Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000279
{"title":"UTI volume 34 issue 2 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000279","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47978056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000267
{"title":"UTI volume 34 issue 2 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000267","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44855003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-21DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000103
Leora Urim Sung
Abstract Most people have the intuition that, when we can save the lives of either a few people in one group or many people in another group, and all other things are equal, we ought to save the group with the most people. However, several philosophers have argued against this intuition, most famously John Taurek, in his article ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ They argue that there is no moral obligation to save the greater number, and that we are permitted to save either the many or the few. I argue in this article that, even if we are almost completely persuaded by these ‘numbers sceptics’, we ought not to just save the few. If the choice is simply between saving the many or the few, we ought to save the many.
{"title":"Never Just Save the Few","authors":"Leora Urim Sung","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000103","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Most people have the intuition that, when we can save the lives of either a few people in one group or many people in another group, and all other things are equal, we ought to save the group with the most people. However, several philosophers have argued against this intuition, most famously John Taurek, in his article ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ They argue that there is no moral obligation to save the greater number, and that we are permitted to save either the many or the few. I argue in this article that, even if we are almost completely persuaded by these ‘numbers sceptics’, we ought not to just save the few. If the choice is simply between saving the many or the few, we ought to save the many.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44492590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-21DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000085
M. Davidson
Kamm thinks through some contributions by physicians and other practitioners. Take for example what Gawande says about what he calls “the dying role.” The dying role is the position that a person occupies at the end of her life where she is able to set her affairs in order, make amends, pass on wisdom, share memories, etc. Gawande says that the dying role is “among life’s most important roles” (p. 72). Against Gawande, Kamm presents the following hypothetical. Imagine that medicine could deny the dying role to people and instead of time in the dying role, the person could be in perfectly good health and have meaningful projects. Does it make sense for the person to exchange this for the dying role? Kamm argues that if it does, it follows that Gawande is wrong and the dying role is not among life’s most important. Kamm acknowledges that perhaps the dying role is still worthwhile when there are no other sources of meaning and that it might be unwise to interfere with meaningful projects (including the dying role), just for the slim chance of a successful medical treatment. She points out that perhaps the dying role is more important for some people than for others. Perhaps it matters a great deal to those who have lived so badly that they need to find peace or make amends. I have a couple of points to make about this. First, Kamm’s reading of Gawande’s position strikes me as too strong. Given Gawande’s practical goals as a physician, we might want to read Gawande as saying that the dying role is one of the most important in life, given how we actually are and the current state of medicine. If this is so, Kamm’s hypothetical would not show that Gawande’s position is wrong. Second, the weaker position that Kamm is willing to accept might be much more interesting than Kamm seems to think it is. It sounds right that the dying role is more important for some people than others, but it is an empirical question how many people actually benefit from the dying role. Kamm does not provide empirical evidence, so, for all we know, it could very well be that all of us would benefit from being in the dying role. These points of concern, however, can only arise about a rich and deep book that constantly invites us to think more and more carefully about vitally important issues for us mortal creatures.
{"title":"Joseph Heath, Philosophical Foundations of Climate Change Policy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 339.","authors":"M. Davidson","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000085","url":null,"abstract":"Kamm thinks through some contributions by physicians and other practitioners. Take for example what Gawande says about what he calls “the dying role.” The dying role is the position that a person occupies at the end of her life where she is able to set her affairs in order, make amends, pass on wisdom, share memories, etc. Gawande says that the dying role is “among life’s most important roles” (p. 72). Against Gawande, Kamm presents the following hypothetical. Imagine that medicine could deny the dying role to people and instead of time in the dying role, the person could be in perfectly good health and have meaningful projects. Does it make sense for the person to exchange this for the dying role? Kamm argues that if it does, it follows that Gawande is wrong and the dying role is not among life’s most important. Kamm acknowledges that perhaps the dying role is still worthwhile when there are no other sources of meaning and that it might be unwise to interfere with meaningful projects (including the dying role), just for the slim chance of a successful medical treatment. She points out that perhaps the dying role is more important for some people than for others. Perhaps it matters a great deal to those who have lived so badly that they need to find peace or make amends. I have a couple of points to make about this. First, Kamm’s reading of Gawande’s position strikes me as too strong. Given Gawande’s practical goals as a physician, we might want to read Gawande as saying that the dying role is one of the most important in life, given how we actually are and the current state of medicine. If this is so, Kamm’s hypothetical would not show that Gawande’s position is wrong. Second, the weaker position that Kamm is willing to accept might be much more interesting than Kamm seems to think it is. It sounds right that the dying role is more important for some people than others, but it is an empirical question how many people actually benefit from the dying role. Kamm does not provide empirical evidence, so, for all we know, it could very well be that all of us would benefit from being in the dying role. These points of concern, however, can only arise about a rich and deep book that constantly invites us to think more and more carefully about vitally important issues for us mortal creatures.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43965867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-07DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000073
N. Cofnas
Abstract A number of philosophers from Hobbes to Mill to Parfit have held some combination of the following views about the Golden Rule: (a) It is the cornerstone of morality across many if not all cultures. (b) It affirms the value of moral impartiality, and potentially the core idea of utilitarianism. (c) It is immune from evolutionary debunking, that is, there is no good naturalistic explanation for widespread acceptance of the Golden Rule, ergo the best explanation for its appearance in different traditions is that people have perceived the same non-natural moral truth. De Lazari-Radek and Singer employ all three of these claims in an argument meant to vindicate Sidgwick's ‘principle of universal benevolence’. I argue that the Golden Rule is the cornerstone of morality only in Christianity, it does not advocate moral impartiality, and there is a naturalistic explanation for why versions of the Golden Rule appear in different traditions.
