Middle East Policy最新文献

Saudi Arabia and Iran played roles, inadvertently or not, in enabling the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel in October 2023. Before the war that ensued, Tehran aided and funded Hamas and its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Riyadh shunned the group by arresting and extraditing its members in a bid to join the US-backed Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel, a move that could lead to alliances to contain Iran. The Hamas assault thwarted the Saudi-Israeli normalization plans, at least in the short term, and gave Iran a chance to engage with the kingdom. The Islamic Republic urged Saudi Arabia to spoil the war by supporting a quick ceasefire, which could have enabled Hamas to regroup when Israeli forces advanced into Gaza. This article shows that the niche diplomacy to halt the fighting exposed the lurking rivalries and limited capabilities of Iran and Saudi Arabia. By not seeking a permanent solution to build peace or subvert the cyclical nature of the most enduring conflict in the Middle East, between Israel and Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Iran were sidelined by the United States when it built the first phase of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas by mid-January 2025.

Throughout its tenure, the Biden administration negotiated a defense pact with Saudi Arabia. Although the deal ran into obstacles, including Riyadh's insistence that Israel promise to allow a pathway toward a Palestinian state, the Trump administration is reportedly interested in continuing the talks. This article contends that one of the main reasons behind the US push for this extraordinary pact is to prevent China from increasing its influence in Saudi Arabia. Aware of the kingdom's reliance on external security guarantees and Beijing's traditional avoidance of military alliances, the Biden team viewed a formal defense cooperation agreement as the most effective way to stem the growing Chinese influence in the region. The analysis examines Riyadh's relationships with Washington and Beijing, then outlines the main features of the reported US-Saudi proposal, including defense cooperation, assistance on a civilian nuclear program, advanced technologies, and normalization between the kingdom and Israel. It then shows how these terms could undermine China's influence with Saudi Arabia. Even in limited form, a Trump deal with Riyadh could reduce Beijing's leverage in the region.

This article contends that to explain the grand strategies of states in the Middle East, we must employ the concept of middle powers. Analyzing the case of Syria between 2011 and 2021, it finds that these actors preferred a strategy of limited balancing against direct threats to their national security. We support this theory through two methodological steps. First, we define a boundary for a subregional sphere focusing on a conflict, and, using material criteria, we identify the middle powers engaged in that conflict. Second, we employ the neoclassical grand-strategy model to analyze their identities, auxiliary threats, goals, and significant military operations. We argue that the main goal of these middle powers is to adopt limited balancing to curtail immediate and proximate threats. We illustrate this by examining how four middle powers—Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—acted in the context of the Syrian civil war. Finally, we show how this theory applies to the post-October 2023 wars between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran.

Lebanon is grappling with an alarming exodus of medical professionals, spurred by a confluence of socio-economic challenges and health-system vulnerabilities. This study delves into the factors fueling this brain drain. It analyzes surveys of Lebanese medical professionals, which indicate a correlation between the country's severe economic crisis and the inclination of these workers to relocate. In addition, the lack of adequate benefits and social protections plays a significant, if moderate, role. The analysis also identifies the impact of ineffective health strategies, especially during the covid-19 pandemic, though this is less influential. The findings demonstrate that an intervention to halt the defection of healthcare workers must be multifaceted. While it is critical to address economic instability and fortify the social safety net, the complexity of Lebanon's predicament necessitates support from international bodies. Such entities can provide much-needed financial, technical, and policy support, helping to offset the limitations of the state's capacity. Collaborative efforts must aim to enhance the resilience of the healthcare system, ensure competitive remuneration, and improve working conditions.

Normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia is part of a three-way negotiation that would allow the United States to prevent further erosion of its regional standing and to contain Iran. However, Israeli politicians and security experts object to the potential deal's allowing a Saudi route to military nuclear capabilities. They criticize the Netanyahu government for failing to require conditioning US-Saudi nuclear cooperation on the kingdom's agreement to forgo the domestic enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Such processes, if misused, could yield military-grade fissile material. I argue that Israeli experts are wrong to assume Riyadh has no alternatives to nuclear cooperation with the United States and should rethink their stances against enrichment and reprocessing in Saudi Arabia, even in American-run facilities. Rejecting this option could benefit China and Russia, which have already proposed building Saudi Arabia's first nuclear power plant. Unlike Washington, Beijing and Moscow may not force the Saudis to accept restrictions beyond their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and give up their right to domestic enrichment and reprocessing. To support my argument, I examine the US-Iran nuclear dialogue of the 1970s, China's and Russia's proliferation policies, Saudi-Pakistani relations, and the Atomic Energy Act—elements upon which Israeli experts base their claims.

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have drawn attention to the role that nuclear weapons can play during periods of conflict and how regional crises can bar preventive diplomacy. Work toward establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has been made all the more urgent by the post-October 7 conflicts, international concerns about Iranian nuclear proliferation, and the potential for domestic Saudi uranium enrichment, which could risk proliferation. This article proposes building such a zone through a gradualist and inclusive process that includes four key components: an American security guarantee for Israel in return for its eventual transition away from nuclear arms; a new US-led nuclear deal with Iran as a platform for further diplomacy; Washington's upholding the nonproliferation “gold standard” as a pillar of regional policy; and the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkey. Much hinges on initiating a series of significant steps as part of a more targeted, consistent, and strategic Mideast policy in Washington.

After Hamas's brutal October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, China appeared to side with the Islamists, as if its relationship with the Jewish state had deteriorated beyond repair. This was accompanied by an officially inspired wave of antisemitism and votes against Israel at the United Nations. Within a few months, however, the Chinese began to tone down their response and to repair what has become an important component in their Middle East policy. Israel was the first Middle Eastern government to recognize the People's Republic, though no diplomatic relations were established between the two until January 1992. The long delay was caused by Beijing's cultivation of ties with the Arab and Muslim worlds, which required enmity toward Israel. This had been expected to be a limited partnership. However, as this article shows, Israel has played a major role in China's regional strategy, somewhat in politics but much more in economic growth, defense modernization, technology, and innovation. In relative and, in some areas, absolute terms, Israel has proved to be as important to China as other regional states, and it has often won, implicitly and even explicitly, Beijing's appreciation—out of all proportion.

This study traces the development of US policy toward and narrative on Iran in the first decade after the 1978–79 Iranian revolution. It examines how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) were portrayed in the mainstream English-language (primarily American) news media, based on an analysis of nearly 1,200 reports. It argues that the narrative constructed by policy makers and the press significantly impacted US-Iran relations, and this established patterns of discourse and action that have persisted to this day. This process helped solidify the official and popular conception of Iran as a dangerous threat antithetical to US values and interests, necessitating a policy of enmity and confrontation.

Oman's leadership transition from Qaboos bin Sa‘id to Haitham bin Tariq validated Al Sa‘id authority in more ways than one. While the 15th Al Sa‘id sultan has only been in power for slightly more than four years, his initial governance preferences indicate that he will manage with poise. Haitham has developed a new doctrine that emphasizes wealth creation, acceleration of education levels, ensuring norms of social security, improving civil rights, and promoting closer ties with the sultanate's neighbors. In key speeches, he has promised to address core challenges and, over the course of four years, has ushered in laws that translate his pledges into actions. This preliminary assessment of Haitham evaluates his early decisions, appraises his declared priorities, and identifies his major preferences. It further highlights some of the internal as well as foreign challenges that confront Omanis. Given his measured and contemplative personality, Haitham has adopted pragmatic policies to preserve and defend Omani interests—not only to continue on his predecessor's path but to further validate long-term Al Sa‘id aspirations.