Middle East Policy最新文献

Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a growing interest in the terrorism problem, in general, and the strategy of suicide bombing, in particular. Between 1996 and 2016, Turkey experienced several deadly suicide attacks by groups like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. These attacks can be explained by individual-oriented, institutional, socio-psychological/economical/identity, and structural theories. However, a central question now is why there have been no suicide attacks since 2016—that is, until the attempted bombing of the Ministry of the Interior on October 1, 2023. This article advances five main reasons for this success: a shift in Turkey's antiterrorism strategy, the introduction of new technologies, terror groups’ concerns about losing legitimacy among supporters, the failure of these organizations to achieve their objectives through suicide terrorism, and changes in Turkey's external environment. The article concludes that, as the October 1 attack demonstrates, the renewal of suicide terrorism is likely, given Ankara's sole focus on the institutional and international/structural aspects of the problem, which does not allow enough attention on individual and sociological factors.

A small state with big ambitions, the United Arab Emirates has become a major player in the Middle East region, especially since the Arab Spring. It played a major role in weakening the Muslim Brotherhood by supporting rulers like Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt and would-be leaders such as General Khalifa Haftar of Libya. Abu Dhabi was the critical player behind the blockade of Qatar in 2017, and it has taken a leading role in the normalization of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This article employs a range of theoretical perspectives, including structural realism and liberalism, to explain the UAE's foreign policy and behavior. It argues that there are at least four major drivers: combating political Islam, containing Iran, dominating regional ports and waterways, and increasing economic prosperity.

This article examines President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's actions since he barely survived the May 2023 election. It argues that although Erdoğan's authoritarian personality and conservative Islamist ideology drive his foreign policy, his pyrrhic victory and Turkey's economic problems have forced him to rebalance the country's regional and bilateral relations with Arab and Western states. The analysis first explains Erdoğan's re-election strategy to demonstrate his authoritarian personality and desire to retain power. It then shows how the election results and Turkey's economic challenges have shaped Erdoğan's pragmatic U-turns in foreign policy since the campaign. From there, the article assesses the president's near-term strategies for municipal elections and other challenges in domestic politics. It concludes that Erdoğan's overconfidence is constrained by Turkish economic stresses, though the direction of foreign policy remains unclear.

Turkey's attempt to act as problem solver in the Ukraine crisis follows its hedging strategy. This approach, which creates strategic ambiguity, has been interpreted as Ankara's distancing itself from its Western allies. Since Turkey realizes that an escalation of the war would complicate its NATO relationships, it is trying to capitalize on its good relations with both Ukraine and Russia and play the role of mediator. This article argues that Turkey, despite its turn toward Eurasianism, is hedging to avoid taking sides in a great-power rivalry. Ankara's preferences should not be expected to change in the medium term, regardless of electoral results.

Before establishing the second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban promised they would not revert to the repressive policies and stringent interpretations of Islam they had imposed during their previous regime. However, since the US withdrawal—and despite financial incentives from the West and diplomatic pleadings within the region—the Taliban have reneged on this vow. Why have the Taliban not moderated? This article argues that their rivalry with Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) is the central cause. The Taliban are concerned that compromise on fundamentalism will lead their hard-line factions to break ranks and join IS-K, enhancing its reputation and allowing it to recruit more foreign fighters. This could lead to increased violence and socioeconomic and political instability in Afghanistan, undermine the legitimacy of the Taliban, and spark the collapse of the regime.

In Egypt's 2012 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power after many years of repression, an unprecedented victory for the country's most active opposition movement. The Brotherhood's journey can be divided into several stages. One of the most important, which has not received enough attention, is the imprisonment of many of its major figures. Long before the coup that overthrew President Mohamed Morsi in 2013, the Arab nationalist President Gamal Abdel Nasser brutally put down the movement with mass arrests. The Brotherhood's members dominated Egypt's prisons, but they were far from the only activists in the system, which also held communists, Zionists, and other Jewish prisoners. This article uses the memoirs of the incarcerated enemies of the state to examine the struggles of these groups inside Egypt's prisons and show how the institutions served as platforms to promote the ideological struggle against the regime.

While the Arab Spring was primarily a revolution of young civilians against the old regimes, its influence on fertility patterns and natalist policies has not received sufficient attention. The first part of this article examines fertility in Arab countries on the eve of the uprisings, and the second looks into the patterns from the decade following the onset of the protests through the outbreak of Covid-19. The third part analyzes the impact of the Arab Spring on the states’ natalist policies, and the final section deals with the socioeconomic challenges imposed by the current demographic structures of these countries. The conclusion is that during the 2010s, the non-oil Arab countries went through two fertility revolutions, with an increase in the first few years and a substantial decrease after. Will the Arab states achieve the targeted replacement-level fertility rate, as was the case in many developing countries around the world over the past generation, including many non-Arab Islamic countries? And what are the socioeconomic and political consequences of this fertility revolution in the Arab countries?

The expansion of Iranian influence through the Houthi rebels in Yemen alarmed Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, leading them to intervene in the civil war. However, this only prolonged the conflict, in part because the two Gulf neighbors failed to coordinate—indeed, they often followed divergent policies. One reason for this was ideological, as the Saudis favored Yemen's al-Islah party, an offshoot of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement. The Emiratis rejected this group and opposed Saudi-backed President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi due to his links to it. The other area of dispute was the UAE's support for secessionists seeking an independent South Yemen, largely driven by Emirati economic interests. Saudi Arabia strongly resisted separation and prioritized the fight against the Houthis. The article analyzes the many facets of the divide over Yemen and shows how the rift is affecting other parts of the region.