery y algunos colaboradores suyos han utilizado datos sobre encuestas para criticar el anti-descriptivismo sobre los nombres propios de Kripke. Presento aqui diversos inconvenientes de esas encuestas. Algunas de mis objeciones conciernen a su ambiguedad. En particular, las respuestas que —segun Machery et al.— revelan intuiciones descriptivistas pueden interpretarse como respuestas anti-descriptivistas, por razones que —por lo que yo se— nadie ha destacado hasta ahora. Ademas, los casos presentados a los encuestados son aparentemente inconsistentes. Tambien abordo otras cuestiones relacionadas con el papel de las intuiciones en la filosofia; las tesis de Machery et al. dependen de un supuesto injustificado: no existen capacidades expertas respecto a las intuiciones EnglishE. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that–according to them–reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses (for reasons that have not been pointed out so far). Furthermore, their vignettes are inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depends on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"13 1","pages":"41-62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80894462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a new approach to conditional donkey sentences that allows us to face successfully the often called proportion problem. The main ingredients of the proposal are van Benthem's generalized quantifier approach to conditionals (van Benthem, 1984), and Barwise's situation semantics (Barwise, 1989). We present some experimental data supporting our proposal.
{"title":"Stop beating the donkey! A fresh interpretation of conditional donkey sentences","authors":"M. Frápolli, A. Ginés","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.13941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.13941","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new approach to conditional donkey sentences that allows us to face successfully the often called proportion problem. The main ingredients of the proposal are van Benthem's generalized quantifier approach to conditionals (van Benthem, 1984), and Barwise's situation semantics (Barwise, 1989). We present some experimental data supporting our proposal.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"28 1","pages":"7-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78975283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In work culminating in Know How (2009), Jason Stanley argues, against Gilbert Ryle, that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. In How Propaganda Works (2015), Stanley portrays this work as undermining a "flawed ideology" supporting elitist valuations of intellectual work and workers. However, the link between Stanley's two philosophical projects is weak. Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that lacks the political consequences foreseen by Stanley. Versions of "intellectualism" have as much potential to align with hierarchical political systems as do versions of "anti-intellectualism." Consequently, the debate about knowledge-how and knowledge-that comes apart from Stanley's more recent concerns about flawed ideologies.
{"title":"Ideology and Knowledge-How: A Rylean Perspective","authors":"Michael Kremer","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16292","url":null,"abstract":"In work culminating in Know How (2009), Jason Stanley argues, against Gilbert Ryle, that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. In How Propaganda Works (2015), Stanley portrays this work as undermining a \"flawed ideology\" supporting elitist valuations of intellectual work and workers. However, the link between Stanley's two philosophical projects is weak. Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that lacks the political consequences foreseen by Stanley. Versions of \"intellectualism\" have as much potential to align with hierarchical political systems as do versions of \"anti-intellectualism.\" Consequently, the debate about knowledge-how and knowledge-that comes apart from Stanley's more recent concerns about flawed ideologies.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"256 2 1","pages":"295-311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76617300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT: What is it for an analytic philosopher to do ideology critique? How should analytic philosophers engage with the great critics of ideology outside the analytic tradition? Just how useful are our proprietary tools as analytic philosophers when it comes to thinking about ideology, and in what sense 'useful', and to whom? And to what end might we pursue ideology critique? Here I attempt to say something about these questions by commenting specifically on a recent contribution to analytic ideology critique, Jason Stanley's How Propaganda Works .
{"title":"Philosophy and Ideology","authors":"A. Srinivasan","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16446","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: What is it for an analytic philosopher to do ideology critique? How should analytic philosophers engage with the great critics of ideology outside the analytic tradition? Just how useful are our proprietary tools as analytic philosophers when it comes to thinking about ideology, and in what sense 'useful', and to whom? And to what end might we pursue ideology critique? Here I attempt to say something about these questions by commenting specifically on a recent contribution to analytic ideology critique, Jason Stanley's How Propaganda Works .","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"19 1","pages":"371-380"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88410995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT: I explore Jason Stanley's notion of ideology. After preliminary remarks on ideology and coercion in social reproduction, I offer a restatement of Stanley's position on ideology, examining his notion of epistemic harm. I then examine the role of emotion in his thinking as that which binds beliefs to agents, and conclude with an argument for a notion I call "affective ideology" that enables us to connect ideology with the use of force in "coercive social reproduction."
{"title":"Stanley on Ideology","authors":"John Protevi","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.16326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.16326","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: I explore Jason Stanley's notion of ideology. After preliminary remarks on ideology and coercion in social reproduction, I offer a restatement of Stanley's position on ideology, examining his notion of epistemic harm. I then examine the role of emotion in his thinking as that which binds beliefs to agents, and conclude with an argument for a notion I call \"affective ideology\" that enables us to connect ideology with the use of force in \"coercive social reproduction.\"","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"70 1","pages":"357-369"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2016-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80184268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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