{"title":"POWER SHIFTS: CONNECTING IR THEORY WITH THE CHINESE CASE – CORRIGENDUM","authors":"Joshua R. Shifrinson, Stephan Haggard","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"365 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/jea.2021.5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45977743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract What drives public discontent about Chinese investment on the ground? This study probes the “ground truth” of public reaction in Zambia by documenting both the public perception and the actual impacts of Chinese investments. We find a “reputation deficit” for Chinese investment: Zambians are significantly less likely to support Chinese investment than investment from other countries. Combining results from an original household survey, interview records, and official statistics, we examine the drivers of this reputation deficit. Chinese firms are no worse at generating employment or adhering to labor and environmental standards than Western corporations operating in Zambia, according to official statistics as well as public opinion. However, Chinese firms possess a lower degree of localization, specifically in managers’ knowledge of local languages and the provision of culturally relevant benefits, and they are less likely to engage with the media. Our study highlights these previously overlooked causes of the reputation deficit.
{"title":"A REPUTATION DEFICIT? THE MYTHS AND REALITY OF CHINESE INVESTMENT IN ZAMBIA","authors":"Weiyi Shi, Brigitte Seim","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.18","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What drives public discontent about Chinese investment on the ground? This study probes the “ground truth” of public reaction in Zambia by documenting both the public perception and the actual impacts of Chinese investments. We find a “reputation deficit” for Chinese investment: Zambians are significantly less likely to support Chinese investment than investment from other countries. Combining results from an original household survey, interview records, and official statistics, we examine the drivers of this reputation deficit. Chinese firms are no worse at generating employment or adhering to labor and environmental standards than Western corporations operating in Zambia, according to official statistics as well as public opinion. However, Chinese firms possess a lower degree of localization, specifically in managers’ knowledge of local languages and the provision of culturally relevant benefits, and they are less likely to engage with the media. Our study highlights these previously overlooked causes of the reputation deficit.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"259 - 282"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49248264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"China and Great Power Responsibility for Climate Change. By Sanna Kopra. New York: Routledge, 2018. 186 pp. $136.87 (cloth).","authors":"C. Pan","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"359 - 361"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47217232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract With the globalization of Chinese capital, economic statecraft has become an increasingly prominent component of China's foreign policy. In this article, I examine China's use of economic inducements in developed democracies, a topic of growing concern for policymakers, focusing on the case of Australia. I show how Beijing's attempts to coopt public voices and influence Australia's foreign policy using non-transparent political donations and academic funding generated a strong backlash. At the same time, economic interdependence has provided a buffering effect, with key domestic actors in Australia advocating for cooperative relations, although this effect can in turn be limited by Beijing's coercive economic tactics. My findings underline the reputational costs of certain approaches to economic statecraft, the value of building supportive coalitions, and the challenges faced by China's authoritarian state capitalist model. They also highlight the impacts of globalized Chinese capital in developed democracies, including the resilience and vulnerabilities inherent in democratic political processes.
{"title":"PEDDLING OR PERSUADING: CHINA'S ECONOMIC STATECRAFT IN AUSTRALIA","authors":"Audrye Wong","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.19","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With the globalization of Chinese capital, economic statecraft has become an increasingly prominent component of China's foreign policy. In this article, I examine China's use of economic inducements in developed democracies, a topic of growing concern for policymakers, focusing on the case of Australia. I show how Beijing's attempts to coopt public voices and influence Australia's foreign policy using non-transparent political donations and academic funding generated a strong backlash. At the same time, economic interdependence has provided a buffering effect, with key domestic actors in Australia advocating for cooperative relations, although this effect can in turn be limited by Beijing's coercive economic tactics. My findings underline the reputational costs of certain approaches to economic statecraft, the value of building supportive coalitions, and the challenges faced by China's authoritarian state capitalist model. They also highlight the impacts of globalized Chinese capital in developed democracies, including the resilience and vulnerabilities inherent in democratic political processes.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"283 - 304"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45158149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Observers have portrayed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) variously, as China's great-power strategy, global infrastructure initiative, or commercial projects. Each characterization has had logical reasoning and evidence to support it. But how? How has one initiative been shown to have such varied motives? This article unpacks the Chinese state and establishes that a “tri-block” structure consisting of political leadership, bureaucracy, and economic arms has accounted for such varied motivations and actors in the BRI in China. In the BRI process, the leadership employed strategic rhetoric, and bureaucracies imposed policy ideas. Yet, more pervasively, the implementers have followed commercial motives in specific projects. BRI's strategic rhetoric and hazardous investment have generated external critiques and anti-China backlash, forcing Beijing to readjust the initiative. However, given the tri-block state structure, Beijing's policy adjustment will not be sufficient. Economic actors’ incentives need to be shifted too.
{"title":"FRAGMENTED MOTIVES AND POLICIES: THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN CHINA","authors":"Min Ye","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.15","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Observers have portrayed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) variously, as China's great-power strategy, global infrastructure initiative, or commercial projects. Each characterization has had logical reasoning and evidence to support it. But how? How has one initiative been shown to have such varied motives? This article unpacks the Chinese state and establishes that a “tri-block” structure consisting of political leadership, bureaucracy, and economic arms has accounted for such varied motivations and actors in the BRI in China. In the BRI process, the leadership employed strategic rhetoric, and bureaucracies imposed policy ideas. Yet, more pervasively, the implementers have followed commercial motives in specific projects. BRI's strategic rhetoric and hazardous investment have generated external critiques and anti-China backlash, forcing Beijing to readjust the initiative. However, given the tri-block state structure, Beijing's policy adjustment will not be sufficient. Economic actors’ incentives need to be shifted too.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"193 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48055304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and China's state-led model for economic globalization more generally, have attracted controversy: Are state-led overseas investment and lending driven by strategic motives or market rationale? How have the recipient economies reacted to the influx of Chinese capital? This special issue sheds light on these questions by first outlining the fragmented state system driving the BRI, a system featuring both Beijing's strategic logic at the top and market considerations in policy implementation. The role of the state is unpacked further in China's globalizing coal industry and in the growth of Chinese industry export to BRI countries. Finally, the issue explores the mechanisms behind public backlash and political pushback facing China in Zambia and Australia. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to shift China's relationship with the world, this special issue contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the modus operandi of Chinese capital going global.
