Journal of the Economics of Ageing最新文献

We show how regional governments affect the appropriate – in terms of territorial equity – assignment of a national LTC benefit. We analyse the case of Italy, featuring a three-layers setting, where eligibility criteria are defined by the central government (which bears the fiscal cost of transfers), but the assignment decision is taken by regional medical commissions, while applications are activated by individual potential beneficiaries. Combining administrative and survey data, and accounting for regional variation in eligibility prevalence, we document large territorial disparities in need-adjusted benefit assignment. We investigate the determinants of such disparities both in terms of individuals’ differential propensity to claim, and of regional discretionary behaviour, as shaped by the underlying quality of regional institutions. While several data limitations recommend caution, the empirical results suggest – in line with our conceptual framework – that regional discretion plays a role in LTC provision: in more detail, lower regional institutional quality appears related to more opportunistic benefit adjudication decisions.

Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, I find that the Black/white gap in standard net worth widened from 1989 to 2019 but narrowed between Hispanics and (non-Hispanic) whites. When the definition of wealth is expanded to incorporate Social Security and defined benefit pension wealth (both the discounted sum of future benefits) to create augmented wealth, the wealth gap is sharply reduced, especially for median wealth. The Black/white and Hispanic/white disparity in Social Security wealth lessened considerably over 1989–2019. In contrast, the Black/white ratio of mean augmented wealth showed no change, though the ratio of median augmented wealth progressed. The Hispanic/white ratio of both mean and median augmented wealth advanced as well. The COVID-19 Pandemic struck in 2020 and hit the minority community much harder than whites in terms of mortality rates. Besides claiming over a million lives overall, it lopped off 4.7 percent of Social Security wealth among whites, 11.5 percent among Blacks, and 13.1 percent among Hispanics. As a result, while mean augmented wealth dipped only 1.2 percent among whites, it fell 6.7 percent among Black households and 7.3 percent among Hispanics. The effect was even stronger on median values – declines of a 2.6, 9.3 and 12.1 percent, respectively.

People’s behaviors are influenced by past experiences. Against the background of the famine that occurred in China from 1959 to 1961 and based on China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data from 2004 to 2011, we take advantage of both temporal and geographic variations in famine intensity to explore the long-term effects of famine experience on food consumption and examine the heterogeneous effecs across age cohorts by constructing a continuous difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. We find that famine experience affects people’s food consumption behavior in the long term. Compared with the group that did not experience the famine, the consumption of staple foods increased while the consumption of meat and vegetables decreased for the group with famine experience, and this effect was heterogeneous across age cohorts and was most significant for the group that experienced famine in their 30 s. The effect of famine experience on food consumption was significantly heterogeneous across regions, household sizes, and income groups. The findings of this paper contribute to a better understanding of the long-term effects of famine experience on food consumption and provide a basis for improving the dietary quality of older adults.

Fertility rates have been falling persistently over the past 50 years in most rich countries. Simultaneously, the trend of outward migration from poorer to richer countries has been steady. These two forces contributed to population aging, and – in an increasing number of countries – even to population decline. In this paper, we quantify the effect of decreasing fertility on the aggregate human capital stock. In doing so we take into account that parents with fewer children may raise investments in their children’s education and health. We find that the human capital impact of declining fertility is partly compensated through such responses when including the full set of countries in our regressions. For the subset of countries that experience population decline, the compensatory effect is weaker and, in many specifications, even insignificant.

National Transfer Accounts (NTAs) provide insights into the effects of ageing on various forms of intergenerational transfers. When these accounts are disaggregated by socioeconomic status (SES) and calculated for at least two different time periods, they offer a powerful tool for understanding changes in economic inequality across age groups and over time. This paper illustrates the application of some standard distributional analysis tools using NTAs, specifically focusing on the case of Peru for 2007 and 2019. The main findings suggest that younger individuals have been the relative “winners” from Peru’s sustained economic growth over the past two decades. Additionally, the equalizing power of tertiary education has increased during this period, i.e., a greater prevalence of tertiary education reduces inequality. However, a concerning observation is the deterioration of living conditions among older and less educated individuals.

There has been extensive research on the importance of saving for retirement and on tools to support the accumulation of retirement wealth. Much less attention has been paid to the decumulation phase, that is, the spending down of wealth following retirement. Understanding the decumulation phase requires information about the spending patterns of older households and how those patterns evolve with age. This study uses comprehensive longitudinal data on total household spending from a survey that is representative of the older U.S. population to estimate the trajectories of spending after age 65. Based on data spanning the period 2005–2019, real spending declined for both single and coupled households after age 65 at annual rates of about 1.7 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. Stratification by wealth holdings observed at or closely following age 65 showed sizeable variation in spending levels by wealth quartile, but little variation in rates of change in spending. The fact that spending declines broadly, including among those in the highest wealth quartile, suggests that the decline may not be related to economic position. This view is supported by an analysis of budget shares which show increases with age in the budget share for gifts and donations which suggests that economic position on average does not deteriorate with age, even as spending declines.

This study examines the impact of informal care provision for older parents on carer’s health and labour market outcomes in England. I evaluate the validity of previously used instrumental variables for care provision. The results suggest that concerns about the validity of these instruments can be partly mitigated by considering variation in the timing rather than the incidence of informal care provision. Effects of informal care provision on health are positive for men and mostly insignificant for women. Informal care provision leads to a reduction in working hours for women, but does not affect labour force participation or labour income.

We show heterogenous displacement effects of mandatory occupational pension savings on private household wealth for different groups. Richer households in particular show larger displacements. This contributes to explaining why empirical studies often come with different estimates of this effect. We study the case of the Netherlands, where wage employed and self-employed workers are differently exposed to compulsory pension savings, and the institutional setting provides exogenous variation in pension wealth that can be used as instrument in the analysis. We use rich administrative data on (pension) wealth and income combined for the first time to supervisory data of pension funds. Our results show a displacement effect of −37% for wage employed and of −61% to −77% for self-employed people. The higher displacement effect we find for the self-employed might be explained by the fact that self-employed workers are arguably more aware of their pension accrual, or lack thereof, because there is no employer who organizes and (partly) pays this for them.

Benchmark replacement rates are commonly used to set up saving plans or to assess retirement preparedness. An open question is whether high earners need the same replacement rate as low earners. In this paper, I apply the GAESE framework, an approach known from the equivalence scale literature, to assess how the replacement rate that maintains income satisfaction through retirement relates to income levels. Using longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, and applying fixed-effects ordered logit models, I find that the benchmark replacement rate decreases with income. For singles, this finding is consistent across many modifications of the approach, whereas for couples the finding is sensitive to the composition of the retiree household, i.e. whether or not the retiree’s partner is still employed.

Growing life expectancy and a rising proportion of older people make the issue of whether cohorts are ageing better a key individual, social and economic issue. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing we characterise how frailty develops with age, how this differs across demographic groups, whether more recent cohorts are ageing better and what the key areas of focus for health policy should be. We find cohort effects such that frailty at each age has been decreasing over time but that this trend shows modest signs of slowing and is less pronounced for those with lower wealth. Improvements across cohorts reflect improvements in ADLs, cognitive function, and mobility but limited progress in reducing the incidence of diseases such as cancer, cardiovascular disease, etc. We find mobility and ADLs the main driver of average differences across regions but cross-regional differences are driven more by within than between group inequality.