Middle East Policy最新文献

This essay contextualizes the 2023 Israel-Hamas war within a century-old legal history of Palestinian dispossession that has been facilitated through the violation and misuse of international law. It argues that Hamas's attacks of October 7 were not simply driven by sanguinary hatred of Jews, as some commentators have suggested. Instead, the war crimes were motivated by the Palestinians’ disillusionment with an international system that has consistently denied them their right to self-determination. This has been exacerbated by Israel's criminalization of nonviolent resistance. Such historical perspective illuminates the underlying causes not just of the present war but of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This essay argues that the recent protests in Iran, ostensibly driven by the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, are a symbol of a far greater dissatisfaction with arbitrary rule, corruption, and incompetence. While compulsory veiling was the immediate cause, the main drivers are the ailing economy and the decline in public services. Given the depth and breadth of street protests and the ongoing civil disobedience, the Islamic Republic simply cannot return to business as usual. At the same time, the regime is incapable of reinventing itself. It faces political and socioeconomic constraints and a mix of demographic and environmental challenges, among others. As for whether outside pressure can help protesters, the West must balance its championing of the movement with its pursuit of diplomatic engagement on Iran's nuclear program. And Iran is now getting more international assistance by looking eastward to China and Russia. With the government and security forces willing to use violence against protesters, civil disobedience may be the only method to systematically challenge the ruling order.

The 9/11 attacks prompted the development of an international nuclear security regime. States are expected to adopt legislation and institutionalize measures to ensure cooperation among stakeholders and create their own national nuclear security regimes. This article evaluates the steps taken by Turkey, a newcomer in nuclear energy. It argues that while Ankara has acted in line with its traditional conception of security, this is not enough. The inadequate cooperation and coordination among stakeholders, and the insufficient development of a security culture specifically oriented to nuclear energy, leave the country vulnerable. The analysis explains the vulnerabilities and incomplete tasks, and proposes actions necessary for Turkey to create a sound national nuclear security regime.

Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a growing interest in the terrorism problem, in general, and the strategy of suicide bombing, in particular. Between 1996 and 2016, Turkey experienced several deadly suicide attacks by groups like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. These attacks can be explained by individual-oriented, institutional, socio-psychological/economical/identity, and structural theories. However, a central question now is why there have been no suicide attacks since 2016—that is, until the attempted bombing of the Ministry of the Interior on October 1, 2023. This article advances five main reasons for this success: a shift in Turkey's antiterrorism strategy, the introduction of new technologies, terror groups’ concerns about losing legitimacy among supporters, the failure of these organizations to achieve their objectives through suicide terrorism, and changes in Turkey's external environment. The article concludes that, as the October 1 attack demonstrates, the renewal of suicide terrorism is likely, given Ankara's sole focus on the institutional and international/structural aspects of the problem, which does not allow enough attention on individual and sociological factors.

A small state with big ambitions, the United Arab Emirates has become a major player in the Middle East region, especially since the Arab Spring. It played a major role in weakening the Muslim Brotherhood by supporting rulers like Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt and would-be leaders such as General Khalifa Haftar of Libya. Abu Dhabi was the critical player behind the blockade of Qatar in 2017, and it has taken a leading role in the normalization of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This article employs a range of theoretical perspectives, including structural realism and liberalism, to explain the UAE's foreign policy and behavior. It argues that there are at least four major drivers: combating political Islam, containing Iran, dominating regional ports and waterways, and increasing economic prosperity.

This article examines President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's actions since he barely survived the May 2023 election. It argues that although Erdoğan's authoritarian personality and conservative Islamist ideology drive his foreign policy, his pyrrhic victory and Turkey's economic problems have forced him to rebalance the country's regional and bilateral relations with Arab and Western states. The analysis first explains Erdoğan's re-election strategy to demonstrate his authoritarian personality and desire to retain power. It then shows how the election results and Turkey's economic challenges have shaped Erdoğan's pragmatic U-turns in foreign policy since the campaign. From there, the article assesses the president's near-term strategies for municipal elections and other challenges in domestic politics. It concludes that Erdoğan's overconfidence is constrained by Turkish economic stresses, though the direction of foreign policy remains unclear.

Turkey's attempt to act as problem solver in the Ukraine crisis follows its hedging strategy. This approach, which creates strategic ambiguity, has been interpreted as Ankara's distancing itself from its Western allies. Since Turkey realizes that an escalation of the war would complicate its NATO relationships, it is trying to capitalize on its good relations with both Ukraine and Russia and play the role of mediator. This article argues that Turkey, despite its turn toward Eurasianism, is hedging to avoid taking sides in a great-power rivalry. Ankara's preferences should not be expected to change in the medium term, regardless of electoral results.

Before establishing the second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban promised they would not revert to the repressive policies and stringent interpretations of Islam they had imposed during their previous regime. However, since the US withdrawal—and despite financial incentives from the West and diplomatic pleadings within the region—the Taliban have reneged on this vow. Why have the Taliban not moderated? This article argues that their rivalry with Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) is the central cause. The Taliban are concerned that compromise on fundamentalism will lead their hard-line factions to break ranks and join IS-K, enhancing its reputation and allowing it to recruit more foreign fighters. This could lead to increased violence and socioeconomic and political instability in Afghanistan, undermine the legitimacy of the Taliban, and spark the collapse of the regime.