Middle East Policy最新文献

This study analyzes how ongoing conflicts in the Levant and the post-Soviet South Caucasus have upset the balance of relationships among Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Russia—and how this could escalate into a major, cross-regional war. Azerbaijan's military victories of 2020 and 2023 over the Armenia-occupied, separatist republic of Nagorno-Karabakh have antagonized Iran, which has seen these gains, coupled with Baku's increasingly revanchist rhetoric, as a major threat to regional security. With Armenia left on its own by its Russian ally, and with Turkey's and Israel's backing of Azerbaijan, the Gaza war has driven Iran to see Baku as a dangerous “Israeli asset.” However, the Palestine conflict has also sparked a rift between Turkey and Israel, throwing into question Baku's strength. If the militarist rhetoric of Azerbaijani elites leads the state to invade its weakened neighbor Armenia, this will increase the potential for a military confrontation between the two Shiite nations of Azerbaijan and Iran, with Armenia, Turkey, Israel, and Russia likely to be dragged in.

Lessons learned from counterterrorism operations indicate that purely military solutions are doomed to fail, and Israel is primed to repeat many of these mistakes. The comparison between America's post-9/11 wars and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not perfect: Al-Qaeda was in Afghanistan but was not native to the country, and the transnational ISIS emerged out of the chaos in Iraq and Syria. Hamas, by contrast, represents a resistance movement indigenous to Gaza. The militant group is deeply rooted in the political and social struggle for Palestinian self-determination, and its activities and support are motivated by desperate conditions on the ground. If Israel's assaults on Gaza in retaliation for the October 2023 Hamas bloodbath are to achieve enduring security, key questions arise, including whether the conflict will end with military occupation or political settlement. I argue that Israel should learn from the US strategic blunders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Absent a political solution, Israelis are likely to face terrorist assaults in the future. The military campaign may weaken or impair Hamas's infrastructure and power bases in Gaza, but without a plan for governance and development, Israel is likely to face the re-emergence of a broadly based resistance movement.

This article analyzes the vicious cycle of Israel's control of water resources in Jordan and the Palestinian territories, the development of a one-state reality in the region, and geopolitical changes driven by the Israeli occupation and the war in Gaza. Israel no longer suffers from water shortages, but its domination of Palestine and the conflict sparked by Hamas have increased the yawning water deficit. This has played a role in the decades-long move away from the two-state solution promised by the Oslo peace process. This article examines regional security through the lens of water resources. It shows that Jordan is left with few options but to accept its dependence on Israel and muddle through. In addition, the Palestinian territories, which face not just Israeli military rule but also the expansion of settlements, experience major water shortages. The article concludes that the increasing water hegemony reduces Israeli incentives for a comprehensive peace with the Palestinians that could resolve the resource crisis and enable two states to live side by side.

While the ambivalence among Middle Eastern states about the war in Ukraine stems from multiple sources, Russian influence is a significant, if underappreciated, factor. Several of these countries see Moscow as an external balancer and hedge against the possibility of a broader US pullback from the region. At the same time, Russia maintains significant coercive capabilities thanks to its military presence in Syria and burgeoning strategic partnership with Iran. Many aspiring regional powers are also sympathetic to Moscow's calls for an international order less centered on the West. This article analyzes these concerns and perceptions, and it shows how they have shaped the way states in the region have responded to the invasion of Ukraine. Broadly speaking, these states see it as a peripheral concern—especially following the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023—though one that could destabilize the region by stoking inflation or further emboldening Iran. While they are wary of confronting Moscow or facing regional instability, many also directly benefit from Russia's economic decoupling from the West. These countries share President Vladimir Putin's assessment that the war in Ukraine is inaugurating a new age more friendly to middle powers.

With the Israeli war on Gaza raging, the Palestinian national movement must overcome divides that have weakened the cause. This study delves into the ramifications of divisive discourse on factionalism in Palestine, focusing on the dynamic between Hamas and Fatah. To do so, it investigates the effects of polarization on the sense of collective consciousness among university students in the occupied territories. Through a questionnaire designed to elicit the perspectives of these young adults, this research sheds light on the extent to which rhetoric employed to provoke or incite aggressive behavior has affected cohesion in Palestinian politics and society, as well as individuals’ beliefs in the possibility of a national movement. The article finds that in all of these facets, young adults have a high degree of cynicism and see divisive discourse reducing faith in institutions and leaders, causing rifts among friends and neighbors, and even leading them to think about emigrating. While the study was conducted before the Israel-Hamas war that began in October 2023, which may force some compromise between factions, the survey results indicate the immense amount of work required to unify the movement.