{"title":"The Golden Rule: A Naturalistic Perspective","authors":"N. Cofnas","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000073","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A number of philosophers from Hobbes to Mill to Parfit have held some combination of the following views about the Golden Rule: (a) It is the cornerstone of morality across many if not all cultures. (b) It affirms the value of moral impartiality, and potentially the core idea of utilitarianism. (c) It is immune from evolutionary debunking, that is, there is no good naturalistic explanation for widespread acceptance of the Golden Rule, ergo the best explanation for its appearance in different traditions is that people have perceived the same non-natural moral truth. De Lazari-Radek and Singer employ all three of these claims in an argument meant to vindicate Sidgwick's ‘principle of universal benevolence’. I argue that the Golden Rule is the cornerstone of morality only in Christianity, it does not advocate moral impartiality, and there is a naturalistic explanation for why versions of the Golden Rule appear in different traditions.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42040257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-07DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000097
Teresa Bruno-Niño
{"title":"F. M. Kamm, Almost Over: Aging, Dying, Dead (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. xii + 330.","authors":"Teresa Bruno-Niño","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000097","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44774868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-24DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000036
T. Beaumont, Yuan Li
Abstract It is possible to distinguish between empire, as a form of political order, and imperialism, as a process of aggressive expansion. Mill's liberalism allows for a legitimate empire, in which a civilized state rules a less civilized foreign people paternalistically to prepare them for liberal democratic self-rule. However, it rejects paternalistic imperialism, in the sense of aggression designed to establish such an empire. Apparent textual evidence to the contrary really demonstrates Mill's commitment to three distinct theses: that imperialism may benefit those subject to it, and this can mitigate its evil; that it is easier to justify non-aggressive, empire-creating wars of conquest in response to aggression by barbarian powers; and finally, that civilized states are justified in engaging distant uncivilized peoples non-aggressively, even though the latter's aggressive tendencies mean that such engagement renders empire-justifying wars more likely.
{"title":"J. S. Mill's Anti-Imperialist Defence of Empire","authors":"T. Beaumont, Yuan Li","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is possible to distinguish between empire, as a form of political order, and imperialism, as a process of aggressive expansion. Mill's liberalism allows for a legitimate empire, in which a civilized state rules a less civilized foreign people paternalistically to prepare them for liberal democratic self-rule. However, it rejects paternalistic imperialism, in the sense of aggression designed to establish such an empire. Apparent textual evidence to the contrary really demonstrates Mill's commitment to three distinct theses: that imperialism may benefit those subject to it, and this can mitigate its evil; that it is easier to justify non-aggressive, empire-creating wars of conquest in response to aggression by barbarian powers; and finally, that civilized states are justified in engaging distant uncivilized peoples non-aggressively, even though the latter's aggressive tendencies mean that such engagement renders empire-justifying wars more likely.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42639434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-17DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000048
K. K. Jensen
Neither Observation 3 nor Observation 4 assumes Non-diminishing Marginal Value. But it does make a difference to assume Non-diminishing Marginal Value. Suppose first we accept Conditions 3 and 4 (i.e. Constant Marginal Value) together with the Archimedean Property (Condition 8). Consider an infinite standard sequence q, 2q, 3q, ..., nq according to Definition 9, where n is any integer, and let b be an object which is better than q. If b were lexically better than q, then the standard sequence q, 2q, 3q, ..., nq would be strictly bounded; but since it is infinite, b being lexically better than q would violate the Archimedean Property. Hence, under Constant Marginal Value, the Archimedean Property excludes any case of lexical betterness. This follows directly from the assumptions and does not depend on any Continuum Argument.
