Middle East Policy最新文献

Over the past three decades, the United Arab Emirates has forged a sturdy bilateral security alignment with the United States. It has also pursued foreign policies that conflict with US interests in the Gulf and the broader Middle East. This contradiction is usually attributed to a hedging strategy. However, a more accurate analysis indicates that this reflects the peculiar type of alignment that exists between the two countries: a dyadic protectorate. Protectorates exhibit a tendency toward obsolescence, which gives the protected state both the incentive and the capacity to assert its self-interests. Protectors have little incentive to block such activism, partly because countermeasures are costly and partly because they tend to be counterproductive. Recent trends in UAE-US relations evidence the willingness and ability of a protected state to push the limits of a dyadic protectorate, but only after the alignment obsolesces.

This article challenges common misconceptions about the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It debunks the notion of a simplistic rebel/regime dichotomy and instead delineates the diversity of actors and interests in a post-Assad Syria. It also critiques the perception that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham won a decisive battlefield victory and illustrates that this was as much a political triumph as it was a military one. It then assesses how genuine the group's transformation from jihadist to pragmatist really is. Further, it shows any claims that Russia and Iran will leave Syria are unrealistic, while Israel's role in the country is often misunderstood. It concludes by critiquing the assertion that the international community has no good options in Syria and should therefore stay away. Instead, it advocates cautious engagement with the new regime. Overall, the analysis highlights Syria's complex power dynamics and warns against oversimp-lifications in devising policies for Syria's post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

This essay analyzes the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip as it has unfolded in the year since Hamas's October 7, 2023, attacks. It first details the death and destruction Tel Aviv has wrought over that period, the predictions for mass casualties to come, and the state-sanctioned violence and theft faced by Palestinians not just in Gaza but across the occupied territories and Israel. It then examines why Washington's support of Tel Aviv has remained steadfast despite domestic and international condemnation, arguing that President Joe Biden's Zionist ideology has played a decisive role. The article further shows that Israel's interest in the territorial dispossession of Palestinians under the cover of war has led its right-wing government to thwart efforts at a ceasefire that would return the hostages still held by Hamas. The analysis concludes with a reflection on the antiwar protests that continue to roil US campuses as Donald Trump returns to power.

Since the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, Tehran and Moscow have increased their collaboration. Iran supported Russia's war in Ukraine, believing that it would weaken the Americans, reduce the effects of sanctions, and benefit its battered economy. Similarly, Russia sought to use Iran as a tool to challenge US influence in the region. However, the authors contend, the costs and benefits have been asymmetrical: While Moscow has gained strategic advantages at minimal expense, the Islamic Republic has borne substantial geopolitical burdens. This study explores the evolution of Iran-Russia relations and assesses the implications for both countries in their conflicts with the United States. It analyzes their cooperation on the wars in Syria and Ukraine, showing that Tehran has been compelled to act in Moscow's interests but has not always received the same support. This has come into sharp relief since the beginning of Israel's war on Gaza, as Iran has faced attacks on its allies and on its own territory. To defend itself and its interests, it needs advanced military equipment, which the Russians have yet to provide. The evidence indicates that Iran's reliance on Russia has led to more harm than benefit.

Between 2014 and 2017, the Islamic State (ISIS) brutally ruled over a population of eight million in Iraq and Syria. The group systematically persecuted and murdered tens of thousands of people of minoritized ethnicities and destroyed their houses and heritage, schools and hospitals, resulting in the displacement of an estimated three to five million people. In this article, we analyze the ongoing impact of the ISIS occupation on social cohesion in Iraq. Our report is based on interviews conducted with community representatives in the Nineveh Plains of the country's northwest. We focus on the dynamics of displacement and return in historically Christian, Assyrian-majority areas during and since the occupation. Our findings show that people's everyday experiences and senses of community in Nineveh are intertwined with adjusting to the recent population changes, which have redrawn ethnic minority/majority relations. The research illustrates that demographic change—which we define as shifts in ethnic composition—is a relevant consideration for policies that seek to foster social cohesion in post-ISIS Iraq. More broadly, the article highlights how post-conflict policy making benefits from research conducted directly with conflict-affected populations, as it reflects communities’ experiences.

Why has the militant group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) become a bigger threat to Pakistan since the Taliban's return to rule in Afghanistan? This article contends that the Taliban's determination to provide the TTP with sanctuary and support—including operational freedom and mobility, arms and ammunition, recruitment and military training, and financial and logistical assistance—has been the central factor behind the TTP's resurgence. The evidence demonstrates that the Taliban's unwillingness to disarm, demobilize, or evict the TTP from Afghanistan, even in the face of intensified pressure from Islamabad, has enhanced the TTP's material strength and resolve to overturn the Pakistani state. The group has therefore made uncompromising demands to establish an Islamic emirate or Sharia-compliant political order in Pakistan and reverse the merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The analysis indicates that gains by the TTP, and the group's allegiance to the Afghan Taliban, could undermine Pakistan's territorial integrity.

Tunisian President Kais Saied's coup in July 2021 has confronted the Renaissance Party, or Ennahda, with a dilemma: Reassume the comfortable position of defending freedoms and maintain party unity, or implement internal reforms, including an overhaul of its leadership and platform. But the party is trapped in a vicious circle. The political context requires unity and is therefore not conducive to a messy process of internal change. However, reform is needed to restore Ennahda's relevance. The repression of Ennahda and imprisonment of its key leaders—including its president, Rached Ghannouchi—make it unlikely that the party's 11th congress, which had been due to take place in 2020, will ever be scheduled. This article examines Ennahda's ascent after the 2011 uprisings and its role both in the transition to democracy and in the events that led to Saied's takeover. It then analyzes critiques by current and former party officials to understand the internal debate over renewing the platform and installing fresh leadership. It also evaluates alternatives to the party, as it is likely to fade gradually. At stake for Tunisia more broadly is the representation of the conservative segment of the population and the return of a pluralist and competitive political scene.

In the summer of 2020, Turkey and Greece deployed naval vessels in the contested eastern Mediterranean waters, which led first to a standoff and eventually a collision. Soon after, a US warship arrived at Crete. While this move should have been intended to calm tensions between the two historical rivals, some observers saw this as a show of support for Greece, marking a significant shift from the traditional American role of mediator. This article examines the US responses to gas exploration and other disputes in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Greek-Turkish divide over Cyprus. It argues that Washington's tilt toward Athens has been pushing Ankara to deepen its economic, diplomatic, and even military relations with Moscow. The United States could rebalance with Turkey and drive a wedge between it and Russia, for instance through incorporating its NATO ally into strategies for reducing Europe's reliance on President Vladimir Putin for energy resources. But if the current zero-sum approach persists, Turkey is likely to continue to look east—which is not in the American interest.