{"title":"CHINESE CAPITAL GOES GLOBAL: THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND BEYOND","authors":"Weiyi Shi, Min Ye","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.14","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and China's state-led model for economic globalization more generally, have attracted controversy: Are state-led overseas investment and lending driven by strategic motives or market rationale? How have the recipient economies reacted to the influx of Chinese capital? This special issue sheds light on these questions by first outlining the fragmented state system driving the BRI, a system featuring both Beijing's strategic logic at the top and market considerations in policy implementation. The role of the state is unpacked further in China's globalizing coal industry and in the growth of Chinese industry export to BRI countries. Finally, the issue explores the mechanisms behind public backlash and political pushback facing China in Zambia and Australia. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to shift China's relationship with the world, this special issue contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the modus operandi of Chinese capital going global.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"173 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43164349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
largely due to a lack of basic infrastructure such as convenient transportation. The Chinese government might be right to invest billions in roads, because it is an effective way of eliminating rural poverty. To deal with its human capital crisis, China may still need to prioritize some short-term measures, such as physical infrastructure construction, to eradicate rural poverty. Despite its rapid economic growth, China faces one of its biggest challenges—the urban–rural human capital divide that threatens its economic health. The Chinese government must reduce this educational inequality as soon as possible. To close this divide, the Chinese should prioritize eliminating rural poverty. I believe that the Chinese government can shift some of its unsustainable practices to a healthy economic model. The world and the West should be optimistic about China’s rapid economic growth and stability. Not only is a healthy Chinese economy beneficial for the global economy, but a stronger China would not threaten the current global liberal order. We should expect China to follow this order, contribute to global growth, and support a better global system.
{"title":"Turkey and China: Political, Strategic, and Economic Aspects of the Relationship. By Selçuk Çolakoglu. London: World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd., 2021. 222 pp. $78.00 (paper).","authors":"Panthea Pourmalek","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.11","url":null,"abstract":"largely due to a lack of basic infrastructure such as convenient transportation. The Chinese government might be right to invest billions in roads, because it is an effective way of eliminating rural poverty. To deal with its human capital crisis, China may still need to prioritize some short-term measures, such as physical infrastructure construction, to eradicate rural poverty. Despite its rapid economic growth, China faces one of its biggest challenges—the urban–rural human capital divide that threatens its economic health. The Chinese government must reduce this educational inequality as soon as possible. To close this divide, the Chinese should prioritize eliminating rural poverty. I believe that the Chinese government can shift some of its unsustainable practices to a healthy economic model. The world and the West should be optimistic about China’s rapid economic growth and stability. Not only is a healthy Chinese economy beneficial for the global economy, but a stronger China would not threaten the current global liberal order. We should expect China to follow this order, contribute to global growth, and support a better global system.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"356 - 357"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45299801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Invisible China: How the Urban–Rural Divide Threatens China's Rise. By Scott Rozelle and Natalie Hell. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2020. 248 pp. $ 27.50 (cloth).","authors":"Jiaqi Zhao","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"354 - 356"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48676759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"JEA volume 21 issue 2 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/jea.2021.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.27","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"f1 - f4"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45984218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article builds on the theoretical debate over age, period, and cohort effects (APC) and explores how these factors might affect Taiwan's partisan stability. We conducted a two-level multinomial logit random effects model using survey data from 1991 to 2020 to disentangle the APC effects. Our findings challenge Converse's core assumption that partisanship strengthens with age. As a new democracy, Taiwan's party affiliations remain fluid, and we do find evidence of period effects, particularly associated with cross-Strait crises that favor the DPP. However, generational replacement is the most significant factor driving party identity changes in Taiwan. With generational replacement, the Kuomintang is burdened by the image of a century-old party. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had previously fared better among young cohorts but has recently lost its support from millennials. The youngest generation increasingly refuses to associate with the traditional political parties. It seems reasonable to expect that the new generational forces will restructure the Blue–Green cleavage and expand the ideological diversity of Taiwan's party system.
{"title":"STABILITY AND CHANGES IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN TAIWAN: AN EXAMINATION OF LIFE CYCLE, COHORT, AND PERIOD EFFECTS","authors":"Rou-lan Chen","doi":"10.1017/jea.2020.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2020.45","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article builds on the theoretical debate over age, period, and cohort effects (APC) and explores how these factors might affect Taiwan's partisan stability. We conducted a two-level multinomial logit random effects model using survey data from 1991 to 2020 to disentangle the APC effects. Our findings challenge Converse's core assumption that partisanship strengthens with age. As a new democracy, Taiwan's party affiliations remain fluid, and we do find evidence of period effects, particularly associated with cross-Strait crises that favor the DPP. However, generational replacement is the most significant factor driving party identity changes in Taiwan. With generational replacement, the Kuomintang is burdened by the image of a century-old party. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had previously fared better among young cohorts but has recently lost its support from millennials. The youngest generation increasingly refuses to associate with the traditional political parties. It seems reasonable to expect that the new generational forces will restructure the Blue–Green cleavage and expand the ideological diversity of Taiwan's party system.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":"331 - 352"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41962953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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