{"title":"Weak Superiority, Imprecise Equality and the Repugnant Conclusion – Erratum","authors":"K. K. Jensen","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000048","url":null,"abstract":"Neither Observation 3 nor Observation 4 assumes Non-diminishing Marginal Value. But it does make a difference to assume Non-diminishing Marginal Value. Suppose first we accept Conditions 3 and 4 (i.e. Constant Marginal Value) together with the Archimedean Property (Condition 8). Consider an infinite standard sequence q, 2q, 3q, ..., nq according to Definition 9, where n is any integer, and let b be an object which is better than q. If b were lexically better than q, then the standard sequence q, 2q, 3q, ..., nq would be strictly bounded; but since it is infinite, b being lexically better than q would violate the Archimedean Property. Hence, under Constant Marginal Value, the Archimedean Property excludes any case of lexical betterness. This follows directly from the assumptions and does not depend on any Continuum Argument.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47803745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-10DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000431
Inés Valdez
Liberalism, Diversity and Domination: Kant, Mill, and the Government of Difference presents a brilliant reconstruction of two canonical thinkers ’ views on racial and cultural diversity, providing a definitive account of the role of anthropology in Kant ’ s system of morality and mining understudied dimensions of Mill ’ s corpus for an account of politics that is culturally pluralist and open to revisiting its own presuppositions. This reconstruction shows that Kant, the thinker who has been repeatedly enlisted to theorize justice by political philosophers, offers a system that is ill fitted to incorporate difference in egalitarian terms and that Mill, while rightly chastised for his hierarchical views of non-Europeans and his own material involvement in colonialism through the British East India Company, is a thinker whose notion of progress is “ contingent, context-dependent, and unpredictable ” (p. 208), lending itself to politics that welcome cultural difference and are less likely to be seduced by certainties of superiority. Despite the highly complex arguments sustained in this book, Marwah ’ s prose is thoroughly readable and rewarding, be it through the masterful piecing together of the anthropological dimensions of Kant ’ s morality – scattered in his essays, lectures, and critical writings – or the careful genealogy of the substantive transformations in Mill ’ s thought, away from the narrow utilitarianism of his father and toward an account of habituation more alert to failure, difference, and education. The introduction sets comparative Kant and Mill the Vis-à-vis contemporary analytical work on global justice, show Kant ’ this his developmental character formation, Kant certain natural predispositions of women and non-whites. literature ’ dismissal of Mill ’ s thought as narrowly utilitarian and/or entanglements
{"title":"Inder Marwah, Liberalism, Diversity and Domination: Kant, Mill, and the Government of Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. x + 298.","authors":"Inés Valdez","doi":"10.1017/S0953820821000431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000431","url":null,"abstract":"Liberalism, Diversity and Domination: Kant, Mill, and the Government of Difference presents a brilliant reconstruction of two canonical thinkers ’ views on racial and cultural diversity, providing a definitive account of the role of anthropology in Kant ’ s system of morality and mining understudied dimensions of Mill ’ s corpus for an account of politics that is culturally pluralist and open to revisiting its own presuppositions. This reconstruction shows that Kant, the thinker who has been repeatedly enlisted to theorize justice by political philosophers, offers a system that is ill fitted to incorporate difference in egalitarian terms and that Mill, while rightly chastised for his hierarchical views of non-Europeans and his own material involvement in colonialism through the British East India Company, is a thinker whose notion of progress is “ contingent, context-dependent, and unpredictable ” (p. 208), lending itself to politics that welcome cultural difference and are less likely to be seduced by certainties of superiority. Despite the highly complex arguments sustained in this book, Marwah ’ s prose is thoroughly readable and rewarding, be it through the masterful piecing together of the anthropological dimensions of Kant ’ s morality – scattered in his essays, lectures, and critical writings – or the careful genealogy of the substantive transformations in Mill ’ s thought, away from the narrow utilitarianism of his father and toward an account of habituation more alert to failure, difference, and education. The introduction sets comparative Kant and Mill the Vis-à-vis contemporary analytical work on global justice, show Kant ’ this his developmental character formation, Kant certain natural predispositions of women and non-whites. literature ’ dismissal of Mill ’ s thought as narrowly utilitarian and/or entanglements","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48308245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-23DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000024
Borgar Jølstad, N. Juth
Abstract Illness severity is a priority setting criterion in several countries. Age seems to matter when considering severity, but perhaps not small age differences. In the following article we consider Small Differences (SD): small differences in age are not relevant when considering differential illness severity. We show that SD cannot be accommodated within utilitarian, prioritarian or egalitarian theories. Attempting to accommodate SD by postulating a threshold model becomes exceedingly complex and self-defeating. The only way to accommodate SD seems to be to accept some form of relevance view, where some age differences are irrelevant. This view can accommodate SD, but at the expense of consistent priority orderings. Severity thus becomes unsuitable for systematic decision-making. We argue that SD should be dismissed and that we should accept a continuous relationship between severity of illness and age.
{"title":"Age and Illness Severity: A Case of Irrelevant Utilities?","authors":"Borgar Jølstad, N. Juth","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Illness severity is a priority setting criterion in several countries. Age seems to matter when considering severity, but perhaps not small age differences. In the following article we consider Small Differences (SD): small differences in age are not relevant when considering differential illness severity. We show that SD cannot be accommodated within utilitarian, prioritarian or egalitarian theories. Attempting to accommodate SD by postulating a threshold model becomes exceedingly complex and self-defeating. The only way to accommodate SD seems to be to accept some form of relevance view, where some age differences are irrelevant. This view can accommodate SD, but at the expense of consistent priority orderings. Severity thus becomes unsuitable for systematic decision-making. We argue that SD should be dismissed and that we should accept a continuous relationship between severity of illness and age.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46372894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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