This article explores sovereign wealth fund investments by Gulf Cooperation Council member states in China's equity market. Using data from Chinese stock exchanges, we analyze patterns of shareholding over two decades, across different sectors and among distinct funds, and compare them to their non-Gulf counterparts. We reveal a gradual upward trajectory in both the scale and diversity of investments by Gulf funds, indicating growing engagement with the Chinese equity market. We anticipate a continuation of current trends, albeit with larger volumes and potential expansions into technological and emerging sectors that align with Gulf interests. We project that the deepening financial linkages between China and the Gulf could give rise to a mini petro-yuan system operating under the dominance of the American dollar. This does not presage a transformation in China-Gulf relations but should be understood within the increasing complexity of their broader economic ties. The article is part of a special issue examining the responses of Gulf countries to rising Sino-American competition, edited by Andrea Ghiselli, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Enrico Fardella.

This article explores the relationship between international-relations theories and Cold War and post-Cold War historical dynamics in the Middle East, in particular the Gulf. It first identifies the theoretical approaches that have been applied or that have failed to be applied to the region's changing geopolitics, then delves into Cold War history and its impact on the Middle East and the Gulf by examining the crucial changes to the Gulf security system sparked by developments in the 1970s and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988. The article next investigates the extent to which the interplay of post-Cold War regional conflicts and key events, from the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003 to the Arab Spring, have impacted the Gulf subregional system. The final part scrutinizes the shifting intra- and extraregional Gulf politics and how theoretically informed approaches inspired by international political economy can accommodate these geopolitical changes. The article is part of a special issue examining the responses of Gulf countries to rising Sino-American competition, edited by Andrea Ghiselli, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Enrico Fardella.

This article examines the evolution of China's policy toward the Persian Gulf, linking its contemporary strategies to its historical principles of diplomacy, particularly those rooted in Maoism. It first outlines a conceptual framework that connects China's Gulf policies to the enduring Maoist tradition in its foreign policy. The analysis then delves into Mao Zedong's theory of intermediate zones and its influence on China's strategic posture in the Middle East from the mid-20^th century to today. The focus shifts to the increasing importance of the region, especially the Gulf, in the current iteration of China's intermediate-zones strategy. Situating China's policies within the context of Mao's anti-hegemonic stance and the concept of intermediate zones provides a nuanced perspective on the Chinese approach to the Middle East. The authors argue that China's longstanding anti-hegemonic strategy has hindered the development of a more independent and assertive regional policy. However, they suggest that the recent intensification of the Sino-American rivalry, the perceived decline in US regional influence, and the “new centrality” of the Persian Gulf may prompt China to adopt a more proactive role in the region, moving beyond its traditional strategy of active defense. This article is part of a special issue examining the responses of Gulf countries to rising Sino-American competition, edited by Andrea Ghiselli, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Enrico Fardella.

This article analyzes Iraq's response to evolving US-China relations, focusing on its foreign-policy objectives of ending isolation, strengthening security, and fostering economic growth. Iraq seeks American support to attain these goals, aspiring to reintegrate into the international system and bolster its defense mechanisms. Simultaneously, Baghdad perceives China and its Belt and Road Initiative as instrumental to economic recovery. Despite these aspirations, Iraq encounters impediments that stem from its external environment and domestic politics. As a relatively feeble power, Iraq grapples with limited economic, political, and diplomatic influence, which constrains its ability to effectively respond to shifts in the Sino-US rivalry. In addition, the country engages in incoherent foreign behavior due to consociationalism and the nonstate armed groups that operate outside of the state`s orbit. The analysis concludes that Iraq's responses to US-China tensions are reactive, not proactive; circumstantial, not strategic. This article is part of a special issue on the responses of Gulf countries to rising Sino-American competition, edited by Andrea Ghiselli, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Enrico Fardella.